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-.:: U.S. Department of Energy's
(DoE's) Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) for Programmatic Spent
Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho
National Engineering Labora tory
Environmental Restoration and Waste
Monagement Programs (DOE /EI50203-F( is divided into three volumes:

I

RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES: Lead Federal Agency: U.S. Depanment of Energy
Cooperating Federal Agency: U.S. Depanment of the Navy
TITLE: Depanment of Energy Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programs Final
Environmental Impact Statement.
CONTACT: For further information on this Environmental Impact Statement call or contact:
DOE Idaho Operations Office
Bradley P. Bugger
Office of Communications
850 Energy Drive, MS 1214
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-3189
208-526-0833

Volume 1, DOE Programmatic
Spent Nuclear Fuel
Management
Volume 2, Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory
Environmental Restoration and
Waste Management Programs
(including site-spedic spent
nuclear fuel management)
Volume 3, Comment Response
Document.

For general information on the U.S. Depanment of Energy NEPA process call 1-800-472-2756 to
leave a message or contact:
Carol Bor strom, Director
Office of NEPA Policy and Assistance (EH-42)
U.S . Depanment of Energy
1000 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, D.C . 20585
202-586-4600
ABSTRA T: This document analyzes at a programmatic level the potential environmental
consequences over the next 40 years of alternatives related to the transportation, receipt, processing,
and storage of spent nuclear fuel under the responsibility of the U.S. Depanment of Energy. It also
analyzes the site-specific consequences of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory sitewide actions
anticipated over the next 10 years for waste and spent nuclear fuel management and environmental
restoration . For programmatic spent nuclear fuel management, this document analyzes alternatives of
no action, decentralization, regionalization, centralization and the use of the plans that existed in
199211993 for the management of these materials. For the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,
this document analyzes alternatives of no action, ten-year plan, and minimum and maximum
treatment, storage, and disposal of U.S. Depanment of Energy wastes.

Volume 1 comprises five primary
sections and ten key appendices. The
five primary sections provide (a) an
introduction and overview to OOE's
spent nuclear fuel management
program throughout the nation, (b) the
purpose and need for action to manage
spen t nuclear fuel, (c) management
alternatives that are under
consideration, (d) the affected
environment, and (e) potential
environmental consequences that may
be caused by the implementation of
each alterna tive. The infonnation
contained in these sections relies, in
part, upon more detailed information
and analyses in the ten key appendices.
These appendices describe and assess
the site-specific spent nuclear fuel
management programs at three primary
OOE facilities and several alternative
sites, the nava l spent nur.:ear fuel
management program, c ffsite
transportation of spent nuclear fuel,
environmental consequences data , and
environmental justice considerations.
Two additiona l appendices include a
glossary and a list of acronyms and
abb revia tions.

provide (a) the "urpose and need fo r
an integrated to-year environmental
restoration, waste management, and
spent nuclear fuel management
program at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory,
(h) background, (c) management
alternatives under consideration,
(d) the affected environment, and
(e) potential environmental
consequences that may be associated
with the implementation of each
alternative. The infonnation
presented in these sections reli~, in
part, upon four key append ices,
which incl ude a basic description of
radioactivity and tOxicology
(chemical effects), agency
consultation letters, detailed project
summaries. and technical
methodologies and key data. Two
additional appendices include a
glossary and a list of acronyms and
abbrev iations.
Volumes 1 and 2 provide an index
as well as a list of references to
enable the reader to further
review and research selected
topics. DOE has
established reading
rooms and
infonnation

Volume 2 is simila ..·ly constructed. Five
primary sections are presented tha t
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locations across the United Sta tes
where these references may either be
reviewed or obtained for review
through interlibrary loan. The
addresses. phone numbers. and
hours of operation for these reading
rooms and information locations are
provided at the end of this EIS
Summary.

I

A line in the margin in Volumes 1
and 2 indicates a change since the
Draft EIS.

Volume 3 comprises a primary
section, called Comment Summaries
and Responses. and three
appendices. In the primary section

I

individual public comments are
summarized, grouped w ith others that
are similar and organized into topical
sections. ca lled Response Sections. The
appendices are designed to aid the
reader in locating specific comment
summaries and responses. Appendix A
is an alphabetical list of commentors,
showing for each the associated
comment document number and
response section number(s). Appendix
B is a numerically ordered list of
comment document numbers, showing
associated comment rs and response
section numbers. and Appendix C
provides a correia tion of response
section numbers to comment
document numbers.

To "00 a response to comment(s), tha reader should:
Tum to Appendix A in Volume 3 and find the name (or organization or agency).
and note the comment document number(s) assigned to hls/her comments.
In the same entry, find the response section number(s) where the responses to
the comments are located.
Tum to the Table of Contents In Volume 3 undE, the heading Comment
Summaries and Responses, where response section numbers ate listed in
numerical order, to find the page on which the response section number(s)
that apply to the comment(s) appear.

Contents
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Purpose and Need for Future Spent Nuclear Fuel Management ........... 7
Technologies for Spent Nuclear Fuel Management ................................. 9
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Tum to the appropriate page(s) to find a response to a summary of the
comment.
A copy of the actual comments (rather than the comment summaries found in
Volume 3 of the EIS) can be found along with the EIS in the public reading rooms
listed at the end of this summary.

The first alphabetical entrant. Dinah Abbott. has been aSSigned comment
document number 615.
Ms. Abbott's flrst entry is for response number 01 .01 .01 .01 (005); four other
response numbers are applicable to her comments.
ThaI first entry is in Section 1.1 .1.1. entitled "Action altematives" under
Specific Preferences for SNF Management AHematives.
Section 1.1 .1.1 begins on page . 1. The selected entry for Ms. Abbott is
Response 005 in thel section and Is located on page 1-2.
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Volume 1. Summary

N

ational Environmental
Policy Act Process

The U.S. Depa rtmen t of Energy (DOE)
is curre. "Iy evaluating its options for
two separa te, but related, sets of
decisions. The fi rst involves
p rogram matic (DOE-w ide)
approaches to DOE's management of
spent nuclea r fuel. The second
involves site-specific approaches
rega rding the future direction of
environmenta l restoration and waste
management programs (including
spent nuclear fuel) at the Idaho
Nationa l Engineering Laboratory.
A key element of DOE's
decisionmaking is a thorough
understanding of the environmental
impacts that may occur during the

implementation of the proposed
ac tion. The National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, as amended,
provides federal agency
decisiorunakers with a process to
consider potential environmental
consequences (both positive and
negative) of proposed actions before
agencies make decisions. In following
this process, DOE has prepared this
final Environmental Impact Statement
(EIS) to assess various managemeont
alternatives and to provide the
necessary background, data, and
analyses to help decisionmakers and
the publ ic understand the potential
environmental impacts of each
alternative. DOE's decisions will be
discussed in a Record of Decision to be
issued by June 1995.

I

BLANK PAGE
Nstlonsl Environmental Policy Act
Nlltlonal Envlron......"'1 Policy Act of 1969: A law that
requires Federal agencies to consider In their
decision making processes the potential environmental

offacts 01 proposed actions and analyses 01 altematives
and measures to avoid or minimize the adverse effects of a

proposed action.
Ahematlv.. : A range ot reasonable options considered in

selacting an approach to meeting tho proposed objactivos.
In accordance with other applicable requirements, the NoAction attemative is also considered.

EnvlronmentallmpolCl SWoment: A detailed
environmental analysis for a proposed major Federal action

that could signifICantly affact the quality of tho human
environment. A tool to assist in decision making. it
describes the positive and negative environmental effects

of tho proposed undortaking and a~omativos .
Record of Declolon: A conciso public record of DOE's
decision, which discusses the decision, Identifies the
altematives (specifying which ones were considered
environmentalty prefer~e) , and indicates whether all
practicable means to avoid or minimize environmental

harm from tho selacted altomatlvo woro adopted (and if
not, why not).
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General Scope of the
Environmental Impact
Statement

I

Volume 1 of this EIS considers
programmatic (DOE-wide)
alternative approaches to safely,
efficiently, and responsibly manage
existing and projected quantities of
spent nuclear fuel until the yea r 203S.
This am ount o f time may be required
to make and implement a decision on
the ultimate disposi tion o f spent
nuclea r fuel. DOE's spent nuclea r
fuel responsibilities include fuel
generated by DOE production,
research, and development reactors;
naval reactor.:;; univers ity and fo reign
research reactors; domestic non-OOE
reacto rs such as those at the Natio nal

Institute o f Stand ards and Tl"Chnology
and the Armed Forces Radiob iology
Resea rch Ins titute; and s pecia l-case
commercia l reactors s uch as Fort St.
Vrain and the Lynchburg Techno logy
Center. Volume 1 focuses on the
following:
Impacts to wo rker safety,
public hea lth, the
environment. and
socioeconomic factors related
to trans po rting, receiving,
s tabilizing, and storing DOE
and naval spent nuclea r fuel,
as wen as special-case
commercial fuels under OOE
responsibility.
Siting locations for spent
nuclear fuel management
operati ons, which may

What Is Spent Huel.., Fwl?
Spent nuclear fuel Is fuel that has been withdrawn from a nuclear reactor following
irradiation. the constituent elements of which have not been separated. For
purposes of this EIS, spent nuclear fuel inventory also includes uranium/neptunium

target material, blanket subassemblies, pieces of fuel, and debris.
Fuel in a reactor consists of fuel assembUes
that come in many configurations but

generally oonsiSl of the fuel matrix, cladding,
and structural hardware. The matrix, which
oontains the fissionable material (typically
uranium oxide or uranium metal). is typically
plates or cylindrical pellets. The cladding
(typically zirconium, aluminum. or stainless
steel) surrounds the fuel, confining and
protecting H. For gas-oooled reactors, this
may be a ceramic coating over fuel particles.
Structural parts hold fuel rods Of plates in the
proper oonfiguration and direct ooolant tIow
(typically water) over the fuel. Structural
hardware is generally nickel alloys, stainless
steel, zirconium, or aluminum, or for gasoooled reactors , grapMe.

4rfr.
I

1
I

The radiatkm of most concern from spent

nuclear fuel Is gamma rays. Although the
radiation levels can be very high, the gammaray intensities are readily reduoed by
shle ing the fuel elements with such
materials as oonaete, lead, steel, and water. The shielding thicknesses are
dependent on the energy of the radiation source, desired protection level, and
density of the shielding material. Shielding thicknesses for ooncrete or lead are
smaller than for water.

incl ud e sto ring,
stabil izing, and
continuing research and
development. (Stabilizing
reduces fue l
deterio ration.)
Fuel stabiliza tion activities
required for sa fe interim
storage such as canning of
degraded fuels or
processing. research and
development of spent
nuclear fuel management
technologies, and pilo t
programs.

I DOE w ill not analyze the ultimate
disposition (final step in which
materia l is d isposed 00 of spent
nuclea r fuel in this EIS. Decisions
regarding the actual d isposition of
DOE's spent nuclear fuel w ill follow
appropria te review under the
National Environmental Policy Act
and be s ubject to licensing by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission .
OOE w ill not select spent nuclear fuel
stabiliza tion techno log ies on the basis
of thi s EIS. These techno logy-based
decisions are more appropria tely dealt
with on a fuel-type basis. DOE w ill
I cond uct additional National
Environmental Policy Act rev iews for
resea rch and development, and
characterization activities that help
select technologies fo r placing the fuel
in a form suitable fo r ulti mate
d isposition (this is commonly referred
to as " ti ~ ring " w ithin the National
Environmental Po licy Act process).
For example, the Waste Management
Programmatic EIS complements
decis ions to be made in Vo lume 2.
Other EISs being prepa red
complement decis ions fo r the
dis position of other nuclear materials,
and these EISs and their relationships
to this EIS are discussed in Section 1.2
of Volume I. The Draft EIS on a
Proposed Nuclear Nonproliferation

Waste management activities at the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.

Policy Concerning Foreign Resea rch
Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel w ill be
distributed for public review and
comment in April 1995. Decisions
derived from tha t policy also
complement this EIS.
Except for special-case commercial
fuel. man agement of spent nuclea r
fuel from comme rcial nuclear power
plants is not the subject of this EIS.

Volume 2 of this EIS addresses
alternative approaches for the
management of DOE's environmental
restoration, waste management, and
spent nuclea r fuel activ ities over the
next 10 yea rs at the Id aho Na tional
Eng ineering Labo ratory. This volum e
includes e valuations of potential
env ironmental impacts associa ted
w ith Id aho Na tional Engineering
Labo ratory program s an d site
activ ities tha t contribute to waste
streams requiring handling o r
disposa l. Waste management
activities are evaluated at both the s itew ide and project-specific levels .

2 Volume , . Summary
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Environmen tal restoration activities
are addressed only at the site-wide
level. Volume 2 considers site-specific
activities for spent nuclear fuel
management, including fuel receipt,
transportation, characteriza tion,
stabilization, storage, and technology
development for ultimate disposition.
Volume 2 evaluates impacts of
operations or programs associa ted
with the spent nuclear fuel,
environmental restoration, and waste
management programs at the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory.
Other activities are discussed when
they are relevant to understanding
the affected environment or are
expected to occur during the nex t 10
years, and are included as part of the
cumulative effec ts ana lysis.

This EIS does not evalua te the DOEwide programmatic alternatives for
waste management, which are being
evaluated in a sepa rate programmatic
EIS to be issued in draft form in 1995.
However, the alternatives presented in
Volume 2 have been developed to be
consistent with the programmatic
objectives of the Waste Management
Programmatic EIS (previously known
as the Environmental Restora tion and
Waste Management Programmatic
Environmental Impact Statement),
which will not be completed befone
the Record of Decision is signed for
the EIS summarized hene. Any
conllicts between these Records of
Decision will be evaluated and, as
appropria te, additional National
Environmen tal Policy Act reviews will
be conducted.

D

uring the public commen t
peri od for the Draft EIS, more
than 1,430 indi viduals, agencies, and
organ iza tions provided ooE with
comments. Comments were received
fro m a ll affected DOE and shipyard
co mmunities. Most citizens and
orga ni za tions expressed broad
opinions, especially on siting and
transporta tion options, and
recom mend ed new or enhanced
alternatives or additi onal si tes, or
commented on the Na tional
Environmental PoHcy Act process.
Many co mmentors used this
opportuni ty to comment on
legislation, policies, or federal
programs not specifically related to
the EIS. Some questioned or
commented on the laws and
regu lations applicable to DOE's
mission, DOE interim spent nuclea r
fuel management, or environmental
restoration and waste management at
the Idaho Na tional Engineering
Labora tory.
Many commentors expressed strongly
held opinions about the EIS, DOE, and
the Navy Cl nd /or the alternatives.
Some com mentors expressed the
opinion that ooE does not consider
public comments and that some
comments will be given more weight
than others. Others stated tha t fea rdri ven commentors shou!d be
ignored, and decis ions should be
based on good science.
Recurring and con trove rsia l issues
rClised during the public comm ent
period included comments on DOE
and Navy cred ibili ty; the appanent
lack of a clear path forward with
respect to ul timate d isposition of
spent nuclea r fuel and nuclea r waste;
con tinued gene ra tion of spent nuclear
fuel; cost of im plementa tion; safety of,
and risk to, the public; transportation
of spent nuclea r fuel and waste;
impacts of accid ents and perceived
risk on local economies and the
qua lity of life; other issues of local
interest; and U.S. nuclear, defense,
energy, and foreign policies.

4 Volume f . Summary

Public comm en ts were considered by
the DOE and Navy and nesulted in
changes to the Draft EIS and in the
preparation of the Comment Response
Document, Volume 3, of this Final EIS.
In general, public comments, coupled
with consultations with commenting
agencies and state and tribal
governments, resulted in additional
ana lyses, clarifying or correcting facts,
or expanded discussion in certain
technical areas. Where appropriate,
Volume 3 provides an explanation of
why certain comments did not
warrant further cha nge to the EIS.
Both volumes of the Final EIS identify
ooE's preferred alternativesRegionalization by fuel type
(Alternative 4A) for managing spent
nuclear fuel, and a hybrid alternative
that is the Ten-Year Plan (Alternative
B) enhanced to include elements of
other alternatives for the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory. The
DOE's preferred alternatives are
consistent with the Navy's preferred
alternative identified in the draft EISto continue to conduct refuE'ling and
defueling of nuclear-powe red vessels
and prototypes, and to transport spent
nuclear fuel to the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory for fu U
examination and interim storage,
using the sa me practices as in the past.
Identification of the preferred
al ternatives was based on
considerati on of environmental
impac ts, public issues and concerns,
regulatory compl iance, the OOE's and
Navy's spent nuclear fuel missions,
national security and defense, cost,
and DOE policy.
As committed to in the Draft EIS, the
evalua tion and discussion of
environmenta l justice has been
expa nded to both Volumes 1 and 2 of
the Final EIS. This approach is
consistent with draft interagency
definitions at the time of its
p repa ration and renects public
com ments received rega rding
environmental justice. Consultati on
with commenting Native American
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Tribes is reflected in the
environmental justice analysis, as well
as in va rious sections of the EIS. as
appropriate.
In response to concerns raised by
public comments regarding the
technical analysis, seismic and water
resource discussions and analyses
were reviewed, clarified, and
enhanced for aU alternative sites, and
curren t data and analyses were added
to Volumes 1 and 2, as appropriate.

In Volume 1, a discussion of potential
accidents caused by a common
initiator was added. The option of
stabilizing some of DOE's spent
nuclear fuel (specifically Hanford site
production reactor fuel) by processing
it at ava ilable facil ities located
overseas was added, thus expanding
processing options discussed in the
EIS. An analysis of barge
transportation was added to the EIS,
addressing the option of transporting
production-reactor fuel to a shipping
point for overseas processing and
supporting the transport of
Brookhaven National Laboratory
spent nuclear fuel to another site, as
appropriate. In addition, an analysis
of shipboard fires was added,
primariJy in response to comments
related to receiving spent nuclear fuel
of U.s. origin from foreign research
reactors.
In response to public comments, the
results of a separate evaluation of the
various alternatives' costs were
summarized in the EIS. The cost
evaluation was performed
independently of the EIS for purposes
broader than those analyzed in the
EIS.
The discussion of the option of leaving
Fort S1. Vrain spent nuclear fuel in
Colorado has been expanded,
specifically with respect to contractual
commitments versus programmatic
benefits.

Other enhancements include
clarification that potential shipment of
spent nuclear fuel of U.s. origin from
foreign research reactors consists of
approxima tely 20 metric tons of heavy
metal. As a result of public comments,
Volume 1 was enhanced to include a
description that clarifies the
relationship between other DOE
NEPA reviews related to spent nuclear
fuel and this EIS. This description
explains the interrelationship of these
actions in response to comments
about segmentation, In the same
regard, the relationship between the
EIS and Spent Fuel Vulnerability Action
Plans was clarified.
With regard to naval spent nuclear
fuel, enhancements to Appendix D
(Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel
Management) include providing
additional information in the
following areas: importance of naval
spent nuclear fuel examination,
impacts of not refueling or defueling
nuclear-powered vessels, the reasons
why storage and processing of naval
spent nuclear fuel in foreign facilities
were not evaluated in detail,
environmenta l justice considerations,
the transition period required 10
implement naval spent nuclear fuel
alternatives; potential accident
scenarios at naval shipyards, and
uncertainties in calcu lating potential
environmental impacts.
In Volume 2, the air quality analysis
was revised to upgrade the
information on existing baseline
conditions. The analysis compared
impacts of each alternative with
?revention of Significant
Deterioration increment limits. The
Waste Experimental Reduction
Facility project summary was
enhanced with respect to related
operation and comb ustion strategy.
The EIS was also revised to reflect
employment projections resulting
from the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory contractor consolidation.

OverView
The DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel
Management Program is intended to
(a) provide interim storage and
management of fuel at specified
locations until ultimate dispOSition,
(b) stabilize the fuel as required for
environmentally safe storage and
protection of human health (for both
workers and the public), (c) increase
safe storage capacity by rep lacing
faci lities that carmot meet current
standards and providing additiona l
capacity for new ly generated spent
nuclear fuel, Cd) conduct research and
development initiatives to support
I safe storage and /o r ultimate
dispOSition, and (e) examine fuel
generated by the Nava l Nuclear
Propulsion Program. DOE's spent
nucle.:r fuel management
respollsibilities include fuel genera ted
by DOE production and research and
development reactors, nava l reactors,
univerSity and foreign research
reactors, other miscellaneous
generators, and specia l-case
commercial reactors. The primary
goa ls of the management program are
to reduce the risk of nuclear accidents
during transportation and storage
and to minimize the release of
radionuclides to the environmen t
where they can pose hazards to
human hea lth, plants, and animals.

History of Spent Nuclear Fuel
Management
Most ooE spent nuclear fuel is
currently stored at three primary
locations: the Hanford Site (State of
Washington), the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory (Sta te of
Idaho), and the Savannah River Site
(State of South CalOlina) (Figure I).
Much sma ller quantities of spent
nuclea r fuel remain at other locations
throughout the nation (see Figure 1).
Historically, DOE has reprocessed
spent nuclea r fuel at the three

primary locations to recover and
recycle uranium and plutonium.

Much of the spen t nuclear fuel at the
three primary locations resulted from
production reactors at the Hanford
and Savannah River Sites. These
reactors are no longer operating, but
they prev;~usly produced material for
OOE's defense programs and research
and development programs. Smaller
quantities of spent nuclear fuel at
other locations have resulted from
experimental reactor operations and
from research conducted by
approxima tely 5S university- and
Government-owned t~s t reactors.
DOE proposes 10 adopt and
implement a policy concerning
management of spent nuclear fuel
containing enriched uranium that
originated in the United States and
was used by foreign research reactors.
DOE also would manage limited
amounts of special-case commercial
reactor spent nuclear fuel.
Since 1957, spent nuclear fuel from
nuclear-powered naval vessels and
naval reactor prototypes (operating
reactors used for land -based training)
has been transported from shipyards
and prototype sites to the Naval
Reactors Facility at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory for testing
and examination, A (''Jurt order
issued on June 28,1993 prohibited the
receipt of all spent nuclear fuel by
Idaho; that order was amended on
December 22, 1993 allowing only a
limited number of shipments of spent
nuclear fuel to Idaho, pending
completion of this "'IS and the Record
of Decision.

Purpose and Need for Future
Spent Nuclear Fuel Management
DOE is responsible for developing
and maintaining a capability to safely
manage its spent nuclear fuel. During
the last four decades, DOE nd its

6 Volume ' . Summary
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Existing Spent Nuclear Fuel Locations

predecessor agencies have
transported, received, stored, and
reprocessed more than 100,000 metric
tons of heavy metal· of spent nuclear
fue l. Approximately 2,700 metric tons
heavy metal of spen t nuclear fuel
stored at various locations in the
UnHed States and overseas have not
been reprocessed . This spen t nuclear
fuel is in a wide range of enrichments
(Ihal is, percent uranium·235), types,
and conditions. By the yea r 2035, this
quantity may increase by
approximately 100 metric tons of
heavy metal.

HawaII

GJ

Legend
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Savannah River Site

Oak Ridge Reservation
Other DOE Facilities
Universities

Other
Total

Energy Facilities

• Naval Sites
7
C Foreign Returns
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(potential points of entry)

206
1
27
2
16
2,646
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•

Speclal·Case

•

Domestic Non·DOE

•

•

Naval Sites b
Kesselring
Newport News
Norfolk
Pearl Harbor
Portsmouth

Puget Sound
Windsor
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New York
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Virginia
HawaII
Maine
Washington
Connecticut

No. of locations

® U.S. Department of

Hanford
2,133
Idaho National
261
Engineering Laboratory

@

Commercial

Universities

DOE Facilities

9
29

State

Argonne National

Laboratory·East
Brookhaven National
Laboratory
Hanford
Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory
los Alamos
National Laboratory
Oak Ridge Reservation
Sandia National

illinois

laboratories
Savannah Alver Site

New Mexico

NawYork
Washington
Idaho
New Mexico
Tennessee

South Carolina

8. A metrIc Ion 01 heavy met.,I. the unit uMd throughout thl, document to Ind/ellte
the amount of spent nucle.r fuel, It corre."ond. 10 1,000 kilogram. (2,200 pound.)
of heavy met.1 (urlln/um, plutonium, thorium).

The end of the Cold War led OOE to
reevalua te the scale of its weapons
production, nuclea r propulsion, and
research missions. In April 1992, OOE
began to phase out reprocessing of
spent nuclear fuel for recovery and
recycling of highly enriched uranium.
In November 1993, OOE documented
current and potential environmental,
safety, and health vulnerabilities
rega rding ooE spent nuclear fuel
storage facilities. OOE also identified
storage loca tions of fuel wi th
degraded cladding (metal coverings to
prevent fue l corrosion) and other
problems that require action to ensure
contin ued s.... 'e storage. This si tuation
has also been identified by \he
independen t Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board in
Recommendation 94-1, issued May 26,
1994. The Board concluded that
imminent hazards could a rise ,..,ithin
several years unless certain problems
are corrected, including those related
to spent nucl ea r fuel storage. Thus,
OOE need s to eslablish an integra led
complex-wide program that provides
safe and effective management for
present and reasonably foreseeable
quantities of spent nuclear fuel.
pending its ultimate disposition.
Relevant decisions th at must be made

WhatSpentNucMarFue/~~t

DecIsIons WIll Be Made BeNd on thl. EIS?
Where should DOE locate specific spent nuclear
fuel management activities?
What capabilities, facilities, and technologies are
needed for spent nuclear fuel management?
What research and development activities are
needed to support the spent nuclear fuel
management program?

include the selection of:
Locations to conduct specific
spent nuclear fuel
management activities after
evaluating existing and
potential locations
Appropriate capabilities,
facilities, and technologies
Research and development
activities needed to support
the OOE Spent Nuclear Fuel
Management Program.

In other words, \his EIS will provide
the environmental information to
support decisions that will facilitate a
transi tion between ooE's current
management practices and ultimate
disposition of spent nuclear fuel.

Techn%gles for Spent Nuc/ear
Fuel Management
Technologies for spent nuclear fuel
management are required to ensure
safe, environmentally sound. and
economic management until ultimate
disposition is implemen ted . Ultimate
dispOSition of ooE's spent nuclea r

RED 0674

b. Name 01 shipyard or .11•.

Figure 1. Locations of current spent nuclear fuel generators and storage sites.
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a. A metric ton of heavy metal is the unit used throughout this document to indicate the amount of
spent ?uclear f~el. It corresponds to t.ooo kilograms (2.200 pounds) of heavy metal (uranium,
plutonium. ttlOnum).
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fuel is a high priority. Two broad
strategies may at this point be
envisioned for the ultimate
disposition of OOE spent nuclear fuel.

The Department could (a) work
toward direct disposa l of spent fuel in
a geologic repository or (b) chemically
dissolve the fuel and produce a waste
lorm (such as vi trified glass) lor
repository disposal. Variations on
these broad strategies are also possible
and bo th remain under considera tion.
It is possible that much 01 DOE's spent
fuel could qualify lor direct disposal.
Aggressive characterization and, if
appropriate, preparation programs
would be necessary to support the
first repository schedule,
Sulficient quantity and quality 01
information is still not available to
determine at this time whether the
Yucca mountain site is a suitable
candidate lor geologic disposal 01
spent nuclear fuel and high-level
radioactive waste. The OOE,
however, is in the early planning
stages lor a repository EIS, which will
be prepared pursuant to the directives
01 the Nuclear Waste policy Act, as
amended, The DOE plans to issue in
mid-1995 a formal notice of its intent

to prepare this analysis. The

repository ElS is being prepared to
evaluate potential environmental
impacts, based o n the best ava il able
info rmation and data, that would be
associa ted with the repository's
development and operation, and to
support the Secretary 01 Energy's linal
recommendation to the President, as
required by the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act, as amended, The repository ElS
wilJ examine the s ite specific
env ironmental impacts from
construction, operation, and eventu al
closure of the repository, including
potential post-closure radiologica l
effects to the environment. Until the
repOSitory EIS is complete, no linal
decis ion could be mad e concerning
what DOE spent nuclea r fuel would
be accepted in a geologic repository,
As part of its spent nuclear fuel
management program, DOE would
(1) stabilize the spent nuclear luel as
need ed to ensu re safe interim storage,

(2) characterize the existing spent
nuclear fuel inventory to assess
compliance with the repository
acceptance criteria as they are

developed, and (3) determine w hat
processing, if any, is required to meet

DeflnHlon of Term. _eel to Spent Nuclear Fuel
~

(of spent nuclear fuel)-Emplacing, operating, and administering
tacilrties. transportation systems, and procedures to ensure safe and environmentally
responsible handling and storage of spent nuclear fuel pending (and in anticipation on
a decision on ultimate disposition.

_,1z8tIon (of spent nuclear fuelf-Actions taken to further confine or reduce the

hazards associated with spent nuclear fuel, as necessary lor safe management and
environmentally nesponsible storage for extended periods 01 time, Activ~i9S that may
be necessary to stabilize spent nuclear fuel include canning, processing, and
passivation,
CIInnlng-The process of placing spent nuclear fuel in canisters to retard corrosion.
contain radklactive releases. or control geometry.

proceuIng (01 spent nuclear fueif-Applying a chemi~1 or physical process designed
to sHer the characteristics 01 the spent nuclear fuel matnx,

pauIYatIon--The process of making metals inactive or less chemically reactive. For
example, the surface of steel can be passivated by chemical treatment.
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the crite ri a. Decisions regarding the
ac tua l d isposit ion of DOE's spent
nuclear fuel wou ld follow app ropriate
review under the National
Environmen tal Policy Act, and would

be subject to licensi ng by the U.s.
N uclear Regu lato ry Commission.
This "path lorwa rd" would be
implemented so as to minimize
impacts on the first repository
schedule, The current planning
assumption is that any OOE material
(vitrilied high-level waste and /or
spent nuclea r luel ) qualilied and
selected fo r emplacement in the first
reposi to ry would be disposed
beginning in the year 2015,
Disposi tion o f the remaining DOE
s pent nuclea r fuel and v itrified hlghlevel waste that is not emplaced in the
lirst repository would not be decided
until the DOE recommendation on the
need for a second repository (which
would consider such factors as the
physica l and statutory limits 01 the
first reposi tory ). The Nuclear Waste
Policy Act, as amended, requires ooE
to make that recommendation
between January 1, 2007 and
Janu ary 1, 2010,
Severa l technology options are
available to accomplish overall spent
nuclea r fuel management objectives.
Their selection is dependent upon fuel
design and its structural integrity, fuel
enrichment, and the chemical stability
01 the cladding including the degree
o f corros ion, and of the fuel matrix .
These options include direct storage
(limited to high-integrity fuels) or
stabiliza tion in preparation fo r
s torage.
Direct storage means storing spent
nuclea r fuel in essentially the same
physica l form in which it is removed
from the reactor (that is, little or
limited stabiliza tion of the fuel

elements), Fuel tha t has high-integrity
cladding, for exa mple naval fuel, can
be direct stored, indelinitely, Both wet

storage in water pools and dry storage
in casks and vaults provide effective

cooling and shielding lor the sale
storage of such high-integrity spent
nuclear fuel.
Some stabilization technologies
provide additional containment for

spent nuclear fuel with reduced
integrity, These technologies include
(a) direct canning, (b) paSSivation, and
(c) coating,
Several processing technologies are
available to stabilize spent nuclear fuel
without separating uranium and / or
plutonium from the highly radioactive
constituents, These technologies
involve changing the physical and
chemical form to reduce fuel vol, Ime
and reactivity, or make the fuel more
homogenous, They include
(a) oxidation, (b) chemical dissolution,
and (c) mechanical steps, such as
chopping or shredding,
Some processing technologies separate
uranium and /or plutonium from
degraded cladding, Available
technologies include (a) aqueous
extraction from the chemically
dissolved fuel, and
(b) electrometallurgical processing
with an electrical current to create
chemical reactions at high temperature
to extract the chemical elements.
Processing lacilities and capabilities
exist at various OOE sites. Fo r some

fuel, such as Hanford Site production
reactor fuel, existing foreign
processing capabilities could be
employed , Foreign processing would
be on a pay-as-you-go basis, without a
substantial investment in facility
upgrades and maintenance. A vi a~ le
scenario would have to cons ider
proliferation concerns, safety of
overseas transport of spent nuclear
fuel and returned materiaJs, and
national security.
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OE must provide fo r safe,

efficient managemen t of its
spent nuclear fuel during the next 40
yea rs, pending ultima te disposi tion.
The alternatives considered are: No
Action, Decentraliza tion, 1992/1993
Planning Basis, Regionaliza tion, and
Centralization. These a lterna tives
include variations of several
components: (a) number of storage
loca tions, (b) a mounts of spent
nuclea r fuel shipped, (c) fuel
stabiliza ti on methods (ways to reduce
deterioration) required, (d) number
and types of storage facilities to be
constructed, and (e) scope of
technology research and d evelopment
efforts for management technologies.

BLANK PAGE
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In addition to the three DOE si tes that
have conducted ex tensive spent
nuclea r fuel management activities,
fo ur na va l shipyards (Norfolk,
Portsmouth, Pearl Harbor, and Puget
Sound) and one prototype reactor site
(Kesselring Site) were selected as
potential storage loca tions for naval
spent nuclear fuel. In response to
public comments raised during the
scoping process, DOE undertook a
process for identifying possible
a lternative sites. The end result of the
selection process was the inclusion
and evaluation of two additiona l sites,
the Oak Ridge Reservation (State of
Tennessee) and the Nevada Test Site
(State of Nevada). DOE did not
consider the Nevada Test Site to be a
preferred site fo r the management of
spent nudear fuel in the Draft EIS
because of the State's current role as
the host site for the Yucca Mountain
Site Characteriza tion Project. DOE's
identification of the preferred
a lternatives also indicates that DOE
does not consider the Nevada Test Site
as a preferred si te for spent nuclear
fuel management in the Final EIS.
Figure 2 depicts the va rio us
a lterna tives, options, a nd locations
tha t OOE is evalua ting for spent
nuclea r fuel management
The DOE's preferred alterna tive is
Regiona lization by fuel type

(A lternative 4A). Under this
alternative, spent nuclear fuel would
be assigned to sites hav ing the
largest inventory of similar fuel
types. The DOE's preferred
alternative is consistent with the
Navy's preferred alternative to
continue to conduct refueling and
d efueling of nuclear-powered
vessels and prototy!'"', and to
transport spent nuclear fuel to the
Idaho National Engineering
Labora tory for full examination and
interim storage, using the sa me
practices as in the past

SUmffJllty of A".",.,'ves for
the llaflllgefFMllt of DOE
Spent NucleBr Fuel
NoActton

Take minimum actions required for
safe and sacura """'-'""nt of
spent nuclear fuel at or close to the
generation site or ..ment storage
location.

store most spent nucfear fuel at or
close to the generation site or current
storage location with IImHed
shipments to DOE facilities.
11111211893 Pl8nnlng Bul.

Transport to and store newly
generated spent nuclear fuel at the
Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory or Savannah River Site.

Consolidate some existing fuels at
the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory or the Savannah River

SHe.
Reglonallzatlon

Distribute existing and projected
spent nuclear fuel among DOE sHes
based primarily on fuel type
(Preferred Memative) or geography.
Centralization

Manage atl existing and projected
spent nuclear fuel inventories from
DOE and the Navy at one sae until
ultimate disposition.

Subalternellve

Name of Alternallve

Opllons

Mise.

tJ

~

"::i
' .000

Radiation Risk

_.000

Estimated latent cancer fatalities less than
lover 40-year period for normal operations.

' .000

EnO"'lHnng Laborala<y

-?-

Apgroxima!a

1. No Action Alternative

No.2''':••' ' ' ' ;---~·.(~E~~,· =;;;:,=~:;:::1.· :E::',
- ?-

-"
l

Locallon

No. ' ! NoAetlon -----;-------;-----;.---~- Slay lnPlal;e

2.000

I .~

..•

.

..

..

.'

: •

.·
\

HawaII

2CM)

• I.t '

•

•
•

Approximate No Action Shipments
Over 40 Years·

Figure 2. Altematives for management of DOE spent nuclear fuel.

The programmatic (DOE-wide)
decisions will not select all sitespecific spent nuclear fuel

management
01'tions. Such
de 'isions will be
maJe following

add itional sitespecific National

Environmental

spent nuclear fuel at or nea r the point
where it is generated or currently
located (Figure 3). Under this

No Action Alternative
Take minimum actions required for safe and secure
management of spent nuclear fuel at or close to the
generation site or current storage location.

Policy Act

After an approximate threa.year transltlon period,
no shipment of spent nuclear fuel to or Irom DOE
facilities would oocur.

evaluations.

No Action
Alternative

Stabilization activities would be limited to the
minimum actions required to safely store spent
nuclear fuel.

In the No Action

alternative, which
provides a baseline
for comparison,

Naval reactor spent nuclear fuel would be stored
at naval shes.

DOE would limit

Facility upgrade/replacement and onshe luel
transfers would be limited to those necessary lor
safe Interim slorage.

actions to the
minimum necessary
for safe and secure
management of

Existing research and development activities
would oontinue.

To: Norfolk. VA
From : Newport News. VA

200
Source

•

Approximate 2035 Inventory
(Metric Tons Heavy Metal)

No. o'/ locationa

U.S. Dep8r1rr.enl of

Energy F.cllltle,

•

N.v.ISlte,

•

Specl.I-C.IN
Commercl.1

•

Dome.tlc N\)~OOE

•

Unlv.,.IU••

Hanford
2.132
Idaho National
EngineerIng Laboratory 274
Savannah River Site
206
55
Naval Sites
Oak Ridge Reservation
2
Other
73

@ DOE Facilities
Argonne National
Laboratory-East
Brookhaven National
Naval Silesb
State
Laboratory
Kesselring
New York
Hanford
Norfolk
Virginia
Idaho National
Newport News
Virginia
Engineering Laboratory
Pearl Harbor
HawaII
Los Alamos National
Portsmouth
Laboratory
Maine
Puget Sound
Washington
Oak Ridge Reservation
Sandia National
Laboratories
B . Shipment numbers exclude shipments tha'
would be made during transition period (see text).
Savannah River Site
Total

2.742

•

29

State
Illinois
New York
Washington
Idaho
New Mexico
Tennessee
New Mexico
South Carolina

RED06M

b. Name of shipyard or site.
Figure 3. Spent nuclear fuel distribution for the No Action alternative.

14 Volume 1. Summary
Volume 1. Summary 15

X'f.-

N--..\

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

I

alternative, both small and large DOE
sites, naval shipyard s and prototypes,
university and other non-DOE
domestic research reactors, and
foreign research reactors would
independently manage their fuel
onsite. No spen t nuclear fuel would
be transported between DOE s ites.
Naval spent nuclear fuel at the
Newport News Shipyard would be
transferred to Norfolk Naval Shipyard
for retention.

I

Nava l reactors would be refueled and
defueled as planned. Naval spent
nuclear fuel would be stored in

Laboratory for exa mination at the
Expend ed Core Facil ity. The shipping
containers would be unloaded and
reused for addition al re fueling nnd
defuelings. However, after the
transitio n period, the fuel remo ved
from naval reactors would rema in in
sto rage at the naval sites and the
Expended Core Facility at the Idaho
National Engineering Labo ra tory
wou ld be shut down. Examinations
of naval spent nuclear fuel would a lso
cease. Current technology
development activities related to
spent nuclear fuel management would
continue within DOE.

shipping containers at the naval or
DOE facility where refueling and
defueling are conducted. This

Decentralization Alternative

alternative would require about a
three-year transition period to obtain
additional shipping containers for
storage. During the transition period.

Under this alternative, DOE would
maintain existing spent nuclear fuel in
storage at current locations and store
newly generated fuel at or near the
s ite of generation (Fig ure 4). This

fuel would be transported to the
Idaho National Engineering

2. Decentralization
Radiation Risk

::1 I,
-----"----------------.---.----

'" .
[SJ
HawaII

o

.~

~D

o

RE00669a

@ U.S. Department of Energy Facilities
Shipments going to Savannah River Site
- - Shipments going to Idaho National Engineering l aboralory
- - -- • • Shipments going to Puget Sound Naval Shipyard

Decentralization Altematlve
Store most spent nuclear fuel at or close to the generation
shipments to DOE facil~ies .

s~e

or ",,,,ent storage location with

lim~ed

• Domestic Non-DOE

DOE spent nuclear fuel shipments would be lim~ed to the following:
Spent nuclear fuel stored or generated at unjyersities and non· DOE facilities
Potential foreign research reactor fuel.

Spent nuclear fuel processing might need to be conducted. Other forms of stabilization might
occur to provide for safe storage and/or transport.

Some facil ~i.. would be upgraded/replaced and additional storage capacity required by the
alternative would be constructed.
Ons~e

fue l transfers would occur for Improved safe storage.

Research and development activities would be undertaken for spent nuclear fuel management,

Including stabilization technology.

.

Three options for naval spent nuclear fuel
No inspedion-fuel remains close to refuelingldefueling site

Umhed inspection at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard
Full inspection at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory followed by storage close to
refuelingldefueling site.

• University

Approximate Shipments
30
To: Id.ho National
Engineering Labor.tory
To: savann.h River Site 190

Approxlm.te Shipments
To : Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory 260
To: savannah River SHe 260

Fuel Source
savannah River Site Destination:
Armed Forces Radiobiology
Research Institute
N.tlonallnstltute of
Standards and Technology

C Foreign Fuel •
(potential
points of entry)

Id~~~::~0~·6:s~p~~:~~g
Aerotest

Dow

General Atomic
General Electric
U.S. Geological Survey
U.S. Air Force
Veter.n. Admlnlstr.tlon Medical Center

Approximate Shipments
To: Idaho N.tlonal
Engineering Labor.tory 460
To: savannah River Site 550

• Naval Fuel Shipments
2A. No Exam b
Approximate Shipments
200
To: Norfolk, VA
From: Newpon News, VA
28. Limited Exam b
Approximate Shipments
To: Puge' Sound, WA
To: Norfolk, VA

50
180

2C. Full Exam C
Approximate Shipments
To: Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory
580
From: Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory
580

REO 0669

Figure 4. Spent nuclear (UBI distribution for the Decentralization alternative.
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spent nuclea r fuel research and
development (including stabilization

refueling/defueling site. Three
Decentralization options are included.
The options differ only with regard to
the examination of the fuel : no
examination, limited exa mination,
and fuU exa mination. Each option
would require a transition period of
about three years to develop storage
facilities. During the transition
period, spent nuclea r fuel would be
transported in shipping containers to

technology) would be performed.

the Idaho National Engineering

alternative differs from the No Action
alternative by allowing fuel shipments
from universities, non·OOE facilities,
and foreign resea rch reactors to DOE
sites, which requires developmg and

I

upgrading facilities . Actions that

would improve management
capability, although not essential for
sa fety, would be undertaken, and

The Decentralization alternative at the
naval sites is similar to the No Action
alternative because nava l reactors
wou ld continue to be defueled and
refueled as planned, and the fuel
would be stored close to the

199211993 Pt.nnIIlflBas/.

I

Transport to and store newly generated spent nuclear fuel
at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory or Savannah
River S~e. Consolidate some existing fuels at the ldeho
National Engineering Laboratory or the Savannah River
S~e .

Fuel would be transported as follows:
- TRIGA fuel from the Hanford S~e to the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory; Hanford S~e
receives limhed fuel for research of storage and
dispositioning technologies
Naval fuel to the Idaho National Engineering
laboratory for examination and storage
West Valley Demonstration Project and Fort SI.
Vrain fuel to Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory
Oak Ridge Reservation fuel to the Savannah
River Site
Domestic research fuel , and foreign research
reactor fuel as may ygt be determined, divided
between the Savannah River She and the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory.
Facilities upgrades and replacements that were
planned would proceed, including increased
storage capacity.
Research and development for spent nuclear fuel
management would be undertaken, including
stabilization technology.
Spent nuclear fuel processing might need to be
conducted. Other forms of stabilization might
occur to provide for sefe storage and/or transport.

_.

:.

3. 1992 - 1993 Planning Basis

ApproJinlal.

Radiation Risk

....
,..

Estimated latent cancer fatalities lesothan
1 over 4Q..year period for normal operations.

3.000 2,100

'."

o

Laboratory and the containers would
be unloaded and reused.
The va rious small non-OOE,
university, and foreign research
reactors would only transport spent
nuclear fuel in limited amounts to
permit continued operations. No
additional storage facilities would be
constructed at these loca tions.

1992/1993 Planning Basis

,.
[SJ
HawaII

. ~.

o

Alternative
The 1992/1993 Planning Basis
alternative represents DOE's plans (in
1992 and 1993) for management 01 its
spent nuclear fuel. Under this

AED0610a

Shipments going to Savannah River Site
- - Shipments going to Idaho NalionaJ Engineering Laboratory
------ Shipments going 10 Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and then 10 thelNEL

alternative, OOE would transport and
store newly generated spent nuclear
fuel at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory or the
Savannah River Site (Figure 5). Most

existing spent nuclear fuel loca ted at
major DOE sites would remain at
those sites.
Some existing spent nuclear fuel at
other sites would be consolidated at
the Idaho National Engineering

Laboratory or Savannah River Site.
The Savannah River Site and Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory

would also receive some test reactor
fuel and some fuel from university
and foreign research reactors. The
Hanford Site would receive only
limited quantities of fuel for resea rch
on storage and dis positioning
technologies. DOE sites would
generally upgrade facilities and

DOE

•

Production reactor SNF remains at Hanford
Fuel Source
• DOEA.... rch
- Brookhaven National Laboratory, NY
- Hanford, WA
- Oak Ridge Reservation , TN
- Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory, 10
- Los Alamos National Laboratory, NM
- Savannah River Site, SC
- Sandia National laboratories, NM
- Argonne National Laboratory-Ent, IL

Approximate Shipments
To: INEL
580
for examination and
storage

• University
Approximate Shipments
To: INEL
260
To: SRS
260

C Foreign Fuel a
(potential points of entry) • Domestic Non-DOE

• Special Case Commercia'
- West Valley, NY
- Lynchburg, VA
- Fort SI. Vrain, CO

Approximate Shipments
To: INEL
To: SRS

~I

Approximate Shipments

To: Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory (INEL)
To: savannah River Site (SRS)

Naval Fuel

410

Approximate Shipment.
To: INEL
30
To: SRS
190

120

s. Foreign tue' could entef the U.S. _I .ny one of the ldentlflfld point. of entIY for'ransport to the INEL or SRS

construct new facilities to manage
Figure 5. Spent nuclear fuel distribution lor the 199211993 Planning Basis alternative.
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Reglonallzatlon
Reglonallzalfon Ahemallve 4A - Preferred Ahernallve:
Distribute existing and projected spent nuclear fuel among DOE
s~es primarily on the basis of luel type.

Naval fuel would be transported to. examined. and stored
at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
Aluminum-clad fuel would be transported to the
Savannah River Site; TAIGA and non-aluminum tuel
would be transported to the Idaho Nalional Engineering
Laboratory: defense production fuel would be retained at
the Hanlord S~e.

spent nuclear fuel. Activities related
to spent nuclea r fuel trea tm ent would
include research and development
and pilot programs to support future
decisions on the ultimate disposition
of spent nuclea r fuel.

Radiation Risk

Nava l reactors would continue to be

Estimated latent cancer .atalltles less than
1 over 4Q..year period .or normal operations.

Nava l spen t nuclear fuel would be
transported from naval sites to the
Expended Core Facility at the Idaho

Facilities required to support spent nudear fuel
management would be upgraded or bunt as necessary.

Under this alterna tive, other gl?nerator
and storage loca tions would continue

Research and development for spent nuclear fuel
management would be undertaken, including stabilization

to ship spenl nuclear fuel to the Idaho

The Eastern Regional Site would receive fuel from east
of the Mississippi River and the Western Regional Site
would receive fuel from west of the Mississippi River.
Naval fuel would be transported to, examinold, and stored
at e~her the Westem Regional S~e or the Eastern
Regional Site.
Spent nuclear fuel processing might need to be
conducted. Other forms of stabilization might occur to
provide for safe storage and/or transport.

Facilities required to support spent nuclear fuel
management would be upgraded or built as necessary.
Research and development for spent nuclear fuel
management would be undertaken, including
stabilization technology.

Q

....,-

• •1)0(1

3,700

..

l."

,

'."

,

------..,

National Engineering Labora tory for
examination. Following examinaron,
fuel would remain in storage at the
Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory pending ultimate

Reglonallzatlon Ahemallve 48: Distribute existing and projected
spent nuclear fuel between an Eastern Regional Site (either Oak
Ridge Reservation or Savannah River Site) and a Western
Regional S~e (e~her Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory, or Nevada Test Site).

AppollmOl!e

Alternative 4A - Preferred Alternative

refueled and d efueled as planned.

Spent nuclear fuel processing might need to be
ronducted . Other forms of stabilization might occur to
provide for safe storage and/or transport.

technology.

:I

4. DOE - Regionalization (by Fuel Type)

disposition.

National Engineering Lab'Jra tory and
Savannah River Site. No additional
storage facilities would be constructed
at these originating locations.

HawaII

~
Shipments going to Savannah River Site
- - Shipments going to Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
- - - - - - Shipments going 10 Puget Sound Naval Shipyard and then to the INEL

Reglonalizatlon and Preferred
Alternative
This alternative would require a
redistribution of spent nuclear fuel
among DOE sites, ei ther on the basis
of fuel type (Regionalization
A lterna tive 4A - Preferred Alternative)
or on the basis of geography
(Regiona liza lion Alterna ti ve 4B).
Regionalization by fuel type
(Alternative 4A- Preferred
Altemative)(Figure 6) would involve
the use of the Idaho National

Engineering Labora tory and Savannah
River Site for storage of most newly
genera led spent nuclear fuel. Existing

defense production spent nuclear fuel
at the Hanford Site would remain
there. Intersite transportation of fuel
would depend on the site's existing
capabilities to manage specific fuel
types with respect to cladding

material, physical and chemical
composition, fuel condition, and
adequate facili ties to handle increased

• University

@DOE
Production reactor SNF remains at Hanford
Approxlmale Shipments
To: Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory (INEL)
To: Savannah River Site (SRS)

I

1,050 I

280

[J Foreign Fuel a
(potential pOints of entry)

Approximate Shipments
To: INEL
To: SRS

840170

Approximate Shipments
To: INEL
120
To: SRS
400

• Domestic Non-DOE
Approximate Shipments
To: INEL
30
To: SRS
190

I

+ Naval Fuel

REDDe71

Approxlmale Shipments
580
To: INEL
for examination and
storage
8. Foreign fuel could enter the U.S. lit IIny one of the Identlfed pOints of entry for transport to the INEl or SRS

Figure 6. Spent nuclear fuel distribution for Regionalization Alternative 4A,
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Manage all exislln:l and
projected spent nuclear 1ue1
inventories at one site until

ultimate disposition.
• Existing spent nuclear
fuel would be
transported to the
central site.

• Naval fuel \,/ould be
transported to.
examined al. and stored
at the central sne.
• projected spent nuclear
fuel receipts would be
transported to the
central.no.
• Spent nuclear fuel
processing might need
to be conducted. Other
forms 01 stabilization
might occur to provide
for safe storage and/or

transport.
• Facility upgrade!
replacement and new
slorage capacity would
be provided at the
central site; stabilization

facilities would be
provided at the
transporting srtes.

• Research and
development would be
undertaken for spent

nudear fuel
management. including

stabilization technology.

quantities of fuel. Nava l fue l would
be transported to Ihe Expended Core
Facility at the Idaho Na tional
Engineering Laboratory for
exa mina tion. Following exa mination,
fue l would remain in storage at the
Idaho Na tional Engineering
Laboratory. Facili ty upgrades.
replacements, and additions would be
underta ken to the extent req uired,
incl uding resea rch and development
activities.
Regionalization by geogra phy
(A lternati ve 4B) (Figure 7) would
involve consolidation of spent nuclear
fuel from the eastern United States at
the Eastern Regional Site (Oa k Ridge
Resen /ation or Savannah River Site)
and consolidation of fuel from the
western United States a t one of the
Western Regional Sites (Hanford Site.
Idaho Nationa l Engineering
La boratory, or Nevada Test Site).
Naval spent nuclea r fuel would be
transported to, examined, and stored
at ei ther the Eastern or the Western
Regional Site. Regionaliza tion
Alternative 4B has 10 op tions, based
on the combination of sites selected as
the Eastern and Western Regional
Sites, and the placement of the
Expended Core Facility a t either of the
sites. There are three potential
Western and two potential Eastern
Regional Sites that could be paired.
with either supporting the Expend ed
Core Facili ty. However, nei ther of the
two possible combina tions that
include the Idaho Na tional
Engineering Laboratory as the
Western Regional Site would consider
moving the Expended Core Facility to
the eastern si te beca use of the
estimated $1 billion cost of
construction. Facili ty upgrades,
replacements, and additions would be
undertaken to the extent required,
incl uding research an d development.
Under this alternative, other generator
and storage loca tions would continue

to transport spent nuclea r fuel to the
Ida ho Na tional Engineering
Labor lry and the Sa vanna h River
Site. The exact destination of fue ls
would vary, depending on the fuel
type under Regionaliza tion
Alternative 4A and on the genera tor /
storage location under Regionaliza tion
Alterna tive 4B.

4. DOE - Regionalization (by Geography)

Transport of nava l spent nuclea r fuel
to the Idaho National Engineering
Labora tory would continue only until
storage and examination faciBties are
constructed at the central site. For
Centraliza tion at sites other than the
Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory. a new facility with
ca pabilities compa rable to the
Expended Core Facili ty a t the Idaho
Na tional Engineering laboratory
would be constructed.
A U spent nuclea r fuel from the other
generator and storage sites would be
transported to the selected centra l
DOE site.

Minim\tITI

Estimated latent cancer fatalities less than
1 over 4O-year period for normal operations.

0.600

,...
,

..4l

.

Centralization Alternative
Under the Centralization a lterna tive,
a ll spent nuclea r fuel that DOE is
obligated to manage would be
transported to one DOE site
(Figure 8). Candida te sites include the
Hanford Site (Option A). Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory
(Option B). Savannah River Site
(Option C), Oak Ridge Reservation
(Option D), and Nevada Test Site
(Option E). New facilities would be
built at the Centra lization si te to
accommoda te the increased
inventories. Some spent nuclea r fuel
would require stabilization before
transport. AU spent nuclear fuel
facilities at the transporting sites
would then be closed. Activi ties
related to stabilization of fuel.
including research and development
and pilot programs. would also be
centralized at this same site.

·........lJ
-"-·~

Alternative 48
Radiation Risk

Q

..

HawaII

81 .

..

•

..

5J
D

DOE - Regionallzation
Alternative 48
(West - Hanford)

Logon<!

Approximate ShipmentsTo : Hanford
Naval shipments
If Expended Core Facility
at Hanford

Source

2,700

•

(pot'"''''

DOE - Regionalization

• Sf*:.. ,-ca ..
Commerc:'"

Alternative 48
(West - INEL)
Approximate Shipments
To: Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory
2,500
(INEL)
Naval sh ipments
If Expended Core Facility
at the INEl

~!r:r~:r::! of

• ~v.ISH..
C ForMgn Rtitum_
point. of entry)

580

•

DomHUefrton-OOE

•

Un'ven'HH
SItes ship to either Hanlord. INEL Of NTS

_

Sites ship to either OAR Of SRS'

•••.•• Shipments going to Puget Sound Naval Shipyard
and then to !he region" sile

580

DOE - Regionalization
Alternative 48
(West - NTS)
ApprOXimate ShipmentsTo: Nevada Test Site (NTS) 4,400
Naval shipments
It Expended Core Facility
81 NTS
580

DOE - Regionalization
Alternative 48
(East - SRS)
Approximate ShipmentsTo : Savannah River Site (SRS) 1.600
Nava' shipments If Expended
Core Facility at SRS
580

DOE - Regionalization
Alternative 48
(East - ORR)
I

Approximate ShipmentsTo: Oak Ridge Reservallon (ORR) 2.300
Navallhlpments If Expended
Core Facility at ORR

I

580
RED 0672
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5. Centralization
..OOO UA""'O"......

.ooo~

Radiation Risk
Estimated latent cancer fatalities less than
2 over 4O-year period for normal operations.
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5,100
580

Spec:W-Ca..
ComIMl'C"1

•

Domestic Non-OOE

•

Unl.,.,./tle,
ShipmenlS going 10 Pug.1 Sound Nayal Stupyard

ancI the" 10 Ihe cernral site

Centralization
Alternative 58 (INEL)

Centralization
Alternative 5C (SRS)

Approximate Shipments

Approximate Shipments·

To: Idaho National

To: Savannah
River Site (SRS)
Naval Shipments

4,900

Engineering Laboratory (INEL)
Naval Shipments
580

Centralization
Alternative 50 (ORR)

6,DOO

Number of Shipments

580

I Figure 9 shows the number of o(fsite

Centralization
Alternative 5E (NTS)

Approximate Shipments·

Approximate Shipments·

To: Oak Ridge
6,700
Reservation (ORR)
Naval Shipments

Number of shipments among
sites
Publ ic and worker health
effects
Spent nuclea r fuel-related
employment
Generation of radioactive
waste
Impact on DOE or Navy
missions
Cost of implementa tion
Cumulati ve impacts.

C For.lgn Return.

Appro.lmate Shipment"
To: Hanford

aD
0

.0

0

Centralization
Alternative 5A (Hanford)

As indicated in the EIS, the
environmental consequences of the
rive spent nuclear fuel management
I alternatives would be small. For
example, analyses of air quali ty, wa ter
quality, and land use for each
alternative showed little or no impact.
The details of these exa mina tions are
discussed in Chapter 5 of Volume L
The comparison of alternatives in this
Summary, therefore, concentrates on
(a) the areas in which the public has
expressed considerable interest and
(b) programmatic factors important to
DOE decisionmaking. The following
factors were selected for compar ison:

.o • •.! .
..• fi-

•

To: Nevada
Test Site (NTS)
Naval Shipments

580

•. Shipment numbers exclude shipment. th., would be made during transition ""/00 (see text).

Figure 8. Spent nuclear fuel distribution for the Centralization alternative.
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stimates in the EIS of potenti al
environmental consequences
resul ting from programmatic (00£wide) alterna tives are based on
conserva tive assumptions (that is,
with a tendency to overestimate).
Analytical approaches are d esigned to
provide estimates of the maximum
reasonably fo reseeable consequences.

6,800
580
REO~73

shipments th at wou ld occur und er
each alternati ve. It quantifies
sru pments o( test specimens, as well
as fuel elements. Shipments o( nava l
test specimens are included beca use o(
their con tribution to cu mulative
im pacts o( nava l spent nuclear (uel
transportation. The No Action
alterna tive would involve only a

limited number o( naval spent nuclear
fuel shipments (about 2(0).
The Decentralization alternative,
1992 / 1993 Planning Basis alternative,
and Regionalization Alternative 4A
(Preferred Alternative) mostly involve
shipments from the smaller reactor
and storage sites and the naval sites to
DOE sites. These shipments would
ran ge in number (rom approximately
2,000 shipments under
Decentra lization Options A or B to
approximately 3,700 under
Regionalization Alternative 4A
(Preferred Alternative).
Decentralization Option C and the
1992/ 1993 Planning Basis alternative
each would involve approximately
2,900 shipments over the 40-year
period.
For the Centraliza tion alternative and
Regionalization Alternative 4B (by
geography), spent nuclear fuel would
be transported to one or two sites,
respectively. For these Alternatives,
the number of shipments would range
from approximately 4,600 under the
Regionalization Alternative 4B (with
Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory and Savannah River Site
as the western and eastern sites
respectively) to about 7,400 shipments
under the Centralization Option E
(Centraliza tion at the Nevad a Test
Site).

Public and Worker Health
Effects
Spent nuclear fuel management
activities would result in radi ation
exposures to the workers ;md the
p ublic from facili ty operations and
transportation activities. Add itional
rad ia tion ex posures could occur as a
resul t of transportation or facili ty
acc idents. An y radiation ex posures
from spent nuclea r fuel management
ac tivi ties would be in addition to
exposures that normaUy occur fro m
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Key:
Decentralization A: No examination of naval fuels
Decentralization B: Limited examination of naval fuels at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard
Decentralization C: Full examination of naval fuels at Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory with spent nuclear fuel stored at naval sites
Regionalization 4A: Regionalization by luel type
Aegionalization 48 : Regionalization by geography

Site initials:

H: Hanlord Site
I: Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
S: Savannah River Site

0 : Oak Ridge Reservation

N: Nevada Test Site

o

Spentluel

•

Test specimensa

a. Test specimens are small quantity fuel samples shipped for laboratory analysis

Other hea lth effec ts that can result
fro m radia tion exposure incl ude nonfa tal cancers an d genetic effects. This
EIS foc uses on latent cancer fatali ties
as the primary health risk from
radiation exposure and uses the risk
of latent cancer fa tality as the basis for
comparison of radiation-induced
impacts among alternatives. As stated
in this EIS, the total estimated health
effects for the public (fatal cancers,
non-fata l cancers, and genetic effects)
ma y be obtained by multiplying the
estimates of latent cancer fa talities by
1.46, based on risk estimates
developed by the International
Commission on Radiologica l
Protection.
Under all alterna tives (over a 40-yea r
period), the estimated number of
latent cancer fatalities to th·: public
from normal OOE spent nude.u fuel
management activities (facility
operations p lus transportation) would
range from approxi matel y zero to
about two la tent ca ncer fatali ties, or

The probabItity 01 receiving the above dose Is
essentially one.
A-.gellfe.n:
72 years Is considered to be the average Inetime.

per"'" ftH."

UIetIt _

,.,./1tJee _
__

:

t

f- f- f-

l - I- l - f-

c

~ . f---

_lilly:

/

f-f--- l - I- l - I- l - I- f- f-

I

1,000
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:::. 4,000
o
~ 3,000
E
~ 2,000

l - f-

I

u

:E

Radioactivity from all sources combinad, including
natural background radiation and medical sources.
produces about a 0.3 ram dose to the average
Individual per year.

p

CD

[5,000

The effects of radiation exposure on
humans (a nd the environment)
depend on (a) the kind of radiation
received, (b) the total amount of
radia tion received (the rate of
exposure times the length of
exposure). and (c) the part(s) of the
body exposed. Radia tion can ca use a
va riety of hea lth effects in people. The
most significant heal th effect to
describe the consequences of public
and worker radiation exposures is
"latent cancer fatality." It is referred
to as " 'atent" because the cancer may
take many years to develop and for ·
death to occur. Section 5.1.1 of Vol ume
1 of this EIS discusses the scientific
basis and methods used to estimate
latent cancer fatalities that could result
fro m exposure to rad iation.

~

f- f-

M

~ 6,000

Doee:

t

f-

f

7,000

t..tent cancer FaIn,.. cautled Per Rem for
an IndltlldUilI ."."",., of ",. GeIlfH'llI Public

o

natural sources such as cosmic
I radiation (involuntary exposure) and
from a rtificial sources such as chest xI ra ys (voluntary exposure).

8,000

0.0005 cancers ara estimated to be caused by
exposure to 1 rem.
C.1cu18llon:
Dose rate x life span x cancers caused per rem _
0.3 remtyear x 72 years x 0.0005 cancers per rem _
0.01 fatal cancers per Individual tnetime.

RIal<:
Probability x latallatent cancers _ 1 x 0.01 _ 0.01
fatal cancer, which is a probability 01 about 1 in 100
01 _
from exposure to nalural bad<ground
radiation and medical sources over II Inetime.

I

about 0.05 latent cancer fatalities per
yea r (Figure 10). In general, the
greatest rad iation exposure from
normal spent nuclear fuel site
activities and incident-free
transportation results when large
quantities of spen t nuclear fuel are
transported among sites, such as
under RegionaHzation Alternative 4B
or the Centralization alternative.
Under incident-free transporta tion, the
estimated total latent cancer fatalitiesare less than two for all alternatives,
with the highest estimates being those
associa ted with the Cen tralization
options. This reflects the higher
number of shipments associated with
these options.
The risk of latent cancer fatalities
associated with facility accidents is

Figure 9. Number of spent nuclear fuel and test sperimen shipments between the years 1995 and 2035.
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Key:

Decentralization A: No examination of naval fuels
Decentralization B: Limited examination of naval fuels at Puge! Sound Naval Shipyard
Decentralization C : Full examination of naval fuels at Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory with spent nuclear fuel stored at naval sites
Regionalization 4A: Aeg ionalization by fuel type
Regionalization 48 : Reg ionalization by geography

Site initials:

H: Hanford Site
I: Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
S: Savannah River Site
0: Oak Ridge Reservation
N: Nevada Test Site

CJ

Operations

•

Transportation a

• Location of Expended Core Facility
a. Total fatalities are the sum of the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer
fatalities for workers and the general population and the estimated number of
nonradiological fatalities from vehicular emissions. Average annual risk for incident free
transportation was determined by dividing the cumulative risks over ~he entire .
transportation campaign by the estimated duration 01 the transportatlor. campaign.
Cumulative risks are presented in Chapter 5 of EI S Volume 1.

Figure 10. Maximum estimated latent cancer fatalities per yea~ in the general population from normal spent nuclear fuel
site operations and total fatalities from incident-free transportation.
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sma ll across all the alte rnatives, as
shown in Figure 11. The evaluated
facilit y accident scena ri o with the
highest risk (breach of a fuel assembly
for the Cen tralization alternative at
the Savannah River Site) wou ld result
in an estimated risk of 0.0072 latent
ca ncer fatality per year (one latent
fa tal cancer in 140 yea rs).
The risk associated with radiation
from transportation accidents poses a
lower risk than facility accidents
(Figure 12). The risks associated with
traffic fatalities (nonradiological) are
grea te r than the risks associated with
ca ncer ca used by radiation exposure,
a lthough both are very small
(Figure 12). The evaluated
transportation accident scenario with
the largest consequences (spent
nuclear fuel transportation accident in
I a suburban area) would lead to 55
laten t cancer fata lities; the probability
of this occurrence is about 1 in
1 10 million yea rs.
In summary, fo r radiation-induced
latent cancer fatalities to the public
over 40 years of spent nudear fuel
managemen t under all the alternatives
eva luated, the most likely outcome is
as follows:

I •

Essentially zero laten t cancer
fatalities from normal facility
operations and facility
accidents
Essentially zero latent cancer
fatalities from transportation
accidents
Up to abou t one latent cancer
fa tality from most incidentfree transporta tion under
most alternatives; up to two
la tent cancer fata lities under
the Centra liza ti on alternative.

I Up to about two fa talities could result
ove r the 40-year period from
non radiological traffic acciden ts. By
compa ri son about 40,000 people are
killed annually in U.s. traffic
accidents.

Although the anticipated potential for
rad ia tion exposures would be smaU,
OOE would use the "as low as
reasonably acruevable" principle for
controlling exposures to workers and
the public. For example, practices
would be implemented to avoid or
red uce production of potentially
harmful substances and waste
minimiza tion would be practiced to
reduce the toxicity and volume of
secondary wastes to be managed.
Furthermore, all sites would update
their current worker training,
emergency planning, emergency
preparedness, and emergency
re'j ponse programs to address new
spent nuclear fuel management
activities.

Spent Nuclear Fuel-Related
Employment
Under various alternatives, the total
labor force involved in spent nuclear
fuel management could d ecrease by
180 jobs or increase by more than 2,100 I
jobs, averaged over the period 1995 to
2005, as compared with the 1995
baseline (Figure 13). The peak
employment is difficult to estimate
beca use it depends on implementation
timing and funding profiles; however,
Regionalization Alternative 48 (by
geography) with the Nevada Test Site
as the western site and Oak Ridge
Reserva tion as the eastern site would
result in the highest employment peak.
The peak, estim ated to be
approximately 4,600 jobs in the year
2000, includes empl oyment at sites
preparing spent nuclear fuel for
srupment to the selected sites .
Under the No Action alternative,
empl oyment would not increase
substantia lly for any site, and the
closure of the Expended Core Facil ity
at the Idaho Na tional Engineering
Laboratory would result in a net loss
of just over 500 spen t nuclear fuel
management-related jobs.
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Key:

N: Nevada Test Site

c

g. g. .~ g>
a: a: a: a: a:

Decentralization A : No examination of naval fuels
Decentralization B: Limited examination of naval fuels at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard
Decentralization C: Full examination of naval fuels at Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory with spent nuclear fuel stored at naval Sites
Regionalization 4A: Regionalization by fuel type
Regionalization 49: Regionalization by geography

I: Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
5 : Savannah River Site
0 : Oak Ridge Reservation

~

.~

~ ~ ~

Key:

H: Hanford Site

z

.~

~
u u u

Decentralization A : No examination of naval fuels
Decentralization B: Limited examination of naval fuels at Pugst Sound Naval Shipyard
Decentralization C: Full examination of naval fuels at Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory with spent nuclear fuel stored at naval sites
Aegionalization 4A : Aegionalization by fuel type
Regiona/lzation 48 : Regionalization by geography

Site inilials :

0

H: Hanford Site
Site initials :

I: Idaho National Engineering Laboratory

~

Traffic fatality risk

S: Savannah River Site
0 : Oak Ridge Reservation

•

Radiological risk

N: Nevada Test Site

• Locat:on of Expended Core Facility

• Location of Expended Core Facility

a. Facility risks are based on the product of the probability and consequences of the respective
maximum foreseeable facility accident lor each alternative and expressed in latent cancer
fatalities per year.

a. Radiological risk is in terms of latent cancer fa talities per year from spent nuclear fuel
shipments ; traffic fatality risk is in terms 01 estimated nonradiological lraffic accident fatalities
per year from spent nuclear fuel shipments .
b. Average annual risk was determined by dividing the cumulative accident risks over the
entire transportation campaign by the estimated duration of the transportation campaign .
Cumulative transportation accident risks are presented in Chapter 5 of EIS Volume 1.

Figure 11 . Estimate of risk of latent cancer fatalities in general population from facility accidents for spent nuclear fuel

management activities.
Figure 12. Estimate of average annual risk" from transportation accidents for spent nuclear fuel management activities.
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Relocating large amounts of spent
nuclea r fuel, such as under
Regionalization Alternative 4B (by
geography) and the Centralization
alternati ve, would eventually result in
the closure of spent nuclear fuel
management facilities at major DOE
sites and, thus, long-te rm job loss at
the closed facilities. However, some
of the job losses at closed facilities
wou ld be accompanied by job gains at
the si tes receiving the shipped fuels.
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Key:
Decentralization A: No examination of naval fuels
Decentralization B: Umited eX,ami,nation of naval fuels at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard
Decentralization C: Full examlnatton of naval fuels at Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory with spent nuclear fuel stored at naval sites
Regionalization 4A : Regionalization by fuel type
Regionalization 48 : Regionalization by geography

Site initials:

H: Hanford Site
I: Idaho National Engineering laboratory

~ Min"

S: Savannah River Site
0 : Oak Ridge Reservation
N: Nevada Test Site

•

For all three Decentralization options,
the 1992/1993 Planning Basis
alternative and Regionalization
Alternative 4A (Preferred Alternative),
no more than an average additional
1 1,150 jobs would be required over the
period 1995 to 2005 for
implementation. Some of the more
significant spent nuclear fuel
employment requirements
(particularly those involving the
Hanford Site) would result from the
development and operation of
processing facilities needed to
stabilize stored spent nuclea r fuel. In
addition, relocating the Expended
Core Facility to sites other than the
Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory would result in an increase
I of about 500 jobs in the support of
naval spent nuclear fuel exa minations
at those sites, and would result in a
co~ponding loss of approximately
500 jobs at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory.

Max"

• Location of Expended Core Facility
a. The maximum values occur with processing: the minimum values occur without processing.

I

Thus, minor emp loyment-related
impac.ts are anticipated . To mitigate
these Impacts, OOE would coordinate
its planning efforts with local
comm.unities and cou nty planning
agenCIes to address changes in
~ommunity services, housing,
mfrastructure, utilities, and
transportation. Such coordination
with loca l planning agencies is
intended to avoid placing undue
bu rdens on local agency resources.

Generation of Radioactive
Wastes
When spent m:..:lear tt..c~ is stored
onsite, very little high-level,
transuranic, or mixed waste is
generated (see Figure 14). These small
quantities of radioactive wastes would
usually be generated during
stabilization activities. As a result,
under the No Action alternative fewer
than 20 cubic meters (26 cubic ya rds)
per year of transuranic wastes would
be generated from spent nuclear fuel
management nationwide because
spent nuclear fuel would not be
stabilized. Under all other
alternatives, where stabilization
activities would occur, between 20 and
190 cubic meters (26 and 250 cubic
yards) of high-level waste and
between 20 and 90 cubic meters (26
and 120 cubic yards) of transuranic
waste would be generated each year.
The lower generation rates would
occur in the Decentralization
alterna tive, where small amounts of
spent nuclear fuel would be
transported among major DOE sites
(and stabilization for transport would
not be necessary).

I

For aU other alternatives, greater
amounts of spent nuclear fuel would
be transported among sites; therefore,
more spent nuclear fuel would require
stabi lization before transport and
more waste would be genera ted.
Low-level waste also is generated as a
result of spent nuclear fuel
management. Figure 15 indicates an
estimated range of annua l volumes for
each of the alterna tives. The higher
values are principally the result of
processing fo r stabilization.
To control the vo lume of waste
gene rated and reduce impacts on the
environment, pollution prevention
practices wou ld be implemented.

:~~i~~t~e!~' Change in the number of jobs averaged over the years 1995 to 2005 for spent nuclear fuel management
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Key:

Decentralization A: No 6xamination of naval fuels
Decentralization B: Limited examination of naval fuels at Puget Sound Na'/al Shipyard
Decentralization C: Full examination of naval fuels at Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory with spent nuclear fuel stored at naval sites
Regionalization 4A: Regionalization by fuel type
Regionalization 48: Regionalization by geography

Oecentralization A: No examination of naval fuels
Decentralization B: Limited examina~ion of naval fuels at Pugst Sound Naval Shipyard
Decentralization C: Full examination of naval fuels at Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory with spent nuclear fuel stored at naval sites
Regionalization 4A: Regionalization by fuel type
RegionaJization 49: Regionalization by geography

Site initials:

o

H: Hanford Site
J: Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
S: Savannah River Site
0 : Oak Ridge Reservation
N: Nevada Test Site

~I
~

Location of Expended Core Facility

Site initials:

o

a. The maximu m values occur with processing: the minimum values occur without processing.

H: Hanford Site
I: Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
S: Savannah River Site
0 : Oak Ridge Reservation
N: Nevada Test Site

•

Max'

Location of Expended Core Facility

a. The maximum values occur with processing: the minimum values occur without processing.

Figure 14. Average volume of high-fevel. transuranic. and mixed waste generated per year over the years 1995/02005

Figure 15. Average volume of low-level wastes generated per year over the years 1995102005 for spent nuclear fuel

for spent nuclear fuel management activities.

management activities.

34 Volume J. Summary

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

XL-

Volume 1. Summary 35

BEST COPY AVAILABLE
'1.1 i

ooE is responding to Execu tive
Order 12856, "Federal Compliance
with Right to Know La \.... s and
Pollution Prevention Req uirements,"
and associated ooE orders and
guideli nes by red ucin g the use of toxic
chemicals; imp roving emergency
planning, response, and accident
notification; and encou raging the
development and use of clean
technologies and testing of innova tive
pollution prevention technologies.
Pollution preventi on programs have
a lready been implemented at DOE
si tes. Program components include
waste minimiza tion, source reduction
and recycling, and procurement
practices that preferentia lly procure
products made from recycled
materia ls.

Impact on DOE and Navy
Missions
The mission concerns of ooE and the
Navy relate to storing spent nuclea r
fue l sa fel y, meeting obli ga tions,
preparing spent nuclear fuel for
ultimate disposition, and exa mining
nava l fuel. Under the 1992/ 1993
Planning Basis, Regionalization, and
Centralization alternatives, the
missions of OOE and the Navy would
be met. However, under the No
Action and Decentraliza tion
alternatives, some parts of their
current missions would not be
achieved.
OO£'s mission is most severely
impacted under the No Acti on
alterna tive. In this alternativt.'. only
the minimal actions necessarv would
be und ertaken to store spent 'nucl ear
fuel. This means that there would be
no faci lity upgrades or replactc'ments
(except those needed for sa fe storage
of spent nuclear fuel) and resea rch
and development activities would be
limited to activ ities a lread y approved.
The consequences of pursuing this
a lternative could include any or all of
the followi ng:

Loss of margin in storage
capacity
More frequent and possibly
more costly repai rs to
eq uipment and facilities as the
frequency of breakdow ns
increases
Eventual loss of the use of
existi ng storage faciliti es
because equipment or
faci lities are beyond repair or
because there is no fle xibility
in storage capacity to permit
repair work
Limited develo pment of
improved storage
technologies and facilities,
redu: ing DOE's abil ity to
meet future needs and
implement fut ure decisions
regarding ultimate
disposition of spent nuclea r
fueL
The Navy's mission would be
hindered if the full examination of
fuels at an Expended Core Facility
were not possible. No or limited
examination would occur unde r the
No Action alternative and
Decentralization alternative (Options
A, no examination, and B, limited
exa mination). The examinations are
an important aspect of the Navy's
ongoing advanced fuel research and
development program. The
information derived from the
exa minations provides engineering
data to support the design of new
reactors, continued safety of existing
reactors, and improvements in nuclear
fuel performance and reactor
operation by providing confirmation
ot thei r proper design and a llowing
maxim um use of thei r fuel.
The 0 Action alternative would also
impact ongoi ng nuclea r resea rch and
tri'lining activities at universities that
h ~ve little or no storage ca paci ty for
spent nuclea r fuel. Such activiti es
wou ld cease once storage ca pacity is
exhausted.

Cost of Implementation

Cumulative Impacts

Since publica tion of the draft EIS,
DOE has completed an evaluation of
potential costs associated with
mana gement of its spent nuclear fuel
fo r an inte rim period (up to 40 yea rs),
and th rough ultimate disposition. For
each a lterna ti ve, the cost evaluation
considered ca pital cost for upgrades to
exis ting faci lities and new facilities,
o perat ion and maintenance costs for
existing and new facilities,
deconta minati on and
deco mmissioning costs for new
fa cilities, and spent nuclea r fuel
transportation costs. Because each
alternati ve would manage va rio us
amoun ts of spent nuclear fuel and the
potential use of existing facilities
would va ry among alternatives, two
cost ranges were conside red-a
minimum (lower) cost range that
considered maximum use of existing
faci lities and a maxim um (upper) cost
range that minimized use of existing
fa cilities in favo r of additional new
management faci lities (Figure 16).

A cumula tive impact results from the
incremental impact associated wi th
implementing an alternative plus the
impacts of other past, present, and
reasonabl y foreseeable future actions.
"Other" actions include DOE p rojects
ilt the potentially affected sites not
related to spent nuclea r fuel
mandgement, as well as projects of
other Government agencies, priva te
businesses, or individuals.

The cost analysis found that when use
of existing facilities was maximized, it
would be least costly to manage spent
nuclea r fuel under a lternati ves that
involve si tes with existing capabili ties
(e.g., Decentralization, 1992/ 1993
Planning Basis, and Regionaiiza tion ).
as opposed to the Centraliza tion
a lternati ve that would require the
constructi on of storage facilities
(Figure 16).
When minimum use of existing
facilities is considered. economies of
scale wo uld be realized as it is more
cost e ffecti ve to build and operate one
larger facility than to build and
o pe rate several smaller facilit ies with
the same combined capacity. Thus, for
exa mple, Regiona li za tion 4A (by fue l
type), in wh ich a ll spen t nuclea r fuel
would be tra nsported to si tes that
have existing fuel managemen t
infrastructures, is less costly than the
1992/1993 Planning Basis and
Decentralization a lternatives
(Figure 16).

On a nati onwide basis, the
implementation of any of the spent
nuclea r fuel management alternatives
would not significantly contribute to
cumu lative impacts. Although
impacts to the natural environment
(for exa mp le, water, air, ecology, and
land use) were analyzed, the
cumulative impacts are very smaU,
especially if impact avoidance and
mitiga tion measures are taken.
In general, the contribution to
cUr.\ulative impacts from activities
required for spent nuclear fuel
management would be very small at
sites where fuel is stored, in
comparison to other ongoing and
reasonably expected nonfuel-related
projects. Even for those alternatives
(Regionalization or Centralization)
w here the use of nonrenewa ble
resources would be relatively large,
increases in the impacts at the selected
site(s) would be offset by changes at
nonselected sites-resulting in a very
small net change.
On a site-specific basis, the
imple mentation of an y of the
alternati ves wo uld not significa ntly
contribute to cumulative impacts.
Genera lly, the contribution to
cumulati ve impacts from spent
nuclea r fu r l management activities a t
a specific site is minor, relative to other
DOE and non-DOE projects.
Radiologica l emissions from normal
o pe ra tions and from transportation of
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spent nuclear fuel would be well
w ithin regulatory requirements. The
volumes of waste produced from fuel
management activities would be a
small addition to waste volumes
generated by other ongoing and
expected projects.
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Key:
Decentralization A : No examination of naval fuels
Decentralization 8 : Limited examination of naval fuels at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard
Decentralization C : Full examination of naval fuels at Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory with SNF stored at naval sites
Aegionalization 4A: Regionalization by fuel type
Regionalization 48: Aegionalization by geography

H: Hanford Site
I: Idaho National Engineering Laboratory

Site initials:

5 : Savannah River Site

0 : Oak Ridge Reservation
N: Nevada Test Site
a. Minimum (lower) cost range with maximum use of existing facilities
b. Maximum (upper) cost range with minimum use of existing facilities
SAA0081

Depending on the economic status
and outlook for an area, spent nuclear
fuel activities coupled with other
actions could have the potential to
strain or overburden the
socioeconomic resources of certain
areas, particularly if either the
Regionalization or Centralization
alternatives were implemented with
the Expended Core Facility placed at
the site. Although each site is
anticipating an overall decline in site
employment over the next few years,
the in-migration of construction
workers associated with proposed
spent nuclear fuel management
alternatives combined with other
reasonably foreseeable activities could
have sman impacts on communities
surrounding the Hanford Site, the
Nevada Test Site, and the Oak Ridge
Reservation. Such socioeconomic
impacts would not be expected to
occur a t the other sites.

Environmental Justice
In February 1994, Executive Order
12898 entitled, "Federal Actions to
Address Environmental Justice in
Minority Populations and LowIncome Populations" was issued to
federal agencies. This order requires
federal agencies to identify and
address disproportionately high and
adverse hum an health or
environmental effects of their
programs, policies, and activities on
minority pop ulations and low-income
populations. Mitigation measures are
to be identified, if necessary, and
federal agencies are to increase
communications with these
communities, in order to promote
increased awareness of Federal

activities and involvement in Federal
decisionmaking.
In accordance with the Executive
Order, an interagency Federal Working
Group on Environmental Justice has
been convened to provide guidance to
agencies on implementation of
environmental justice. Draft Guidance
for Federal Agencies on Terms in
Executive Order 12898 provide draft
definitions of certain terms in the
Executive Order. The definitions
adopted for this Final EIS are
consistent with the draft guidance.
Disproportionately high and adverse
human health effects are defined to
ocr ur when the risk or rate for a
minority or low-income population
from exposure to an environmental
hazard significantly exceeds the risk or
rate to the general population and,
where available, to another
appropriate comparison group.
Disproportionately high and adverse
environmental effects are defined to be
any deleterious environmental impact
affecting minority populations or low
income populations that significantly
exceed those on general population or
other appropriate unit of geographic
analysis.

The programmatic management of
DOE spent nuclear fuel and associated
transportation was reviewed under
each alternative. This review included
potential impacts that would arise for
each of the environmental disciplines,
under normal operating conditions
and under potential accident
conditions, to minority and lowincome communities with in 50 miles
(SO ki lometers) of each potential site.
Demographic information was
ga thered from the U.S. Census Bureau
to identify minority populations and
low-income communities in the zone
of potential impact ((SO mile
(SO kilometer» ) surrounding each of
the si tes under consideration. Analysis
of environmental justice concerns was
based on a qualitative assessment of

Figure 16. Management costs for interim storage of spent nuclear fuel tnrough the year 2035.
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the human health and environmental
impacts o f each alternative. The
analysis found that the impacts of the
programmatic management of spent
nuclear fuel under all alternatives

would not constitute a
disproportionately hig h and adverse
impact on minority o r low-income
communities and, thu s, do not present
an environmental justice concern.

D

OE is committed to
operating its spent nuclear
fue l mana gement program in
compliance with all applica ble
environmental laws, regulations,
executive orders, DOE orders, and
permits and compliance ag reements
wi th regulatory agencies. The DOE
regulations that implement the
Na tional Environmental Po hcy Act
require consul tation w ith other
agencies, when appropriate, to
incorpo rate any relevant requirements
as ea rly as possible in the process.
These consultation and coordination
requirements will commence and be

completed as site-specific spent
nuclear fuel management projects and
decisions are proposed . To the extent

that this ElS supports existing sitespecific proposals, those consultations
and coordination efforts are contained

within Volume 1 Section 7.2 and
Volume 2 Appendix B-3. OOE has
reviewed aU comments received on
the draft ElS. To more full y
understand , evaluate, and consider
certain agency comments,
consultations have taken place among
agency, Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory and Navy officials on the
EIS.
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D

OE is currently in the process of
making two important sets of
decisions. The first involves
programmatic (OOE-wide) decisions
regarding 00£'5 future spent nuclear
fuel management (addressed in Volume
I of the EIS). The second involves sitespecific decisions regarding the fu~e
direction of environmental resto rahon
and waste management programs,
which include spent nuclear fuel. at the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
(addressed in Volume 2 of this EIS).

OOE's programmatic decisions
regarding spent nuclear fuel affect the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory-

specific decisions about spen t nuclear
fuel. Therefore, the spent nuclear fuel

components of the Idaho National

Volume 1-Programmatlc Spent
Nuclear Fuel Management
AHematlves-Summary
Ho_
Take minimum ac:tkHts required for safe
and secure management of spent nuclear
fuel at, or dose to, the generation sI1e or
current storage location.
o.c.ntr8llut1on
Store most spent nuclear fuel at or dose
to the generation sI1e or current storage
Iocatlon. with limited shipments to DOE
facilities.

1119211893 I'I8nnlng .,..1.
Transport and store newly generated
spent nuclear fuel at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory or Savannah
River Site. Consolidate some existing
fuels at the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory or the Savannah River Sits.
Reglonallzatlen
Oistribule existing and projected spent
nuclear fuel among DOE sites. based
primarily on fuel type (Preferred
Alternative) or on geography.

Centralization
Manage all existing and projected spent
nuclear fuel inventories from DOE and
the Navy at one site until uftimate
disposition.

Engineering Laboratory-specific
alternatives have been constructed to

U.S. Department of Energy
Reading Rooms

bear a relationship to those of
Volume!.

Public Reading Room for U.S. Department
of Energy Headquarters

Volume 2-1daho National
Engineering Laboratory Spent
Nuclear Fuel Management
Alternatives - Summary

Room l E·I90, Fotresial Bullding
Freedom of Information Reading Room
1000 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 10585
1202) 586·6020
Monday·Friday 9:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.

Ac1lon
• Phase out inspection of naval spent
nudear fuel. Close Expended Core
Facility.
• Receive no non-naval spent nuclear
fuel.
o Phase out Idaho Chemical
Processing Plant-603 _storage pools.

Public Reading Room for U.S.
Department 01 Energy
Oakland Operations Office
Environmental lnlormation Cenler
1301 Clay Street. Room 700 N
Oakland. CA 94612
1510)637·1762

nuc_ .....)

I'I8nendP_
(for apent
o Examine and store naval spent
nuclear fuel.
o Receive additional offsne spent
nuclear fuel.
o Transfer aluminum-dad spent nuclear
fuel to Savannah River Site.
o Phase out Idaho Chemical
Processing Plant-603 storage pools.
o Expand storage capacity In existing
Idaho Chemical Processing Plant-666
pools.
o Phase In dry storage.
o Demonstrate electrometallurglcal

Monday-Friday 8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
Public Reading Room for U.S.
Department of Energy
Rocky Flats Operations OffJee
Front Range Community College library
3645W. 11 2th Ave.
level B. Cenler or the Building
Weslminisler. CO 80030
(303)469·4435
Monday and Tuesday 10:30 a.m. 10 6:30 p.m..
Wednesday 10:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m..
Thursday 8:00 a.m. 10 4:00 p.m.

process.
T_nt,S~,

end

out inspection of naval spent
nudear fuel. Close Expended Core
Facility.
o Transport all spent nudear f"el to
another DOE sne.
o Phase out spent nuclear fuel handling
facilnies.
• Demonstrate electrometallurgical
process.

Public Reading Room for U.S.
Department of Energy

Idaho Operations Office
Public Reading Room
I n6 Science Cenler Drive
Idaho Falls. 10 83402

(208) 526·9162
Monday·Friday 8:00 a.m. 10 5:00 p.m.

Trutment, 510"-, end
Public Reading Room for U.S.

and store naval spent
nuclear fuel.
• Receive DOE-wide spent nuclear fuel.
o Phase out Idaho Chemical
Processing Plant-603 storage pools.
o Expand storage capacity in existing
Idaho Chemical Processing PIant-666
po<'!3.
o Phase In expanded dry storage.
o Demonstrate electrometallurglcal

Department 0' Energy
University of Illinois al Chicago library
Government Documents Section
801 Soulh Morgan Slreet
Chicago, Il 60607
(312)996·2738
Monday-Thursday 8:00 a.m. 10 10:00 p.m..
Friday 8:00 a.m. 10 7:00 p.m.. Saturday 10:00 a.m. 10
5:00 p.m., Sunday 1:00 p.m. 10 9:00 p.m.

Public Reading Room for U.S.
Department of Energy
National Alomic Mut.eum
20358 Wyoming Boulevard. SE
Albuquerque, NM 87185

(505) 845-4378
Monday-Friday 9:00 a.m. 10 5:00 p.m.
Publtc Anding Room for U.S.
Department 01 Energy
Nevada Opel'ltlonl Office
Coordination and Information Cenler
3084 South Highland Drive
P.O. 80)( 98521
las Vegas. NV 89106
(702) 295-0731
Monday·Friday 7:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.
Publtc Information Room for U.S.
Dep8rtment of Energy

Fernald Ope_I OfIIc:o
PubUc Environmental Center
JANTER Building 10845
Hamihon·Cleves HiOhway

Harrison. OH 445030
(513) 738.()184
Monday and Thursday 9:00 a.m. 10 7:00 p.m.•
Tuesday. Wednesday. and Friday 9:00 a.m. 10 4:30 p.m..
Saturday 9 a.m. 10 1 p.m.

_,og

Public
Room 'Of U.S.
Doponmont 0' EMfg'f

Sav.nnet! RI.,... Operations Offlce
Public Reading Room
Road lA. Building 703A. 0232
Aiken. SC 29802
(803)841 ·3320
Monday·Thursday 8:00 a.m. 10 11:00 p.m.,
Friday 8:00 a.m. 10 5:00 p.m..
Salurday 10:00 a.m. 10 5:00 p.m..
Sunday 2:00 p.m. 10 11 :00 p.m.
Public Reading Room lor U.S.
Departmenl or Energy
Oak Ridge Operellons Office
Public Reading Room
S5 Jefferson Allenue
Oak Ridge. TN 37831
1615) 576·1216
Monday·Friday 8:00 a.m. 10 11 :30 a.m. and
12:30 p.m. 10 5:00 p.m.
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Public Reading Room for U.S.

Virginia Beach Central LIbrary

Department of Energy
Richland Operations Office

4100 Virginia Beach Blvd.

Washinglon State University Trf·Cities

Virginia Beach. VA 23452
(B04) 431·3001

Pe.rl Harbor Naval Shipyard
Alea Public Library
99· 143 Manalua Ad.
Alea. HI 96701

100 SprOUl Road, Room 130West
Richland, WA 99352

Monday·Thursday 10:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m.•
Friday and Salurday 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.rn ..

(BOB) 488·2654

(509) 376-B583

Sunday 1:00 p.m. 10 5:00 p.m.

Monday and Thursday 10:00 a.m. 10 8:00 p.m,.

Monday· Friday 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and
t :OO p.m. to 4:30 p.m.

Puget Sound Naval Shipyard

Tuesday. Wednesday. Friday. and Saturday
10:00 a.m. 10 5:00 p.m.

Navy Information Locations

Kltsap Regional Library

Norfolk Naval Shipyard

1301 Sylvan Way
Bremerton. WA 98310
(206) 377·7601

Chnlpeake Cantril Library
298 Cedar Rd.
Chesapeake, VA 23320-5512
(B04) 43&-8300

Monday· Thursday 9:30 a.m. to 9:00 p.m.•
Friday and Salurday 9:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.,
Sunday 12:30 p.m. 10 5:30 p.m.

Hawaii State Library
478 South King Streel

Tuesday and Thursday 9:00 a.m, 10 8:00 p.m.•

Monday· Thursday 7:30 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.•
Friday 7:30 a.m. 10 6:00 p.m..
Salurday 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p,m"
Sunday 11 :00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.

Newpor1 News Public Library

Monday·Friday 10:00 a.m. 10 5:30 p.m.

(BOB) 455-4134
Monday·Wednesday 10:00 a.m. 10 8:00 p.m..
Thursday and Salurday 10:00 a.m, 10 5:00 p.m..
Friday and Sunday 1:00 p.m. 10 5:00 p,m.

University 01 Washington

Pearl H.tI)or NIYSII e... Llbrlry

Seattle, WA 98185
(206) 543·9158

Code9Ol
1614 Makalapa Dr.
Pearl Harbor, HI 96860-5350

Friday 7:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.•
Saturday 9:00 a,m. to 5:00 p.m.•

Tuesday·Thursday 10:00 a.m. 10 7:00 p,m.•

Norlolk. VA 23510
(B04) 441·2429

Sunday 12:00 noon to 12:00 midnight

Friday and SaIUrday 9:00 a.m. 10 5:00 p.m..

Monday. Thursday 9:00 a.m. 10 9:00 p.m.,
Friday 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.,
Saturday 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

Portsmouth Naval Shipyard

Sunday 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.

KHMlringSl1e
Rice Public Llbrlry
8 Wentworth Streel

Hampton Public Library
4207 Victoria Boulevard

Kittery. ME 03904
(207) 439·1553

Hampton. VA 23669

Monday·Wednesday. Friday 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m..

(B04}727·1154

Thursday 10:00 a.m. 10 8:00 p.m,.
Saturday 10:00 a.m. 10 4:00 p.m.

Monday·Thursday 9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m.•

(BOB) 471-8238

Alblny Public Ubrlry
Reference and AduH Services
161 Washington Ave.
Albany, NY 12210

Mondc."Y'Thursday 9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m..
Friday 9:00 a.m 10 6:00 p.m.•

Portsmouth Public Library

Saturday 9:00 a.m. 10 5:00 p.m.•

8 Islington Streel

Sunday 1:00 p.m, 10 5:00 p.m.

Portsmouth Public LIbrary
Main Branch

Portsmouth. NH 03801
(603) 427·1540

Sliratoge Springs Public Library

601 CourtSl

Monday·Thursday 9:00 a,m, to 9:00 p.m"

320 Broadway

Portsmouth. VA 23704
(B04) 393-B501
Monday. Thursday 9:00 a.m to 9:00 p.m.

Friday 9:00 a.m. 10 5:30 p.m.•
Saturday 9:00 a,m, to 5:00 p.m.

Saratoga Springs. NY 12866
(51 B) 584·7860

Monday·Thursday 9:00 a.m. 10 9:00 p.m..
Friday 9:00 a.m. 10 6:00 p.m..
Salurday 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.•
Sunday 1:00 p.m. 10 5:00 p.m,

Friday and Saturday 9:00 a.m to 5:00 p.m.

Main Library
University 01 Calilornia allrvine
Government Publications Receiving Dock
Irvine. CA 92717
(714) B24·6836
School Hours:
Monday· Thursday 8:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m..
Friday 8:00 a.m. 10 9:00 p.m"
Saturday 9:00 a,m, 106:00 p.m..
Sunday 12:00 noon 10 1:00 a.m.
Summer Hours:
Monday·Friday 8:00 a.m. 10 5:00 p.m..
Salurday and Sunday 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.
Pleuanton Public Llbrlry· Reference Desk
400 Old Bemal Avenue
Pleasanton. CA 94566
(510) 462·3535
Monday and Tuesday 1:00 p.m. 10 8:00 p.m..
Wednesday 10:00 a.m. 10 8:00 p.m.,
Thursday 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.•
Closed Friday
Saturday and Sunday 1:00 p,m. 10 5:00 p,m..

(5 1B) 449-3380

Friday and Saturday 9:00 a.m. 10 5:00 p.m.•
Sunday 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.

(2OB) 384·4023

Monday·Thursday 8:00 a.m, to 9:30 p.m"
Friday 8:00 a.m. 105:00 p.m.•
Sunday 2:30 p.m. 10 9:30 p,m.

Other Locations

Saturday 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

Grissom Branch

301 Easl City Hall Ave.

Sunday 1.00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.

Idlho Sill. Library
325 West Stale Street
Boise. 10 83702
(2OB) 334·2152

Monday·Thursday 9:00 a.m. to

a:oo p.m.•

Friday and Saturday 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m"
Sunday 2:00 p.m, to 6:00 p.m.
AeeHLlbrary
Augusla College
Augusta. GA 30904·2200
(706) 737·1744

School Hours:
Monday·Thursday 7:45 a.m. to 10:3Op.m.,
Friday 7:45 a.m. 10 5:00 p.m.•
Saturday 9:00 a.m. 10 5:00 p,m..
Sunday 1:30 p.m. to 9:30 p.m.
Summer Hours:

Shosho,.Bannock Library
Bannock and Pima Sireets. HAOC Building
FOIl Hall. 10 83203
(208) 238·3882
Monday·Friday 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

Idaho Falls Public Library
457 Broadway
Idaho Falls. 1083402
(208) 529-1462
Monday·Thursday 9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m.
Friday and Saturday 9:00 a.m. 10 5:30 p.m.•
Sunday 1:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m,

Monday·Friday 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

University 01 Idaho Ubrary

Challu1m-Effinglu1m-Liberty
RegIo",,1 Library

Moscow, 1083844·2353
(208) 885-6344

2002 Boll Streel

Monday·Friday 8:00 a.m. 10 12:00 midnight.
Salurday 9:00 a.m. 10 12:00 midnight.

Aayburn Street

Savannah. GA 31401
(912) 652·3600

Sunday 10:00 a.m. 10 12:00 midnighl

Monday·Thursday 9:00 a,m, 10 g:OO p.m.•
Friday 9:00 a.m, 10 6:00 p.m"
Salurday 10:00 a.m, 10 6:00 p.m.•

Pocatello Public Library

Sunday 2:00 p.m, 10 6:00 p.m.

812 East ClarX Sireel
Pocatello. 1083201

ParULlbrlry

Monday· Thursday 9:30 a.m, to 8:00 p.m.

(20B) 232·1263
Iowa State Unrversity
Government Publications Departmenl

Sunday 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.

Monday·Friday 9:00 a.m. 10 5:00 p.m.

2500 Walton Way

820 "E' Sireet
San Diego. CA 92tOl
(6191236·5887
Monday·Thursday 10:00 a.m. 109:00 p.m.•
Friday and Saturday 9:30 a.m. 10 5:30 p,m"
Sunday t :OO p.m, 10 5:00 p.m.

Monday-Wednesday 10:00 a.m. 109:00 p.m..
Thursday·Saturday 10:00 a.m. 10 5:30 p.m.•

Saturday and Sunday 12:00 noon to 5:00 p.m,

t Margaret Mitchell Square

San Olego Public Library

Denver Public Library
1357 Broadway
Denver. CO 80203
(303) 640·8845

Monday and Friday 10:00 a.m. 10 6:00 p.m.,
Tuesday-Thursday 10:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m.,

AUantl Public Library

Monday. Wednesday. and Friday.
9:00 a.m. 10 5:00 p.m.•

Pe.rt City Public Library

Monday·Thursday 7:30 a.m. to 12:00 midnight,

Monday· Thursday. 9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m.•
Fnday and Saturday. 9:00 a,m. 10 5:00 p.m..

Atlanla. GA 30303

1138 Waimano Home Rd.
Pearl City. HI 96782

Kiln Ubtary

Gainesville. FL 32611 -7001
(904) 392·0367

(404) 730-1700

612 5th Ave.

Sunday 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.

715 South Capitol Boulevard
Boise. 10 83702

(5181388·4511

Tucson. AZ 85721
(602) 621-6421

Bremerton, WA 98310
(206) 377-3955

Monday'Thursday 9:00 a.M. to 9:00 p.m.,
Friday and Saturday 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.,

P,O. Box 117001

University 01 Arizona

Kjtup Rtglonal Llbrlry

Suullo Llbrlry SM25
University 01 Washington Ubfaries

Boise Public Library

University 01 Florida Library. Room 241

Main Library

Downtown Branch

(B04) 88&-7B96

George A. Smathers Libraries, Library West

Honolulu. HI 96813
(B08) 586·3535

Monday. Thursday 9:00 a.m to 9:00 p.m.•
Friday and Salurday 9:00 a.m to 5:00 p.m..
Sunday t :OO p.m to 5:00 p.m.

366 Deshazor Dr.
Newport News. VA 23602

Schenectady County Library
99 Clinlon Slreet
Schenectady. NY , 2305

Ames. IA 50011 -2140
(515) 294·3642
School Hours:

Friday and Saturday 9:30 a.m. 10 5:30 p.m.
Twin Falls Public Library
434 Second Streel East
Twin Falls. 10 8330t

MOnday,Thursday 7:30 a.m. to 12:00 midnighl,

(20B) 733·2964

Friday 7:30 a.m. 10 10:00 p.m.•
Saturday 10:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m..

Monday, Friday, and 5a!\Jrday 10:00 a.m. 10 6:00 p.m..
Tuesday- Thursday 10:00 a.m. to 9:00 p,m.

Sunday 12:30 p.m. to 12:00 midnight.
Summer Hours:
Monday·Thursday 7:30 a.m. 10 10:00 p.m.•
Friday 7:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.•
Saturday 12:30 p.m, 10 5:00 p.m..
Sunday 12:30 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.
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Main Library, Third Floor
UnIVersity 01 Illinois
801 South Morgan. Mail Code 234
Chicago. Il 60607
(312)413-2594
Monday.ThYrsday 7:30 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.•
Friday 7:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.,
Saturday 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.,
Sunday 1:00 p.m. 10 9:00 p.m.
Documents Library, 200-0
University of Illinois
1408 W. Gregory Drive

O'leary Library
University 01 Massachusetts

Zanhow Library
Saginaw Valley Stale University

Omaha Public Library
215 S. 15th Street
Omaha, NE 68102

1 University Ave

7400 Bay Road
University Cenler. MI 48710

lowell. MA 01854
(508)934-3205

School Hours:

(402)44....800
Monday· Thursday 9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m.•
Friday and Saturday 9:00 a.m. 105:30 p.m.,

School Hoors:
Monday-Thursday 7:30 a.m. to 12:00 midnight.

Monday·Thursday 8:00 a.m. 10 11 :00 p.m.•

Sunday 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.

Friday 7:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.,
Salurday 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.,

Saturday 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.•
Sunday 1:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.

Sunday 1:00 p.m. to 12 midnight

Summer Hours:
Monday·Thursday 8:00 a.m. to 10:30 p.m.,

Summer Hours:
Monday·Friday 8:30 a.m. 10 9:00 p.m.•
Sunday 2:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m.

Umana. tl 61801

(511)790-4240

Friday 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m..

Friday 8:00 a.m. 10 4:30 p.m.,

General Library
University 01 New Mexico
Albuquerque, NM 87131-1466
(505) m -5441

cardinal Hay" Library
Manhattan College
4531 Manhattan College Parkway
Riverdale, NY 10471

(814)665-2112

School Hours:

Monday·Thursday 8:00 a.m. 10 11 :00 p.m..

Monday-Thursday 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 midnight.

Friday 8:00 a.m. 106:30 p.m.•

Friday 8:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.•
Saturday 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m.,

Saturday 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.•
Sunday 1:00 p.m. to 11 :oop.m..

Sunday 1:00 p.m. 10 12:00 midnight.

Summer Hours:
Monday-Thursday 8:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m..

Summer Houts:
Monday-Thursday 7:45 a.m. to 10:00 p.m..

School Hours :
Monday-Thursday 8:00 a.m. 10 9:00 p.m..

FriOay 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.

Friday 8:00 a.m. 10 5:00 p.m.,
Saturday and Sunday 12:00 noon to 4:00 p.m..

Brookhaven National Laboratory
25 Brookhaven Avenue, Building 477 A

Worentar Public Llbr.ry

(217) 244-2060
gchool Hoors:
Monday·Thursday 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 midnight.

3 Salem Square
Worchester, MA 01608

EIII.Llbrary
University 01 Missouri

Summer Hours:
Monday-Friday 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.,

P.O. Box 5000
Upton, NY 11973·5000

Friday 8:00 a.m. 10 6:00 p.m.•

(508)7990 1655
Monday-Thursday 9:00 a.m. 10 9:00 p.m.•

Columbia, MO 65201
(31 4) 882.()748

Saturday 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

Friday and Saturday 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.

School Hours:
Monday-Thursday 7:30 a.m. to 12:00 midnight,

U.S. DOE Community Reading Room

(5 16)282-3489
Monday-Friday 8:30 a.m. to 9:00 p.m..
safVfday and Sunday 9:00 a.m. 10 5:00 p.m.

Bethesda Public Library
7400 Artington Road

Friday 7:30 a.m. to 11 :00 p.m.,

MSC314
los Alamos, NM 87544

Saturday 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.,
Sunday 1:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight
Summer Hours:
Monday-Thursday 8:00 a.m. 10 9:00 p.m.•

Bethesda, MD 20814

Saturday 9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m.,
Sunday 12:00 noon to 1:00 a.m.

(30 1)986-4300
Monday-Thursday 10:00 a.m. to 8:30 p.m.,

Summer Hours:
Monday and Thursday 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. ,

Engineering Ubrary

Friday 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m..

Purdue University
West lafayette, IN 47907

Saturday 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m..
Sunday 1:00 p.m. 10 5:00 p.m.

Tuesday. Wednesday, and Friday 8:00 a.m. 10 5:00 p.m.•
Saturday 12:00 noon to 5:00 p.m.

Friday 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.,
Salurday 9:00 a.m. 10 5:00 p.m.•
Sunday 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.

Lockwood LIbrary
Stale University of New York· Buffalo

Friday 7:45 a.m. 109:00 p.m..
Saturday 8:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m..
Sunday 1:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m.
Narragansan Public Llbnry
35 Kingston Road
Narragansett, AI 02882
(401)789-9507
Monday 10:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m.,
Tuesday-Friday 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m..

1450 Central Avenue, Suite 101

(505)665·2127
Monday·FriOay 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

University Par\(. PA 16801

(71 8)920·0100

School Hours:

Sunday 1:00 p.m. 10 5:00 p.m.

Saturday 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.,

Paneellbr1ry
Pennsylvaria State UniverSity

Columbus Me!ropolltan Library

96 SOuth Grant Avenue

Saturday 10:00 a.m. 105:00 p.m.
(Saturday hours September to May only)

Columbus. OH 43215
(614) 645-2710
Monday·Thursday 9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m.,
Friday and Saturday 9:00 am. to 6:00 p.m.,

Char1eston County MIIln Llbr1ry
404 King Street

Sunday 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.

Charleston. 5C 29403
(803) 723-1645
Monday-Thursday 9:30 a.m. 10 9:00 p.m.•

Buffalo, NY 14260-2200
Curtis Law.Wilson Library

(716)645-2816

Kerr Llbr.ry

Friday-Saturday 9:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.•

University of Missouri Ubrary
Rolla, MO 65401.()249

School Hours:

Oregon Slal~ University

Sunday 2:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.

Monday-Thursday 8:00 a.m. to 10:45 p.m.•

Corvallis, OR 97331 ·4905

Friday 8:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.•

G.lthersburg Regional Library
18330 Montgomery v.nage Avenue
Gaithersburg, MD 20879

(314)341-4227

(301)840-2515
Monday-Thursday 10:00 a.m. to 8:30 p.m.,

School Hours:
Monday·Thursday 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 midnight,

Friday 8:00 a.m. 10 9:00 p.m..
Salutday 9:00 am. 105:00 p.m.•

(503)737-0123
Monday·Friday 7:45 a.m. to 12:00 midnight.

South Carolina State Llbrlry

Saturday 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.•
Sunday 1:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnighl.

Sunday 1:00 p.m. 109:00 p.m.,

Saturday and Sunday 10:00 a.m. to 12:00 mid·

Columbia, SC 29201

Summer Hoors:
Monday·Friday 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

FriOay 10:00 a.m. 10 5:00 p.m.•

Friday 8:00 a.m. to 10:30 p.m.,

Saturday 9:00 am. to 5:00 p.m.,

Summer Hours:
Monday, Wednesday, Thursday and

(803) 734-8666
Monday·Friday 8:15 a.m. to 5:30 p.m.,

Sunday 1:00 p.m. 10 5:00 p.m.

Saturday 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.,
Sunday 2:00 p.m. to 12:00 midnight,

night.
Summer Hours:
Monday· Friday 7:45 a.m. 109:00 p.m.,

Juliette and Poyntz

Summer Hours:
Monday· Friday 8:00 a.m. 10 5:00 p.m.

Tuesday 9:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.
Sunday 1:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.

Salurday 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.•

HVtrttsville Public Ubrary

Sunday 10:00 to 9:00 p.m.

Manhattan, Ks 66502
(913) n6-4741
Monday·Friday 9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m.,

6530 Adelphi Road

Clinton Public Library
118 South Hicks streel

Hyattsville. MD 20782

O.H. Hili Library

Engineering Library

Brantford Price MiII.r Llbr1ry

Clinton. TN 37716

(301) n9-9330
Monday·Thursday 10:00 a.m. 10 9:00 p.m.,

North Carolina State University

Cornell University
Carpenter Hall, Main Floor

Portland Slate University

(615)457-0519
Monday and Thursday 10:00 a.m. 108:00 p.m.,

Ithaca, NY 14853
(607) 255-5762

Portland. OR 97201
(503)725-4617
Monday·Thursday 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 midnight.

Tuesday, Wednesday. Friday. and
Saturday 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

(317) 494-2871

School Hoors:
Monday·Thursday 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 midnight.

M.nhattan Pu~ lc Library

Saturday 9:00 a.m to 6:00 p.m..
Sunday 2:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m

Friday 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m..
Saturday 10:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.•

P.O. Box 711 1
Ralelgh,NC 27695--7111

Friday 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.,

934 s.w. Harrison

1SOO Senate Streel

Saturday 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.

M.ssachusetts Institute ot
Technology Science library

Sunday 1:00 p.m. 10 5:00 p.m.

(919)515-3364
School Hours:
Monday-Thursday 7:00 a.m. to 1:00 a.m.,

Friday 8:00 a.m. 10 10:00 p.m.•

Karriman Public library

160 Memonal Drive Building 14

Ann Arbor Pu~l<; Library

Friday 7:00 a.m. 10 9:30 p.m.,

Friday 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.•

Saturday 10:00 a.m. 10 to:oo p.m.•

601 Walden Streel

Cambridge, MA 02139

343 South 5th Avenue

Harriman. TN 37748

(617) 253-5685
Monday·Thursday 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 midnight,

Saturday 10:00 a.m. 10 6:00 p.m..
Sunday 12:00 noon to 11:00 p.m.•

Sunday 11 :00 a.m. to 12:00 midnight

Friday and Salurday 8:00 a.m. 10 8:00 p.m.,

Ann Arbor. MI 48104
(313)994-2335
Monday 10:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m.,

Saturday 9:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m..
Sunday 1:00 p.m. to 1:00 a.m.
Summer Hours:
Monday· Thursday 7:00 a.m. to 11 :00 p.m.,

Summer Hours:
Monday·Friday 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p m..

Sunday 12:00 noon 10 12:00 midnight

Tuesday·Friday 9:00 a.m. to 9:00 p.m..

Friday 7:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.,

Saturday 12:00 noon to 6:00 p.m.

Saturday 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m..

Saturday 9:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m..
Sunday 1:00 p.m. 10 11 :00 p.m.

Sunday 1:00 p.m. 10 5:00 p.m.

$chool Hours:
Monday·Thursday 8:00 a.m. to 11 :00 p.M. ,

(615) 882-3195
Monday-Thursday 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.,
Friday and Salurday 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m.
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Kingston Public Library
1000 Bradford Way Building #3

Evans Library
Texas A&M University. MS 5000

Owen Science & Eng ineering LIbrary

Kingston. TN 3n63

College Staticn. TX n843-SOOO

(6151376-9905
Monday and Thursday 10:00 a.m. to 7:30 p.m.,
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1. INTRODUCTION
The u.s. Department of Energy (DOE) is evaluating its options for two separate but related
sets of decisions pertinent to the management of the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) for which the DOE is
responsible. As a result, this Environmental Impact Statement" (EIS) is divided into two parts.
Volume 1 involves programmatic (DOE-wide) approaches to the management of DOE's SNF;
Volume 2 discusses site-specific approaches for environmental restoration and waste management
activities at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, including SNF management. This EIS has
been prepared in accordance with the National Environmental Policy Act and its applicable
implementing regulations (40 CFR Parts 1500-1508 and 10 CFR Part 1021).
The DOE's proposed action for Volume 1 is to safely, effiCiently, and responsibly manage
existing and projected quantities of DOE's SNF through the year 2035, pending ultimate disposition.
Volume 1 has been developed to support DOE's decisioomaking on the most appropriate location for
implementing national strategies for managing DOE's SNF until its ultimate disposition is detertnined
and implemented . For planning purposes, it has been assumed that decisions regarding ultimate
disposition strategies may require as long as 40 years to implement. The general environmental
consequences of managing SNF in a range of configurations at various sites are summarized in this
volume.
Volume 1 is supported by site-specific appendices (under separate cover) that provide detailed
information on the consequences of management activities under each alternative at the Hanford Site
(Appendix A); Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (Appendix B); Savannah River Site
(Appendix C); naval SNF management facilities , including management of naval SNF at DOE
facilities (Appendix D); other generator/storage sites (Appendix E); and the Oak Ridge Reservation
and the Nevada Test Site (Appendix F). This EIS does DOt select site-specific technical management
options presented in Appendices A through F. The management options are representative of
potential activities at each of the sites under consideration.
Volume 2 addresses the Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programs at the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. DOE objectives for the next 10 years are to mitigate the
impacts of past operations through environmental restoration and to treat, store, or dispose of waste at
the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory in a way that minimizes future adverse impacts.
Volume 3 summarizes the comments that DOE received on the Draft EIS during the public
comment period and provides responses to those comments. Volume 3 also discusses the extent to

a. The Department of Energy Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programs Environmental
Impact Statement (SNF and INEL EIS).
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which public comments resulted in changes to this EIS and describes how to find specific comment
summaries and responses.

1.1 Overview of Spent Nuclear Fuel in the DOE Complex
This section is an introduction to the nature, types, and quantities of DOE SNF; the historic
generation and storage of SNF; and the current program structure as it existed in April 1995. This
section also explains what SNF is not included in this EIS as DOE SNF.
1.1.1 What is Spent Nuclear Fuel
Nuclear reactors use a process called fission to generate heat to produce electricity and to
generate power to propel Navy ships and submarines. Production reactors have been used to produce
defense materials at DOE facilities and radioisotopes for industrial and medical use. Some colleges
and universities, government facilities, and commercial establishments use nuclear reactors for
research and educational purposes, as well . Fuel that has been withdrawn from a nuclear reactor
following irradiation, the constituent elements of which have not been separated, is called spent
nuclear fuel, or SNF. The EIS also evaluates uranium/neptunium target materials, blanket
subassemblies, pieces of fuel, and debris. Contact-handled fuel/targets (that is, fuel/targets with
radiation levels low enough to permit handling without shielding or remote operations), even though
slightly irradiated, are not included. This material will be managed by DOE along with the other
excess nuclear materials.
1.1.1.1 Configuration of Nuc/e.rfue/. The fuel in a nuclear reactor consists of fuel
assemblies that may range in number from one to several hundred, depending upon the reactor size
and the design of the reactor and fuel assemblies. Fuel assemblies are constructed in many
configurations, but they generally consist of the fuel matrix, cladding, and structural hardware.

The fuel matrix contains the fissionable material (typically uranium oxide or uranium metal).
The matrix form is typically plates or cylindrical pellets. For gas-cooled reactors, the matrix may be
small particles. The cladding is the encapsulation (typically zirconium, aluminum, or stainless steel)
that surrounds the fuel, confining and protecting it. For gas-cooled reactors, this may be a ceramic
coating over the fuel particles.
The strucrural parts of a fuel assembly hold fuel in the proper configuration and direct coolant
flow (typically water) over the fuel. Structural hardware is generally nickel alloys, stainless steel,
zirconium, or aluminum, or, for gas-cooled reactors, graphite. The size of a fuel assembly ranges
from a weight of I lcilogram (2 .2 pounds) and a length of less than I meter (3 feet) to a weight of
more than 450 Idlograms (1,000 pounds) and a length of more than 3 meters (10 feet) . Fi!'llre I-I
illustrates a representative fuel element.
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Figure 1-1. Representative reactor fuel assembly and element.

1.1.1.2 Properties of Spent Nucle.r Fuel. When it is initially removed from a reactor,
SNF is highly radioactive. A fraction of the initial mass of fissionable material (uranium-235 or
plutonium) has been converted into fission products, some of which are radioactive with half-lives
ranging from a few seconds to thousands of years. At the time of withdrawal from the reactor, most
of the radioactivity is associated with fission products with very short half-lives. The radioactivity
from SNF decreases very rapidly over time after irradiation. After I year, the levels are about
I percent of that at the time of removal. After 10 years, these levels have decreased by another
factor of 10.
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The radiation of most concern from SNF is gamma rays. Although the radiation levels can be
very higb, the gamma-ray intensities are readily reduced by shielding fuel elements with such
materials as concrete, lead, steel, and water. The thickness of the required shielding is dependent on
the energy of the radiation source; the desired protection level, and the density of the shielding
material . Typically, shielding thicknesses for concrete or lead are much smaller than for water.

In addition to the Spent Fuel Worlcing Group report on vulnerabilities and the associated plans
of action to resolve the identified vulnerabilities, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board issued
Recommendation 94-1 (Conway 1994) calling for DOE to develop an expedited schedule for resolving
identified vulnerabilities across the DOE complex. Recommendation 94-1 was critical of DOE's lact
of urgency in correcting known SNF management deficiencies. Further, Recommendation 94-1
criticized DOE' s lack of prioritization of corrective actions and lact of an integrated systems approach
to resolving previously identified SNF management issues. DOE has developed a plan for
implementing Recommendation 94- I across the DOE complex. DOE's Implementation Plan (DOE
1995a) for Recommendation 94-1 was submitted to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board on
February 28, 1995. The plan includes a prioritization of corrective actions to remedy known
deficiencies utilizing a DOE complex-wide syster..s approach and considering limited budgets. The
plan focuses on fulfilling outstanding commitments to other parties (for exatnple, court-ordered
milestones) and fully recognizes the urgency required to rectify long-standing SNF management

The radioactivity produces heat, and the assemblies must be cooled for a period of months to
years following removal from the reactor to prevent excessive fuel temperatures from being reached .
Typically, the SNF removed from reactors has been stored in water pools for a period of 3 to
18 months for cooling before transfer to other facilities for storage or processing. Storage systems
are designed to prevent nuclear criticality (nuclear chain reaction).
Many fuel elements that are now SNF, particularly production reactor fuel, were designed to
be easily dissolved in nitric acid for uranium-235 and plutonium recovery. Because the fuels were
designed for only short-term storage, prolonged storage sometimes presents problems. For exatnple,
some fuels, such as a1uminum-clad fuels, corrode during prolonged storage in water pools unless the
water chemistry within the pool is carefully controlled. Corrosion can result in cladding failures and
the release of small quantities of fission products, especially radioactive gases and readily soluble

issues .
1.1 .2 DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel Management
For the purposes of this document, SNF is separated into two categories: commercial SNF
and DOE-managed SNF. The management of commercial SNF (with a few special-case exceptions)
is outside the scope of this SNF and INEL EIS and is not discussed further herein."

isotopes.
1.1.1.3 SNF Management Vulne/"abllitlea. Prolonged storage of some types of SNF has
resulted in deterioration of the cladding, degradation of the fuel matrix, or other storage problems
leading to significant environmental, safety, and health concerns. DOE reported its evaluation of
these concerns in a Spent Fuel Working Group Report on inventory and Storage of the Department's
Spent Nuclear Fuel and Other Reactor irradiated Nuclear Materials and their Envirolll7U!nlal, Safety
and Health Vulnerabilities in November 1993 (DOE 1993a). This evaluation was followed by a Plan
of Action to Resolve Spent Nuclear Fuel Vulnerabilities in February 1994, which identified three
phases to resolve those vulnerabilities (DOE 1994a). This Phase I Action Plan, which addresses the
most urgent activities, was issued immediately. The Phase II Action Plan was released April 1994 for
public comment (DOE I 994b). The Phase m plan was issued in October 1994 (DOE 1994c).
Phases I, II, and ill corrective actions include activities at the main DOE SNF storage sites .
Exatnples of corrective action projects include installing equipment to improve storage pool water
quality at the Savannab River Site; transferring fuel from an old, inadequate water pool to a newer
pool at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory; removal of all fuel and sludge from the
I05-K basins at the Hanford Site.
Some of the SNF Action Plan activities could potentially result in emission and effluents .
These effects are not individually analyzed because their impacts are no greater than the impacts of
normal SNF management activities reported and analyzed for each site in Volume I and the respective
site appendices. Successful completion of the corrective actions would reduce the potential for health
and safety problems to the workers and public and minimize degradation to the environment.
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Since 1943, DOE and its predecessor agencies have generated more than 100,000 metric tons
of heavy metal b (MTHM) of SNF, of which about 2,700 metric tons remains. This SNF was
generated in various programs in different types of reactors, including ilOE defense production
reactors, United States naval reactors, and DOE test and experimental reactors. In addition, DOE has
accepted responsibility for SNF from non-DOE sources, including United States university research
reactors, special-case commercial power reactors, and selected foreign research reactors.
In 1992, the Secretary of Energy directed the DOE to develop an integrated, long-term SNF
management progratn. This progratn is assessing DOE's SNF and fuel storage facilities, integrating
DOE's many existing SNF activities into one progratn, deciding the most appropriate and responsible
means of facility operation, and ensuring that issues associated with SNF are resolved safely and cost

a. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as atnended, gives DOE the responsibility and ultimate title for
the Nation's SNF. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as atnended, sets up the process for
disposition of the Nation's commercial nuclear power reactor SNF in a mined geologic repository and
malces provisions for cost recovery for the ultimate disposition of that SNF. It also specifies the
procedures for ultimate disposition of DOE's high-level waste and SNF.
b. Quantities of fresh nuclear fuel, SNF, and targets are traditionally expressed in terms of metric
tons of heavy metal (typically uranium), without the· inclusion of other materials, such as cladding,
alloy materials, and structural materials. A metric ton equals approximately 2,200 pounds.
1-5
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effectively. Solutions to the storage questions may require changes in Ibe management strategies for
these fuels, including such options as the construction of new facilities and stabilization of certain
fuels . The program has also established a programma:,. objective to define a management path and
proceed toward ultimate disposition of DOE-managed SNF, as outlined in DOE (l994d). A number
of activities are currently in process to meet or address this objective. Appendix J, Spent Nuclear
Fuel Management, provides an overview of technologies for SNF management.
For various reasons, including the lack of characterization data on the interim storage behavior
of certain SNF types and the fact that the acceptance criteria for ultimate disposition have not yet been
defined , DOE cannot yet make all the decisions for the full 4O-year period. Therefore, this EIS
focuses on issues relating to deciding the locations of future SNF management activities.
DOE faces a number of major programmatic and site-specific decisions regarding SNF
management over the next 40 years including
Where should DOE locate specific SNF management activities? Broadly, the
alternatives include managing the SNF where it is and minimizing shipments;
consolidating the SNF at a limited number of sites (the Decentralization, 199211993
Planning Basis, and Regionalization 4A and 4B alternatives); or consolidating the SNF
at a central site.
What capabilities, facilities, and technologies are needed for SNF management? DOE
has identified the need for SNF interim storage sites and must select appropriate means
at each site for meeting these needs under each of the SNF siting alternatives.
What research and development activities should support the SNF management
program?
1.1.2.1 Current and Projected Spent Nuc/ear Fuellnventorles. Table I-I summarizes
!he current inventories of SNF at DOE and other facilities and thos ~ projected to be generated through
!he year 2035. These estimates are based on assumptions regarding reasonably foreseeable future
reactor operations and the generation rates of SNF for which DOE is responsible. The principal SNF
generators and storage sites for SNF are described below and in Appendices A through F. Figure 1-2
illustrates those locations, as well as represenl'otive points of entry for foreign fuels under
consideration in this EIS .
1.1.2.2 DOE FaCilities. During !he last four decades, DOE and its predecessor agencies
have transported, received, reprocessed, and stored SNF at various facilities in the nationwide DOE
complex. Three of the DOE facilities have primary responsibility for managing DOE SNF; several
others have smaller roles in SNF management.
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Table 1-1. Spent nuclear fuel inventory.a
Existing
Generator or storage site

b

Total

Future mcreasel
(Ihrough 2035)

(1995)

MTHMc

Perceot

MTHMc

Perceot

(2035)

MTHMc

Perceot

2132.44

77.8
10.0

DOE Silts
Hanford Site

2132.44

80.6

0.00

0.0

Idaho Nalional Engineering
lAbol1llory

261.23

9.9

12.92

U .S

274.14

Savannah River Site

206.27

7.8

0.00

0.0

206.27

7 .S

Oak Ridge Reservalion

0.65

<0.1

1.13

1.2

1.78

<0.1

Other DOE Sites

0.78

2.28

<0.1

<0. 1

1.50

1.6

Naval Nuclear Propulsion Reactors

O.OOd

0.0

55.00

57.6

55.0

2.0

Forrign Research Reactor

0.00

0.0

21.70

22.7

21.70

0.8

Domestic Research and Test

2.22

<0.1

3.28

3.4

5.50

0.2

Special-Case Commereial
SNF at non-DOE location/

42.69

1.6

0

0

42.69

1.6

Non-DOE Domestic
Reactors e

Totalg,b

2646.27

95.53

2741.80

96.5

3.5

100.0

Pereent of 2035 total

•. Soun:e: Wichmann (1995). Changes to the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) inventory contained in the Dl1Ift
Environmental Impact Statement were made to reflect updated inventories at domestic research and test
reaclors and 10 remove materials that are contact-bandied (i.e., materials unirradiated or slightly irradiated).
b. The Nevada Test Site does not currently slore or generate SNF and is not expected to generate SNF
Ihrough 2035.
c. MTHM = melric tons of heavy metal. Ooe MTHM equals approximately 2,200 pounds.
d. Exisling invenlory of naval SNF (10.23 MTHM) is included in the Idaho Nalional Engineering
Laboralory totals.
e. lncludes research reactors at commercial, university, and government facilities.
f. The total inventory of SNF from special-<:aSe commercial reactors is 186.41 MTHM. The 42.69 MTHM
indicaled here is just that stored at the Babcock & Wilcox Research Center, Fort SI. Vrain Reactor, and West
Valley Demonstration Project. The remaining special~ commercial SNF is stored at the Idaho National

Engineering Laboralory, Oalc Ridge Reservalion, Hanford Site, and Savannah River Site and is included in
the lotals (in this table) for those sites.
g. (:hanges to the fuel inveolory occurred due to recalculalion of the Idaho National Engineering lAbol1ltory
invenlory al the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II and Hot Fuel Examinalion Facility and the removal of
contacl-handled fuel.
h. Numbers may not sum due to rounding.
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commercial and experimental SNF. As shown in Table I-I, the Hanford Site currently stores over
80 percent (by MTHM) of the current complex-wide SNF.
Idaho National EngIneering Laboflltol)'-The Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory is one of the principal centers in the DOE complex for nuclear research and development.
Ongoing activities include continued safe storage of SNF, continued reactor operations, and onsite
fuel transfers to reduce identified vulnerabilities.
As a result of its historic mission, the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory bas been safely
managing SNF for over 40 years. This site is the home of the Expended Core Facility and the Naval
Reactors Facility, which are central to the Navy's nuclear propulsion program. Currently, the site
stores approximately 261 MTHM (about 10 percent) of DOE's SNF from a variety of DOE programs
and a limited number of commercial and foreign sources.

Hawaii

D

Savannah RIver Sit_The Savannah River Site was constructed in the early 1950s to
produce the basic materials used in nuclear weapons-primarily plutonium and tritium.
Legend
Source

[!]

No. of locations

U.S. Department of
Energy Facilities

8

~

Naval Sites

7

®

Special-Case
Commercial

4

.4l

Domestic Non-DOE

9

@

Foreign Returns
(potential point of entry)
Universities

•

10
29

Figure 1-2. Locations of principal spent nuclear fuel generators and storage sites.

Hanford Sit_The Hanford Site was dedicated to producing plutonium for more than
40 years, until production was halted in 1989. Hanford's production reactors (including the
N Reactor and Single-Pass Reactor) have generated 2100 MTHM of the existing DOE SNF. The
ongoing actions at Hanford are focused on improving worker health and safety and protecting the
environment. SNF management activities include reducing water contarr:ination levels, performing
physical upgrades necessary to assure facility safety fOf near-term storage, characterizing SNF
condition, and stabilization or repackaging for storage and/or ultimate disposition.
The SNF at facilities associated with the Hanford Site include N-Reactor SNF, Single-Pass
Reactor SNF, Shippingport Core II SNF, Fast Flux Test Facility SNF, and miscellaneous special-<:ase
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Savannah River's production reactors have generated about 150 MTHM of the existing DOE
SNF. Most of the SNF from Savannah River Site reactor operations is stored underwater in concrete,
water-filled reactor storage basins. These reactor disassembly basins were originally intended for
only short-term storage of production reactor SNF. Some of the SNF stored at Savannah River
consists of uranium clad in stainless steel or zirconium alloy, which Savannab River Site cannot
process without facility modifications. Ongoing activities include improving the use of existing
storage facilities to provide for continued safe storage of the less corrosion-resistant a1uminum-<:lad
SNF. DOE currently manages approximately 206 MTHM (about 8 percent) of its SNF at the
Savannah River Site.
Oak RIdge Reservatlo~The Oak Ridge Reservation was originally developed as
part of the Manhattan Project-the effort to build the first nuclear weapons. The missions of Oak
Ridge Reservation facilities include weapons dismantlement, storage of enriched uranium, maintaining
production capability, technology research and development, and environmental management. Less
than I MTHM (0.07 percent) of DOE's SNF is either in storage or being generated at several
facilities at the Oak Ridge Reservation.
Other Department of Energy Slte~A number of other DOE sites also store SNF,
principally from experimental and test reactors that have operated at many Department sites
nationwide. Four of these DOE sites storing SNF are as follows :
Argonne National Laboratory-East has one reactor that is being decontaminated and
decommissioned. This site currently manages 0 .08 MTHM of SNF.
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Brookhaven National Laboratory is generating and storing SNF at two facilities . The
Brookhaven High Flux Beam Reactor and the Brookhaven Medical Research Reactor are
both operating at the present time. This site currently manages 0.24 MTHM of the
DOE's SNF.
Los Alamos National Laborato. y has SNF at the Omega West Reactor, which has
been shut down since December 1992. There is 0.014 MTHM of SNF in storage at Los

Alamos.
SandIa National Laboratories have reactors that operate as needed. These reactors
will generate small quantities (0.4 MTHM) of SNF when shut down and defueled.
1.1,2.3 Navy Nllc/ear Propu'.'on Program. Naval SNF is removed from naval reactors at
shipyards and protolJlile sites and placed in shielded shipping containers. Since 1957, the SNF
removed from nuclear-powered naval vessels and prototypes has been transported from shipyards and
prototype sites to the Naval Reactors Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The
SNF is then removed from the shielded shipping containers and placed into a water pool at the
Expended Core Facility. In the water pool, eacb naval fuel assembly receives, as a minimum, an
internal and external visual examination to confirm that it performed as designed and to identify
anomalies that would warrant more detailed examination. After examination, the SNF is loaded into
shielded containers and transferred to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant for storage.

Currently, four naval shipyards and one commercial shipyard (Norfolk, Puget Sound,
Portsmouth, Pearl Harbor, and Newport News) and the Kesselring Site support the refueling of
nuclear-powered ships and prototypes. Other naval shipyards that formerly supported defuelings and
refuelings, such as Charleston and Mare Island, are being closed because of military base closure
decisions. An existing water pool facility, constructed to support the refueling of nuclear-powered
aircraft carriers, is located within the industrial zone of the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. To date,
the facility has been used for refueling equipment demonstrations and testing. The facility contains a
radiologically controlled, high bay structure and a Personnel Support Building, which provides office
and other nonradiological support functions. The high bay structure contains the water pool and
general work areas. At Newport News, SNF is removed from naval vessels and temporarily stored
near the removal site before transport.
1.1.2.4 ForeIgn Research Reactors. In accordance with national nuclear nonproliferation

goals, DOE has accepted (and is considering the renewal of the policy to accept) SNF that contains
enriched uranium of United States origin that was used in foreign research reactors. In April 1994,
DOE decided to accept up to 409 additional SNF elements from eight foreign research reactors in
seven European countries for storage at the Savannah River Site One bundred fifty-three of these
elements were actually received before an order by the court in the case of South Carolina v.
O'Leary, No. 3:94-2419-0 (District of South Carolina January 27, 1995) preventing the receipt of
VOLUME I
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additional sbipments. That order is currently on appeal to the United States Court of Appeal for the
Fourth Circuit. The United States Government is currently considering the acceptance of SNF from
approximately 40 nations. This foreign researcb reactor SNF is estimated to amount to 21.7 MTHM
and is the subject of the Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons
Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (see Section 1.2.S),
due to be published in 1995.
1.1.2.5 Non-DOE Domestic. This category includes non-DOE domestic, licensed facilities,
including training, research, and test reactors at univerSity, commercial establishments, and
government~wned installations for which DOE bas contractual obligations to accept SNF.
Appendix E provides additional detail on these sites. These locations currently have less than
I percent of the existing DOE SNF.

Domestic Re.earch .nd Test Re.ctoI3-Fifty-seven domestic non-DOE facUities
have been licensed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 38 of wbich are expected to be
small generators of DOE SNF during the next 40 years. These facilities include colleges,
universities, government, and commercial establishments in the United States that use reactors for
educational and researcb activities. The reactors are of several different types and are used for
training, experimentation, and teaching in nuclear science and engineering. Some of these researcb
sites have limited storage capacity compared with generation rates. Table 1-2 provides a summary of
these locations, the SNF currently at these locations, and the amount of SNF they currently have
stored plus projected generation through the year 2035.
Spec/.,-C••e Commercl.1 Power Re.ctoI3-DOE also has taken possession of
SNF assemblies and complete or sectioned SNF rods from various commercial nuclear power reactors
that were to be used to support DOE-sponsored research and development programs. By way of a

Table 1-2, Summary of domestic research and test reactors.
Type

Number of locations

MTHMa
(ROD,,)

MTHMa
(203S)

Universities<

29

2.01

4.96

Government,
non-DOE<

5

0. 11

0.42

Commerical<

4

0. 10

0. 12

Total

38

2.22

5 .50

a. MTHM = metric tons of heavy metal .
b. ROD = Record of Decision, June 1995.
c. See Appendix E of Volume I of this EIS for a discussion of these locations.
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three-party agreement among the Public Services Company of Colorado, General Atomics, and the
Atomic Energy Commission, the DOE bas agreed to provide dry storage at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory for eight segments of Fort St. Vrain SNF (approximately 1,920 SNF
elements). Three segments of this SNF have been transported to the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory; the other five are currently being stored at the Fort SI. Vrain site. Other SNF in this
category includes SNF from development reactors (Shippingport and Peach Bottom Unit I); SNF used
for destructive and nondestructive examination and testing; SNF remaining at the West Valley
Demonstration Project; SNF from fuel performance testing at the Babcock & Wilcox Research
Center; and special-ase SNF debris (Three-Mile Island Unit 2).
Table 1-3 summarizes the types and quantities of special-case commercial power reactor SNF
in storage. This SNF currently is in storage at either the West Valley Demonstration Project in West
Valley, New York, the Babcock & Wilcox Research Center in Lynchburg, Campbell County,
Virginia, or the Fort SI. Vrain facility in Colorado. Additionally, special-case commercial SNF (such
as from Three-Mile Island, Peach Bottom, and Shippingport) is also stored at the Hanford Site, Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory, Savannah River Site, and Oak Ridge Reservation.
1.1.3 Technologies for the Management of Spent Nuclear Fuel

DOE must safely manage SNF until its ultimate disposition. Some SNF, such as naval reactor
fuel, was desigoed for long-term operation and to survive combat conditions; therefore, it is rugged
enough to retain its integrity during prolonged storage. Commercial reactor fuel is also inherently
stable and suitable for prolonged storage. The DOE will not select SNF technologies on the basis of
Volume I of this EIS. These technology-based decisions are most appropriately dealt with on a fuel
type-specific or site-specific basis.

Table 1-3. Special-ase commercial power reactor spent nuclear fuel (SNF).
Storage location

West Valley, NY
Lyncbburg, VA

Fort St. Vrain, CO

Category

Ugbt-waler reoctor fuel
Ugbt-water .actor partial fuel
elements
Higb-temperature gas-<:ooled .actor
fuel

125 elemea..
3 full-length rods and 17
sectioned rods
1,464 olomea..

• . No additions projected througb 2035.
h. MTIIM

= metric tons of heavy metal.

One MTIIM equal. approximately 2,200 pounda. (The

approximate total of SNF currenUy It these locations is 43 MTIIM.)
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27
0.044
16

1.1_3.1 SfOrage. Interim storage may be accomplished with either dry or wet storage
technology. Wet storage normally involves the use of belowgrade water-filled pooll. Dry storage
places the SNF in a shielded container for aboveground storage. Dry storage technologies range from
the use of casks, which hold only a few fuel elements, to vaults that are capable of bolding a large
quantity of fuel. Casks are normally constructed of steel or reinforced concrete, lIId vaults are
normally constructed of concrete. For dry storage, a number of similar concepts have been used for
commercial power reactor-type fuels and may be suitable for some of the DOE SNF. While both wet
and dry storage are being evaluated for SNF management, dry storage has several unique advantages
when beat dissipation is not a major concern. These advantages include lower emissions, simpler
operation, lower cost, shorter times for desigo and construction, and capability for licensing by the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, if required.
1.1.3.2 Stabilization. Stabilization may be necessary to provide safe interim storage of
SNF. Stabilization technologies can be placed in three broad categories: containerization, processing
without fissile material separation, and processing with fissile material separation. Containerization
can involve processes such as canning, coating, and passivation. Canning involves placing the fuel in
a sealed canister of durable construction (snch as stainless steel). Coating involves depoSiting a
protective film on the fuel to inhibit corrosion. Passivation involves treating the SNF to place
exposed surfaces in a less reactive form when the SNF is stored in either water or air.

Processing without fissile material separation involves processes such as direct dissolving of the
fuel elements or oxidation of the fuel elements. Oxidation involves separation of the fuel matrix from
the cladding using oxygen at elevated temperatures [up to 800°C (1,472°F)]. The principal existing
approach for processing with fissile material separation is aqueous processing. Aqueous processing
involves breaking down the fuel through mechanical means (shearing, chopping, cutting) or chemical
means (acid or electrolytic dissolution, combustion, hydrolysis) and then chemically separating the
fuel constituents by solvent extraction. Aqueous processing would normally be followed by a
vitrification process where the high-level waste is processed into a glass or ceramic form. The
Savannah River Site currently has the capability to process a1uminum-clad fuel.
Appendix J provides more details on fuel management technologies. Appendices A through F
provide details on the storage and stabilization technologies evaluated for eacb of the potential SNF
management sites. These technologies are representative of those discussed above. This EIS
evaluates the environmental impact of these technologies to illustrate, at a programmatic level, the
characteristic impacts from implementing each programmatic alternative.
The DOE will conduct additional National Environmental Policy Act reviews for research and
development and characterization activities that help select technologies for placing the SNF in a form
suitable for interim storage and ultimate disposition.
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1.1.3.3 Tranlfportatlon. Depending on the SNF management options selected, some of the
5NF may be moved one or more times before being transported. SNF is transported in massive, lead
and sted shielded casks that can weigh above 100 tons. These casks must conform to both U.S .
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and U.S. Department of Transportation regulations. Shipment by
both rail cars and trucks is common, with the chief advantage of rail being the ability to transport
heavier, more massive casks and, thus, transport more SNF per shipment.
The casks serve two functions : (a) providing gamma radiation shielding from the SNF so that
the radiation level outside the casks meets regulatory requirements, and (b) providing protection to
arid containment of the SNF even in case of accidents. The casks are designed to withstand a wide
range of very severe accidents. Because the SNF is generally metallic in form, most of the
radionuclides stay within the metal fuel even in maximum foreseeable transportation accidents. The
risks to both workers and the public have been evaluated many times, most recently in Appendix I of
this EIS, and have been shown to be low.

1.1.3.4 U/tlm.te Dllfpoll/tlon. In the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as amended, Congress
established a national policy for disposal of high-level waste and commercial SNF in a geologic
repository, and directed DOE to characterize the Yucca Mountain site in Nevada for suitability as the
site of a first United States repository. Th.t Act authorizes disposal of DOE SNF, as well as
commercial spent fuel, in the first repository, subject to a limit on repository capacity and the
payment of appropriate fees . For planning purposes, the DOE assumes that some or all of the SNF in
its inventory that satisfies the repository's acceptance criteria could be placed in the first geologic
repository developed under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended.
Although beyond the scope of this EIS, two broad strategies may at this point be envisioned
for the ultimate disposition of DOE SNF. The DOE could (a) work toward direct disposal of SNF ir.
a geologic repository, or (b) chemically dissolve the fuel and produce a waste form (such as vitrified
gl ~:.) for repository disposal . Variations on these broad strategies are also possible, and both remain
under consideration. It is possible that some of DOE's SNF could qualify for direct disposal.
Aggressive characterization and, if appropriate, preparation programs would be necessary, and would
need to be coordinated with plans to develop one or more repositories.
Sufficient quantity and quality of information is still not available to determine at this time
whether the Yucca Mountain site is a suitable candidate for geologic disposal of SNF and high-level
radioactive waste. The DOE, however, is in the early planning stages for a repository EIS, which
will be prepared pursuant to the directives of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended.
The DOE plans to issue in mid-I995 a formal notice of its intent to prepare this analysis. The
repository EIS is being prepared to evaluate potential environmental impacts, based on the best
available information and data, that would be associated with the repository's development and
operation, and to support the Secretary of Energy's final recommendation to the President, as
required by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended . The repository EIS will examine the
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site-specific environmental impacts from construction, operation, and eventual closure of the
repository, including potential post-closure radiological eifects to the environment. Until the
repository EIS is complete, no final decision could be made concerning what DOE SNF would be
accepted in a geologic repository.
As part of its SNF management program, DOE would (a) stabilize the SNF as needed to
ensure safe interim storage, (b) characterize the existing SNF inventory to assess compliance with the
repository acceptance criteria as they are developed, and (c) determine what processing, if any, is
required to meet the criteria. Decisions regarding the actual disposition of DOE's SNF would follow
appropriate review under the National Environmental Policy Act, and would be subject to licensing by
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This ·path forward· would be implemented so as to
minimize impacts on the first repository schedule. The current planning assumption is that any DOE
material (vitrified high-level waste andlor SNF) qualified and selected for emplacement in the first
repository would be disposed beginning in the year 2015. Disposition of the remaining DOE SNF
and vitrified high-level waste that is not emplaced in the first repository would not be decided until
the DOE recommendation on the need for a second repository (which would consider such factors as
the physical and statutory limits of the first repository). The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as
amended, requires DOE to make that recommendation between January 1,2007, and January I ,
2010.
Except perhaps for a need to develop them further, the technologies described above for
stabilization and safe storage are available for the management of SNF and appear adequate to meet
the ueeds of ultimate disposition. Disposal in a repository, for example, may require canning,
canisterization, encapsulation, or processing the fuel to create a vitrified waste form. Resource
recovery requires dissolving the fuel to separate the fissile material from the waste and producing a
stable waste form . These required technologies have already been applied and are under continued
development in several countries. Once the acceptance criteria are established, the appropriate
technologies can be identified and finalized to ensure that the SNF can be put in an acceptable form
for ultimate disposal.

1.2 Relationship to Other
National Environmental Policy Act Documents
DOE currently has a range of National Environmental Policy Act reviews planned or under
way that are interrelated with or tier frem this SNF management review . Because the scope of SNF
management includes a wide variety of proposals, multiple National Environmental Policy Act
reviews are, or will be, necessary . Related reviews are identified in Table 14. Figure 1-3
graphically presents the interrelationships of the various National Environmental Policy Act reviews.
Discussion in the following subsections centers primarily on reviews with an interrelationship with
this SNF management review. The remaining documents in Table 14 are site-specific reviews of
SNF management, or individual project reviews that have a relationship to SNF management.
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Table 1-4. Major National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) reviews related to Volume I of this
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) as of March 1995.
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Figure 1-3. Interrelationships of National Environmental Policy Act reviews related to SNF
management.
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Volume I of this EIS provides the overall programmatic National Environmental Policy Act
review of the management of DOE SNF. This review and the Record of Decision will be
summarized and incorporated in the DOE Waste Management Programmatic EIS, currently in
development. Programmatic reviews for nuclear weapons disposition and weapons-usable fissile
materials will also provide input to the DOE Waste Management Programmatic EIS. This SNF EIS
will provide input to the EIS for the management of SNF from foreign research reactors. Except for
special-case commercial reactors, commercial SNF is not evaluated in this SNF EIS . DOE is also
preparing an EIS for a mUltipurpose canister system. Additional National Environmental Policy Act
reviews for DOE and commercial SNF will be prepared as needed.

The alternatives are structured to ensure analysis of the impacts of the mixed waste
configuration that will be defined in the site treatment plans developed pursuant to the Federal Facility
Compliance Act.
The Draft Waste Management PElS is scheduled to be available for public and agency review
and comment by mid-I995. Although the DOE Waste Management PElS was originally intended to
provide the programmatic analyses of alternatives for SNF management, these analyses are also
presented in this volume. The Waste Management PElS is expected to summarize and consider, as
part of its analysis of cumulative environmental consequences, the impacts of the SNF alternatives
identified in this EIS.

Table 14 and Figure 1-3 also identify site- or project-specific National Environmental Policy
Act reviews currently planned or underway. This Volume I is a DOE-wide programmatic EIS
covering a full range of strategic alternatives for the management of SNF. As such, this document is
an upper tier EIS, intended to provide National Environmental Policy Act review of related and
potential actions. By tiering National Environmental Policy Act documentation, DOE is able to loole
at the overall potential impact of a group of connected actions. Lower-tier reviews provide more
specific and detailed analyses on specific sites and projects that stem from the programmatic
decisions. The tiering of National Environmental Policy Act reviews as they relate to this SNF
management review is shown schematically in Figure 1-3. This programmatic EIS does not replace
site-specific or project-specific National Environmental Policy Act documentation, except where
adequate coverage is provided in this EIS to evaluate reasonably foreseeable impacts. For the Idabo
National Engineering Laboratory, the site-specific documentation is provided hy Volume 2 of this
EIS.

1.2.1 Waste Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
DOE is currently analyzing nationwide and site-specific alternative strategies to maximize
efficiency for DOE's waste management program. The nationwide analyses will be part of the DOE
Waste Mana~ement Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PElS) (previously Jcnown as the
Environmentll Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement). This PEtS evaluates
proposed DOt; actions regarding the
T.'Pe, size, and number of waste storage, treatment, and disposal facilities needed and
where to build them, including the transportation network
Proposed action formulating and implementing an integrated Waste Management
Program
Alternative configurations for each waste type (except hazardous waste) to provide a
framework for siting future facilities at specific locations.

VOLUME I

1- 18

1.2.2 Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Tritium Supply and Recycling
The Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Program bas evolved considerably since its
original Notice of Intent to prepare a Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration PElS was issued in
February 1991. DOE has now separated the Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration EIS into
two programmatic EISs: (a) a PElS for Tritium Supply and Recycling (expected completion in
November 1995) and (b) a Stoclcpile Stewardship and Management PElS. In the original Notice of
Intent, DOE proposed to reconfigure the Nation's nuclear weapons complex to be smaller, less
diverse, and less expensive to operate. This proposal offered the advantage of enabling the closure
and remediation of the Mound and Rocley Flats Plants. At that time, no new plutonium or highly
enriched uranium storage facilities were envisioned, and a new tritium production facility was being
planned as part of a separate New Production Reactor Program. Later, the New Production Reactor
Program was lncorporated into the Reconfiguration PElS. DOE's needs have evolved since then for
many reasons, but primary among them is the end of the Cold War. The tangible effects of this
include the significant reduction in the size of the Nation's stoclcpile of nuclear weapons and reduced
requirements for production of tritium.
Accordingly, the Tritium Supply and Recycling PElS addresses alternatives associated with
new tritium production and the recycling of tritium recovered from weapons being retired from the
stoclcpile. Alternative technologies for producing tritium are planned to be analyzed at five candidate
sites (Savannab River Site, Oalc Ridge Reservation, the Pantex Plant, the Idabo National Engineering
Laboratory, and the Nevada Test Site). The PElS was issued in draft form February 28, 1995.

1.2.3 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Environmental Impact Statement
The Stoclcpile Stewardship and Management Environmental Impact Statement was originally
part of the Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Programmatic Environmental Impact
Statement (see Section 1.2.2). DOE expects to begin the scoping process for the Stoclcpile
Stewardship and Management PElS in 1995. Stoclcpile stewardship includes activities required to
maintain a high level of confidence in the safety, reliability, and performance of nuclear weapons in
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the absence of underground testing, and to be prepared to test weapons if directed by the President.
Stockpile management activities include maintenance, evaluation, repair, or replacement of weapons
in the existing stockpile. The review will take into account the latest information on current and
projected future stockpile requirements.
1.2.4 Storage and Disposition of Weapons .usable Fissile Materials Programmatic
Environmenlallmpact Statement
In response to the President's Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy issued on
January 24, 1994, the Department created a separate Department-wide project for developing
recommendations and for directing implementation of decisions conceroing disposition of excess
nuclear lI!aterials. Througb this PElS, DOE proposes to develop a comprebensive national policy tor
the management and dIsposition of fissile materials (primarily separated plutonium and highly
enriched uranium, but also other excess nuclear materials including neptunium, americium, and
uranium-233) that are no longer required for military purposes.
1.2.5 Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research
Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Envlronmentallmpcct Statement
DOE proposes to adopt and implement a policy concerning management of SNF containing
enriched uranium that originated in the United States and was used by foreign research reactors.
Under the proposed policy, the United States may manage approximately 22,750 elements (19.2
MTHM) of high-enriched uranium or low-enriched uranium SNF during a IO-year period from
foreign research reactors in approximately 40 nations. Alternative methods of implementing the
proposed action and the No Action alternative are being analyzed in an EIS. DOE will not make a
final decision on the acceptance of SNF from these foreign research reactors until after the EIS for
the Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor SNF
and this programmatic SNF EIS are both completed. Both of these EISs are scheduled to be
completed in 1995.
The proposed action would support the nuclear nonproliferation policy of the United States by
removing the highly enriched uranium from these reactors from international commerce. The
implementation of this policy could result in the receipt of foreign research reactor SNF at one or
more United States points of entry and overland transport to one or more DOE sites for storage
andlor processing.
1.2.6 Fabrication and Deployment of. Multipurpose Canlster-Based System for the
Management of Civilian Spent Nuclear Fuel Envlronmenlallmpact Statement
This environmental impact statement is addressing the potential environmental impacts
'!SSociated with alternative systems for storage and transport of SNF assemblies for civilian and naval

VOLUME I

1-20

SNF. The review will analyze the following: (a) manufacturing of multipurpose canister system
components, (b) packaging and handling of SNF as it is transferred to canisters or casks, (c) canister
transfer and loading operations, (d) storage of SNF in canisters and casks at the reactor sites, (e) SNF
transport from the reactor sites to a hypothetical monitored retrievable storage facility andlor
repository, (f) handling and storage of SNF at a hypothetical monitored retrievable slllrage facility,
and (g) surface activities involving the handling and disposal of SNF at a repository.
The multipurpose canister-based technOlogy may have application for DOE and Navy SNF.
1.2.7 Environmental Impact Statement for a Potential Repository at Yucca Mountain for
Disposal of High-level RP.dloactive Waste
Under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, DOE is investigating the suitability
of the Yucca Mountain, Nevada, site as the nation's first licensed geologic repository for SNF and
high-level radioactive waste. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, requires that
DOE's recommendation of a repository site to the President must be accompanied by an EIS . DOE
has tentatively scheduled the Notice of Intent for the repository EIS for 1995 and the Record of
Decision for 2000. Yucca Mountain is a potential disposal site for DOE SNF.

1.3 Scope ofthls Volume
1.3.1 Scoplng Process
On October 22, 1990, DOE published a Notice of Intent in the Federal Register announcing its
intent to prepare a PElS addressing environmental restoration and waste management (including SNF
management) activities across the entire DOE complex . DOE then invited the public to submit
written comments on the scope of the PElS, held 23 scoping meetings across the country, and issued
a draft Implementation Plan in January 1992 reflecting the comments provided. DOE held six
regional public workshops on the draft Implementation Plan and recorded public comments given at
these workshops . The Implementation Plan for the PElS was issued in January 1994 and addressed
the comments received from scop;~g and the regional workshops.
On October 5, 1992, DOE published a Notice of Intent to prepare an EIS for Environmental
Restoration and Waste Management at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory in the Federal
Register. The notice invited Government agencies and the public to participate in five scoping
meetings throughout Idaho and to provide written comments . Oral testimony from the meetings was
transcribed and made available at DOE public reading rooms. The comment period lasted from
October 5, 1992, to December 4, 1992.
On September 3, 1993, DOE published a Notice of Opportunity to Comment in the Federal
Register proposing to expand the scope of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Environmental
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Restoration and Waste Management EIS to include impacts related to transportation, receipt,
processing, and storage of DOE SNF at locations other than the Idaho National Engineering
Laborztory. This comment period started on September 3, 1993, and eoded on October 4, 1993.
Government agencies and the public were invited to provide comments on the DOE ProgrammaJic
SNF and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Environmental Restoration and Waste
Management Programs ElS. A. toll·free telephone number was provided for questions, requests for
documents or other information, and for the public to provide oral comments that were transcribed for
DOE's consideration. The Implementation Plan (issued October 29, 1993, and ameoded on
May 9, 1994) for this EIS summarizes these comments and DOE's responses.
As existing large·scale SNF management operations, the Hanford Site at Richland,
Washington; the Idaho Naticnal Engineering Laboratory in southeastern Idaho; and the Savannah
River Site near Aiken, South Carolina, were logically identified as reasonable site alternatives for
SNF management in the October 29, 1993, Implementation Plan. In addition, four Navy shipyards
and the Kesselring Site (in West Milton, New York) with years of SNF handling experience were
identified for consideration in the EIS for activities limited to naval SNF. The four Navy sbipyards
are the Norfolk Naval Shipyard, Portsmouth, Virginia; the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard, Kittery,
Maine; the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, Honolulu, Hawaii; and the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard,
Bremerton, Washington.
In response to public scoping comments, DOE committed to consider other sites for SNF
management in an effort to broaden the range of reasonable alternatives for locations at which SNF
management activities could be conducted. DOE developed a screening process, which resulted in
selection of the Oak Ridge Reservation, near Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and Nevada Test Site, near
Mercury, Nevada, as additional site alternatives for regionalized or centralized SNF management
(DOE-ID 1994). The EIS Implementation Plan was amended on May 9, 1994, to reflect this
addition.

1.3.2 Scope
1.3.2.1 Prog,..mmatlc Spent Nuclear Fuel Dlspo.ltlon. The DOE will not a!lalyze the
ultimate disposition of SNF in this EIS. The focus of this Volume 1 of the EIS is the management of
SNF in a safe and environmentally sound manner until decisions regarding its ultimate disposition are
made and implemented. Decisions regarding the actual disposition of DOE's SNF will follow
appropriate review under separate National Environmental Policy Act documentation. Congress bas
mandated that the Federal Government pursue the developmeot of mined geologic repositories for the
permanent disposal of SNF and higb·level waste, and has directed DOE to study the Yucca Mountain,
Nevada, site to determine whether it is a suitable site. Ultimate disposition of DOE SNF, however, is
outside the scope of this programmatic SNF EIS.
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1.3.2.2 Prog,..mm-Uc Spent Nuc/e.r Fuel Stabll/z-Uon. DOE is phasing out
reprocessing activities because of decreased demaod for the recovery and reuse of certain nuclear
materials. Fuel stabilization activities potentially required for safe interim storage and management of
SNF, such as canning of some degraded fuels or processing as necessary, are relevant to the safe
storage of SNF and within the scope of this EIS. Worker safety, public bealth, and potential
environmental impacts associated with SNF stabilization, research and development of technologies,
and pilot programs are topics of importance in analyzing the appropriate alternatives for interim
storage of SNF and are included in this EIS.

In April 1992, the Secretary of Energy directed that DOE phase out defense-related chemical
separations activities due to a reduction in the demand for new material for nuclear weapons (Claytor
1992). DOE no longer produces plutonium-239 and bighly enriched uranium, and, in December
1994, DOE committed to prohibit the use of plutonium-239 and bighly enriched uranium separated
and/or stabilized during the phaseout, shutdown, and cleanout of weapons complex facilities for
nuclear explosives purposes (Reis and Grumbly 1994). However, the use of chemical separations or
other processing technologies is a reasonable site-specific option to assure the safe interim
management of some types of SNF (or its constituents). Selection of chemical processing as a
potential management option will be made after detailed analyses in site-specific National
Environmental Policy Act reviews tiered from this EIS. Specific technologies for managing SNF are
described in Volume I, Appendix J. The potential impacts from a representative processing
technology bave been evaluated to aid in the analysis of reasonable technology options for interim
storage of SNF and are included in this EIS . The DOE selected chemical separations for stabilization
of degrading SNF as the technology for evaluation. The DOE believes the impacts from this activity
are representative of the overall potential impacts of other similar technologies. This EIS assesses the
impacts of processing only at the Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and Savannah
River Site because DOE determined it would require significant resources to consider uodertaking
such processing activities at sites with no facilities or infrastructure to support these processes.
Precessing operations that modify the SNF form to create new forms suitable for interim storage are
much more complex than the activities associated with either dry storage or wet storage of intact
SNF. For example, processing by chemical separation requires large-scale facilities for: SNF
storage, SNF dissolution and chemical element separation operations, liquid high-level waste storage,
storage for special nuclear material, and facilities to process the liquid high·level waste into a stable
form, for example, vitrification, for storage. Additionally, all these facilities must be supported by a
complex infrastructure of services and utilities. The Hanford Site, Idaho National Eneioeering
Laboratory, and Savannah River Site bave some or all these facilities and all of the infrastructure for
these types of operations. The other sites (that is, Nevada Tesl Site and Oak Ridge Reservation) lack
this level of plant facilities or high-level waste infrastructure. The cost alone to create this level of
capability makes evaluating the other sites less than desirable. Construction of the necessary highlevel waste infrastructure is estimated to be several billion dollars .
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1.3.2.3 Programmetlc Spent Nuc/eer Fuel Storage. Current and projected DOE SNF
inventories are considered in this EIS. Existing storage facilities are identified, and their status,
capacities, and accident histories are described. SNF container design, integrity, corrosion and
corrosion byproducts, storage technologies, and storage facility design life are factored into the EIS
analysis for eacb alternative. Storage options at the site of generation and other storage options are
analyzed. The analysis of the storage options for each alternative includes the estimated type and size
of representative storage facilities potentially needed at each site.
1.3.2.4 Programmetlc Spent Nuc/eer Fuel Transporfetlon. The EIS includes an
analysis of the potential impacts of SNF transportation, including safety and emergency preparedness
requirements. A review of the safety record for past SNF transportation activity is included, along
with an analysis of potential transportation impacts from normal transport and from transportation
accidents.

Transportation modes and routes deemed reasonable for SNF shipment have been analyzed to
estimate potential risks to worker safety, public health, and the environment. Federal and state
regulations that place restrictions on certain aspects of SNF shipment and limits on shipment size,
types of containers, and number of shipments have been accounted for in the analyses. Hazardous
materials manifests, required for each shipment of SNF, include information on the carrier, the
materials involved and their characteristics, and the containers.
The potential impacts of transporting nuclear fuel for ultimate disposition will be included in
the appropriate National Environmental Policy Act documentation. Therefore, an alternative to
transport SNF directly to a repository is not considered in this EIS.
1.3.2.5 Spec/.,-Case Commen:/el Fuels. This EIS addresses the management of certain
small quantities of special-case commercial SNF for which DOE has responsibility. Some of this
SNF is currently being managed at DOE facilities; some is being managed at non-DOE facilities.
1.3.2.11 Nsvsl Spent Nuc/e.r Fuel. This EIS addresses the impacts of and alternatives to
transporting, receiving, and storing SNF from naval reactors (Navy warships and reactor prototypes)
at a number of sites across the country, including sites near the point of refueling or defueling. The
analysis includes alternative sites for naval fuel examination, as well as the possibility of phasing out
this examination. This EIS addresses existing naval SNF inventories and fuel to be generated from
future refuelings and defuelings.

programmatic need, technical feasibility, and cost, in arriving at DOE's preferred alternatives.
During the public comment period for the Draft EIS, more than 1,430 individuals, agencies, and
organizations provided DOE with comments. A broad spectrum of private citizens; businesses; local,
state, and Federal officials; Native American tribes; and pl!blic interest groups are represented within
this volume of comments. Comments were received from all affected DOE and shipyard
communities .
Volume 3 summarizes the comments on the EIS received by DOE during the public comment
period and provides responses to those comments. In addition, Volume 3 explains how public
comments influenced the selection of the preferred alternatives, discusses the extent to which public
comments resulted in changes to the EIS, and describes how to find specific comment summaries and
responses in this volume.
Responses to comments consist of two parts. The first part summarizes the comment(s), and
the second part responds to the comment(s). Identical or similar comment(s) were frequently
provided by more than one commentor and, in such cases, DOE grouped the comments and prepared
a single response for each group. This summarization was also appropriate due to the large volume
of comments received.
In compliance with National Environmental Policy Act and Council on Environmental Quality
regulations, public comments on the Draft EIS were assessed and considered both individually and
collectively by DOE and the Navy. Some comments resulted in modifications in the EIS or
explanations of why comments did not warrant further response. Most comments not requiring a
change to the EIS resulted in a response to correct factual misinterpretations, to explain or
communicate government policy, to clarify the scope of the EIS, to explain the relationship of the EIS
to other related policy, to clarify the scope of the EIS, to explain the relationship of the EIS to other
related National Environmental Policy Act documentation, to refer commentors to information in the
EIS, to answer technical questions, or to further explain technical issues. The Record of Decision
will include the decision made by the Secretary of Energy, which will consider public comments on
the DraftoBlS.

•

1.4.1 How DOE Considered Public Comment. In the Nationsl Environmental Policy Act
Process

Volume 3, Response to Public Comments, was added to this EIS to fully address and respond
to public comme.ts. In addition, DOE considered public comments, along with other factors such as

As required in the Council on Environmental Quality regulations [40 CFR 1502.14(e»), DOE's
preferred alternatives are identified in the Final EIS . The preferred alternatives for Volumes I and 2
were identified based on the consideration of environmental impacts, regulatory compliance, DOE and
SNF programmatic missions, public issues and concerns, national security and defense, cost, and
DOE policy. Public input considered in the decisionrnaking and preferred alternatives selection
process included concerns, desires, and opinions regarding the activities addressed in the EIS and
expectations of DOE in making the management decisions on complex-wide programmatic SNF
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management and environmental restoration and waste management programs at the Idabo National
Engineering Laboratory. Public input contributed to the development of performance factors, defined
as desirable attributes or characteristics that measure the relative acceptability of alternatives, which
were used to select candidate preferred alternatives. The candidate preferred alternatives were then
evaluated against a number of technical and nontechnical sensitivities, including public perception of
environmental impact, indicated stakeholder preferences, implementation flexibility, regulatory risk,
SNF processing potential, environmental justice, potential resistance to implementation, and fairness.
DOE's preferred alternative reflects DOE consensus that SNF should be actively managed in
preparation for ultimate disposition. In addition, DOE' s preferred alternative supports the
implementation of a path forward for the ultimate disposition of SNF, a significant issue raised by the
public. The EIS, including its preferred alternatives, will be considered by the Secretary of Energy,
along with other factors, in arriving at a decision to be documented in a formal Record of Decision.
1.4.2 Changes to the Environmental Impact Statement Resulting from Public Comment
A major purpose of the National Environmental Policy Act is to promote efforts that will
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment by ensuring informed decisionmaking on major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. Consideration of public
comments on the Draft EIS helps to ensure that the EIS is an adequate decisionmaking tool;
accordingly, this EIS has been enhanced, as appropriate, in response to public comments. While a
number of specific issues and concerns were raised by commentors, none of the issues or concerns
identified new reasonable alternatives requiring assessment or resulted in significant change in the
results of the analysis of the potential environmental consequences.
Based on review of public comments, coupled with the consultations held with commenting
agencies as well as State and tribal governments, the main EIS enhancements include the following:

Significant Deterioration (PSD) increment consumed, thus updating the baseline
conditions presented for the Idabo National Engineering Laboratory. Additionally, the
Waste Experimental Reduction Facility project summary was enhanced and clarified.
This EIS was also revised 10 reflect current projections of employment, inCluding the
projected downsizing of the Idabo National Engineering Laboratory due to contractor
consolidation.
In response to public comments, a brief summary of the results of a separate evaluation
of the costs of the various alternatives was added to the EIS, although the cost
evaluation was performed independently of the EIS for additional purposes. The
discussion of the options regarding the management of Fort SI. Vrain SNF currently
stored in Colorado has been expanded. As committed to in the Draft EIS, the
evaluation and discussion of environmental justice has beeo expanded in both Volumes I
and 2 of the EIS. This analysis was based 00 interim DOE guidance in the absence of
interagency policy in this regard and reflects limited public comments received
regarding environmental justice. Consultation with the commenting Native American
tribes is reflected in the environmental justice analysis, as well as in the various sections
of the EIS, as appropriate.
Other enhancements include a clarification that potential shipment of SNF containing
uranium of U.S. origin from foreign research reactors consists of a bounding estimate of
22 MTHM. In addition, as a result of public comments, Volume I of the EIS was
enhanced to clarify the relationship between current DOE National Environmental Policy
Act actions and this EIS . Likewise, the relationship between the EIS and the Spent Fuel
VUlnerability Action Plans was clarified in this EIS . With respect 10 the naval SNF,
Appendix 0 of Volume I was modified to more fully explain the import of naval SNF
and to discuss potential effects of terrorist attacks at naval shipyards.

Seismic and water resources discussions were reviewed, clarified, and enhanced for all
alternative sites, and current data and analyses were added to Volumes I and 2, as
appropriate. A discussion of potential accidents caused by a common initiator was
added. The option of stabilizing some of DOE's SNF (specifically from the N Reactor)
by processing it at available facilities located overseas was added, thus enhancing the
processing options discussed in the EIS . An analysis of barge transportation was added
to the EIS, with respect to the option of transponing N-Reactor fuel to a shipping point
for overseas process,ng . as well as to suppon the potential transpon of Broolthaven
National Laboratory SNF to another site. as appropriate. Ir addition. an analysis of
shipboard fires was added. primarily in response to cornmems related to receiving SNF
containing uranium of U.S . origin from foreign research reactors.
In Volume 2 of the EIS . the air quality analysis was revised to upgrade the existing
baseline conditions and impacts of alternatives in terms of the amount of Prevention of
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2. PURPOSE AND NEED FOR AGENCY ACTION

3. ALTERNATIVES

DOE, according to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, is responsible for
developing and maintaining a capability to manage nuclear materials [Atomic Energy Act Sections
l1(z), l1(aa), and l1(e)). During the last four decades, DOE and its predecessor agencies have
transported, received, stored, and reprocessed approximately 100,000 MTHM of SNF from various
sources, including DOE production reactors; the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program; DOE,
university, and other research and test reactors; special case commercial power reactors; and certain
foreign research reactors. Approximately 2,700 MTHM of SNF was not reprocessed and is stored at
various locations in the United States and overseas. Approximately 100 MTHM of additional SNF is
projected to be received in the next 40 years . This SNF is in a wide range of enrichments, types, and
conditions.

Chapter 3 describes a range of programmatic alternatives for managing the DOE SNF currently
stored within the DOE complex and at non-DOE generator sites. These alternatives also address SNF
that is projected to be generated through the year 2035. Figure 1-2, given in Chapter I, identifies
locations within the United States where DOE SNF is being generated and stored.

The end of the Cold War led DOE to reevaluate the scale of its weapons production, nuclear
propulsion, and research missions. In April 1992, the Secretary of Energy directed DOE to phase out
reprocessing of SNF for recovery and recycling of plutonium and highly enriched uranium to support
the nuclear weapons stockpile. In 1993, a DOE report" documented current and potential
environmental, safety, and health wlnerabilities regarding existinf DOE SNF storage facilities. The
report identified locations with degraded fuel cladding integrity and other problems that require action
to ensure continued safe storage. As a result of the Secretary's directive and the information in the
DOE report, the proposed action is 10 safely, efficiently, and responsibly manage existing and
projected quantities of spent nuclear fuel through the year 2035, pending ultimate disposition.
As part of establishing an effective SNF Management Program, DOE needs to make complexwide strategic decisions for the management of SNF for the next 40 years, including (a) where to
conduct SNF management activities, after evaluating existing and potential locations, (b) the
appropriate capabilities, facilities, and technologies for SNF management, and (c) the research and
development activities to support the SNF Management Program.
Volume I of this EIS focuses on strategies for where to conduct SNF management activities
as in (a) above. Decisions on the site-specific and technical implementation of the program, as in (b)
and (c) above, would b~ made after subsequent, tiered National Environmental Policy Act reviews, as
appropriate.
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The five alternatives
analyzed in Volume I of
this EIS are summarized in
the box to the right.
These alternatives. which
are consistent with the
alternatives under
consideration for the DOE
Waste Management
Programmatic EIS, present
a range of programmatic
approaches for managing
existing and projected SNF
inventories. The
alternatives involve
varying amounts of SNF
shipments, levels of fuel
stabilization, numbers and
type.~ of storage facilities,
and the scope of research
and development efforts
for SNF management
technologies.
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The programmatic action that DOE ultimately selects is not necessarily limited to one of the
alternatives presented. A hybrid alternative could, for example, be developed that would incorporate
actions from one or more of the five alternatives analyzed. Moreover, the programmatic decisions
wiH not identify all site-specific SNF management options . If appropriate, the decisions would be
made after additional site-specific National Environmental Policy Act evaluations.
In developing the alternatives, the need to comply with applicable regulations, permits. and
DOE orders was assumed . Under some of the alternatives (for example. No Action and
Decentralization), DOE would be required to renegotiate existing commitments to accept SNF fro m
ulilities (for example, Fort SI. Vrain), domestic research reactor SNF. and potential agreements to
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accept foreign research reactor SNF. Under all alternatives, actions to resolve outstanding SNF
management deficiencies identified and prioritized according to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board Recommendation 94-1 Implementation Plan would be implemented as appropriate. The
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 94-1 implementation Plan will be balanced with other factors
such as budgetary constraints and public comments. Under all alternatives, DOE would consider
ways to reduce costs for the management of SNF.

decision management process, which included developing screening and performance criteria.
Screening criteria are requirements that an alternative must satisfy to be further evaluated;
performance criteria are desirable attributes or characteristics that help distinguish the relative merit of
each alternatiVE that satisfies the screening criteria. After applying the screening criteria, additional
management considerations (technical and nontechnical), discussed below, were used to arrive at the
final preferred alternative.

Some of the alternatives include references to transition periods. These can be defined as the
periods of time needed to fully implement the alternative, if selected. Transition periods vary from
3 to 20 years depending on the time required to plan, design, procure, or construct equipment and
facilities needed to fully implement the alternative. Activities taking place during transition periods
would be similar to anticipated activities associated with one or more of the defined alternatives.
Therefore, environmental impacts of transition period activities are bounded by the impacts
assessment for the defined alternatives.

The screening and performance criteria were developed considering the following factors :
(a) environmental impact, (b) environmental regulatory compliance, (c) DOE and SNF programmatic
missions, (d) public comments, (e) national security mission, (I) cost, and (g) DOE policy.

The DOE SNF Management Program is intended to (a) provide interim storage and
management for SNF at specified locations until ultimate disposition, (b) stabilize the fuel as required
for environmentally safe storage and protection of human bealth (for both workers and the public),
(c) increase safe storage capacity, replacing facilities that cannot meet current standards and provide
additional capacity f Jr newly generated SNF, (d) conduct research and development initiatives to
support safe storage and safe disposal, and (e) examine SNF generated by the Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Program. The possible need to convert SNF into a form that meets the acceptance criteria
of geologic repositories is beyond the scope of this EIS and will be the subject of future National
Environmental Policy Act review.

Each alternative was first evaluated based on the following screening criteria:
Resolving vulnerabilities consistent with DOE's Plan of Action to Resolve Spent
Nuclear Fuel Vulnerabilities (DOE 1994a, b, c)
Complying with all applicable Federal and state environmental laws and regulations,
consent orders, and Federal facility agreements
Maintaining backup capabilities for SNF management to limit interruptions of vital SNF
program activities
Providing the capability for 100 percent examination of naval SNF
Providing technology development for SNF treatment, storage, and ultimate disposition.

The planning period for this EIS is 40 years, beginning with the issuance of the Record of
Decision (that is, baseline conditions in June 1995) and extending through the year 203S. The
4O-year timeframe may be required to make and implement decisions on the ultimate disposition of
SNF. Detailed impact analyses are performed for the time period from 1995 to 2OOS . Normal
operation impacts are then projected for the remaining 30 years.
Decisions as a result of this EIS apply to actions taken by DOE and the Navy from the date of
the Record of Decision through the interim storage period. At the present time. intersite shipments of
DOE SNF have been curtailed . However. limited shipments of SNF from Navy shipyards have
occurred during the preparation of the EIS. Shipments from sources such as universities and fo reign
research reactors needing urgent relief have also occurred . These shipments are in acaJrdance with
existing court orders. Federal facility compliance agreements. and Council on Environmental Quality
regulations. If the No Action alternative is selected in the Record of Decision. all such shipments
would cease after an appropriate transition period .
After considering a number of elements. DOE has identified Regional ization 4A (management
by fuel type) as the preferred alternative. DOE arrived at its preferred alternative through a formal
VOLUM E I
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Those alternatives that did not satisfy all of the screening criteria were not considered further,
and these were No Action, Decentralization A and B, and Centralization. The remaining alternatives.
1992-93 Planning Basis. Decentralization C. and Regionalization 4A and 4B. met all of the screening
criteria. These alternatives were then evaluated based 00 optimizing overall performance relative to
the following performance criteria:
Minimizing transport of SNF
Minimizing environmental impact

Assuring lowest cost consistent with mission accomplishment
Maximizing support for DOE's National SNF Program to achieve safe storage and
preparation for final disposition
Maximizing DOE 's ability to honor new and historical commitments and contracts.
3-3
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Applying these performance criteria, two of the four remaining alternatives, 1992-93 Planning
Basis and Regionalization 4A, rated the highest, so they were determined to be candidates for the
preferred alternative. These candidate alternatives were then evaluated against a number of technical
and nontechnical considerations, including environmental impact perception, indicated stakeholder
preferences, implementation factors , regulatory risk, SNF processing potential, environmental justice,
and fairness. This final evaluation resulted in Regionalization 4A being identified as the preferred
alternative, because Regionalization 4A better supports a path forward for ultimate disposition of the
SNF. Additional information on this alternative can be found in Section 3. 1.4.
While the Nevada Test Site is analyzed in this EIS as an alternative site for SNF management
activities, DOE did not consider it to be a preferred site for the management of SNF because of the
State of Nevada's current role as the host site for the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project
and the Nevada Test Site's lack of SNF management facilities and high-level waste infrastructure.
The DOE's preferred alternative is consistent with the Navy's preferred alternative to continue
to conduct refueling and defueling of nuclear-powered vessels and prototypes, and to transport SNF to
the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory for full examination and interim storage, using the same
practices as in the past. Details and analyses supporting the Navy's preferred alternative can be found
in Appendix D of Volume 1.
The remainder of this chapter is comprised of three sections. Section 3. 1 summarizes the
alternatives and the implications for each site. Section 3.2 discusses the alternatives eliminated from
further evaluation. Section 3.3 provides a brief comparison of the potential environmental impacts
associated with each alternative.

3.1 Overview of Alternatives Considered
Section 3. 1 and Tables 3-1 through 3-5 discuss the potential actions at each site as a result of
implementing each of the alternatives.
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Table 3-1. Summary of the No Action alternative.
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Table 3-2. Summary of the Decentralization alternative.
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Table 3-4. Summary of the Regionalization alternative.
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Table 3-5. Summary of the Centralization alternative.
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3.1.1 No Action
The No Action
alternative is an alternative
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on Environmental Quality
II or cl_ 10 the aeoermoo site or cumot storage locIIioo.
regulations for implementing
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the National Environmental
10 or from DOE facilities would occur.
Policy Act of 1969. Under
the No Action alternative,
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required 10 safely store SNF.
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the minimum necessary for
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safe and secure management
of SNF at the generation site
• Facility opsradeI~laaomeot aod oDsite fuel trOIIsfen would be
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or current storage location.
Under this alternative, small
• Existin, _~ aod development octiviti.. would conWlue.
and large DOE sites, naval
sites, university and other
non-DOE domestic reactors, and foreign research reactors would all independently manage their SNF
onsite. Generally, after an appropriate transition period SNF shipments between sites for
management purposes would be discontinued, including those SNF shipments currently allowed by
court orders and Federal facility compliance agreements. Figure 3-1 indicates SNF inventories. The
technology development activities related to SNF management, limited to activities already approved,
would continue within DOE. Figure 3-1 also shows the distribution of fuel from 1995 through 2035 .
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The following subsections highlight actions associated with the No Action alternative at the
sites being considered for SNF management.
3.1.1.1 Hanford Site. Under the No Action alternative at the Hanford Site, only those
actions deemed necessary for the continued safe and secure management of the SNF would be carried
out. Thus, the existing SNF would be maintained close to its current storage locations and there
would be minimal facility upgrades. Activities required to safely store SNF would continue.
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Specific actions proposed for the near term include proceeding with the characterization of
defense production reactor fuel to establish safe interim storage limits, containerizing the fuel in the
105-KE reactor basin by 1998, procuring the first \0 dry storage casks for the Fast Flux Test
Facility, transferring SNF to dry cask storage if required for safety reasons (with emphasis on Fast
Flux Test Facility fuel now stored in liquid sodium), and possibly consolidating SNF from defense
production at the 105-KW reactor basin.
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Figure 3-1. Spent nuclear fuel distribution, location, and inventory for the No Action alternative.
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No new facilities are planned under the No Action alternative.

3.1.1.2 Idaho N.Uon.' Engineering L.:'oratory. For the No Action alternative, DOE
would maintain SNF close to defueling or current storage locations wit!. minimal facility upgrades or
replacements. The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would neither receive nor transport SNF
except for naval SNF during a transition period of about 3 years (see Section 3. 1. 1.6). After the
transition perioo, naval SNF would not be transferred to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,
and the Expended Core Faciaty at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would be shut down.
DOE would continue to transfer onsite SNF to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant until the existing
storage capacity is used.
DOE would continue operating existing SNF-related facilities at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory. Because of the deteriorated condition of some of the fuel stored underwater
in the CPP-603 Underwater Fuel Storage Facility, additional characterization and canning capabilities
would be necessary to stabilize the fuel for safe transport and subsequent storage. DOE has
scheduled the installation and operation of new fuel characterization and canning equipment in the
Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility by late 1995 to provide these capabilities. DOE would perform other
required stabilization of SNF at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory in either the Remote
Analytical Laboratory or the F1uorinel Dissolution Process Hot Cell. DOE would not start any new
projects to increase SNF interim storage capacity.
SNF research and development would be limited . Existing SNF management research and
development proje.-ts would continue, but the development of technology for the ultimate disposition
of SNF would cease. Existing facilities, such as the Process Improvement Facility, the Remote
Analytical Laboratory, and the Pilot Plant Facility, would support continuing research and
development work.

3.1.1.3 Savannah River Site. For the No Action alternative, DOE would use the existing
Savannah River Site facilities for extended wet storage of its current SNF inventories . The Savannah
River Site would not transport any SNF offsite and would not receive any SNF . Only onsite
consolidation and rearrangement would take place. DOE would temporarily move fuel currently on
the Savannah River Site among facilities to accommodate facility upgrades.
Six Savannah River Site facilities are used for the storage of SNF: the Receiving Basin for
Offsite Fuel, K-Reactor Disassembly <lasin, L-Reactor Disassembly Basin, P-Reactor Disassembly
Basin, F-Canyon, and H-Canyon. Most of the fuel is located in the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuel ,
the L-Reactor Disassembly Basin, and the F-Canyon . DOE would accomplish onsite transfers as
requ ired to ensure the safety of a1uminum-clad fuel. The Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels and an
upgraded reactor basin would be utilized for continued storage of this fuel. Additionally, DOE would
place the a1uminum-clad fuel , which is degrading because of corrosion, in containers to minimize the
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spread of radioactive material in the pools in case the cladding is breached. DOE would continue
existing SNF-related research and development.

3.1.1.4 Oak Ridge ReservaUon. Under the No Action alternative, the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, which is on the Oak Ridge Reservation, would generate and store SNF as a result of
reactor research activities. No SNF would be transported to the Oak Ridge Reservation, and no SNF
would be transported offsite. SNF would be stabilized, as necessary, to ensure safe storage. Oak
Ridge Reservation research and development activities would continue as planned except that the
alternative could lead to the shutdown of the High Flux Isotope Reactor as a result of filling the
existing SNF storage capacity . Additional SrF management planning is not expected to be required
for the Bulk Shielding Reactor or the Oak Ridge Research Reactor through the year 2035 . It is
anticipated that the fuel now stored in the Tower Shielding Reactor No. II core would be moved to
the Y-12 area at the Oak Ridge Reservation for interim storage. If this is not possible, additional
storage space or cessation of reactor operations may be required after 2005. If the Advanced Neutron
Source becomes operational in 2005, additional SNF interim storage space may be required.
3.1.1.5 Nevada Test Site. The Nevada Test Site does not generate or store any SNF and
would not receive any SNF under the No Action alternative. Therefore, this alternative does not
affect the Nevada Test Site.
3.1.1.6 Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. Under the No Action alternative, naval
reactors would continue to be defueled and refueled as planned. In accordance with normal practices,
the spent fuel would be removed from the ships (or prototypes) and placed into shipping containers.
No action would be needed to prepare the naval SNF for storage because of its corrosion resistance,
high integrity, and strength. The SNF would be stored in this condition at a location near the
defueling site. Naval SNF from ships defueled or refueled at Newport News Shipbuilding, a private
shipyard located in Newport News, Virginia, would be transported to the Norfolk Naval Shipyard, in
Portsmouth, Virginia, which is the nearest naval site.
Under this alternative, examination of naval SNF would ultimately cease. A transition period
of approximately 3 years would be required to procure sufficient shipping containers to store naval
SNF being removed by ongoing defueling or refueling. During this period, naval SNF would
continue to be transported to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory for detailed examination and
storage. After the transition period, naval SNF would no longer he transported to the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory for examination and subsequent storage; the SNF removed from naval
reactors would remain for storage at the naval sites . In addition, the Expended Core Facility at the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would be shut down.

3.1.1.7 Other Generator/Storage LocaUons. Under the No Action alternative, the SNF
generated and/or stored at DOE research and non-DOE research reactors and other locations would
not be transported offsite. For the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that SNF from foreign
3-15
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research reactors would not be transported to the United States under this alternative. DOE research
reactors with adequate storage capacity could continue operating as planned. [f the onsite storage
capacity is inadequate or cannot be expanded, new plans would have to be considered, including
potential cessation of reactor operations after storage capacity limits are reached.
The No Action alternative would also affect the management of SNF from nuclear power plants
that DOE is obligated to store. For this alternative, the SNF would remain at these sites .
Stabilization would be performed, as necessary, to ensure safe storage. Loss of access to the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory for storage of its SNF has already resulted in the construction of
new onsite SNF storage at Fort SI. Vrain. Therefore, implementation of the No Action alternative
would have no additional impact on the management of SNF at Fort St. Vrain.

3.1.2 Decentralization
Under the
Decentralization Albimative
Decentralization alternative,
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thereby reducing the amount
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",
..
,.
'.'
alternative by slightly
• OoSite fuel ~f~ w~~d .,..,;;, for iDq>;"vod~f. stOrage.
,
, "
'.
~~
increasing shipments to
~e~kuvitie8~cibo wideitalreo tor SNP
DOE sites and developing or
' management,incl~~ stabilizatioo "teChnology: •
upgrading facilities.
Table 3-2 summarizes the
' . "Three optiOns
fue( :?;'
.. ~~.
.. ~
- No inspection-,fuel 'r.maitiS clOse to refuelin&/detueliD, site
basic actiolL" at each site
- t, LimitediMpeCtion al PugO! S<Iimd"Niviir Sliipyaid ' " c'
under this alternative.
" Full inspection altho, Idaho NatiOnaJ Eo,;neerina I.8bOr2!Ory
Actions that would improve
followOd by storago close tOJefueling/derUe\ioa site.
management of SNF would
be undertaken. SNF
processing and research and development would be performed . Fuel may be transported for safety or
research and development purposes. Figure 3-2 identifies the movement of fuel from 1995 through
2035 under this alternative. SNF from non-DOE locations would be transported to one of the major
existing sites for management. SNF managed by DOE would remain at its current location until a
decision on final disposition is made. The Navy has evaluated three options for SNF management
under this alternative, based on the amount of examination that would be performed on the SNF. [n
general, naval SNF would be stored at the defueling site. SNF from Newport News Shipbuilding
would be transferred to the Norfolk Naval Shipyard.
~

.

• Itesesn:IIazid

for naval

3.1.2.1 Hanford Site. Under the Decentralization alternative, the near-term activities at the
Hanford Site include those activities identified under the No Action alternative, as well as substantial
facility development and upgrades, and SNF processing research and development. [n addition to the
three principal activities identified for the No Action alternative (that is, fuel characterization, fuel
canning, and cask procurement for Fast Flux Test Facility fuel), the following general activities
would also occur: evaluating wet and dry storage methods for defense production N-Reactor and
Single-Pass Reactor fuel ; evaluating dry storage methods for other fuels (Shippingport Core II, Fast
Flux Test Facility, miscellaneous); conducti ng extensive research and development on defense
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The Hanford Site would not transport SNF to or receive SNF from oft'site locations, unless the
option to process defense production SNF at an overseas facility is selected. Local transport of fuel
would occur to support safety requirements, improved SNF management, and research and
development activities.
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production SNF stabilization techniques; and constructing and using wet and lor dry storage facilities
and possibly a stabilization facility . In response to public comment, this alternative also includes the
option to process defense production SNF at an overseas facility . A discussion of this option is
provided in Volume I, Appendix A, Attachment B.
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Combinations of wet and dry storage would be considered. Either a new wet storage facility
or dry casks or vault-type dry storage would be needed to replace existing facilities. Dry storage of
defense production SNF would require a Dew stabilization facility . Because of substantial chemical
and physical differences between defense production fuels and the nondefense fuels, it is possible that
separate storage facilities would be built. Additional National Environmental Policy Act
documentation would be prepared before selecting this option.

3.000

Locations where SNF would
be stored.

1

2 .500

~2.000

!

'0 ,500
'
~ 1,000

.g
~ SOO

7.'="
f"~:,:

,i:~)

~

,

10%
~

.-

f- .'"

SAS
ORR
NTS
InvenlOry 01 SNF al each site

INEL

HanfOrd

0%

cO. 1%

_

2%

2%

Naval

Ot

h'"

Shipments going 10 the INEl
.. Shipments going to Savannah River
Shipments \Icing to Pugsl Sound Naval Shipyard

Mintmurn: No ..am 01 naval SNF
MUJI'fIfJfn: Ful e.. .m at ",...., SNF

- .. .

i

o

7:,

<; 4,000 '

z

DOE would use the characterization and canning equipment described for the No Action
alternative to stabilize SNF removed from the CPP.{i()3 Underwater Fuel Storage Facility for interim
SNF storage. DOE would transfer the SNF in the CPP.{i()3 Underwater Fuel Storage Facility to the
Fuel Storage Area by the year 2000. DOE would continue to use the Underground Storage Facility
and the Irradiated Fuel Storage Facility for existing SNF inventory and transfers of other SNF based
on safety analyses . DOE would upgrade or increase fuel storage capacity at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory, as required.
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F1gure 3-2. Spent nuclear fuel distribution, location, and inventory for the Decentralization
alternative.
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3.1.2.2 Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Under the Decentralization alternative,
the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would accept limited shipments of SNF for stc.rage,
including SNF from some domestic research reactors and some foreign research reactors. Some
onsite transfers would also be conducted. DOE would manage the existing SNF at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory, such as the naval SNF at the Naval Reactors Facility and the SNF in
underwater pools, to accomplish safe and secure interim storage until ultimate disposition.
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The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would conduct various research and development
activities, including laboratory and pilot-plant testing, continued repository performance assessments
and acceptance criteria development, and the characterization of SNF.
The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would examine different amounts of naval SNF,
depending on the option selected for the Navy Nuclear Propulsion Program (see Section 3. 1.2.6).
Under two of the three options, the Expended .:ore Facility would ultimately be shut down. As with
the No Action alternative, each of the options for naval fuel would require a transition period.
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During this transition period, SNF would be transported in shipping containers to the Expended Core
Facility for examination and then to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant for storage.
3.1.2.3 Savannah River Site. The near-term fuel transfer and consolidation activities at the
Savannah River Site for the Decentralization alternative would be similar to those under the No
Action alternative, except that the site would receive limited SNF shipments from other locations.
The Savannah River Site would receive research and test reactor fuel from some domestic and
perhaps some foreign research reactors. This SNF would consist primarily of aluminum-clad fuel
elements and some stainless steel and zircaloy fuel elements.
Fuel would continue to be stored in the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels and in an upgraded
reactor basin until it is either canned, placed in wet or dry storage, or is processed. The processing
option represented for evaluation in the EIS consists of processing existing Savannah River Site
aluminum-clad fuel using existing chemical separations facilities (that is, F- and H-Canyons) and
storing the current inventory of stainless-steel-clad and zirconium-clad fuel as well as future receipts
of aluminum-clad SNF. This option is analyzed because DOE has data from past processing that can
be used for analyses. The impacts from this technology are representative of other processing
technology options that may be considered in the future. Other processing options, such as
processing all SNF or processing coupled with vitrification, are also feasible and would be analyzed
as part of the site-specific National Environmental Policy Act documentation needed to implement any
option for this alternative.
The Decentralization alternative would require a new fuel characterization facility, a new wet
or dry canning facility, and a new wet or dry storage facility . The Savannah River Site would
evaluate wet and dry storage and processing options because (as in the No Action alternative) interim
wet storage of the fuel elements without canning could cause corrosion and cladding failures . The
Savannah River Site would initiate projects to design characterization, canning, and dry storage
facilities for aluminum-clad fuels . Ongoing SNF research would continue at the site.
3.1.2.4 Oak Ridge Reservation. Under the Decentralization alternative, the Oalc Ridge
National Laboratory would generate and store SNF from reactor research activities. No SNF would
be transported to the Oalc Ridge Reservation except for small amounts associated with research and
development activities (for example, from Sandia National Laboratories). No SNF would be
transported offsite. SNF would be stabilized, as necessary, to provide safe storage. Research and
development activities at the Oalc Ridge Reservation would continue as planned . Because the interim
storage capacity for SNF at the Oalc Ridge Reservation is limited, new interim storage capacity would
be added . The amount of SNF in interim storage would not increase substantially.
3.1.2.5 Nevada Test Site. Under the Decentralization alternative, the Nevada Test Site
would not generate or store any SNF and would not receive any SNF. Therefore, this alternative is
not applicable to the Nevada Test Site.
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3.1.2_6 Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. The Decentralization alternative at the naval
sites is similar to the No Action alternative because naval reactors would continue to be defueled and
refueled as planned, and the fuel would generally be stored at or near the defueling site. No action
would be needed to prepare the naval SNF for storage because of its corrosion resistance, high
integrity, and strength . A transition period would be required while the necessary interim storage
capabilities could be procured and developed at the naval sites. During this period, naval SNF would
continue to be transported to the Expended Core Facility for examination and subsequent interim
storage at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The principal difference from the No Action
alternative is that the options for interim storage would be selected from shipping containers, dry
storage casks, and wet storage in water pools. Another important difference is that examination of
naval fuel would be possible.

Under this alternative, the Navy has three options, which vary by the amount of detailed
examination that could be performed on the naval SNF:
Option A, No Examination-Interim storage of naval SNF at the naval site of origin
without any detailed examination, except during the 3·year transition period when naval
SNF would continue to be transported to the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory for detailed examination and preparation for storage at
the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant.
Option B, Limited Examination-Transport approximately 10 percent of the naval SNF
to the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard where the existing water pool, designed to support
aircraft carrier refuelings, would be modified to enable limited examination of certain
high-priority SNF. Use of this water pool for examination would preclude the
performance of aircraft carrier refueling work at the shipyard.
Option C, Full Examination-Transport naval SNF to the Expended Core Facility for
full examination and then return the fuel to the naval or DOE facility near the site of
origin for storage.
For Option A, the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would
be shut down after the transition period. For Option B, the water pool facility at the Puget Sound
Naval Shipyard would be modified to support SNF examinations and, upon completion, the Expended
Core Facility would be shut down. It would not be possible to perform aircraft carrier refuelings at
the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard if this option were selected. Under Options A and B, examinations
of SNF would be either terminated or severely decreased. Under Option C, the Expended Core
Facility would continue to operate, and planned Expended Core Facility improvements, including
construction of the dry cell, would be completed.
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3.1.2.7 Other GenerlltoriStorllge Locatlona. The Decentralization alternative for other
generators and storage locations is similar to the No Action alternative because offsite transport of
SNF would be allowed in limited amounts for continued operation. Thus, both DOE and non·DOE
research reactors would be allowed to transport SNF offsite, as necessary. Additional SNF interim
storage facilities at domestic research reactors would not be required . For this alternative, SNF
currently stored at the West Valley Demonstration Project, Babcock & Wilcox Research Center, and
the Fort St. Vrain power plant would remain at these sites. As identified in the No Action
alternative, loss of access to the Idabo National Engineering Laboratory for storage of its SNF has
already resulted in the construction of new onsite SNF storage at Fort St. Vrain. Therefore,
implementation of the Decentralization alternative would have no additional impact on the
management of SNF at Fort St. Vrain.

3.1.3 199211993 Planning Basis
The 1992/1993
Planning Basis alternative
represents DOE's 199211993
plans for management of its
SNF. Under this
alternative, existing SNF
located at major DOE sites
would remain at those sites.
This results in less intersite
transportation of SNF
compared with the other
alternatives, except for the
No Action alternative.
Table 3-3 summarizes the
basic actions at each site
under this alternative.

199211993 Planning Basis Alternative '

Transport 10 and store newly generated SNF at the Idaho National
Engineeriog Laboratory or Savaonah River Site. Co"",lidate some
existing fuels at the Idaho National Engineeriog Laboratory or the
Savaonah River Site.
•

Fuel would be transported

IS

follows:

TRIGA fuel from the Hanford Sile to the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory; Hanford Site receivea limited fuel for
,....",h of storage and dispositiooiog technologies
Naval fuel to tho Idaho National Engineering Laboratory for
examination and storage

Ww. VaUey Demonstration Projecl and Fort 51. Vrain fuel to
the Idaho National Engineeriog Laboratory
Oak Ridge Reservation fuel to the Savaonah River Site
Domestic research fuel, and foreign research reaclor fuel as
may yet be determined, divided between the Savaonah River
Site and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.

Under this
• Facilities upgrades and replacements that were plaooed would
proceed, including increased storage capacity.
alternative, DOE would
transport and store newly
• Research and development for SNF management would be
generated SNF at the Idaho
undertaken, includiog stabilization technology.
National Engineering
• SNF processing mighl need to be conducled. Other forms of
Laboratory or Savannah
stabilization might occur to provide for safe storage and/or
River Site. Some existing
transport.
SNF currently at other sites
would be consolidated at the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory or the SavaMah River Site. Specifically, the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory would receive TRiGA fuel from the Hanford Site, SNF from naval sites,
some test reactor SNF, SNF from the West Valley Demonstration Project and Fort St. Vrain, and
some SNF from university and perhaps from foreign research reactors . The Savannah River Site
would also receive some test reactor SNF and some SNF from university and perhaps from foreign
research reactors. DOE sites would generally upgrade facilities and construct new facilities for the
management of SNF.
Continued SNF transportation, receipt, processing, and storage are assumed for this alternative.
The construction and operation of any new faciliti es required to accommodate current and projectspecific SNF interim storage requirements would be implemented . Figure 3-3 identifies the
movement of fuel from 1995 through 2035 under this alternative. Activities related to SNF
processing would include research and development and pilot programs to support future decisions on
the ultimate disposition of SNF .
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Naval SNF would continue to be transported to the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory for examination. After examination, the SNF would be transferred
to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant for interim storage, pending ultimate disposition.
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3.1.3.1 Hanford Site. The activities at the Hanford Site for the 1992/1993 Planning Basis
alternative are the same as those identified for the Decentralization alternative, except that 191
TRIGA SNF elements currently stored in the 308 Building and the 200 Area low-level burial grounds
would be transported to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. No new SNF would be
transported to the Hanford Site except for limited quantities of materials for research in support of
interim storage technologies for ultimate disposition. Thus, the overall inventory at the Hanford Site
would decrease slightly.

Locations where SNF would

3.1.3.2 Idaho Nat/onal Engineering Laboratory. Under the 1992/1993 Planning Basis
alternative, DOE would continue the maintenance and operation of existing SNF-related facilities in a
manner similar to the No Action alternative; however, some consolidation of Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory facilities could occur. Newly generated SNF would, with minor exceptions,
be transported to either the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory or the Savannah River Site.
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Flgure 3-3. Spent nuclear fuel distribution, location, and inventory for the 199211993 Planning Basis
alternative.
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SNF research and development, with the construction of a Technology Development Facility,
would continue as planned. The ElectTometallurgical Process Demonstration Pruject "'fluld continue
at the ArgoMe National Laboratory-West Fuel Cycle Facility. The Dry Fuels Storage Facility would
be used to demonstrate technology for the dry storage of selected DOE highly enriched uranium fuels .
Naval SNF would continue to be transported to the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory for examination. After examination, the SNF would be transferred
to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant for interim storage, pending ultimate disposition.

Toalte, mIn

~

DOE would complete a new characterization and canning facility with appropriate inspection,
conditioning, and packaging equipment to stabilize any new receipts of SNF and to prepare fuel
currently in underwater storage for dry storage. DOE would upgrade or increase dry fuel storage
capacity at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, as required.

3.1.3.3 Savannah River Site. The implementation of the 1992/1993 Planning Basis
alternative at the Savannah River Site would involve the same actions and options as the
Decentralization alternative, except that DOE would transfer about half of the newly generated
domestic and foreign aluminum-clad research reactor SNF to the Savannah River Site.

The stabilization activities and options would be the same as those for the Decentralization
alternative. The Savannah River Site would place the nonaluminum fuels and offsite a1uminum-clad
fuel receipts in interim storage and either process the a1uminum-clad fuels currently at the Savannah
River Site or place them in interim storage. The storage options and new facility requirements would
3-25
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also be the same as those for the Decentralization alternative. The Savannah River Site would
undertake the same types of research and development programs as those described for the
Decentralization alternative. Current ongoing activities would continue. The Savannah River Site
would also conduct research and pilot-scale studies to determine the best technology for ultimate
disposition of the aluminum-clad fuels .
3.1.3.4 Oak Ridge Reservation. Under the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative, the Oak
Ridge Reservation would transport excess SNF to other DOE locations as necessary to permit
continued operations of Oak Ridge reactors. The option for acquiring dry storage facilities would
support continued High Flux Isotope Reactor operation during the transition period. The amount of
SNF stored at the Oak Ridge Reservation would not increase. Research and development activities
would continue, and SNF interim storage capacity would not increase.
3.1.3.5 Nevada Test Site. U ,der the 199211993 Planning Basis alternative, the Nevada Test
Site would not generate or store any SNF and would not receive any SNF. Therefore, this alternative
is not applicable 10 the Nevada Test Site.
3.1.3.6 Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. Under this alternative, naval reactors would
continue to be defueled and refueled as planned. Upon removal from the ship, the SNF would be
transported to the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory for
examination. After examination, the fuel would be transported to the Idaho Chemical Processing
Plant for interim storage, pending ultimate disposition. No action to prepare the SNF for storage
would be necessary because of its corrosion resistance, high integrity, and strength. Planned
improvements for the Expended Core Facility, including construction of the dry cell facility, would
be completed.
3.1.3.7 Other Generator/Storage Locations. Under this alternative, SNF would continue
to be transported to designated DOE sites. At Brookhaven National Laboratory, implementation of
this alternative could require a transition period of several years and construction of temporary SNF
storage facilities or acquisition of dry storage containers. DOE assumes that no additional SNF
interim storage facilities would be constructed at the other generator/storage sites. For th;s
alternative, SNF currently stored at the West Valley Demonstration Project, Babcock & Wilcox
Research Center, and the Fort St. Vrain power plant would be transported to the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory.

3.1.4 Reglonallzation
The Regionalization alternative comprises Regionalization 4A, which would assign existing and
projected SNF among DOE sites based primarily on fuel type, and Regionalization 4B, which would
assign fuels geographically. This subsection briefly defines each one, provides a boxed summary, and
discusses the implications of both on each site.
Table 3-4 summarizes actions at the sites being considered for the Regionalization alternative.
Regionalization 4A is
the management of SNF
Reglonanzatlon ~ref.rredAltam.ttv8 .
based on the specific fuel
Distribute existiDg ind 'proj;"ied SNF amo~g DOE sites
primarily
type. The DOE has
00 fuel type.
.
identified Regionalization
• Navai fuel. would be . ~~ to, ex.a.minOd, aod atoted at the
4A as its preferred
Idaho Naiiotial Eogineeririg'Laboratory:
alternative (see Section 3.0).
All SNF would be
• Aluminum..,lad fuel would lMi.trBnsported to the S.~iDnah River
Site: TRIGA ODd noDaIuminum. fuel would be transported to the
transported to and stored at
Idaho Natiooal Eogineeririg Laboratory; defense production rUei
either the Idaho National
would be relained at the H8nfonl Siie.
Engineering Laboratory or
• SNF prOcessing llligb'need' ~ be eoodueted. Otli~r forms 'of
the Savannah River Site,
stabilization' might occur 'to provide for safe atorage . andior
depending upon the fuel
transport.
type, with the exception of
defense production fuel that
• Facilities required to support SNF inanagement would be upgraded
or built as necessary.
would be retained at the
Hanford Site.
• Research and developmeot for SNF managemeot would be
Regionalization 4A is
uodertakeo, iDcludiDg stabiliwion tecbnology.
similar to the 1992/1993
Planning Basis alternative
but involves more intersite transportation of SNF to the si!::.>, depending on the existing capabilities of
the sites to manage the specific fuel types with respect to cladding material , physical and chemical
composition, fuel condition, and adequate facilities to handle the increased quantity. Actions for this
alternative would assign all but defense production SNF to either the Idaho National Engineering
Labo ratory or the Savannah River Site, depending on the fuel type.

based

Figure 3-4 shows the movement of SNF from 1995 through 2035 under Regionalization 4A.
Facility upgrades, replacements, and additions would be undertaken to the extent required by this
alternative. Activities related to the management of SNF, including research and development
activities, would be included.
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Figure 34. Spent nuclear fuel distribution, location, and inventory for Regionalization 4A (by fuel
type).
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Regionalization 4B is
the management of SNF
Reglonal1zatlon 4B
based on geography. In
Distribute existing and projected SNP between an Eastern Re&ional Site
general, SNF from eastern
(eilher Oak Ridee Reservilion or Savannah River Site) and a Western
locations (east of the
Regioual Site (either Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory, or Nevada TeO! Site).
Mississippi River) would be
consolidated at the Eastern
• Tho Eastern Re&iOiW Site wOuld ""';vo fuel from _
of tho
Regional Site (either the
Missisaippi River ODd thoWeotem ~ooaJ Site would .-ive fuel
from
west
of
tho
Missi.ssippiRiver.
'
Oak Ridge Reservation or
the Savannah River Site);
• Naval fuel would be transported to, examined, and stoted al either
SNF from western locations
the Westem Re&iona\ Site or the Eastern Reiiona\ Site.
(west of the Mississippi
SNF
processing might need io be CODd'"'ted~ Other forms of
I
•
River) would be
stabilization ' might occur ' to ' provide for oaf. storage andlot
I
consolidated at the Western
1tmISpOrt.
"
I
Regional Site (either the
• Facilitieo required to IIIII'P"'l SNP ......gement would be upgraded
Hanford Site, the Idaho
or built sa necessary.
National Engineering
Laboratory, or the Nevada
• Resean:h and devOiopmenl would be undertaken for SNP
""","gemenl, including stabilization teCbnology.
Test Site). All naval SNF
would be transported to,
examined, and stored at
either the Eastern or the Western Regional Site. Regionalization 4B has 10 options, based on the
combination of sites selected as the Eastern and Western Regional Site and the placement of the
expended core facility at either the Eastern or the Western Regional Site. There are three potential
Western and two potential Eastern Regional Sites that could be paired, with either supporting the
expended core facility . Neither of the two possible combinations that include the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory as the Western Regional Site would consider constructing another expended
core facility at the Eastern Site because of the estimated $1 billion cost to construct the expended core
facility. Figure 3-5 shows the movement of SNF from 1995 through 2035 under Regionalization 4B
with the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory as the Western Regional Site and the Savannah River
Site as the Eastern Regional Site. Facility upgrades, replacements, and additions would be undertaken
to the extent required by Regionalization 4B. Activities related to the management of SNF, including
research and development, would be included.
3.1.4.1 Hanford Site.
Reglonallzatlon 4A-Under Regionalization 4A, activities at the Hanford Site would
be intermediate to those of the Decentralization and the 199211993 Planning Basis alternatives.
Hanford would continue to store its defense production fuel. The Hanford Site would not receive any
shipments of SNF and would transport commercial remnants and stainless steel and nondefense
production zircaloy-dad fuels to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Facility upgrades,
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replacements, and additions associated with defense production fuel would occur as for the
Decentralization and 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternatives. Minor facility additions required to
consolidate and prepare other onsite SNF for transport offsite would also occur.
•

Other generator/storage siles

C

Foreign research raaClar SNF potential points-ol-entry

INEL = Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
SAS :: Savannah River Sile
OAR =- Oak Ridge Reservation
NTS :: Nevada Test Site
,0

Naval = Naval Site s

New facilities would also be required to receive, bandle, and store offsite fuel. In addition, a
new facility for research and development and pilot programs would be required to support ultimate
disposition. An expended core facility would be built on the Hanford Site, if the naval SNF were
sent to the Hanford Site.
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Figure 3-5. Spent nuclear fuel distribution, location, and inventory for Regionalization 4B (by
geography).
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Implementation of Regionalization 4B at a site other than the Hanford Site would require the
Hanford Site to consolidate and prepare onsite SNF for transport to the Western Regional Site.
Because of the potential chemical reactivity of the defense production fuel at Hanford, it would
require stabilization before offsite transport, which would require a new facility similar to the one
described in the Decentralization alternative. Additional casks and associated handling equipment
compatible with the receiving capabilities at the regional site may also be required. After the SNF is
transported, related facilities at the Hanford Site would be closed.

Reglonallzation 4A-Under Regionalization A, stainless-steel- and zircaloy-clad,
TRIGA, and naval SNF would be transported to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would transport aluminum-clad fuel to the Savannah River
Site. Dry interim storage capacity would be increased and facility upgrades similar to those described
for the 199211993 Planning Basis alternative would be undenaken, with replacements and additions as
appropriate.

~7,~ +---+---+---~--~~
Minimum _ Shipments WI'h INEL as
WflstlHTl regional sire (~h & pended

Reg/onallzation 48-lf the Hanford Site were selected as the Western Regional Site
for implementation of Regionalization 4B, DOE SNF located or generated in the western United
States and possibly naval SNF nationwide would be sent to the Hanford Site. This would require the
completion of upgrades, increases, and replacements of storage capacity identified for the existing
inventory under the Decentralization alternative, as well as additional capacity to accommodate DOE
SNF and naval SNF within the existing or new facilities . A new stabilization facility may be required
to accomplish safe interim storage of SNF.
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Reg/onsllzat/on 48-lf the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory were selected as
the Western Regional Site for implementation of Regionalization 4B, SNF from western locations
would be transported to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The western facilities would
characterize, stabilize, and can the SNF in containers compatible with dry storage at the Idaho
Chemical Processing Plant at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Naval SNF removed from
naval reactors would be transported to the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory for examination. Following examination, the SNF would be transferred to the Idaho
Chemical Processing Plant for interim storage.
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DOE would complete an expanded Dry Fuels Storage Facility, which would include a new
characterization and canning facility similar to the one described for the 199211993 Planning Basis
alternative. In addition, the same new facility projects described for the 199211993 Planning Basis
alternative would be initiated.
DOE would conduct SNF research and development. Similar to the 199211993 Planning Basis
alternative, the Electrometallurgical Process Demonstration Project would continue at Argonne
National Laboratory-West.
If implementation of Regionalization 4B were to occur at a different site, DOE would construct
a characterization and canning facility at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant to assist in stabilizing
the different types of Idaho National Engineering Laboratory SNF before placement in various
shipping casks and storage containers before transport to the selected Western Regional Site.
Similar to the No Action alternative, DOE would complete the transfer of the CPP.@3
Underwater Fuel Storage Facility pool inventory to existing dry storage facilities by the year 2000.
DOE would not build the Dry Fuels Storage Facility. DOE would then close all SNF-related
facilities at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, except for operating reactor support facilities,
such as the Advanced Test Reactor canal or the Argonne National Laboratory-West Hot Fuel
Examination Facility and Fuel Cycle Facility.
The SNF-related research and development activities would be phased out, although the
Electrometallurgical Process Demonstration Project would continue at Argonne National
Laboratory-West (but would only test processes for SNF currently on the site). Similar to the No
Action aliemative, shipments of naval SNF to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would
cease, and the Expended Core Facility would be phased out.

3.1.4.3 Savannah Rive, Site.
Reglonallzatlon 4A-Under Regionalization 4A, DOE would transport aluminum·dad
fuels to the Savannah River Site. The same actions and options as the Decentralization alternative
would be required. The Savannah River Site would transport nonaluminum·dad fuels to the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory.
The stabilization activities and options would be similar to those described for the
Decentralization alternative. The principal differences are that, under this alternative, the Savannah
River Site would can and store more aluminum-clad fuel and would not manage nonaluminum-clad
fuels. The amount of fuel processed would remain the same. The storage options and new facility
requirements would be similar to those described for the Decentralization alternative, except that
storage space for stainless-steel-clad and zirconium-alloy-clad fuels would not be necessary. The
Savannah River Site would undenake similar types of research and development programs as those
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described for the 199211993 Planning Basis alternative. The principal difference would be that
nonaluminum-clad fuels would not be included under this alternative.

Reglonallzatlon 4B-lf the Savannah River Site were selected as the Eastern Regional
Site for implementation of Regionalization 4B, eastern locations would transport aluminum-clad and
nonaluminum-clad fuels to the site. In addition, naval SNF might be transported to the Savannah
River Site, if the Eastern Regional Site were selected for naval fuels . The stabilization activities and
options required would be similar to those for the Decentralization alternative. The Savannah River
Site would store the nonaluminum fuels and either store or process the aluminum-clad fuels . The
storage options and new facility requirements would also be the same as those for the Decentralaation
alternative. The Savannah River Site would undenake the same types of research and development
programs as those described for the Decentralization alternative. Current ongoing activities would
continue. The Savannah River Site would also conduct research and pilot-scale studies to determine
the best technology for ultimate disposition of aluminum-clad fuels.
If the Savannah River Site were not selected as the Eastern Regional Site, DOE would
transport SNF to the Oak Ridge Reservation. Some fuel would have to be stabilized before transport.
3.1.4.4 Oak Ridge Reservation.

Reglonallzatlon 4A-Under Regionalization 4A , the Oak Ridge Reservation would
not receive SNF and would transport its aluminum-clad SNF to the Savannah River Site. All other
SNF would be transported to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.

Reglonallzatlon 4B-lf the Oak Ridge Reservation were selected as the Eastern
Regional Site for implementation of Regionalization 4B, the eastern locations would transport SNF to
the Oak Ridge Reservation for storage. In addition, naval SNF might be transported to the Oak
Ridge Reservation if the Eastern Regional Site were selected for naval fuel. SNF currently stored at
other DOE facilities would arrive at the Oak Ridge Reservation fully stabilized. New non-DOE
domestic, foreign research reactor, and naval SNF would arrive in a condition necessary for safe
transportation but uncanned. This fuel would be stabilized, prepared, and canned at the Oak Ridge
Reservation to ensure safe interim storage. Research and development activities at the Oak Ridge
Reservation would increase from current levels. A new SNF management complex would be built,
including (a) an SNF receiving and canning facility, (b) a technology development facility, (c) an
interim dry storage area, and (d) an expended core facility similar to the one at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory.
The SNF receiving and canning facility would receive SNF cask shipments from offsite and
prepare the SNF for dry storage. A pool storage area would be included in this facility for cooling
SNF before dry storage. The technology development facility would be used to investigate the
applicability of dry storage technologies and pilot·scale technology development for disposition of the
various types of SNF. The interim dry storage area would consist of passive storage modules
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designed to safely store the SNF for 40 years. Naval SNF would be examined at the new expended
core facility at Oak Ridge before interim storage.
A small quantity of Molten Salt SNF is stored in tanks at the Oak Ridge Reservation.
Currently, technology to stabilize this SNF for transport does not exist. Under this alternative, if the
Oak Ridge Reservation were to transport SNF to the Savannah River Site, this Molten Salt SNF
would continue to be stored at the Oak Ridge Reservation until it could be stabilized for safe
transport.
If the Oak Ridge Reservation were not selected as the Eastern Regional Site, almost all SNF at
the Oak Ridge Reservation would be transported to the Savannah River Site. Some SNF might not be
transported until a stabilization process is developed because of the current inahility to stabilize some
SNF for transport. The option for acquiring dry storage facilities would support continued High Flux
Isotope Reactor operation during the transition period.

3.1.4.5 Nevada ran Slta. Regionalization 4A would not affect the Nevada Test Site
because fuel is not currently stored onsite and fuel would not be transported to the site.

If the Nevada Test Site were selected as tl,e Western Regional Site for implementation of
Regionalization 4B, SNF fcom western locations would be transported to the Nevada Test Site for
stocage. In addition, naval SNF might be transported to the Nevada Test Site if the Western Site
were selected for naval fuel. SNF currently stored at other DOE facilities would arrive at the Nevada
Test Site fully stabilized. New non-DOE domestic, foreign research reactor, and naval SNF would
arrive in a state necessary for safe transportation but uncanned. This fuel would be stabilized,
prepared, and canned at the Nevada Test Site to ensure safe interim storage. A new SNF
management complex would be built including (a) an SNF receiving and canning facility, (b) a
technology development facility, (c) an interim dry storage area, and (d) an expended core facility
similar to the one at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (if Nevada Test Site were selected for
receipt of naval fuel).

3.1.4.6 Naval Nuclear PropulsIon Program.
Reglonallzatlon 4A-Under Regionalization 4A, the management of naval SNF would
be the same as for the 199211993 Planning Basis alternative. Naval SNF removed from naval
reactors would continue to be transported to the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory for examination. Following examination, the SNF would be transferred to
the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant for interim storage. Planned improvements for the Expended
Core Facility, including additions to the Dry Cell Facility, would be completed.

Reglonallzatlon 4B-Under Regionalization 4B, naval reactors would continue to be
defueled and refueled, and the SNF would be sent to either the Western or the Eastern Regional Site
for examination and storage.
If the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory were selected as the Western Regional Site, then
naval SNF would continue to be transported to the Expended Core Facility for examination. After
examination, the SNF would be transferred to the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant for storage. If
another site were chosen for storage, naval SNF would continue to be transported to the Expended
Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory for examination until construction of a
new nuclear fuel examination facility or modification of an existing facility to perform the
examinations at the selected site. The new facility would provide capabilities equivalent to the
Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.

3.1.4.7 other Generator/Storage Locations. Under Regionalization 4A, the
activities at the other generator and storage locations are the same as indicated for the 199211993
Planning Basis alternative. The exact destination of SNF transported would vary depending on the
fu el type under Regionalization 4A and on the generation/storage location under Regionalization 4B.

The SNF receiving and canning facility would receive SNF cask shipments from offsite and
prepare the SNF for dry storage. A pool storage area would be included in this facility for cooling
SNF, as necessary, before dry storage. The technology development facility would be used to
investigate the applicability of dry storage technologies and pilot-scale technology development for
disposal of the various types of SNF. The interim dry storage area would consist of passive storage
modul es designed to safely store the SNF for 40 years . Naval fuel would be examined at the new
expended core facility at the Nevada Test Site before interim storage (if Nevada Test Site were
selected for receipt of naval fuel) .
If the Nevada Test Site wer nnt ,.Iected as the Western Regional Site, then Regionalization
4B would not be applicable to the Nevada Test Site because it does not generate or store SNF.
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3.1.5 Centralization
Under the
Centralization alternative,
Centralization Alternative
the SNF that DOE is
Maua,e all existing and proje<ted SNP inventories at one site until
obligated to manage would
ultimate disposition.
be transported to a single
• Existing SNF would be trausported to the ceotraJilM site.
location for management.
Potential sites include the
• Naval fuel would be trausported to, examined, and stored at tho
Hanford Site, Idaho National
ceotraJilM site.
Engineering Laboratory,
• Proje<ted SNF """,;pm would be tmnsported to the ceotraJilM site.
Savannah River Site, Oak
Ridge Reservation, and
SNF processing might Deed .to be conducted. Other forms of
stabilization might occur to provide for safe storage andlor
Nevada Test Site. Table 3-5
transport.
summarizes the basic actions
at each site under this
• Facility upgrade/replacement and new storage capacity would be
provided at the centraJilM site; stabilization facilities would be
alternative. Consequently,
provided at the transporting sites.
this alternative has five
options (Options A through
• Research and development would be undertaken for SNF
E)-centralization at each of
mamgomenl, including stabilization technology.
the five potential sites. For
the five sites designated
under the Centralization alternative, the following discussion comprises two parts. The first part
addresses the implications for the site if it were selected as the receiving site (that is, the
centralization site). The second part presents the implications to the site if it were not selected as the
centralization site, but currently managed SNF would be transported to the centralized site.
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3.1.5.1 Hanford Site. Under the Centralization alternative, Option A, DOE·controlled and
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- - - Shipments going to Pugel Sound Naval Shipyard

Regardless of the option selected, new facilities would be built at the selected site to
accommodate the increased inventories. Some SNF would require stabilization, such as canning,
before transport. SNF facilities at the transporting sites would then be closed . Activities related to
the processing of SNF, including research and development and pilot programs, would also be
centralized. Figure 3-6 shows the movement of fuel from 1995 through 2035 under this alternative.
For consolidation at sites other than the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, a new
expended core facility with capabilities comparable 10 the one in Idaho would be constructed, and the
Idaho facility would be closed. Naval SNF would continue to be transported to the Expended Core
Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory during a transition period, pending construction
of storage and examination facilities at the central site.

Naval
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Figure 3-6. Spent nuclear fuel distribution, location, and inventory for the Centralization alternative.

naval reactor SNF would be transported to the Hanford Site. This would require the completion of
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the upgrades, increases, and replacements of storage capacity identified for the existing inventory
under the Decentralization alternative, as well as of the additional capacity within those facilities or
new facilities to accommodate the SNF from the other sites and possibly a stabilization facility .
New facilities would also be required to receive, handle, and store offsite fuel. [n addition, a
new facility for research and development and pilot programs would be required to support ultimate
disposition. An expended core facility would also be built at the Hanford Site.
If the Hanford Site were not selected for storage, Hanford would have to consolidate and
prepare onsite SNF for transport to the central site. Some of the SNF would require stabilization
before offsite transport, which would require a new facility similar to the one described in the
Decentralization alternative. Additional casks and associated handling equipment compatible with the
receiving capabilities at the central site might also be required. After transport of the SNF, related

SNF-related research and development activities would be phased out, although the
Electrometallurgical Process Demonstration Project would continue at the Argonne National
Laboratory-West Fuel Cycle Facility (but would process only SNF currently on the site). Similar to
the No Action alternative, naval SNF would not be transported to the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory, and the Expended Core Facility would be shut down.
3.1.5.3 Savannah River Site. If Option C were selected under the Centralization
alternative, the Savannah River Site would receive all DOE and naval SNF. Major new facilities,
including an expendtd core facility for naval fuels , would have to be constructed. Near-term actions
and options would be similar to those described for the Decentralization alternative.
The activities and options for management of the a1uminum-clad fuel would be similar to those
described for the Decentralization alternative. Fuels received from other sites would be stored.

facilities at the Hanford Site would be closed.
3.1.5.2 Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. If Option B were selected under the
Centralization alternative, the Hanford Site. the Savannab River Site, and other DOE facilities would
characterize, stabilize, and can the SNF in containers compatible with dry storage at the Idaho
Chemical Processing Plant. Naval SNF removed from naval reactors would be transported to the
Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
Projects and activities for storage of SNF would be similar to those described for the

199211993 Planning Basis alternative, except that accelerated schedules for the Increased Rack
Capacity and Additional Increased Rack Capacity projects would be necessary to accommodate the
increased fuel receipts. [n addition, the schedule for the Dry Fuel Storage Facility project would
have to be accelerated and its scope expanded.
DOE would conduct maximum SNF research and development. Similar to the Regionalization
alternative, the Electrometallurgical Process Demonstration Project would continue at Argonne
National Laboratory-West .
[f the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory were not selected as the storage site, a canning
and characterization facility would be constructed at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant to stabilize
the different types of Idaho National Engineering Laboratory SNF in various shipping casks and
storage containers before transport to the selected DOE facility.
Like the No Action al ternative, the CPP.@3 Underwater Fuel Storage Facility pool inventory
would be transferred to existing dry storage facilities until it is transported offsite. The dry fuels
storage facility would not be built. SNF-related facilities at the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory would be closed, except for facilities directly supporting operating reactors, such as the
Advanced Test Reactor canal or the Argonne National Laboratory-West T'uel Cycle Facility.
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The Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels and reactor disassembly basins would be used to meet
near-term storage requirements for the current inventory of Savannah River Site SNF in the same
manner as described for the Decentralization alternative. The Savannah River Site would build
large-capacity wet or dry storage facilities for the SNF received. [n addition, SNF receiving,
characterization, and canning facilities would be necessary, and an expended core facility would be
built onsite for examination of naval SNF.
Projects would be initiated to design characterization, canning, and storage facilities for the
fuel types that the Savannah River Site would manage. Additional research would be conducted to
develop requirements for the ultimate disposition of the SNF.
If the Savannah River Site were not selected as the centralized storage site, it would have to
transport onsite SNF to the central site after stabilizing any fuel that is not safe for transport. No new
storage facilities would be necessary because the Savannah River Site would maintain the SNF in the
existing pools (as described for the Decentralization alternative) until moving it to the characterization
facility before transport. The Savannah River Site would construct new characterization and canning
facilities to prepare the SNF for transport. [n addition, research would be conducted on stabilization
and transport of aluminum-clad fuel that is heavily corroded .
3.1.5.4 Oak Ridge Ruervatlon. [f Option D were selected under the Centralization
alternative, the Oak Ridge Reservation would receive DOE SNF stabilized and canned to the extent
necessary for safe transportation. The SNF might need to be uncanned, stabilized, prepared , and
recanned at the Oak Ridge Reservation, however, to ensure safe interim storage. New non-DOE
domestic, foreign research reactor, and naval SNF would arrive in a form suitable for safe
transportation. If necessary, this fuel would be stabilized , prepared, and canned at the Oak Ridge
Reservation to ensure safe interim storage. Research and development activities would increase fro m
current levels. A new SNF management complex would be built, including (a) an SNF receiving and

3-39

(C r1

VOLUME 1

Centralization altemative

Centralization altemative

canning facility, (b) a technology development facility, (c) an interim dry storage area, and (d) an
expended core facility similar to the one currently at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
The SNF receiving and canning facility would receive SNF cask shipments from offsite and
prepare the SNF for dry storage. A pool storage area would be included in this facility for cooling
SNF before it is placed into dry storage, as necessary. The applicability of dry storage technologies
and pilot-scale technology development for ultimate disposition of the various types of SNF would be
investigated in the technology development facility. The interim dry storage area would consist of
passive storage modules designed to safely store the SNF. Naval SNF would be examined at the
expended core facility before storage.
A small quantity of Molten Salt SNF is stored in tanks at the Oak Ridge Reservation.
Currently, technology to stabilize this SNF for transport does not exist. Under this alternative, if the
Oak Ridge Reservation were to transport SNF to the Savannah River Site, this Molten Salt SNF
would continue to be stored at the Oak Ridge Reservation until it could be stabilized for safe
transport.

If the Nevada Test Site were not selected as the centralization site, then this alternative would
not be applicable to the Nevada Test Site because it neither generates nor stores SNF.

3.1.5.6 Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. Under the Centralization alternative, naval
SNF wou ld be transported to the selected site for examination and storage. If a site other than the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory were selected, then a transition period would be required,
during which naval SNF would be transported to the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory and a new expended core facility at the central site would be constructed. No
actions wou ld be needed to prepare the naval SNF for storage because of its corrosion resistance,
high integrity, and strength.
3.1.5.7 Other Generator/Storage Locations. Under the Centralization alternative, SNF
would be transferred from the other generator and storage locations to the central storage site.
Although the shipment destination may vary, the impacts from SNF operations at these locations
would be the same as those identified in the 199211993 Planning Basis alternative.

If the Oak Ridge Reservation were not selected as the centralization site, then almost all SNF
at the Oak Ridge Reservation would be transported to the centralization site. The option for acquiring
dry storage facilities would support continued High Flux Isotope Reactor operation during the
transition period.

3.1.5.5 Nevada rest Site. If Option E were selected under the Centralization alternative,
the Nevada Test Site would receive DOE SNF stabilized and canned to the extent necessary for safe
transportation. (However, the SNF might need to be uncanned, stabilized, prepared, and recanned at
the Nevada Test Site to ensure safe interim storage.) New non-DOE domestic, foreign research
reactor, and naval SNF would arrive in a state necessary for safe transportation but uncanned. This
fuel would be stabilized, prepared, and canned at the Nevada Test Site to ensure safe interim storage.
A new SNF management complex would be built, including (a) an SNF receiving and canning
facility, (b) a technology development facility, (c) an interim dry storage area, and (d) an expended
core faci lity similar to the one currently at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
The SNF receiving and canning facility would receive SNF cask shipments from offsite and
prepare the SNF for dry storage. A pool storage area would be included in this facility for cooling
SNF before it is placed into dry storage, as necessary . The applicability of dry storage technologies
and pilot-scale technology development for disposal of the various types of SNF would be investigated
in the technology development facility. The interim dry storage area would consist of passive storage
modules designed to safely store the SNF for 40 years . Naval SNF would be examined at the
expended core facility before interim storage.
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3.2 Alternatives Eliminated from Detailed Analysis
In the process of evaluating management alternatives available to the DOE, several other
management concepts and technologies have been considered for incorporation into the programmatic
alternatives described in Section 3.1. The following section describes the concepts and technologies
considered and not carried forward and identifies why they have been eliminated from detailed

the additional piers, waterfront services, and utilities would be large, both for ships that are to be
decommissioned and for ships that would normally be refueled and rerurned to duty. (Failure to
remove the SNF from Navy ships that are still needed for service would result in these ships being
unavailable once their currently installed reactor fuel reaches the end of useful life.)

3.2.3 Alternate Sites for the Management 0 Spent Nuclear Fuel

analysis.

3.2.1 Examine or Store Spent Nuclear Fuel in Foreign Facllitie.
The design and operating characteristics of the fuel for naval reactors and certain portions of
other SNF are classified . As such, they are not releasable to foreign interests without going through
a complex procedure prescribed in the Atomic Energy Act and strict U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission licensing requirements. Some of these classified design details and characteristics are
obvious from the physical form of the fuel, and others could be learned from detailed examination or
analyses. The United States Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy is summarized in the White
House Fact Sheet on Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy, dated September 27, 1993 (White
House 1993). Under its nuclear nonproliferation policy, the United States seeks to reduce or
eliminate, where possible, the accumulation of stockpiles of highly enriched uranium or plutonium.
These factors, along with others such as the security required for foreign transport and storage, malce
this alternative impractical. Based on these considerations, this alternative was eliminated from
detailed analysis .

3.2.2 Leave Naval Spent Nuclear Fuel In Nuclear-¥owered Ships
It is physically possible to retain SNF in the reactors in nuclear·powered vessels and moor the
ships at shipyards until a decision on the ultimate disposition of the SNF is determined and
implemented, and the fuel could then be removed from the ships.
Implementing this alternative would require extensive modifications to facilities at shipyards,
including increasing the number of piers and the availability of waterfront utilities to support the ships
at their moorings . Other shipyard facilities also might have to be modified or replaced in order to
moor the numbers of ships involved during the 4O-year period. The construction of piers and other
needed facilities would cause impacts on the waterfronts and harbors and could affect the local
ecology. Sh ipyard facilities would become overloaded with the requirement to moor vessels retaining
their SNF onboard and skilled shipyard staff would be unable to continue to work on the operational

An alternative SNF site selection process was undertaken to identify alternatives to the three
major DOE sites-Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, alld Savannah River Site.
The candidate sites evaluated, site selection screening process, and results are presented in the
Alternate Site Selection Decision Process Report (DOE-ID 1994). This study concluded that the
uncertainties regarding Department of Defense sites together with their lack of SNF facilities and
expertise made these additional Department of Defense sites less attractive as site alternatives. The
alternative SNF site selection process resulted in the addition of the Nevada Test Site and Oalc Ridge
Reservation as potential regionalization and centralization sites for SNF management. The Oalc Ridge
Reservation represented a reasonable alternative site to the Savannah River Site for regionalization of
Eastern-based SNF and the Nevada Test Site represented a reasonable alternative site to the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory or Hanford sites for regionalization of Western-based SNF. These
two sites also represented options for centralization of all SNF management activities. However, the
DOE did not consider the Nevada Test Site to be a preferred site for the management of SNF because
of the State of Nevada's current role as the host site for the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization
Project and the Nevada Test Site's lack of SNF management facilities and high-level waste
infrastructure. For purposes of conducting a thorough National Environmental Policy Act analysis,
the Nevada Test Site provides a contrast to other potential sites because it represents a site that has no
existing SNF infrastructure. Non-DOE sites were eliminated from further analysis .

3.2.4 Chemical Separation/Processing of Spent Nuclear Fuel
Three potential technical management options were evaluated for chemical
separation/processing of DOE SNF. However, DOE will not select SNF technical management
options on the basis of Volume I of this EIS . These technology-based decisions are most
appropriately made after detailed analysis on a fuel type-specific or site-specific basis. The three
options include (a) chemical separation/processing in DOE facilities at the Hanford Site. Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory, and Savannab River Site; (b) chemical separation/processing in
foreign commercial facilities; and, (c) chemical separation/processing in domestic commercial
facilities.

fleet.
In addition. the costs and impacts on national security resulting from such an approach would
be large; it would affect the ability of the U.S. Navy to carry out its mission. The costs of
maintaining the ships with SNF remaining installed under Navy operating procedures and of providing
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Chemical separation/processing at DOE sites was evaluated under certain alternatives as a
reasonably foreseeable activity as a SNF stabilization technology. This activity is discussed in
Section 3.1 of this EIS . However, the evaluation was limited to certain alternatives and certain fuel
types based largely tn historical technologies and capabilities. Future technology·based SNF
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management decisions would be made only after funher National Environmental Policy Act reviews
were completed.
Several foreign commercial facilities exist that have the capability to process certain types of
DOE SNF. An analysis of processing DOE SNF at those facilities would have to consider United
States nuclear nonproliferation policy (with regard to highly enriched uranium and plutonium),
national security concerns (with regard to the classified nature of naval fuel), and other technical
considerations (with regard to transportation of wet fuel, processing capability in foreign facilities,
possible fuel instability, etc.). There are certain fuel types addressed in this EIS for which
management by processing in a foreign facility may be considered appropriate. In such instances,
final decisions on technology-based options would be made based on funher analysis in other
site-specific or fuel type-specific National Environmental Policy Act reviews tiered from this EIS .
For example, in a separate EIS on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning
Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel, DOE addresses foreign processing of the foreign
research reactor SNF included in this EIS as a potential management alternative.

3,3 Comparison of Alternatives
As discussed in Chapter 5 and the site-specific appendices, the environmental consequences
and, therefore, differences among the five SNF management alternatives addressed in Section 3.1
would be small. The comparison of alternatives in this section concentrates on (a) the areas in which
the public has expressed considerable interest, and (b) programmatic factors important to DOE
decisionmaking. The following factors were selected for comparison:
Number of SNF shipments among sites
Public health effects
SNF-related employment
Generation of radioactive waste

In response to public comment, Appendix A, Volume I of this EIS includes an analysis of
transporting N-Reactor and Single-Pass Reactor SNF currently stored at the Hanford Site to a site in
England for processing. The impacts identified by this analysis are considered to be representative of
the impacts of transporting and handling any specific DOE SNF that might be considered for foreign
processing, because N-Reactor SNF is low-<lnriched SNF and is a large fraction (in MTHM) of the
currently stored inventory. In addition, the analysis included transportation routes that maximize
foreign and domestic distances . A summary of these transportation impacts is included in
Appendix I, Volume I of this EIS .

Impact on DOE or Navy missions
Cost of implementation.
The alternatives that would cause the smallest impacts in these areas maximize the use of existing
facilities, staff, and infrastructure.

3.3.1 Number of Shipments
Domestic commercial facilities are not available for SNF processing for interim storage and,
therefore, were eliminated from funher consideration.

3.2.5 Preparations for Disposal
DOE has not yet decided whether the ultimate disposition for DOE SNF is disposal in a
repository or removal/recycle of the fissile material (primarily uranium). Disposal of SNF would
require (a) development of the repository waste acceptance criteria, and (b) completion of the
characterization of the various types of SNF that would allow a determination of the specific
technology needed for SNF preparation (processing, canning, etc.) for each fuel type. Because of the
large number of uncertainties at this time, it is considered too speculative to include in this EIS at this
time. Therefore, preparation for disposal in a geologic repository was eliminated from funher
evaluation in this EIS.
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Figure 3-7 shows the number of shipments that would occur under each alternative.
Figure 3-7 also quantifies shipments of test specimens under each alternative. Shipments of naval test
specimens are included here because of their contribution to cumulative impacts of naval SNF
transportation. Details concerning naval test specimens and methodologies for calculating impacts of
specimen shipments can be found in Appendix D. The No Action alternative would involve a limited
number of naval spent fuel shipments (200) and test specimen shipments (320). The Decentralization
alternative, 199211993 Planning Basis alternative, and Regionallzation 4A alternative mostly involve
shipments to DOE sites from the smaller reactor and storage sites and from the naval sites to DOE
sites. These Shipments range in number fl Om approximately 2,300 shipments under Decentralization
Options A or B to approximately 4,500 under the Regionalization 4A alternative. Decentralization
Option C and the 199211993 Planning Basis alternative have approximately 3,200 and 3,700
shipments, respectively, over the 40-year period . For the Regionalization 4B alternative and the
Centralization options, SNF is transported to one or two sites. For these alternatives and options, the
number of shipments range from approximately 5,500 under the Regionalization 4B alternative (Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory and Savannah River Site) to a high of about 9,200 under the
Centralization Option E (centralization at the Nevada Test Site). The number of shipments is
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summarized in Table Hi. A more detailed discussion can be found in Appendices D and I of
Volume I. The public health effects from such shipments are discussed in the next section.

8,000
3.3.2 Public Health Effects

7,000

This section discusses the public health effects from radiation exposure and traffic accidents
under DOE's SNF Management Program (see Section 5.1.1.4 for basic information regarding
assessment methods). These effects are estimated to be small, as shown by Figures 3-8, 3-9,
and 3-10. The three sources of radiation exposure are (a) normal site operations, (b) transponation,
and (c) accidents . Under all alternatives, the estimated number of latent cancer fatalities from the
operation of the entire DOE SNF management system over a 4O-year period would range from
approximately zero to about two latent cancer fatalities .
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3.3.2.1 Norma/OpentJone. In general, the greatest radiation exposure from normal SNF
site activities and incident-free transponation results when large quantities of SNF are transported
among sites, such as under the Regionalization 4B alternative or Centralization alternative. Under
incident-free transponation, as noted in Table 3-7, the estimated total fatalities are less than two for
all alternatives, with the highest estimates associated with the Centralization options. This reflects the
higher number of shipments associated with these options.
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In summary, estimated radiation impacts on public health are small for all alternatives (which
include many different siting options), and it would, therefore, not be possible to materially reduce
the impacts through a site selection process.
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Key:
Decentralization A: No examination of naval fuels
.
Decentralization B: Limited examination of naval fuels at Pugel Sound Naval Shipyard
Decentralization C: Full examination of naval fuels at Idaho National EnginE"ering
Laboratory with spent nuclear fuel stored at naval sites
Regionalization 4A: Regi onali~ation by fuel type
Regionalization 4B: Regionalization by geography

Site initials:

H: Hanford Site
I: Idaho National Engineering laboratory
5: Savannah River Site
0 : Oak Ridge Reservation
N: Nevada Test Sile

\

•

Spenl fuel

•

Test specimensa

I

3.3.2.2 Acc/dente. Transponation accidents pose the lowest risk of cancer fatalities
(although the consequences of some accidents can be high). The accident risks are presented in
Table 3-8. The results indicated that the risks associated with traffic fatalities are greater than the
risks associated with cancer caused by radiation exposure. Both normal site operations and
incident-free transportation have greater risk than that expected from transponation accidents when the
probability and the consequences of potential accidents are considered. The latent cancer fatalities
associated with onsite accidents is small across alternatives . The transponation accident with the
largest consequences would lead to 55 latent cancer fatalities; the probability of occurrence is
1.1 x 10.7 per year (I in 10 million years) (see Appendix I).

a. Test specimens are small quantity fuel samples shipped for laboratory anatysis

In summary, for radiation-induced latent cancer fatalities to the public over 40 years of SNF
management under all of the alternatives evaluated, the most likely outcome is as follows:

Figure 3-7. Number of spent nuclear fuel and test specimen shipments between the years 1995
.... ~ 2035.

Essentially zero lalent cancer fatalities from normal facility operations and facility
accidents
Essentially zero latent cancer fatalit ies from transponation accidents
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Table 3-6. Number of offsite spent nuclear fuel and test specimen shipments by alternative.
Maximum number of shipments

:;;

Spent fuel shipments"

Test
specimen shipments b

200

320

2,000
2,000
2,900

320
320
320

(ij

199211993 Planning Basis

2,900

760

.c

Regionalization 4A

3,700

760

4,800
4,600

1,750
760

6,600
5,600
5,400

1,750
1,750
760

Alternative
No Action
Decentral ization

Option A
Option B
Option C

Regionalization 4B
Hanford Site/Savannah River Site
Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory/Savannah River Site
Nevada Test Site/Savannah River Site
Hanford Site/Oak Ridge Reservation
Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory/Oak Ridge Reservation
Nevada Test Site/Oak Ridge Reservation
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Key:

5,700
5,500
6,600
7,300
7,400

Hanford Site
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
Savannah River Site
Oak Ridge Reservation
Nevada Test Site

a. Assuming naval SNF shipments by rail and DOE SNF by truck.
b. Test specimens by truck.

1,750
760
1,750
1,750
1,750

Decentralization A: No examination of naval fuels
Decentralization B: Umited examination of naval fuels at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard
Decentralization C: Full examinsiion of naval fuels at Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory with spent nuclear fuel stored at naval sites
Regionalizalion 4A: Regionalization by fuel type
Regionalization 48: Regionalization by geography

Sile initials:

H: Hanford S~e
I: Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
S: Savannah River Site
0: Oak Ridge Reservation
N: Nevada rest Site

I_

Operations

I

•
Transportation8
' -_ _ _ _ _ _ _.J

• Location of Expended Core Facility
a. Tolal fatalities are the sum at the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer
fatalities for workers and the general population and the estimated number of
nonradiological fatalilies from vehicular emissions. Average annual risk for incident free
transportation was determined by dividing the cumulative risks over the entire
transportation campaign by the estimated duration of the transportation campaign.
Cumulative risks afe presented in Chapter 5 of EIS Volume 1.

Figure 3-8. Maximum estimated number of latent cancer fatalities per year in the general
population from normal spent nuclear fuel site operations and total fatalities from incident-free
transportation.
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Key:

H: Hanford s ne
I: Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
S: Savannah River Site
0 : Oak Ridge Reservation
N: Nevada Test Site

Decentralization A: No examination of naval fuels
Decentralization 8 : Limited examination
naval fuels at Puge! Sound Naval Shipyard
Decentralization C: Full examination of naval fuels alldaho National Engineering
laboratory with spent nuclear luel stored at naval sites
Regionalization 4A: Regionalization by fuel type
Regionalization 48: Regionalizatlon by geography

0'

H: Hanford Sile
Site initials:

I: Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
S: Savannah River Site
0 : Oak Ridge Reservalion
N: Nevada Tesl Sile

I_

Traffic fatality risk

I

•
Radiological risk
' -- - - - - - -.....

• Location of Expended Core Facility

• Location of Expended Core Facility
3. Facility risks are based on the product of the probability and consequences of the respective
maximum foreseeable facility accident for each alternative and expressed in latent cancer
fa talilies per year.

Figure 3-9_ Estimate of risk of latent cancer fatalities in general population from facility
accidents for spent nuclear fuel management activities.
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a. Radiological risk is in terms of latent cancer fatalities per year from spent nuclear fuel
shipments; traffic fatality risk is In terms of estimated nonradiological traffic accident fataliUes
per year from spent nuclear fuel shipments.
b. Average annual risk was determined by dividing the cumulative accident risks over the
entire transportation campaign by the estimated duration of the transportal ion campaign .
Cumulative transportation accident risks Brs presented in Chapter 5 ot EIS Volume 1.

Figure 3-10_ Estimate of average annual riskb from transportation accidents for spent nuclear
fuel management activities.
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Table 3-7. Comparison of incident·free transportation total fatalities for alternatives over the 4O-year
period.
Minimum&·b
Maximum b•c
total
fatalities

0.0089

0.12 to 0.15

0.35 to 0.38

199211993 Planning Basis

0. 14

0.45

Regionalization 4A (fuel type)

0.17

0.61

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and
Savannah Ri..,er Site

0.15 to 0.17

0.51 to 0.53

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and
Oak Ridge Reservation

0.14 to 0.15

0.53 to 0.54

0. 17

0.55 to 0.56

Hanford Site and Oak Ridge Reservation

0.15

0.57

Nevada Test Site and Savannah River Site

0.19

0.88

Nevada Test Site and Oak Ridge Reselvation

0.17

0.90

Decentral ization

Truck accident rUb·

total
fatalities

0.0089

No Action

Table 3-8. Comparison of estimated transportation accident risks for alternatives over the 4O-year
period.
Rail accident risb-

fatalitiea

Traffic C&la.litiea

Lalenl
c:ancer fatalities

No Action

4 . 1 )( 10-6

0.047

4.1 )( 10-6

0.047

Dcccntralizationb

0.0008510

0.20 10 1.01

0 .0002910
0.00034

0.2610 1.07

Alternative

0.00090

Traffic fatalities

199211993 Planning Basis

0.0010

0.70

0.00035

0.73

Regionalization 4A (fuel type)

0.0011

0.77

0.00037

0.76

0.00090

0.72

0.00034

0.73

0.00095

0.73

0.00024

0.72

0.0013

0.84

0.00075

0 .82

Hanford Site and Oak Ridge
Reservation

0 .0013

0 .81

0 .00050

0 .78

Nevada Test Site and

0 .0012

0.99

0 .00045

0 .91

0.0012

1.00

0.00035

0 .91

Rcgionalization 48 (geography)

Regionalization 4B (geography)

Idaho National Engineering

Hanford Site and Savannah River Site

Latent cancer

Laboratory and Savannah

Rivet Site
Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory and Oak Ridge
RC5ervation

Hanford Site and Savannah

River Site

Savannah River Site
Nevada Test Site and Oak
Ridge Reservation

Centralization

Centralization

Hanford Site

0.23

1.3

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory

0.21

1.1

Hanford Site

0.0050

1.10

0.0013

1.05

Savannah River Site

0.26

1.7

Idaho National Engineering

0.0048

1.00

0 .0013

0.95

Oak Ridge Reservation

0.21

1.6

Savannah River Site

0.0020

1.44

0.00080

1.09

Nevada Test Site

0.26

1.6

Oak Ridge Reservation

0.0017

1.35

0.00055

1.00

Nevada Test Site

0.0050

1.33

0 .0014

1.19

a. The minimum total fatalities are associated with transport of DOE fuel by rail; naval SNF
shipments are by both truck (onsite) and rail (offsite).
b. Total fatalities are for the 4O-year period 1995 through 2035 and were the sum of the
estimated number of radiation·related latent cancer fatalities for workers and the general
populatio n and the estimated numbe r of nonradiological fatalities from vehicle emissions .

Laboratory

Assumes SNF shipments are 100 percent by truck or 100 percent by rail. except (or naval SNP . hipments that are by
both truck (onsite) and rail (orrsitc).

&.

b. Range of valuc. in each column for the Decentralization alternative renccll the different fuel eumination options for
naval SNF.

c. The maximum total fatalities are associated with transport of DOE fuel by truck; naval SNF
shipments are by both truck (onsite) and rail (offsite).
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Up to about one latent cancer fatality from most incident-free transportation scenarios;
up to two latent cancer fatalities under the Centralization options

'"~ 2,500
>-

o

Up to about two fatalities from nonradiological traffic accidents.

~ 2,000

o

il
A more detailed discussion of accidents is fo und in Chapter 5, Volume I of this EIS.

~ 1 ,500
~

3.3.3 Employment Related to Spent Nuclear Fuel Management at DOE and Naval Sites

1l

Q.

1,000

LL

Under various alternatives, the total labor force involved in SNF management could decrease
by 180 jobs or increase by more than 2,100 jobs averaged over the period 1995 to 2005, as compared
to the 1995 baseline. This labor force is the sum of permanent employment in operating or
maintaining new facilities and shorter term construction jobs . Figures 3-11 and 3-12 characterize the
range of SNF jobs under each alternative. The number of jobs related to SNF management is small
compared with the total number of jobs (2 to 4.5 percent) at the sites that would be involved in SNF
management. SNF management-related jobs account for less than 4.5 percent of total employment at
the sites and less than 8 percent of employment at anyone site.

Z

(/)

"0
~
E

"c:

"co

500

o

ID

Under the No Action alternative, employment would not increase substantially at any site, and
the closure of the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would result
in a net loss of just over 500 jobs involved in SNF management following closure. The maximum
number of jobs indicated in Figure 3-11 assumes processing for stabilization and reports the maximum
number for options at each site.
For any of the alternatives, no more than an average additional 2,100 jobs over the period
1995 to 2005 would be required for implementation. Some of the larger SNF employment
requirements (particularly those involving the Hanford Site) would be caused by the development and
operation of processing facilities needed to stabilize stored SNF. If processing were not undertaken ,
less employment would be generated at those sites. In addition, the relocation of the Expended Core
Facility to sites other than the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would result in an increase of

II 1I 1I

~ -500

u

c:

j

0

It is important to note that the relocation of large amounts of SNF under the Regionalization
4B alternative and the Centralization options would eventually result in closure of SNF management
facilities at major DOE sites and, therefore, long-term job loss at the closed facilities. However,
some of the job losses at closed faci lities would be accompanied by joh gains at the sites receiving the
fuel shipments. In addition, from 1995 to 2005 several management actions already initiated at
various sites to maintain a safe storage configuration for existing SNF will be completed, and much of
the SNF would need to be stabilized before transport. In the near term, the combination of building
facilities at some sites and stabilizing SNF before transport at other sites complicates estimating the
near-term SNF employment situation.
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Key:
Decentralization A: No examination of naval fuels
Decentralization B: limited examination of naval fuels at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard
Decentralization C: Full examination of naval fuels alldaho National Engineering
laboratory with spent nuclear fuel stored at naval sites
Regionalization 4A: Regionalization by fuel type
Regionalization 48: Regionalization by geography

Sile initials:

H: Hanford Site
I: Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
S: Savannah River Site
0 : Oak Ridge Reservation
N: Nevada Test Site

~
~

• Location of Expended Core Facility
a. The maximum values occur with processing; the minimum values occur without processing.

Figure 3-11. Change in the number of jobs averaged over the years 1995 to 2005 for spent
nuclear fuel management activities .
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5.0

about 500 jobs per year in the support of naval SNF examinations at those sites and would result in a
corresponding loss of approximately SOO jobs at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
However. regionalization with the Nevada Test Site as the Western Regional Site and the Oak Ridge
Reservation as the Eastern Regional Site w()uld result in the highest employment peak. The peak,
estimated to be approximately 4,600 jobs in the year 2000, includes employment at sites preparing
SNF for transport to the selected sites.
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A more detailed discussion of socioeconomic impacts can be found in Chapter 5, Volume I of
this EIS .
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3.3.4 Generation of Radioactive Wastes
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Key:
Decentralization A: No examination of naval fuels
Decentralization B: Limited examination of naval fuels at Pugsl Sound Naval Shipyard
Decentralization C: Full examination at naval fuels alldaho National Engineering
Laboratory with spent nuclear fuel stored at naval sites
Regionalization 4A: Regionalizalion by fuel type
Aegionalization 48: Hegionalizalion by geography

Site initials:

H: Hanford S~e
I: Idaho Nationat Enginearing Laboratory

•

Min"

•

Max"

When SNF is stored onsite, very little high·level, transuranic, or mixed waste is generated (see
Figure 3-13). These small quantities of radioactive wastes would usually be generated during
stabilization activities. As a result, under the No Action alternative fewer than 20 cubic meters per
year (26 cubic yards per year) of transuranic wastes would be generated from SNP management
nationwide because SNP would not be stabilized. Under the other alternatives, where stabilization
activities are assumed to occur, it is estimated that between 20 and 190 cubic meters (26 and
250 cubic yards) of high-level waste and between 20 and 90 cubic meters (26 and 120 cubic yards) of
transuranic waste would be generated each year (Figure 3-13). The lower generation rates would
occur in the Decentralization alternative, where small amounts of SNP would be transported among
major DOE sites (and stabilization for transport would not be necessary). For other alternatives,
greater amounts of SNF would be transported among sites; therefore, more SNF would require
stabilization before transport and more waste would be generated. The difference between the
minimum and maximum volume of waste generated results principally from the contribution
attributable to processing for stabilization.
Low-level waste is also generated as a result of SNF management. Figure 3-14 indicates the
estimated annual volume for each of the alternatives. As previously noted for high-level, transuranic,
and mixed w~te, the higher values are principally the result of processing for stabilization .

S: Savannah River Site

0 : Oak Rid;Je Reservation
N: Nevada Test Site

A more detailed discussion of radioactive waste generation under each alternative can be found
in Chapler 5, Volume I of this EIS .

• Locatior. of Expended Core Facility
a. 1995 baseline is the sum of the employment at all sites involved in that alternative .

3.3.5 Impacts on DOE and Navy Missions

b. The maximum values occur with processing; the minimum values occur wilhout processing.

The concerns for the missions of DOE and the Navy relate to storing SNF safely, meeting
obligations, preparing SNF for ultimate disposal, and examining naval SNF.
Figure 3-12. Change in site employment between the years 1995 and 2005 for spent nuclear
fuel management activities as a percent of 1995 baseline.
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3.3.5.1 Impllct6 on OOF. The DOE mission regarding the safe storage of SNF is impacted
in the No Action alternative. Under this alternative, DOE will initially suffer from a loss of margin
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Key:
Decentralization A: No examination of naval fuels
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laboratory with spent nuclear fuel stored at naval sHes
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H: Hanford Site
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I: Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
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• location of Expended Core Facility
a. The maximum values occur with processing: the minimum values occur without processing_

Key:
Decentralization A: No examination of naval fuels
Decentralization B: Umited examination 0' naval fuels at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard
Decentralization C: Full examination of naval fuels at Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory with spent nuclear fuel stored at naval sites
Regionalization 4A: Regionalizalion by fuel type
Regionalization 4B: Regionalization by geography

Site initials:

H: Hanford Sile
I: Idaho Nalional Engineering Laboralory
S: Savann?h Rive r Site
0 : Oak Ridge Reservalion
N: Nevada Tesl Sile

• Location of Expended Core Facility
a. The maximum values occur with processing; the minimum values occur without processing.

figure 3-13. Average volume of high-level, transuranic, and mixed waste generated per year
over the years 1995 to 2005 for spent nuclear fuel management activities.
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figure 3-14. Average volume of low-level wastes generated per year over the years 1995
to 2005 for spent nuclear fuel management activities,
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in storage capacity. In addition, DOE may be impacted by needing to make more frequent repairs to
existing facilities (potentially losing the use of a facility because it is beyond repair). In time, there
would be little or no nexibility for repairs under the No Action alternative.
Additionally, by limiting research and development to activities already approved, DOE's
ability to safely store SNF would be impacted by being unable to conduct new research and
development. The No Action alternative would not permit development of processing and other
technologies excepl for those underway as of June 1995.
Under the No Action alternative, DOE would not satisfy its obligations associated with SNF
from university reactors, other research reactors, and special-case commercial SNF. Also, under the
No Action alternative, DOE might not be able to fulfill agreements wiL" states or other Federal
agencies that involve SNF, except those specific actions already in progress, unless the agreements
are changed . Faiiure to meet the terms of these agreements would expose DOE to adverse legal
actions. In addition, DOE would not proceed, as it has proposed, to establish a new policy for
management of foreign research reactor fuel that contains United States origin uranium (see
Section 1.2.4). These mission impacts could be avoided under any alternative but the No Action
alternative.
The DOE recognizes a need, which is not yet well defined, to prepare SNF for its ultimate
disposition. At this point, the processing and other technology required for ultimate disposition are
not precisely known. Under !he No Action alternative, no new facilities or new research and
development would be allowed . The No Action alternative would not permit development of
processing and other technologies except for those begun as of June 1995. Although the acceptance
criteria for DOE-managed SNF have not yet been defined and repository disposal may permit canned
SNF, alternative approaches for ultimate disposition must be developed. By not allowing this
development under this alternative, DOE would be unable to meet one of the major goals of the SNF
Management Program. For the No Action alternative, no facilities could be built for converting SNF
to forms acceptable for disposition. In addition, with facilities storing SNF throughout the country,
more canning or other processing facilities might be required than are currently planned . Building
additional facilities at multiple locations would impede efficient disposition of SNF produced at small
reactor sites. Other alternatives would allow research and development to proceed as deemed
appropriate to support stabilization.

3.3.5.2 Impacts on tho Navy. The Navy would incur large storage costs under the
No Action and Decentralization alternatives. In addition, the Navy mission would be hindered if the
fu ll examination of fuels at an expended core facility were not possible. Full examination would not
happen under the No Action alternative and Decentralization Options A and B. The examinations are
a critical aspect of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program's ongoing advanced fuel research and
development program. They provide engineering data on nuclear reactor environments, material
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behavior, and design performance. These data support
The design of new reactors having extended lifetimes
Continued safety of naval reactors
Improvements in nuclear fuel performance and ship operational performance
The operation of existing naval reactors by providing confirmation of their proper
design and allowing maximum depletion of their fuel.
The verification of engineering methods and models to design naval nuclear fuel.
Although it is difficult to quantify the benefits of an outstanding safety record and improved
operational characteristics, increased core life yields an economic advantage-a reduction in the
number of reactor cores that must be procured and in the number of refuelings that must be
performed . It also results in less SNF being generated. Another advantage is the increased online
availability of nuclear-powered ships with Iife-<>f-ship fuel, which would reduce the number of ships
required. About $5 billion would be saved if life-<>f-ship fuels are developed, based on an assumed
force structure of fewer than 100 nuclear-powered ships by 2005. Additional details can be found in
Appendix 0 , Volume 1 of this EIS.

3.3.6 Cost of Implementation
The DOE prepared and issued in March 1995 a cost evaluation report (DOE 1995b) that
provides insight for short- and long-term planning for DOE complex-wide SNF management. This
report was also used to provide costs relevant to this EIS . This section provides potential costs
3l>sociated with the management of DOE SNF for the 4O-year period evaluated in this EIS.

3.3.6.1 Results. Table 3-9 provides a range of costs for interim storage. Because of the
very broad scope associated with complex-wide SNF management and the uncertain nature of future
actions, "best estimate" costs cannot be developed at this time. The degree to which existing facilities
factor into a given alternative can vary. To account for this, each alternative was analyzed for two
cost ranges to define the possible spread of cost for each alternative. The upper and lower cost
ranges were defined as follows :
Upper Cost Range - Assumed construction of new facilities, except for a limited number
judged adequate for 40 years.
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Table 3-9. Cost results for storage only (billions of dollars).

Upper
range

Lower
range

No Action (I)

17.4

10.6

Decentralization-no examination (2A)

17.9

8.6

Decentralization-limited examination (2B)

18.1

8.9

Decentralization-full examination (2C)

20. 1

10.8

199211993 Planning Basis (3)

18.0

9.4

Alternatives

Regionalization by fuel type (4A)

17.6

9. 1

Regionalization by geography (4B)"

16.0

9.6

Centralization at Hanford (SA)

15.4

13.5

Centralization at Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (5B)

13.8

11.9

Centralization at Savannah River Site (5C)

15. 1

9.5

Centralization at Oak Ridge Reservation (50)

17. 1

15. 1

Centralization at Nevada Test Site (5E)

17.5

15.3

a. All options were considered, however, only Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and
Savannah River Site costs are shown.

In the lower cost range, if existing facilities can continue to be used, it would be least
expensive to manage fuel under alternatives that maximize the use of sites with existing capabilities
(that is, Alternatives 2A, 2B, 4A, or 4B). The centralization alternatives, which would require the
construction of storage facilities, could cost up to $6.7 billion more that the least costly alternative
(2A). Before drawing conclusions based on the lower cost range results, bowever, the reader should
recognize that the selection of an approach using existing facilities, combined with a commitment to
upgrade facilities [over and above correction of vulnerabilities (DOE 1994c») may significantly change
the cost comparisons. In this situation, cost would tend to increase toward the upper cost range.
Additional details can be found in DOE (l995b). This report is available in the DOE Public
Reading rooms listed in the EIS, or upon request from the Office of Communications, DOE Idaho
Operations Office at the address listed in the front of the EIS.

3.3.7 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing Standards
DOE is proceeding with actions to implement safe, efficient, and cost-effective interim storage
of its SNF before final disposition. The need for interim storage bas led DOE to evaluate storage
technologies and alternative management strategies to provide an optimum solution to storage
challenges . Several commercial storage technologies under evaluation for DOE SNF have been
licensed and regulated by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In addition, DOE SNF could
eventually come under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission if it is to be
disposed of in a geologic repository. Therefore, DOE is considering having any new interim storage
facilities reviewed to determine whether they could meet U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
licensing standards. This approach, if implemented, would provide a testing ground for the
development of the technical and administrative protocols between the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and DOE in the event that some type of U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulatory
oversight occurs in the future.

Lower Cost Range - Assumed existing facilities used at the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory and the Savannah River Site but no existing facilities used at Hanford. Facility
upgrades were limited to Phase m vulnerability costs (DOE 1994c).
3.3.6.2 Discussion and Conclusions. Table 3-9 shows that Alternatives I, 2A, 2B, 3,

or 4A are roughly equivalent. This is because most of the SNF would be located at the s~'IIe sites
(Hanford , Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and Savannah River Site) in each alternative.
Alternative 4B costs less than Alternative 3 because all SNF would be moved to two sites (Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory and Savannah River Site), which have existing infrastructures, and
econo mies of scale (fewer sites cost less) dictate that two sites would be less costly than three. The
table also sbows that if new facilities are required, it would be least expensive to centralize SNF
management at a site with existing SNF management infrastructure (that is, Alternatives SA, 5B, or
SC). Transportation costs, which are typically I percent of total costs, would not be an overriding
consideration in the selection of locations for SNF management.
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4. AFFECTED ENVIRONMENT
This ch~pter contains overviews of the potentially affected environments at and around the
existing and potential sites under consideration for management of SNF within the various alternatives
addressed in the EIS. Because of the large amount of information necessary to adequately
characterize the affected environments at these sites. the space available in this chapter limits the
presentations to summaries of the relevant key site characterization information. Consequently, the
detailed descriptions of the affected environments are presented under separate cover as self-contained
appendices to Volume I. This approach allows the reader to compare the relative similarities and
differences among the sites without having to review thousands of pages of text. These separate
site-specific appendices also contain the detailed analyses of environmental impacts associated with
each alternative that are rolled up and summarized in Chapter 5.
The site-specific appendices under separate cover are organized as follows:

Appendix
A

Focus of appendix
Hanford Site

B

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory

C

Savannah River Site

D

Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

E

Other Generator/Storage Locations

F

Nevada Test Site and Oak Ridge
Reservation

The population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the Hanford Site has been characterized for
the purposes of identifying whether any disproportionately high and adverse impacts exist to minority
and low-income communities . The population surrounding the Hanford Site is shown to be 20
percent minority and 18 percent low-income, based on U.S. Bureau of Census information and the
definitions and approach presented in Appendix L.
Approximately 6 percent of the Hanford Site is occupied by operational facilities . Waste
management and SNF processing activities and waste storage occur near the center of the Hanford
Site. Eight retired plutonium production reactors and the N Reactor are located on the south side of
the Columbia River, and the nuclear research and development laboratories are located in the
southeastern pan of the Hanford Site near the city of Richland. The majority of Hanford's SNF is
stored in basins in 100-KW and 100-KE. The Fast Flux Test Facility is located in the east-central
area of the Hanford Site. The remaining area is undeveloped land that provides for buffer zones for
the operating areas. The Hanford Site is a Superfund site, listed on the National Priority List.
The land adjacent to the Hanford Site is either urbanized or agricultural. Agricultural areas
include irrigated and dry-land farming and grazing.
In 1992, the Hanford Site employed 16, 100 people, accounting for almost 25 percent of the
nonagricultural employment in Benton and Franklin Counties. Other major employers include the
Siemens Nuclear Power Corporation, Sandvik Special Metals, Iowa Beef Processors, Boise Cascade,
and Burlington Northern Railroad .

This chapter focuses on details about resources most likely to be affected by the actions
evaluated under the various alternatives. Consequently, not every category of information addressed
in the site-specific appendices is rolled up for presentation here.

4.1 Hanford Site
This section summarizes the environmental characterization information on the Hanford Site,
Richland, Washington. This information has been used in evaluating environmental impacts that
might result from implementing the various alternatives for management of SNF at the Hanford Site.
More detailed information characterizing the affected environment of the Hanford Site is presented in
Appendix A, under separate cover .
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The Hanford Site covers about 1,450 square kilometers (560 square miles) of the southeastern
pan of the State of Washington (see Figure 4-1). It is located in parts of Benton, Grant, and Franklin
Counties. The nearest city is Richland, Washington, which borders the Hanford Site on its southeast
corner . About 380,000 people live within an 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius of the Hanford Site.
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As of 1992, 248 prehistoric archaeological sites were recorded by the Hanford Cultural
Resources Laboratory of the Pacific Northwest Laboratory. Of the 48 sites on the National Register
of Historic Places, two are single sites and the remainder are in seven archaeological districts.
Archaeological sites include remains of numerous pithouse villages, campsites, cemeteries along the
river banks, spirit quest monuments, hunting camps, game drive complexes, quarries in mountains
and rock bluffs, hunting/kill sites in lowland stabilized dunes, and small temporary camps near
perennial sources of water away from the river. Native Americans have inhabited the land around the
Hanford Site since prehistoric times . The Wanapum and the Chamnapum bands of the Yakama tribe
were the area's primary inhabitants, being joined by Pal us people, Walla Walla people, and Umatilla
people for fishing the Hanford Reach of the Columbia River. These people retain traditional secular
and religious ties to the region. Some native plant and animal foods , which are used in religious
ceremonies performed by members of the Washane or Seven Drums religion, can be found on the
Hanford Site.
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The Hanford Site is on a low-lying. modified alluvial plain of the Columbia River. Altitudes
range from about 105 meters (345 feet) in the southeast pan to about 245 meters (804 feet) in the
northwest corner. The Hanford Site is bounded to the east by the Columbia River and the White
Bluffs of the Ringold Formation. to the southeast by the city of Ri chland. to the west by the
Rattlesnalee Hills, and to the north by the Saddle Mountain .
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The principal geologic features beneath the Hanford Site. listed from the oldest to the
youngest, include the Columbia River Basalt Group (basaltic lava flows) . the Ringold Formation
(weakly cemented coarse sandy gravel to compacted silt and clay), and a series of deposits called the
Hanford formation (coarse gravel and sand). These units are covered by a few meters or less of
recent alluvial or windblown sands. Other than gravel, there are no geologic resources of economic
value on the Hanford Site.

I

The area of the Hanford Site is historically of low-to·moderate seismicity. On a scale of 0
to 4, the Hanford Site is in a Uniform Building Code Seismic Risk Zone 28. (Zo ne 0 represents little
damage, and is subject to the greatest seismic risk.) The largest seismic shock near the Hanford Site
on record was approximately 4 .5 to 5.0 on the Richter scale and Modified Mercalli Intensity of V; it
was recorded in Corfu. 35 kilometers (22 mil:-s) north of the Hanford Site in 1918. A Modified
Mercalli Intensity V qualee occurred in 1973. Many lower intensity earthqualees have occurred in the
Columbia Plateau and on the Hanford Site as pan of "earthqualee swarms,· which are clusters of
several small earthqualees occurring over a shon period of time.
The Hanford Site is located approximately 160 kilometers (100 miles) to the east of the
Cascade Range, which includes several volcanic vents . The great distance el iminates the potential for
lava flows from these volcanoes reaching the Hanford Site. The foreseeable volcanic effects at the
Hanford Site are limited to windborne volcanic ash .
The general climate of the Hanford Site is hot and dry in summer and cool in winter. The
average annual precipitation is 16 centimeters (6.3 inches), most of which falls during the winter. On
average, thunderstorms occur II days per year. mostly during the summer. Tornadoes are extremely
rare, occurring within 160 kilometers (100 miles) of the Hanford Site about once in 3 years. Air
quality in the Hanford region is well within the State of Washington and U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency standards for criteria pollutants, except that shon·term panicul ate concentrations
occasionally exceed the PM· IO standard . (pM·1O is panicul ate matler defined as suspended
paniculates with an aerodynamic diameter less than 10 micrometers.) The Class I Area (areas where
degradation of air qu al ity is to be severely restricted) nearest to the Hanford Site is at Goat Rocks
Wilderness Area, 145 kilometers (90 miles) away.

.. - . - Hanford S~e Boundary

-0-

Siale Highway

- - - S~eRoad
59312On.5

AFFC·F·1.H

Figur e 4-1. Hanford Site local ion and site map.
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Two rivers pass through or near the Hanford Site. The Columbia River pas,es through the
northern pan of the Hanfo rd Site and forms pan of the eastern boundary. The average daily flow of
this ri ver is 3,400 cub ic meters per second (120, 100 cubic feet per second ). The Yaleima River. with
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an average flow of 104 cubic meters per second (3 ,673 cubic feet per second), is located near the
southern ponion of the Hanford Site. Wastewaters are discharged to several ponds on the Hanford
Site and the Columbia River. In addition to these surface waters, there are two intermittent creeks
that form the remainder of the surface waters on the Hanford Site. The flood areas of these rivers
and streams include some areas where facilities are located, but flooding is well-controlled by
upstream darns on the Columbia River. Minor flooding (away from facilities) occurs from other
watercourses . While specific information on the 1000year floodplain has not been defined, the
projected extent of the maximum probable flood, which is greater than the area of inundation
expected from a 1000year flood , would not impact proposed SNF facilities . More details on flooding ,
including that induced by dam failures, are given in Section 4 of Appendix A of Volume I .
The water quality of the Columbia River is high, with minor increases in constituents
resulting from Hanford Site discharges. Radiological monitoring shows low levels of radionuclides in
samples of Columbia River water. Tritium, iodine-129, and uranium are found in somewhat higher
concentrations downstream of the Hanford Site than upstream, but are well below concentration
guidelines established by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency drinking water standards.
Nonradiological water quality parameters measured during 1989 were similar to those reponed in
previous years and were within Washington State Water Quality Standards.
Part of the water supply at the Hanford Site and for the nearby Tri-Cities is the Columbia
River. In 1991, the combined water use for Richland , Pasco, and Kennewick was 4.3 x 107 cubic
meters (11 .38 billion gallons) . Richland and Kennewick derive a ponion of their water used from
nearby groundwater wells and rely on groundwater as a sole source of water from November through
March each year. Additional references and more detailed information on groundwater are in
Appendix A of Volume I.
In 1993, several radionuclides and nonradioactive chemicals were present in unconfined
aquifers located beneath the Hanford Site in some locations at levels exceeding U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency drinking water standards andlor DOE Derived Concentration Guides. These
constituents are listed, as follows : radiological constituents-tritium, strontium-90, cobalt.{i(),
antimony-125, technetium-99, iodine-129, cesium-137, uranium, and plutonium; and nonradiological
constituent- nitrate, chromium , trichloroethylene, cyanide, fluoride, carbon tetrachloride, and
chloroform. Groundwater beneath the Hanford Site is not used for human consumption or food
production with the exception of a well utilized for drinking at the Fast Flux Test Facility visitor
center. Above-background levels of tritium and iodine-129 have been detected in this well ; however,
these levels are well below U.S. Environmental Protection Agency drinking water standards .
DOE assens a federally reserved water withdrawal right with respect to the Hanford Site
operations . Current withdrawals from the Columbia River occur under this assenion. Of the water
consumed from surface waters in the vicinity of the Hanford Site, 13 percent is used for industrial
purposes . The Hanford Site uses 41 percent of the water targeted for industrial use.
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The Hanford Site is a shrub-steppe environment dominated by cheatgrass and sagebrush, but it
includes 10 different types of plant communities. This plant environment suppons 12 species of
amphibians and reptiles, 39 species of mammals, and numerous bird and insect species. Deer and elk
are the major large animals, and coyotes are the major mammalian predators. Wetlands of varying
size exist along the Columbia River and suppon extensive stands of willows, grasses, aquatic plants,
and other plants. In the Hanford Reach of the Columbia River, 44 species of fish have been
identified . The Hanford Reach is also used by various salmon and trout species as a spawning area
and a migration route to and from upstream spawning areas. Four threatened or endangered plants
classified by the State of Washington exist on the Hanford Site, as well as seven species of threatened
or endangered birds or mammals and one insect species . The insect species and three of the bird
species are federally li~ted .
No federally listed threatened or endangered species have been observed at the proposed SNF
site. However, two Federal andlor state candidate species, the loggerhead shrike (Federal and state
candidate) and sage sparrow (state candidate), were observed during a survey of the proposed SNF
site. The sagebrush habitat at the proposed site is considered priority habitat by the State of
Washington for the loggerhead shrikes, sage sparrows, burrowing owls (state candidate), pygmy
rabbits (Federal candidate and state threatened), sage thrashers (state candidate), western sage grouse
(Federal aod state candidate), and sagebrush voles (state monitored). Although burrowing owls were
not observed at the site, ground squirrel burrows used by burrowing owls and owl pellets were
observed during the survey . No evidence of the other species were found at the proposed site. The
closest known ferruginous hawk (Federal candidate and state-threatened species) nest is approximately
8.9 kilometers (5 .5 miles) northwest of the site. The proposed site should be considered as
comprising a ponion of the foraging range of this species .
The Tri-Cities (Richland , Kennewick , and Pasco) serve as a regional transportation center
with major air, land, and river connections . The Tri-Cities area has four major highways:
U.S. Routes 12 and 395, State Route 240, and Interstate 82 . State Route 240 traverses the Hanford
Site from southeast to northwest. The Burlington Northern and Union Pacific railroads connect the
area to more than 35 states . Docking facil ities exist at the pons of Benton, Kennewick, and Pasco .
The Tri-Cities Airpon, located in Pasco. provides daily passenger and freight services .
For the years 1991 to 1993. the potential collective dose to the population within 80
kilometers (50 miles) from all Hanford Site effluents was calculated to be 0.9, 0.8 , and
0.4 person-rem, respectively . In 1993. the dose to the maximally exposed offsite individual was
calculated to be 0.00003 rem (0.03 millirem) per year from all exposure pathways. For perspective.
collective dose to the same population fro m natural background radiation was calcul ated to be about
100,000 person-rem from an average indiv idual dose of 0.3 rem (300 millirem) per year .
In 1993, about 14,500 individuals were monitored at the Hanford Site. Of those monitored ,
11 ,000 were classified as radiation workers with a collective dose of 200 person-rem and an average
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annual dose equivalent of 0.02 rem (20 millirem) per individual with measurable doses. A subset of
Hanford radiation workers associated with SNF storage at 100 K Basins averaged doses of 0.4 rem
(400 millirem) per year. These averages are well below the \0 CFR Part 835 radiation dose limit of
5 rem (5,000 millirem) per year and the DOE Administration Control Level of 2 rem (2,000
millirem) per year for occupational exposure.
Electricity in the region is provided by several different entities, but it is ultimately generated
by the Bonneville Power Administration. About 74 percent of the region's installed generating
capacity is hydroelectric. Power for the Hanford Site is purchased wholesale from the Bonneville
Power Administration, amounting to greater than 550 megawans in 1988. Because of the reliance on
h ~dropower, annual production is variable, averaging 16,400 megawans of capacity.
Major incorporated areas in Benton and Franklin Counties are served by municipal wastewater
treatment systems. The unincorporated areas are served by onsite septic systems.
High-level radioactive waste has been accumulating at the Hanford Site since 1944 in
149 single-shell tanks-no new waste has been added to these tanks since 1980. Much of the liquid
waste from single-shell tanks has been transferred to newer double-shell tanks for safer storage.
Transuranic wastes were disposed of onsite befo~e 1970 in unlined trenches. Since 1970, transuranic
wastes have been stored in abovegrade storage facilities . As of 1991 , there were about 120,000 cubic
meters (157,000 cubic yards) of transuranic waste buried or in retrievable storage. Mixed low-level
waste totaling 16,745 cubic meters (21,902 cubic yards) was buried at the Hanford Site from 1987 to
1991. Another 4,225 cubic meters (5,526 cubic yards) of mixed waste has accumulated in storage.
In 1992,56,245 kilograms (124,000 pounds) of mixed low-level waste was generated. From 1944 to
1991, approximately 558,916 cubic meters (731 ,030 cubic yards) of low-level waste was buried at the
Hanford Site. In 1991 , 5,300 cubic meters (6,932 cubic yards) of low-level waste was generated at
the Hanford Site. In 1992, 619,268 kilograms (1,365,000 pounds) of hazardous waste was generated .
Mixed wastes are 99 percent tank wastes at the Hanford Site resulting from \08 different waste
streams . Hazardous wastes generated in 1995 from SNF are expected to total 2.2 cubic meters
(2.9 cubic yards). In 1992, industrial solid waste totaled 22,213 cubic meters (29,054 cubic yards)
and asb tos totaled 1,017 cubic meters (1,330 cubic yards). A total of 1,484 hazardous chemicals
are reponed at the Hanford Site at over 783 locations, and they are found in 2,926 different
hazardous materials . In 1992, the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act reponing
threshold was exceeded for 53 hazardous che.micals.

4.2 Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
This section summarizes environmental characterization information on the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory. This information has been used to evaluate impacts at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory under various alternatives for management of SNF. More detailed
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information characterizing this Idaho National Engineering Laboratory is presented in Appendix B,
under separate cover.
The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory is located on approximately 2,300 square
kilometers (890 square miles) of land in southeastern Idaho and contains nine major facility areas (see
Figure 4-2) . It is located primarily within Butte County, but ponions of the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory are also located in Bingham, Jefferson, Bonneville, and Clark Counties. The
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory is roughly equidistant from Salt Lake City, Utah, and Boise,
Idaho . Cities near the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory include Idaho Falls to the east,
Blackfoot to the southeast, Pocatello to the south-southeast, and Arco to the southwest. Yellowstone
National Park is 149 kilometers (90 miles) to the east.
Categories of land use at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory include facility
operations, grazing, general open space, and infrastructure, such as roads. About 2 percent of the
total Idaho National Engineering Laboratory area [4600 hectares (11,400 acres)1 is used for facilities
and operations. The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory is a Superfund site, listed on the
National Priority List.
The region of inHuence for the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory is a seven-county area
comprising Bingham, Butte, Bonneville, Clark, Jefferson, Bannock, and Madison counties. The
region of inHuence had a 1990 population of219,713 . Historically, the regional economy has relied
predominantly on farming and ranching. Mining is also an imponant component of the regional
economy.
The population within an 80-kilometer (50-mile) circle centered at Argonne National
Laboratory-West on the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory has been characterized for the
purposes of identifying whethec any disproponionately high and adverse impacts exist to minority and
low-income communities. The population surrounding the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory is
shown to be 7 percent minority and 14 percent low-income, based on U.S. Bureau of Census
information and the definitions and approach presented in Appendix L.
During fiscal year 1990, the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory directly employed
approximately 11,100 personnel , accounting for almost 12 percent of the total regional employment.
Approximately 38,000 persons, or 17 percent of the total regional population, were directly supported
by employment associated with the operation of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory . In 1992,
the total direct Idaho National Engineering Laboratory employment was approximately 11 ,600 jobs.
The total number of jobs at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory is projected to decrease to
approximately 8,620 in fiscal year 1995 and to approximately 7,250 in fi scal year 2004.
More than 1,500 prehistoric and historic archaeological resources have been identified in the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory area, but only 4 percent of the Idaho National Engineering
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Laboratory has been surveyed, mostly near major facili ty areas. The resources identified include
prehistoric and historic sites and isolates . Although not formally evaluated, these sites are considered
potentially eligible for nomination to the National Register of Historic Places; the isolates have been
categorized as unlikely to meet eligibility requirements. The Experimental Breeder Reactor-I is listed

~orth
To Re.burg
132 km(82rri)"

on the National Register of Historic Places, and other structures could potentially be listed. The
Shoshone-Bannock Tribes are the region's primary Native American residents. Because they believe
the land is sacred, the entire Idaho National Engineering Laboratory reserve is potentially culturally
imponant to them. Cultural resources, to the Shoshone-Bannock peoples, include all forms of
traditional lifeways and usage of all natural resources. This includes not only prehistoric
archaeological sites, which are imponant in religious or cultural heritage context, but also features of
the natural landscape, air, plant, water, or animal resources that might have special significance.
DOE has committed to additional interaction and exchange of information with the Shoshone-Bannock
Tribes at the Fon Hall Reservation.
The nonhwestern edge of the Eastern Snake River Plain, where the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory is located, is bordered on the nonh and west by the Bitterroot, Lembi , and
Lost River mountain ranges . A number of inactive volcanic buttes also form pan of the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory landscape.
The Eastern Snake River Plain forms a broad, nonheast-trending, crescent-shaped trough with
low relief comprised primarily of basaltic lava flows . These flows at the surface range in age from
1.2 million to 2,100 years. The surface of the Eastern Snake River Plain is comprised primarily of
basaltic lava flows with thin, discontinuous, interbedded deposits of wind-blown loess and sand ,

To Idaho Falls
80 km (SOmi)"

waterborne alluvial fan and floodplain alluvial sediments, and rhyolitic domes formed 1,200,000 to
300,000 years ago.
The Eastern Snake River Plain is on an area of low seismicity that is adjacent to the
seismically active Intermountain Seismic Belt and Centennial Tectonic Belt and lies in Uniform
Building Code Seismic Ri sk Zones 2B and 3. The largest reco rded eanhquake in the Centennial

"Distance from Central Facilities Area

Tectonic Belt occurred on October 28, 1983, near Borah Peak, Idaho, and had a moment magnitude

To6la.:ldool

ARA· Auxiliary Reactor Area
ANL· W . Argonne Nalional Laboratory ' West
CFA . Cenl rat Facilities Area
EBR·1 . Experimental Breeder Reactor · I
IC?P · Idaho Chemical Processing Plant
NRF · Naval Reactors Facility
P8~ . Power Burst Facility
. ,WMC· Radioactive Waste Management Complex
TAN · Test Area North
TRA - Test Reactor Area
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of 6 .9 (surface wave magnitude of 7 .3) . The epicenter was about 90 to 100 kilometer~ (56 to 68
miles) from the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The largest recorded earthquake within the
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Intermountain Seismic Belt surface wave (Richter scale magnitude 7.5) occurred on August 17, 1959,
near Hebgen Lake, Montana, with an epicenter 145 kilometers (90 mil es) nonheast of the Idaho
Nat ional Engineering Laboratory. In addition to these eanhquakes , a total of 29 eanhquakes greater
than magnitude 5.5 have occurred within 322 k.il ometers (200 miles) of the Idaho National
Engineeri ng Laboratory since 1884. The Idaho National Engineering Labo ratory lies in a potentiall y
act ive but long-time dormant volcan ic area. The conditional probability of basaltic volcanis m
affecting a south-central area of the Idaho Nat io nal Engineering Laboratory is one incident in 40,000
to 100,000 years . The probability of volcani c impact on Idaho National Engineering Laboratory

Figure 4-2. Idaho National Engineering Laboratory location and site m~p .
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facilities fu nher nonh is estimated to be less than one incident in every million years or longer.
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Within Idaho National Engineering Laboratory bour:daries, the geologic resources found or
produced are sand, gravel, and pumice. Several quarries or pits maintain supply material for various
onsite construction projects.
The general climate of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory is characterized by average
seasonal temperatures that range from -7.3°C (l8.8°F) in winter to 18.2°C (64.8°F) in summer, with
an annual average temperature of about 5.6°C (42°F). Annual precipitation is light, averaging 221
millimeters (8.71 inches). Snowfall averages 701 millimeters (27.6 inches) per year.
Although the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory is in a belt of prevailing westerlies,
these winds are normally channeled by the adjacent mountain ranges into southwest wind. The annual
average windspeed measured at the 6. I-meter (20-foot) level at the Central Facilities Area weather
station is 3.4 meters per second (7.5 miles per hour). Monthly average values range from 2.3 meters
per secood (5.1 miles per hour) in December to 4.2 meters per second (9.3 miles per hour) in April
and May. The highest hourly average nearground windspeed measured at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory is 22.8 meters per second (51 miles per hour).
Severe weather, other than thunderstorms, is uncommon. Five funnel clouds (that is,
tornadoes not touching the ground) and no tornadoes have been reported between 1950 and 1988.
Neither the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory nor the surrounding counties is designated
as a nonattainment area (40 CFR Part 81.313) with respect to any of the National Ambient Air
Quality Standards (40 CFR Part 50). The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory is located in a
Class /I area. Three prevention of significant deterioration (40 CFR Part 52.2 1) Class I ambient air
quality areas have been designated in the vicinity of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory:
Craters of the Moon Wilderness Area, Idaho, 53 kilometers (33 miles) west-southwest from the
center of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory; Yellowstone National Park, Idaho-Wyoming,
143 kilometers (89 miles) east northeast from the center of the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory; and Grand Teton National Park, Wyoming, approximately 145 kilometers (90 miles) east
from the center of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
The types and amounts of nonradiological emissions from Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory facilities and activities are similar to those of other industrial complexes of similar size.
Baseline concentrations from criteria and hazardous/toxic air pollutants are within applicable standards
and guidelines. Radioactive emissions occur from Idaho National Engineering Laboratory facilities;
the calculated annual dose to the maximally exposed offsite individual is 0.00005 rem (0.05 millirem).
Essentially
creeks and streams
little flow of water
the Big Lost River

no 'Surface water bodies drain the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory-all
arise in the mountains and much of their water is diverted for irrigation. There is
ons ite. Water that does reach the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory through
flows past the Test Reactor Area/Idaho Chemical Processing Plant area before
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going be!ow ground or may be diverted by an onsite dam during heavy flows onto the southern part
of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The remainder of the water infiltrates near Test Area
North. All rivers and streams are intermittent. No surface water runs off of the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory .
The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory does not withdraw or use surface water for
operations, nor does it discharge effluents to natural surface water. However, the three surface water
bodies at or near the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (Big and Little Lost Rivers and Birch
Creek) have the following designated uses: agricultural water supply, cold-water biota, salmonid
spawning, and primary and secondary contact recreation. In addition, waters in the Big Lost River
and Birch Creek have been designated for domestic water supply and as special resource waters .
Depths to the water table at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory range from 61 meters
(200 feet) in the north to 274 meters (900 feet) in the south. Flows in the largely unconfined Snake
River Plain Aquifer are generally to the southwest. Groundwater flows at speeds ranging from 1.5 to
6.1 meters per day (5 to 20 feet per day) . The water quality of the aquifer is generally good, and it
is designated a sole source aquifer. As of 1992, concentrations of iodine-129, cobalt-60,
strontium-90, and cesium-137 had exceeded the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's maximum
contaminant levels for drinking water established for radionuclides in localized areas within the
aquifer inside the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory boundary. However, concentrations of
these radionuclides in groundwater are generally decreasing over time. This decrease is attributed to
improved waste management practices, reduced discharges, adsorption, and radioactive decay.
Individual maximum contaminant levels have not been established for plutonium-238, plutonium-239,
plutonium-24O, and americium-241 . However, these radionuclides have not been detected above the
established limits for gross alpha particle activity or the proposed adjusted gross alpha activity
maximum contaminant levels for drinking water. Extremely low concentrations of iodine-129 and
tritium have migrated offsite, but both concentrations are well below the current U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency's maximum contaminant levels for drinking water.
Of the nonradioactive metals, only total chromium has exceeded max imum contaminant levels
established by the Safe Drinking Water Act. Nitrates have exceeded the maximum contaminant levels
in the past near the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant but have been below the maximum contaminant
level since 1988. Carbon tetrachloride, chloroform, 1,l-<lichloroethylene, cis- I,2-<lichloroethylene,
tran,-I,2-<lichloroethylene, tetrachloroethylene, trichloretilylene, and vinyl chloride have exceeded
maximum contaminant levels at various times over the last 5 years.
Grou"dwater use on the Snake River Plain includes irrigat ion, food processing and
aquaculture, and domestic, rural, public, and livestock supply. Water use for the upper Snake River
drainage basin and the Snake River Plain Aquifer was 16.4 x 109 cubic meters (4 .3 x IO t2 gallons)
per year in 1985. Most of this water is for agriculture. The aqu ifer is the source of all water used at
the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Site activities withdraw an average of 7.4 million cubi c
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meters (1.9 billion gallons) per year, with a substantial portion discharged to the surface or subsurface
and eventually returned to the aquifer. This withdrawal represents approximately 0.4 percent of the
water consumed from the Eastern Snake River Plain Aquifer, or 53 percent of the maximum yield of
a single typical irrigation well .
Total consumption of water at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory averages 0.25 cubic
meters per second (8.8 cubic feet per second). DOE holds a Federal Reserved Water Right for the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, which permits a groundwater pumping capacity of 2.3 cubic
meters per second (80 cubic feet per second), though this capacity is not utilized. The DOE priority
on water rights dates back to the establishment of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
Localized flooding can occur at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory when the ground
is frozen and melting snow combines with heavy spring rains. Test Area North was flooded in 1969;
and, also in 1969, extensive flooding caused by snowmelt occurred in the lower Birch Creek Valley.
Studies have shown that both the 25- and lOO-year, 24-hour rainfall/snowmelt storm event could
cause flooding within the Radioactive Waste Management Complex . The drainage system, including
dikes and erosion prevention features designed to mitigate potential surface water flooding, have been
upgraded. The area inundated by a probable maximum flood in the vicinity of Mackay Dam, 75
kilometers (45 miles) northeast of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, coupled with a dam
failure, probably exceeds the areas expected to be inundated by 100- and 500-year floods of the Big
Lost River at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Analyses indicate that the shallow depths
and low flow velocities resulting from the Mackay probable maximum flood and dam failure would
not have a significant impact on Idaho National Engineering Laboratory facilities.
Onsite vegetation is predominantly shrub-steppe. Communities range from shadscale-steppe
vegetation at lower altitudes, through sagebrush and grass dominated communities, to juniper
woodlands along the foothills of nearby mountains and buttes. Big sagebrush and rabbit brush are the
most common shrub species. Indian ricegrass, wheatgrasses, squirreltail, and cheatgrass are common
grasses. Common forbs include phlox, mustards, and Russian thistle.

No Federal- or state-listed plant species occur at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,
but eight plant species identified by the U.S. Bureau of Land Management, the U.S. Forest Service,
or the Idaho Native Plant Society as sensitive, rare, or unique are known to occur there. These
species are not generally located near any facilities and are uncommon on the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory because they require unique microhabitats.
Two interstate highways serve the general region: Interstate 15, a north-south route that
connects several cities along the Snake River, approximately 40 kilometers (25 miles) east of the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and Interstate 86, an east-west route that intersects Interstate
15 about 64 kilometers (40 miles) south of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
U.S. Highways 20 and 26 are the main access routes to the southern portion of the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory. State Route 33 provides access to the northern portion of the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory from the east, State Routes 28 and 33 from the north, and State Route 22
from the west. These roads are complemented by an onsite (controlled access) system of about 140
kilometers (87 miles) of roads.
The Union Pacific Railroad provides rail service to the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory. Idaho Falls receives railroad freight service from Butte, Montana, to the north, and from
Pocatello, Idaho, and Salt Lake City, Utah, to the south. The Union Pacific's Blackfoot-to-Arco
route, which crosses the southern portion of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, provides rail
service to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. This branch connects with a DOE spur line
that links with developed areas. Most naval reactor SNF has been transported to the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory over these rail lines . Other shipments arrive by truck.
Several airlines provide Idaho Falls with aircraft passenger and cargo service.
Recorded doses from 1987 to 1991 were used as a baseline for comparison with SNF
management operations for the next 40 years. The average annual occupational dose to individuals
with measurable doses was 0. 156 rem (156 millirem), giving an average collective dose of about
300 person-rem.

About 270 vertebrate species have been observed onsite. These include 46 mammal,
204 bird, to reptile, 2 amphibian, and 9 fis h species. Major fur-bearing species include coyote,
badger, and bobcat. Important big-game species include the pronghorn, mule deer, and elk. Two
federally endangered and nine candidate animal species potentially occur on the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory. The bald eagle is a winter resident and is locally common in the far north
end and the western edge of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Peregrine falcons are
infrequently observed in the winter. Neither species is known to nest onsite, and neither is commonly
observed near facilities . The candidate species include the white-faced ibis, northern goshawk,
ferruginous hawk, burrowing owl, Townsend's big-eared bat, pygmy rabbit, long-eared myotis,
small-footed myotis, and Idaho pointheaded grasshopper (occurs just north of the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory).
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Industrial health and safety statistics from 1987 to 1991 are used as a baseline for comparison
for the alternatives. There were 1,337 total recordable injury and illness cases at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory from 1987 to 1991 , for an average of 8,385 employees working a total of
79,654,000 hours. One fatality occurred at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory between 1987
and 1991 when an employee was struck and killed by a forklift.
The water supply for the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory is provided by a system of
about 30 wells, with pumps and storage tanks . The average combined pumpage from the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory wells from 1987 through 1991 was 7.4 billion liters per year
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(1 .9 billion gallons per year), calculated based on the cumulative volumes of water withdrawn from
the wells.
Average annual wastewater discharge volume at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
for 1989 through 1991 was 537 million liters (142 million gallons).
The rated capacity of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory electric power transmission
loop line is 124 megavolt-amperes. The peak demand on the system from 1990 through 1993 was
about 40 megavolt-amperes, and the average usage was approximately 200,000 megawan-hours per
year.
No high-level liquid waste resulting from reprocessing activities has been generated at the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory since 1992; however, cenain other processes generate waste
classified and handled as high-level waste. These sources are estimated to generate 750 cubic meters
in 1995. From 1989 through 1992, an average of approximately 48.5 cubic meters of mixed
low-level waste was generated annually. From 1989 through 1992, an average of approximately
46.5 cubic meters of low-level waste was generated annUally.
Burial of transuranic waste ended in 1970; since then all transuranic waste has been placed in
retrievable storage. Receipt of offsite transuranic waste ended in 1988 (with minor case-by-case
exceptions). After 1988, only minor amounts of Iransuranic waste have been generated onsite and
placed into retrievable storage. About 127,000 cubic meters (166,000 cubic yards) are retrievably
stored or buried at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The average annual volume of
hazardous waste transponed offsit. from 1988 through 1991 was approximately 180 cubic meters.
The average annual volume of industrial and commercial solid waste disposed of at the Central
Facilities Area landfill from 1988 through 1992 was approximately 52,000 cubic meters (68,000 cubic
yards).

4,3 Savannah River Site
This section presents summary environmental characterization information on the Savannah
River Site. This information has been used to evaluate impacts at the site under various alternatives
for management of SNF. More detailed information characterizing the Savannah River Site is
presented in Appendix C, under separate cover.
The Atomic Energy Commission established the Savannah River Site in 1950 as the Savannah
River Project to produce nuclear materials for the national defense. The number of Savannah River
Site facilities grew to include five nuclear production reactors (now inactive), two chemical
separations areas, a fuel and target fabrication facility (inactive), and suppon facilities.
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The Savannah River Site occupies an area of approximately 800 square kilometers (310 square
miles) in western South Carolina, in a generally rural area about 40 kilometers (25 miles) southeast of
Augusta, Georgia (see Figure 4-3). The Savannah River Site, which is bordered by the Savannah
River to the southwest, includes ponions of three South Carolina counties: Aiken, Barnwell, and
Allendale.
Approximately 73 ,500 hectares (181,500 acres) of the Savannah River Site is undeveloped,
and 90 percent of this area (more than 65,000 hectares) is forest land. The Savannah River Forest
Station (a branch of the U.S. Forest Service) manages the forested areas, many of which are pine
plantations, under a cooperative agreement with DOE. Facilities that previously produced defense
nuclear materials occupy approximately 5 percent of the total Savannah River Site land area. The
remaining area consists of wetlands, ponds, and reservoirs.
Approximately 90 percent of the Savannah River Site work force lives in six counties around
the Savannah River Site (Aiken, Allendale, Bamberg, and Barnwell counties in South Carolina and
Richmond and Columbia counties in Georgia). In 1990, employment at the Savannah River Site was
20,230, representing approximately 10 percent of !he employment in the six-county region of
influence. Employment at the Savannah River Site grew to 23,351 in Fiscal Year 1992, with a
payroll of more than $1.1 billion. The total number of jobs at the Savannah River Site is p~ojected to
decrease to approximately 15,800 in Fisc'; Year 1995.
Between 1980 and 1990, the population in the six-county region of influence increased
13 percent, from 376,058 to 425,607 . More than 88 percent of the 1990 population lived in Aiken
(120,940), Colum!>ia (66,031), and Richmond (189,719) counties. According to census data, the
estimated average number of persons per household in the six-county region was 2.72, and the
median age of the population was 31.2 years.
The population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the Savannah River Site has been
characterized for the purposes of identifying whether any disproponionately high and adverse impacts
exist to minority and low-income communities. The population surrounding the Savannah River Site
is shown to be 38 percent minority and 17 percent low-income based on U.S. Bureau of Census
information, and the definitions and approach presented in Appendix L.
As of the end of Fiscal Year 1992, archaeological surveys have covered about 60 percent of
the Savannah River Site :md recorded 858 archaeological sites. Of these 858 sites, more than 200
have been evaluated , and 53 have been determined to be eligible for the National Register of Historic

Places.
Three Native Ameri can groups-the Yuchi Tribal Organization, the National Council of
Muskogee Creek, and the Indian Peoples Muskogee Tribal Town Confederacy-have ex pressed
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concern over sites and items of religious significance on the Savannah River Site. DOE routinely
notifies these organizations about major planned actions on the Savannah River Site and asks them to
comment on the Savannah River Site documents prepared in accordance with the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969.
Miles 0
Kilometers

1

2 3 4

m-t'4T

The Savannah River Site has gently rolling terrain and is heavily wooded . Facilities are
scattered about the Savannah River Site, but major production facilities (for example, reactors and
separations areas) are confined to its interior. As a result, the Savannah River Site facilities are
generally not visible from outside of the Savannah River Site.
The Savannah River Site lies in the Coastal Plain physiographic province of South Carolina,
approximately 32 kilometers (20 miles) southeast of the Fall Line, which separates the Atlantic
Coastal Plain province from the Piedmont province. Onsite elevations range from 27 to 128 meters
(89 to 420 feet) above mean sea level.
The Coastal Plain sediments underlying the Savannah River Site consist of sandy clays and
clayey sands; however, occasional beds of clean sand, gravel, clay, and carbonate do occur.
Underlying these sediments are dense crystalline igneous and metamorphic rock or younger
consolidated sedimtnts of the Triassic Period . A regional aquitard, the Appleton Confining System,
hydrologically separates the Triassic formations and older igneous and metamorphic rocks from the
overlying Coastal Plain sediments.

Allendale@

The area of the Savannah River Site is historically of low-to-moderate seismicity. On a scale
of 0 to 4, the Savannah River Site is in a Uniform Building Code Seismic Risk Zone 2A. The
partially mapped Pen Branch Fault, which spans the central portion of the Savannah River Site, is
considered to be Cretaceousrrertiary (140 million to 1.6 million years) reactivation of a northern
bcundary fault of the Triassic age Dunbarton basin. There is no evidence to indicate that the Pen
Branch Fault is a capable fault as defined by the U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Surface
mapping, subsurface boring, and geophysical investigations have not identified any faulting of the
sedimentary strata at the Savannah River Site that would have an effect on facilities.
The closest offsite fault system of significance is the Augusta Fault Zone, approximately
40 kilometers (25 miles) from the Savannah River Site. In this fault lone, the Belair Fault has
experienced the most recent movement, but it is not considered capable of generating major
earthquakes. There is no conclusive evidence of recent displacement along any fault within
320 kilometers (200 miles) of the Savannah River Site, with the possible exception of the buried faults
in the epicentral area of the 1886 Charleston, South Carolina, earthquake, approximately
145 kilometers (90 miles) away.

Figure 4-3. Savannah River Site location and site map.

Two major earthquakes have occurred within 320 kil ometers (200 miles) of the Savannah
River Site: (a) the Charleston earthquake of 1886, which had an estimated Ri chter scale magnitude of
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6.8, and (b) the Union County, South Carol;na, eanhquake of 1913, with an estimated Richter
magnitude of 6.0, which occurred about 160 kilometers (100 miles) from the Savannah River Site. In
June 1985, a minor eanhquake with a local Richter scale magnitude of 2.6 and a focal depth of
1.0 kilometer (0.60 mile) occurred at the Savannah River Site. An eanhquake with a local Richter
scale magnitude of 2.0 occurred on the Savannah River Site on August 5, 1988, but was not felt by
onsite workers .

nonhernmost portion of the Savannah River Site to the surface in areas where the water table

The Savannah River Site is in a temperate region with mild winters and long humid summers.
Average monthly temperatures range from 7.2"C (45°F) in Jant:ary to 27 .2"C (81°F) in July. The
average annual precipitation at the Savannah River Site is approximately 122 centimeters (48 inches).

Crouch Branch, and McQueen Branch Aquifers.

Prevailing winds are from the nonheast and southwest, with an annual average windspeed of
3.8 meters per second (8.5 miles per hour). Windspeeds are typically highest in winter and lowest in
summer.
On average, thunderstorms occur 56 days per year. The estimated probability of a tornado
striking the Savannah River Site is 7.0 x 10.5 per year. Nine tornadoes have been confirmed on the
Savannah River Site since 1953. Hurricane-strength winds have been recorded once at the Savannah
River Site, from Hurricane Gracie in 1959.
Air quality at the Savannah River Site is generally goOO, meeting National Ambient Air
Qual ity Standards for criteria pollutants. The nearest Class I Area, the Congaree National
Monument, is more than 80 kilometers (50 miles) from the Savannah River Site. Tritium is the only
radionuclide of Savannah River Site origin that is routinely detected in offsite air samples in
concentrations above background .
Five streams drain the Savannah River Site: Upper Three Runs Creek , Fourmile Branch , Pen
Branch, Steel Creek, and Lower Three Runs Creek. These streams originate on the Aiken Plateau
and descend 15 to 60 meters (50 to 200 feet) before discharging to the Savannah River.
Surface-water quality in the Savannah River downstream of the Savannah River Site is
generally good. In 1992, the South Carolina Department of H~th and Environmental Control
changed the class ification of the river and its tributary streams to ·freshwaters· from ·Class B
waters ,· imposing more stringent water quality standards. Two elements- iron and manganese (both
naturally high constituents of local waters}-have historically exceeded maximum concentration limits.
Two distinct hydrogeologic systems underlie the Savannah River Site: (a) the southeastern
Coastal Plain province, where a wedge of ur•.:onsolidated sediments of Late Cretaceous and Tertiary
origin contains the major aquifer systems of the area, and (b) the Piedmont Province, where
groundwater OCC;1rS in mudstones and sandstones within Paleozoic metamorphic and igneous basement
rock. The vadvse zone ranges in thickness from approximately 40 meters (130 feet) in the
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intersects wetlands or streams.
The sediments of the southeastern Coastal Plain hydrogeologic province are grouped into
three major aquifer systems divided by two major confining systems, all underlain by the Appleton
Confining System. These aquifer systems are known regionally as the Floridan, the Dublin, and the
Midville systems. The local aquifers associated with these three aquifer systems are the Steed Pond,

The Crouch Branch and McQueen Branch hydrostratigraphic units are the most important
aquifers in the vicinity of the Savannah River Site. The McQueen Branch Aquifer, in particular, is
highly transmissive and serves as the main production aquifer for the Savannah River Site. The
groundwater in the Crouch Branch and McQueen Branch Aquifers is suitable for most domestic and
industrial purposes.
Industrial solvents, metals, tritium, or other constituents used or generated at the Savannah
River Site have contaminated the groundwater over 5 to 10 percent of the Site. Contaminated
groundwater generally underlies only a few facilities, and the contaminants detected reflect the
material and processes used in these facilities . Contamination of groundwater in an aquifer supplying
drinking water has occurred in one relatively small area in the nonhwest portion of the Savannah
River Site: two wells in the Dublin-Midville Aquifer System (formerly known as the Tuscaloosa
Formation) contain low concentrations of trichloroethylene and tetrachloroethylene.
The aquifers underlying the Savannah River Site sustain single-well yields of abo'lt
10.2 million liters per day (2 .7 million gallons per day). The Savannah River Site withdraws
approximately 14.0 billion liters per year (3 .7 billion gallons per year) of groundwater for domestic
and industrial uses . The Savannah River Site draws approximately 75.7 billion liters per year
(20 billion gallons per year) of cooling water from the Savannah River. Water rights are not at issue
at the Savannah River Site.
The Savannah River Site lies in the Upper Coastal Plain physiographic province. The
Savannah River Site is near the transition area between the oak-hickory-pine forest and the southern
mixed forest. As a consequence, species typical of both associations are pr",;ent.
Plant communities adapted to dry co nd itions occur on more nonhern, upl and areas of the
Savannah River Site. (This area is sometimes referred to as the Aiken Plateau .) The most common
community types on the nonhern half of the Savannah River Site are longleat" pine plantations and
longleaf pine-turkey oak sandhills. Wetter areas along streams support different groups of plant
species , includ ing lobloll y pine and bottomland hardwood forest communities . Other aquatic habitats.
such as ponds , marshes. river swamps, and Carolina bays. add considerable botani cal diversity to the
Savannah River Site.
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Four federally listed endangered animal species occur on the Savannah River Site or in the
Savannah River upstream and downstream of the Savannah River Site: the red-cockaded woodpecker,
the wood stork, the southern bald eagle, and the shortnose sturgeon. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service lists a fifth species, the American alligator, as "threatened due 10 similarity of appearance" (to
the endangered American crocodile). Researchers have found one federally listed endangered plant
species, the smooth coneflower, on the Savannah River Site.
In 1992, the Savannah River Site hunters (chosen by lottery from a large pool of applicants)
harvested 1,5 19 deer and 168 feral hogs. The purpose of these hunts is to keep deer and feral hog
populations in check and to reduce the number of animal-vehicle accidents on the Savannah River
Site. The Savannah River Site measures each animal killed during the hunts for radioactivity. The
maximum measurement of cesium-137 in a Savannah River Site deer was 22.4 picocuries per gram;
the average was 6.4 picocuries per gram. For hogs, the maximum value was 22 .9 picocuries per
gram: and the average was 3.5 picocuries per gram. The estimated maximum dose received by a
Savannah River Sit. hunter was 0.049 rem (49 millirem) per year. This estimate assumed a hunter
whose entire meat consumption for the year consisted of the Savannah River Site deer.

0.00021 rem (0.21 millirem). This resulted in average doses of 0.00004 and 0.00005 rem (0.04 and
0.05 millirem) per year to consumers of drinking water from the downstream Beaufort-Jasper (South
Carolina) and Port Wentworth (Georgia) water treatment plants, respectively.
The Savannah River Site purchases power from South Carolina Electric and Gas Company
through three purchased power-line interconnects to the Savannah River Site transmission grid.
Recent total annual power consumption for the Savannah River Site was approximately 659,000
megawatt hours. The average load was 75 megavolt-amperes, and the peak demand was about
130 megavolt-amperes.
Average annual wastewater discharge volume at the Savannah River Site is about 2 million
liters per day (528,400 gallons per day), which is about SO percent of capacity. Eighteen waste
treatment plants currently process all Savannah River Site sanitary waste. A new centralized sanitary
wastewater treatment facility, scheduled for completion in mid-I995, will replace 14 of these plants.

The major sources of noise at the Savannah River Site are equipment and machinery (for
example, cooling towers, transformers, engines, pumps, boilers, steam vents, and paging systems) in
developed operational areas. Studies indicate that, because of the remote locations of the Savannah
River Site operational areas, existing onsite noise sources do not adversely affect individuals offsite.
Workplace noise limits established by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration protect

The Savannah River Site had 127.9 million liters (33.8 million gallons) of radioactive
high-level waste onsite at the end of 1991, in 50 underground tanks, which is more than 90 percent of
existing capacity. By 1993, the Savannah River Site had 9,900 cubic meters (350,000 cubic feet) of
transuranic waste in storage. The current volume of mixed low-level waste at the Savannah River
Site is 1,700 cubic meters (60,000 cubic feet). Low-level waste is packaged for disposal onsite in
carbon steel boxes and deposited in trenches. Hazardous wastes in storage at the Savannah River Site
total some 1.6 million kilograms (3.6 million pounds), with a volume of 2,430 cubic meters

onsite workers.

(86,000 cubic feet).

Interstate 20 is the primary east-west corridor in the general area of the Savannah River Site.
U.S. Highways I and 25 are the principal north-south routes. Direct access to the Savannah River
Site from the northwest is provided by South Carolina Highways 125 and 19; South Carolina
Highway 125 is open to through traffic. South Carolina Highways 39 and 64 also provide access to
the Savannah Ri ver Site. The CSX railroad line also serves the Savannah River Site.
Atmospheric releases of rad ioactive material to the environment from Savannah River Site
operations from 1990 to 1992 resulted in an average dose of approximately 0.00002 rem
(0.02 millirem) per year to indi viduals living within an 80-kilometer (50-mile) rad ius of the Savannah
River Site. The collective dose equivalent due to atmospheric releases from the 1992 Savannah River
Site operations to the population of 620, 100 occupying the 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius was
6.4 person-rem. Atmospheri c releases of tritium accounted for more than 90 percent of the estimated
offsite population dose.
Similarly, liquid releases of tritium account for more than 99 percent of the total radioactivity
discharged to the Savannah River from the Savannah River Site activities . The calculated average
annual dose to the maximum exposed individual resulting from liquid releases from 1990 to 1992 was
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4.4 Nevada Test Site
This section presents summary environmental characterization information on the Nevada Test
Site. This information has been used to evaluate impacts at the Nevada Test Site under various
alternatives for management of SNF. More detailed information characterizing the Nevada Test Site
is presented in Appendix F, under separate cover.
The Nevada Test Site is located in southwestern Nevada in southern Nye County. The
Nevada Test Site is bordered on three sides by the Nellis Air Force Base Bombing and Gunnery
Range (see Figure 4-4). The Nellis Range serves as a buffer zone between Nevada Test Site test
areas ar:d land open to the public. The Nevada Test Site comprises about 3,500 square kilometers
(1,350 square miles), making this one of the largest contiguous, unpopulated land areas in the United
States. The Nevada Test Site has been used for underground weapons testing and as a nonnuclear test
area. Congress has mandated that the Federal Government pursue the development of mined geologic
repositories for the permanent disposal of SNF and high-level waste and has directed DOE to study
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the Yucca Mountain, Nevada, site 10 determine whether it is a suitable site for the nation's first
geologic repository.

"

The majority of the land near the Nevada Test Site is managed by the U.S. Bureau of Land
Management and used for IiveslOck grazing. The area is surrounded by recreational areas used for
activities such as hunting, fishing, and camping.
The economy of the 1W0-county area near the Nevada Test Site is dominated by support
services for contractor personnel at the Nevada Test Site, with a direct link 10 Clark County and the
Las Vegas area where most of the employees reside. Most of the offsite supporting contractors and
the labor and capital supporting indirect economic activity connected 10 the Nevada Test Site are also
located in Clark County. In 1m, the population of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Statistical area was
735,000, with a 4.7 percent annual growth rate since 1980. In contrast, Nye County is sparsely
populated, with employment provided by service industries, some mining, and Government-sector
jobs. As of 1:!flUary 1994, the work force IOtaled 8,563 .
The population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the Nevada Test Site has been characterized
for the purposes of identifying whether any disproportionately high and adverse impacts exist 10
minority and low-income communities. The population surrounding the Nevada Test Site is shown 10
be 6 percent minority and 12 percent low-income, based on U.S. Bureau of Census information and
the definitions and approach presented in Appendix L.

~
~

On the Nevada Test Site, numerous prehistoric sites and prehislOricihistoric sites have been
recorded and recommended as eligible for the National Register of Historic Places. However, none
of them are located in the vicinity of the proposed SNF management facility . HislOric activities began
in 1849 with the Emigrant Trail, mining camps, and later the settlements of Bullfrog-Goldfield,
Las Vegas, and Tonopah . Southern Nevada, including parIS of what is now the Nevada Test Site,
was inhabited by peoples of the Southern Paiute and Shoshone Tribes. Areas in the northern portion
of the Nevada Test Site, including the Pahute and Rainier Mesas, contain sites of cultural affiliation to
these peoples. However, no known Native American resources are located within the areas proposed
for SNF facilities . Some late PleislOcene terrestrial vertebrate fossils also occur in the area, notably
at Tule Springs.
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The Nevad~ Test Site is located in the southern part of the Great Basin section of the Basin
and Range Physiographic Province. Local geology is characterized by mountains of Precambrian and
Paleozoic sedimentary rocks and Tertiary volcanic tuffs and lavas separated by alluvial,

figure 4-4. Nevada Test Site location and site map.
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The Nevada Test Site is in a visual setting of low-lying valleys and flats interspersed with
mountains and the vegetation of the Mojave Desert and Great Basin. Because the public can be
expected to have little concern about changes in the area's landscape and views are not regionally
unique, the area may be considered 10 have low to moderate visual sensitivity.
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topographically closed valleys. Sedimentary rocks are complex, folded, and faulted carbonates in the
upper and lower parts and shale and sandstone in the middle section. Volcanic rocks are
predominantly Teniary tuffs with some basalts and scattered granitic plutons. Potential geologic
resources within the Nevada Test Site boundaries include silver, gold, tungsten, molybdenum,
zeolites, barite, and fluorite .
The area of the Nevada Test Site is historically of low-to-moderate seismicity. On a scale of
o to 4, the Nevada Test Site is in Uniform Building Code Seismic Risk Zones 2B and 3. Seismic
activity in the Nevada Test Site area generally occurs as thrust faults, normal faults, and strike-slip
faults . Recent displacements are thought to have occurred as a consequence of underground nuclear
explosions. Recorded seismic activity before 1978 within 10 kilometers (6 miles) of Yucca Mountain
shows seven earthquakes; two had magnitudes 3.6 and 3.4 on the Richter scale, and five had
magnitudes that were smaller or could not be determined because of instrument problems. Two
historical earthquakes with a magnitude of 6 (Richter scale) have been reponed 110 kilometers (68
miles) southwest of Yucca Mountain and 210 kilometers (130 miles) to the northeast. Most
earthquakes in the area are less than 10 kilometers (6.2 miles) in depth. Historic seismic events and
the length of active faults can be used to infer a maximum magnitude of 7 to 8 for earthquakes in the
Yucca Mountain region. Recurrence intervals for earthquakes with magnitudes greater than 7 are
25,000 years, greater than 6 are 2,500 years, and greater than 5 are 250 years.
The climate in the Nevada Test Site region is characterized by high solar radiation, limited
precipitation, low humidity, and large diurnal temperature ranges. At Area 6, the mean daily
minimum and maximum temperatures are -0. 1 to 1O.6°C (21 to 51°F) in January and 14 to 36°C
(57 to 96°F) in July. Average precipitation at Area 6 is 15 centimeters (6 inches).
DOE maintains an extensive network of air sampling stations for radiological parameters such
as paniculates, reactive gases, tritium, and noble gases. Nonradiological air pollutants are within
state and Federal standards. In recent years, the majority of radioactive effluents at the Nevada Test
Site have resulted from underground nuclear tests. In addition. some of the radioactivity detected by
onsite air monitors can be attributed to resuspension of radioactive paniculate matter remaining from
the atmospheric testing conducted from 1951 to 1962. Monitoring of airborne paniculates, noble
gases, and tritiated water vapor on the Nevada Test Site in 1992 indicated onsite concentrations that
were generally not statistically different from background concentrations. External gamma exposure
monitoring has indicated that the gamma environment has been consistent from year to year.
Although airborne releases of radioactivity to offsite areas occurred during the years that atmospheric
testing was performed , in recent years, no Nevada Test Site-related radioactivity has been detected
offsite at any air sampling station .
Surface drainage in the Nevada Test Site area is ephemeral , and almost no streamflow data
have been collected . Perennial surface waters occur as springs and in shon reaches of the Amargosa
River. Potential evaporation is 152 to 170 centimeters per year (60 to 67 inches per year). Run-{)ff

4-25

'/ I &:

VOLUME I

still occurs in response to infrequent storm events, which may cause local flooding, especially in
Fonymile Canyon, the Amargosa River, and Jackass Flats drainage. There is the potential for a
1000year magnitude flood to transpon radioactive contaminants released as a result of historic
underground nuclear testing beyond the boundaries of the Nevada Test Site.
Six major aquifers occur in the area of the Nevada Test Site, including some perched
groundwater. The hydrogeology is characterized by great depths to the groundwater table of 200 to
500 meters (660 to 1,640 feet) and slow velocity in the saturated and unsaturated zones. Flow
velocities in these systems range from 1.8 to 183 meters (6 to 600 feet) per year. Regional
groundwater flow is from the north and northeast toward the regional discharge area near Ash
Meadows in the Amargosa Desen. Modeling studies for the Radioactive Waste Management Site at
Area 5 indicate that the travel time from the surface to the regional water table is on the order of
thousands of years.
Water in southern Nevada (excluding the Las Vegas area) is used chiefly for irrigation and to
a lesser extent for livestock, municipal needs, and domestic supplies. Almost all water supplies are
pumped from the groundwater aquifers, although some springs supply water to Death Valley and
other areas south of the Nevada Test Site. The Nevada Test Site obtains its water supply from the
aquifers underlying the Nevada Test Site in the Ash Meadows Subbasin and Alkali Flat-Furnace
Creek Ranch Subbasin. Nevada Test Site water use is discussed in detail in Appendix F of
Volume I.
Groundwater meets U.S. Environmental Protection Agency secondary standards for major
cations and anions and the primary standards for deleterious constituents . Contamination by
radionuclides occurs below the water table as well as in the unsaturated zone above it as a result of
underground nuclear testing. The extent of this contamination is curreOlly being studied .
The Nevada Test Site lies in a transition area between the Mojave Desen and Great Basin,
supponing flora and fauna from both areas. Less than I percent of the area has been developed.
Natural veg ...ation occurs in nine plant communities identified as creosote bush ; blackbrush;
creosote-blackbrush, hopsage-desen thorn; sagebrush; saltbush ; mountains, hills, and mesas; and two
distinct desen thorn plant communities. Introduced weedy species, such as cheatgrass and Russian
thistle, are common in disturbed areas.
Approximately 273 venebrate wildlife species have been observed onsite, including over
30 species of reptiles, 190 species of birds. and 50 species of mammals. Com",on species include
reptiles, rodents. raptors, and wild horses. A number of game and fur-bearing species are found 0n
the Nevada Test Site, but hunting and trapping are not permitted .
National Wetland Inventory maps of the Nevada Test Site have not been prepared, nor have
wetlands been delineated onsite. Available information indicates that wetlands on the Nevada Test
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Site are limited in distribution and extent. Small riverine and palustrine wetlands may occur adjacent
to surface drainages, springs, playas, and reservoirs on the Nevada Test Site. There are no perennial
streams on the Nevada Test Site, and permanent surface water sources are limited to a few small
springs and reservoirs. Springs do not support fish populations onsite, while reservoirs support
introduced bluegill, goldfish, and golden shiner.
Twenty-five federally and state-listed threatened , endangered, and other special status species
have been identified on and in the vicinity of the Nevada Test Site, including 9 birds, 2 reptiles, I
fish, 2 mammals, and 11 plant species . Federally endangered species include the American peregrine
falcon , bald eagle, and Devil's Hole pupfish . The federally threatened species is the desert tortoise.
The major noise sources at the Nevada Test Site occur primarily in developed operational
areas and include various facilities; equipment and machines (for example, engineS, pumps, boilers,
steam vents, paging systems, construction equipment, and vehicles); aircraft operations; and testing.
At the Nevada Test Site boundary away from most facilities, noise levels are barely distinguishable
from background noise levels . Some wildlife disturbances may occur as a result of these activities.
Vehicular access to the Nevada Test Site is provided by U.S. Route 95 from the south and
off-road access via State Route 375 from the northeast. No major improvements are scheduled for
these segments providing immediate access to the Nevada Test Site.
The major railroad in the area is the Union Pacific, which runs through Las Vegas and is
located approximately 80 kilometers (50 miles) east of the Nevada Test Site. A IS-kilometer (9-mile)
railroad serves Area 25, but it does not connect with the Union Pacific line.
Background radiation exposure and releases of radionuclides to the environment from Nevada
Test Site operations provide the sources of radiation exposure to people in the Nevada Test Site
region. The estimated dose-equivalent during 1992 for the population within 80 kilometers (50 miles)
of the Nevada Test Site was 5.2 x 10-3 person-rem. The average dose was 1. 1 x lO' s rem
(1. 1 x 10.2 millirem) in 1992 for a person at the Nevada Test Site boundary. This dose is well below
the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants standard of 0.01 rem (10 millirem) per
year and is a very small percentage of the background dose.
From 1988 to 1993, water use at the Nevada Test Site varied from a high of 134 liters per
second (2, 125 gallons per minute) in 1989 to a low of 60 liters per second (949 gallons per minute) in
1993. Significant changes in consumption are not anticipated .
From 1989 to 1993, Nevada Test Site electrical consumption ranged from 144,521 to
183, 188 megawatt hours, with peak demands varying from 30.9 to 38.4 megavolt-amperes. In 1995,
consumption is projected to be 176,440 megawatt hours, with a peak demand of
39.5 megavolt-amperes .
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Nevada Test Site manages the following categories of waste: low-level waste, transuranic
waste, hazardous waste, radioactive mixed waste, and nonhazardous waste. The Nevada Test Site
does not currently manage high-level waste or SNF. Waste management activities include onsite
treatment, onsite storage, onsite disposal, and preparation for appropriate offsite disposal. In
addition, the Nevada Test Site uses and manages an onsite inventory of hazardous materials, including
some managed in underground storage tanks.
Total nonradioactive waste generated at the Nevada Test Site in 1992 included approximately
90,000 kilograms (100 tons) of Resource Conservation and Recovery Act hazardous waste and
218,000 kilograms (240 tons) of hazardous non-Resource Conservation and Recovery Act waste.

4.5 Oak Ridge

I~eservation

This section presents summary environmental characterization information on the Oak Ridge
Reservation. This information has been used to evaluate impacts at the Oak Ridge Reservation under
various alternatives for management of SNF. More detailed information characterizing the Oak Ridge
Reservation is presented in Appendix F, under separate cover.
The Oak Ridge Reservation is located on approximately 34,667 acres (140 square kilometers)
of federally owned land. The reservation comprises forested lands, public lands, buffer zones and
three operations areas: Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge National Laboratories, and the K-25 Site (formerly the
Oak Ridge Gaseous Diffusion Plant) (see Figure 4-5). The Oak Ridge Reservation is located within
the incorporated city limits of Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Bordering land uses are predominantly rural ,
including residences, small farms , forest, and pasture.
Most of the industrial and commercial development, by energy-related companies in support
of the Oak Ridge Reservation, has occurred in the City of Oak Ridge in Anderson and Roane
counties . Regional economic linkages at the Oak Ridge Reservation occur primarily within Anderson,
Knox, Roane, and Loudon counties, where most of the offsite contractors, labor, and capital are
located . Employment at the Oak Ridge Reservation in 1990 was approximately 17,080 people, and it
is projected to decrease to approximately 16,980 by the year 1999.
The population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the Oak Ridge Reservation has been
characterized for the purposes of identifying whether any disproportionately high and adverse impacts
exist to minority and low-income communities . The population surrounding the Oak Ridge
Reservation is shown to be 6 percent minority and 16 percent low-income, based on U.S. Bureau of
Census information and the definitions and approach presented in Appendix L.
There are no identified archaeological sites or historic structures on the proposed site for the
SNF management facilities on the Oak Ridge Reservation. Invertebrate fossils remains are found in
early Cambrian to early Mississippian aged formations underlying the Oak Ridge Reservation. In the
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caused severe damage. There is no evidence of any volcanic activity in the area for more than one
million years.
The climate of the region is characterized by moderate to high precipitation in all seasons,
high humidity, low winds, and low diurnal temperature ranges. At Oak Ridge, mean annual
precipitation was 54 inches (137 centimeters) from 1961 to 1990. Mean daily temperatures range
from 2.6°C (36°F) in January to 24.8°C (76.7°F) in July _ Daytime winds are usually southwesterly,
while nighnime winds are northeasterly. In Tennessee, tornadoes are infrequent. The western half of
the state has experienced three times as many tornadoes as the eastern half where the Oak Ridge
Reservation is located. The Oak Ridge Reservation experienced a tornado from a severe
thunderstorm on February 21, 1993.
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A network of air monitoring stations at the Oak Ridge Reservation measures several types of
uranium particulates , heavy metals, and several materials released by a Toxic Substances Control Act
incinerator. The total dose of 0.0033 rem (3 .3 millirem) per year to the maximally exposed
individual is well within the 0.01 rem (10 millirem) per year National Emission Standards for
Hazardous Air Pollutants standard. The estimated collective commined effective dose equivalent to
the approximately 880,000 persons within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the Oak Ridge Reservation was
approximately 52 person-rem for 1992. This represents about 0.02 percent of the
280,000 person-rem that the surrounding population might receive from all sources of natural
radiation. The Oak Ridge Reservation meets the state and Federal standards for all criteria pollutants.
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Figure 4-5. Oak Ridge Reservation location and site map .
early 1700s, the Overhill Cherokee lived in the area of the Oak Ridge Reservatio n. These Native
Americans were forcibly moved to Oklahoma in 1838. While the Cherokee may retain cultural
affiliation with their ancestral home, there are no known Native American resources on the proposed
site for SNF facilities.
Visual resources are characterized by a series of low ridges and valleys trending northeast to
southwest. Deciduous and coniferous forest covers about 80 percent of the Oak Ridge Reservation.
The DOE facilities are brightly lit at night, making them highly visible.
The area of the Oak Ridge Reservation is historicall y of low-to- moderate seismicity. On a
scale of 0 to 4, the Oak Ridge Reservation is in a Uniform Building Code Seismic Risk Zone 2A .
The Oak Ridge Reservation lies entirel y within the western portion of the Valley and Ridge Province,
near the boundary wi th the Cumberland Plateau. This province is characterized by numerous linear
ridges and Valleys. There are three regional thrust faults in the area. From 1811 to 1975. five major

The surface drainage of the Oak Ridge Reservation includes numerous creeks (such as White
Oak, Poplar, and Bear Creeks) and the Clinch River, which subsequently flow to the Tennessee
River. Melton Hill Dam, immediately south of the Oak Ridge Reservation, controls the flow of the
Clinch River near the Oak Ridge Reservation. Average discharge from the dam was 150 cubic
meters (5,300 cub ic feet) per second from 1963 to 1979. The Clinch River supplies water for the
Oak Ridge Reservati on and for regional industrial uses.
Geologic units of the Oak Ridge Reservation comprise two hyd rologic groups: (a) the Knox
Aquifer, formed by the Knox Group and Maynardsville Limestone, and (b) the Oak Ridge
Reservation aquitards, which include other geologic units of the area including sandstones, siltstones,
and shales . The Knox Aquifer has solution conduits that store and transmit relatively large volumes
of water, while the aquitards are contro lled by frac tures and transmit limited amounts of water. The
aquifer is the primary source of sustained stream fl ow on the Oak Ridge Reservation. However,
some f10wpaths of the Knox Aquifer lead to discharge points outs ide the Oak Ridge Reservation
boundary . Because of the abund ance of surface water in the area . groundwater wells are not
common. Groundwater quality is good above 300 meters (1.000 feet). but it has high total dissolved
solids at depth .

earthquakes have affected the Oak Ridge Reservation area, but none has been at an intensity that
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Groundwater contamination has occurred in the general area of past-practice waste disposal
sites, waste storage tanks, spill sites, and contaminated inactive facilities . Principal contaminants
include volatile organics, nitrates, heavy metals, and radioactivity. Exact rates and extent of the
contamination have not been quantified. However, data indicate that most contamination remains
relatively close to the source. As an example of the maximum extent of groundwater contamination,
nitrate has been detected in wells 3,000 feet (900 meters) southwest of the source. Nitrate is
relatively mobile in groundwater and may therefore define the maximum horizontal migration of
contamination. At Oak Ridge National Laboratory, 20 waste area groups have been identified and are
being monitored for groundwater contamination. Monitoring data from each waste area group will
direct funher groundwattr studies. At the K-2S Site, organics are th~ most commonly detected
groundwater contaminants. Elevated levels of gross alpha and gross beta have been detected in a
number of wells. Uranium and technetium-99, respectively, appear to be primarily responsible for
the elevated gross alpha and gross beta levels. The metals chromium, lead, arsenic, and barium have
been detected in a number of wells at concentrations exceeding d"'nking water standards. Elevated
levels of fluoride and polychlorinated biphenyls have also been detected in SLme wells.
The offsite residential drinking water quality monitoring program has detected radinr"ldides
and organics in some offsite monitoring wells; however, concentrations have been below drinking
water standards. Fluoride has been detected at concentrations exceeding drinking water standards in
one offsite well . The high fluoride concentration and accompanying pH are most likely from natural
chemical reactions in the substrate.

Wetlands have been identified on the Oak Ridge Reservation, based primarily on the National
Wetland Inventory maps. Wetlands on the Oak Ridge Reservation include emergent, scrub/shrub,
and forested wetland . These wetlands are located in embayments of the Melton Hill and Watts Bar
Reservoir that border the reservation; along all major streams, including East Fork Poplar Creek,
Bear Creek, and their tributaries; in old farm ponds; and around groundwater seeps. Commercial
fishing occurs adjacent to the Oak Ridge Reservation for catfish and carp. Spon fishing for bass,
catfish, and other fresh-water fish is also popular.
Forty-seven species of federally and state-listed threatened, endangered, and other special
status species have been identified on and in the vicinity of the Oak Ridge Reservation, including
19 plants, 3 amphibians, 4 reptiles, 2 fish, 14 birds, and 5 mammals. Virginia spirea is a federally
threatened plant species; bald eagle, peregrine fal.:on, gray bat, and Indiana bat are federally
endangere'll species found in the area. The state-listed TeMessee dace has been recorded in Bear
Creek and tributaries of East Fork Poplar Creek.
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The Clinch River supplies most of the water to the Oak Ridge Reservation, the City of Oak
Ridge, and other cities along the river. Major surface water uses include withdrawals for industrial
and public water supplies, commercial and recreational navigation, and other recreational water
activities. Because of the abundance of surface water, most community and Oak Ridge Reservation
water supplies come from surface supplies rather than groundwater. One supply well exists on the
reservation for use as a supplemental water supply to a laboratory. Groundwater is used for some
domestic, municipal, farm , irrigation, and industrial purposes. A typical well in the aquitard yields
under 0.25 gallons per minute (O.02 liters per second), and in many places wells are incapable of
producing enough water to suppon a typical household .
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Approxi mately 267 different venebrate wildlife species have been recorded onsite, including
39 mammals, 169 birds. 33 reptiles, and 26 amphibians. Local habitats include wetlands, fields,
pasture, and pine plantations in addition to forest . Undeveloped areas on the Oak Ridge Reservation
suppon game and fur-bearing populations.
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Bear Creek Valley Road provides vehicular access to the Oak Ridge Reservation . TeMessee
State Routes 58, 62, 95, and 162 pass through the Oak Ridge Reservation and are open to the public.
Road construction and modification are planned for segments of Bear Creek Valley Road , Scarboro
Road, and State Routes 58 , 62 , and 95 in the near future. Interstate 40 is within 8 kilometers
(5 miles) to the south . Railroad service on the Oak Ridge Reservation is provided by CSX
Transportation and the Norfolk and Southern Corporation. Knoxville is the closest major airport,
64 kilometers (4O miles) away.

1
1

The Oak Ridge Reservation area was cleared by logging and agricultural practices in th~ past,
but it is currently dominated by pine and pine hardwood, and oak hickory, as well as nonhem
hardwood and hemlock-white pine-hardwood forest types.

The major noise sources within the Oak Ridge Reservation occur primarily in developed
operational areas and include facilities and equipment and machines, such as transformers, engines,
pumps, boilers, and vehicles. Outside the operations area major sources of noise are vehicles and
railroad operations. At the Oak Ridge Reservation boundary, away from most of these activities,
noise from these sources is barely distinguishable from background noise levels. Some disturbances
of wildlife may occur on the Oak Ridge Reservation as a result of operations and construction
activities.

Low-level, hazardous, and mixed wastes are generated and managed at the Y-12 Plant, K-25
Site, and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory . Nonhazardous wastes are generated at all three sites
and disposed of at the Y-12 Plant Sanitary Landfill. Oak Ridge Reservation generates and manages
SNF and transuranic waste. Waste management at the Y-12 Plant and the Oak Ridge National
Laboratory includes onsite waste treatment, on.<ite waste disposal, preparation for proper offsite waste
disposal , and onsite waste storage. Liquid and solid hazardous wastes are disposed of offsite. Some
low-level radioacti ve wastes are disposed of onsite.
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4.6 Naval Sites
This section presents summary environmental characterization information on the naval sites
that have been evaluated under various alternatives for management or examination of naval SNF.
This information has been used to evaluate impacts at the sites under various alternatives for
management of SNF. More detailed information characterizing these sites is presented in
Appendix 0, under separate cover.
The average annual radiation exposure for each naval shipyard radiation worker is 0.26 rem
(260 millirem) (NNPP 1993). The average lifetime accumulated exposure for shipyard workers is
1.2 rem (1,200 millirem) (NNPP 1993).
4.6.1 Puget Sound Naval Shipyard

The Puget Sound Naval Shipyard is located in Bremerton, Washington, 23 kilometers
(14 miles) west of Seattle and 32 kilometers (20 miles) northwest of Tacoma (Figure 4-6). The
population within SO kilometers (50 miles) of the shipyard is about 3 million people.
The population within SO kilometers (50 miles) of the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard has been
characterized for the purposes of identifying whether any disproportionately high and adverse impacts
exist to minority and low-income communities. The population surrounding the Puget Sound Naval
Shipyard is shown to be 13 percent minority and S percent low-income, based on U.S. Bureau of
Census information and the definitions and approach presented in Appendix L.
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard is on 132 hectares (327 acres) of highly developed land. The
waterfront dry dock area is the high-security portion of the shipyard where most production activities
take place. This area includes production shops, administration, and some public works and supply
functions. The upland area of the shipyard provides services to military personnel, including housing,
retail goods and services, recreation, counseling, dental care, and other support services. The
industrial support area in the southwestern portion of the shipyard includes st',al piers for
homeported ships and inactive fleet, the power plant, warehouses, a steel yard, public works shops,
and parking.
There are about 10,200 civilians working at the shipyard. With other Government facilities in
the area, the Federal payroll in Kitsap County, where the shipyard is located, provides about
45 percent of the total employment.
There are no prehistoric archaeological sites identified at the shipyard . There are
four National Registered Historical Districts and one National Historic Landmark within the
boundaries of the shipyard. Until the mid-ISSOs, Kitsap County was inhabited by several Native
American tribes of the Salish language group who lived on the shores of Puget Sound. For about
4-33
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100 years, the principal settlement of the Suquamish Tribe lay along the west shore of Agate Passage.
There are no Native American properties or ceremonial sites in the shipyard areas where SNF
activities would be c.,oo"",,,,,

SPOKANE ·
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The natural topography of the shipyard has been altered significantly from its original
condition. Portions of the upland areas of the complex were cut to fill marshes an': create level land.
The resulting fill material was predominantly a silty, gravelly sand with occasional pockets of silts
and clays . The remaining areas of natural soils vary from dense glacial deposits to soft bay mud and
peat. The upland soil is a stiff, hard packed, clay soil with low penneability.
The site lies within Unifonn Building Code Seismic Risk Zone 3. There have been
approximately 200 earthquakes in the area since 1840, most of which caused little or no damage. The
most recent earthquakes of high magnitude were near Olympia [64 kilometers (40 miles) from
Bremerton) in 1949 (7 . 1 on the Richter scale) and near Seattle in 1965 (6.S on the Richter scale).
The central Puget Sound area could experience an earthquake of intensity 7.S on the Richter scale.
There has been no known surface faulting in conjunction with earthquakes in the shipyard region.
Potential hazards from volcanism are minimal and limited to windborne volcanic ash.
The potential hazard from tsunamis and seiches is minimal because the system of straits and
inlets that surround Puget Sound provides a natural barrier, effectively damping the propagation of
distantly generated tsunamis.

o

•

The general area around Bremerton is damp, cool, and cloudy much of the year. Average
windspeed at the Seattle-Tacoma Airport is 4 meters per second (9 miles per hour), with prevailing
winds from the southwest.

•
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The Code of Federal Regulations (40 CFR Part 81) states that the Air QUality Control Region
for this site is bener than national standards for total suspended particulate maner and sulfur dioxide.
The area has no specific classification for ozone, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen dioxide. The
nearest Class I Area is Olympic National Park, approximately 24 kilometers (IS miles) from the site.

FOREST

Puget Sound Naval Shipyard has no important surface freshwaters. Groundwater is generally
iound within 30 meters (100 feet) of the ground surface in sand and gravel layers . The quality of
most groundwater near Bremerton is good. Groundwater is used for approx imately 3S percent of the
public water supply. Current shipyard use is about 2.6 bill ion liters (676 million gallons) annually.

Figure 4-6. Puget Sound Naval Shipyard location and vicinity map.
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Vegetation and wildlife on the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard are limited to undeveloped areas
that comprise approximately 19 hectares (46 acres) of the entire Bremerton Naval Complex. Most of
these areas have been previously disturbed and are currently landscaped with native and vrnamental
trees and shrubs. No sensitive, threatened, or endangered aquatic or terrestrial species have been
observed at the shipyard .
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Land access to the Seanlerracoma area is over two interstate highways: Interstate 90 and
Interstate 5. The major thoroughfare in south Kitsap County is State Route 16, which runs south
from Bremerton to Tacoma where it connects with Interstate 5. Bremerton's primary access routes
include State Routes 3, 303, and 304.

STATE OF VIRGINIA

ARLINGTON .

The Burlington Northern Railroad provides scheduled and on-<lemand freight service to
southern and central Kitsap County . A Navy-owned spur line from Shelton, Washington, provides
additional rail service to the shipyard. SNF originating at Bremerton and Pearl Harbor has
historically been transportej by rail from Bremerton to the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory. Since 1962, all 134 shipments of SNF have been sent from
Bremerton to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory by rail-I 14 originating from Puget Sound
Naval Shipyard and 20 transported by ship from Hawaii to the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, where
the containers were transferred to railcars for the journey to the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory.
The annual airborne emissions from the site do not result in any measurable radiation
exposure to the general public. Emissions of radionuclides from the site result in a calculated
effective dose equivalent of less than 0.0001 rem (U.I millirem) per year to any member of the
general public.
In ad dition , normal activities associated with current naval nuclear operations at the site do
not result in the intentional discharge of any radioactive liquid effluent. Environmental monitoring
programs conducted by the site and independent U.S. Environmental Protection Agency monitoring of
shipyard sites have shown that the operations at the site have had no adverse impacts on public health
or safety. Additional discussion of these monitoring programs is found in Section 4.1.1 of
Appendix D of Volume I of th is EIS .

4.6.2 Norfolk Naval Shipyard
Norfolk Naval Shipyard is located in the Tidewater region of Virginia and is contiguous with
the city of Portsmouth (see Figure 4-7). Newport News Sh ipyard , where some naval nuclear ships
are defueled , is located in Newport News, Virginia (see Figure 4-8). Six city areas are within 24
kilometers (15 miles) of the Norfolk Naval Shipyard : Portsmouth, Chesapeake, Norfolk, Virginia
Beach, Hampton and Newport News, and Suffolk. About 1.5 million people (USBC 1992) reside
within an 80-kilometer (50-mile) rad ius of th e shipyard , and about 8,500 Shipyard workers are
employed at the shipyard .
The population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the Norfolk Naval Shipyard has been
characterized for the purposes of identifying whether any disproportionately high and adverse impacts
exist to minority and low-i ncome communities . The population surrounding the Norfolk Naval
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Figure 4-7. Norfolk Naval Shipyard location and vicinity map.
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Shipyard is shown to be 33 percent minority and II percent low·income, based on U.S. Bureau of
Census information and the definitions and approach presented in Appendix L.

ARLINGTON.

Norfolk Naval Shipyard occupies over 486 hectares (1,200 acres) and includes over
500 administrative, industrial, and suppon structures along 4 miles of shoreline. Over 95 percent of
the land within its boundaries is covered with structures or paved with concrete or asphalt. The
facility is divided into a controlled industrial area and a nonindustrial area. All piers, dry docks, and
work facilities involved with naval nuclear propulsion plant work are within the controlled industrial
area.
No prehistoric archaeological sites or submerged cultural resources have been identified at the
shipyard . Drydock I is a National Historic Landmark. There are no Native American properties or
ceremonial sites in the areas where naval SNF activities would be conducted.
Norfolk Naval Shipyard is located in Uniform Building Code Seismic Risk Zone I, which is
the second lowest of four risk categorir~. No volcanic hazards exist.
The general climate of the area is mild and moist, with predominant winds from the south to
southwest. In summer, afternoon thunderstorms are very common. Thunderstorms occasionally
spawn isolated tornadoes throughout the region, but they move through the area rapidly along with
storm centers. Hurricanes and tidal flooding are not uncommon; tornados are infrequent. The Code
of Federal Regulations (40 CFR Part 81) states that the Air Quality Control Region that includes this
site is in marginal nonattainment for ozone and is better than national standards for total suspended
particulate matter and sulfu r dioxide. The area has no specific classification for carbon monoxide and
nitrogen dioxide. The nearest Class I Area is the Swanquarter National Wilderness Area, which is
approximately 160 kilometers (100 miles) from the site.
Norfolk Naval Shipyard is located on the Southern Branch of the Elizabeth River in a highly
industrialized area of the city of Portsmouth , Virginia, 13 kilometers (8 miles) upstream from the
confluence of the James and Elizabeth Rivers. The Southern Branch is a deep water river that
provides access to heavy industry in the vicinity of the shipyard . The Southern Branch is brackish
and is not a source of drinking water.
Shallow groundwater underlies the whole region. Designated as the Columbia Aquifer, the
aquifer is comprised of interbedded gravel , sand , silt, and clay and is unconfined throughout the
reg ion. Underneath the Columbia Aquifer is the Yorktown Aquifer, which is a major source of
domestic, commercial, and light industrial water. This aquifer is the usual source of drin king and
domestic consumption water for those localiti es within the region not served by municipal water
systems.

Figure 4-8. Newpon News Shipyard location and vicin ity map.
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The shipyard area is highly developed, and its surface is about 95 percent covered with
impervious materials . Several federally designated threatened or endangered species e.ist in the
region; however, habitats have not been identified on shipyard property. No state-listed rare ,
threatened, or endangered species e.ist within the 24-kilometer (IS-mile) tidal influence zone.

STATE OF
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There are three main road corridors within the city of Portsmouth. These roads are High
Street, Portsmouth Boulevard, and George Washington Highway, and they provide access to suburban
co mmercial and residential areas. The Downtown and Midtown Tunnels link Portsmouth and Norfolk

STATE OF MAINE

and join via connecting arteries to the regional interstate highway network consisting of Interstates 64,
262, 464, and 664. Interstate 64 crosses Hampton Roads and Interstate 664 crosses the lower James
River, linking the south-side cities to Newport News and Hampton on the peninsula.
Norfolk Southern and CSX operate e.tensive rail transportation networks for freight and bulk
cargo. Norfolk and Newport News are the Nation's largest terminals for coal e.ports, and, along
with Portsmouth, have a large capacity for containerized and bulk cargos. Lines operated by CSX
and Norfolk Southern subsidiaries serve the shipyard at the north and south ends and at Southgate and
St. Juliens Creek an~e.es . Since 1965, all 10 shipments of naval SNF originating at the Norfolk
Naval Shipyard have been made by rail to the E.pended Core Facility at the Idaho National

PORTlAND

Engineering Laboratory.
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The annual airborne emissions from the site do not result in any measurable radiation
e.posure to the general public. Emissions of radionuclides from the site result in a calculated

I

effective dose equivalent of less than 0 .0001 rem (0.1 millirem) per year to any member of the
general public.
In addition, normal activities associated with current naval nuclear operations at the site do
not result in the intentional discharge of any radioactive liquid effluent. Environmental monitoring
programs conducted by the site and independent U.S. Environmental Protection Agency monitoring of
shipyard sites have shown that the operations at the site have had no adverse impacts on public health
or safety. Additional discussion of th ese monitoring programs is found in Section 4.1.2 of
Appendi. D of Volume I of this EIS .
4 .6 .3 Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard is located in York County, in the southeast corner of Maine. It is
on Seavey Island, near the mouth of the Piscataqua River (see Figure 4-9). Seavey Island has an area
of 113 hectares (278 acres) . To the north lies the low-density residential community of Kittery,
Maine. South of the shipyard , across the river, is the city of Ports mouth (population 22,300) and the
town of New Castle in New Hampshire. The population within an 80-kilometer (50-mile) radius of
the site is appro.imately 2.4 million . The shi pyard is the region's largest employer, with 5,000
employees.
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Figure 4-9. Portsmouth Naval Shipyard location and vic inity map .
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The population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard has been
characterized for the purposes of identifying whether any disproportionately high and adverse impacts
exist to minority and low-income communities . The population surrounding the Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard is shown to be 5 percent minority and 7 percent low-income, based on U.S. Bureau of
Census information and the definitions and approach presented in Append ix L.
On November 17, 1977, the National Park Service, U.S. Department of the Interior, entered
the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard Historic District on the National Register of Historic Places. The
district includes 54 acres of land and 59 buildings and structures. There are no known cultural
resources in the area of the site where naval SNF would be stored.
Seavey Island is a rock knob, a prominent bedrock outcrop . The bedrock is a fine-grained ,
lime-silicate material consisting of chalky sandstone formed under heat and pressure, siltstone, and
gray sandstone shale. There are no economic geoiogic resources at the site.
The shipyard is in Uniform Building Code Seismic Risk Zone 2A. Numerous small faults are
found in rock units across the region, but only the Rye-Kittery contact is important enough to show
on a geologic map.
The typical weather is caused by various incursions of cold , dry arctic air; warm land air
from the Gulf States; and cool, damp air from the Atlantic Ocean. Dominance of these systems can
change on a daily basis, creating highly variable weather conditions. Precipitation is evenly
distributed over the year for an annual total of 108 centimeters (42 .6 inches). Local fog is observed
15 percent of the time, and it is dense enough to restrict visibility to 2 kil ometers (1.2 miles) or less
about 35 percent of th at time.
Winds average 3.9 meters per second (8.8 miles per hour), but speeds greater than
17.9 meters per second (40 miles per hour) can occur any time of year. Severe weather from

tornadoes and hurricanes is rare.

The limited amount of vegetation and the industrial nature of the shipyard limit the availability
of suitable habitat for most terrestrial species. There is one small freshwater wetland located at the
shipyard. No threatened or endangered species have been identified at the site.
Vehicl es can reach the Kittery-Portsmouth area by means of Interstate 95 alld U.S. Route I.
The shipyard is accessible by two federally owned bridges that cross to the residential streets of
Kittery, Maine. Walker Avenue is the primary access route to Bridge I, and Whipple Road provides
direct access to Bridge 2.
There is daily freight rail service to the Shipyard by the Boston and Maine Railroad . The
railroad connects Portsmouth with Manchester, New Hampshire; Portland , Maine; and Boston,
Massachusetts.
Naval SNF has been removed from Navy nuclear ships at the shipyard and transported to the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory since 1959. There have been 43 shipments made, all by rail.
The annual airborne emissions from the site do not result in any measurable radiation
exposure to the general public. Emissions of radionuclides from the s ite result in a calculated
effective dose equivalent of less than 0.0001 rem (0. 1 millirem) per year to any member of the
general public.

In addition, normal activities associated with current naval nuclear operations at the site do
not result in the intentional discharge of any radioactive liquid effluent. Environmental monitoring
programs conducted by the site and independent U.S. Environmental Protection Agency monitoring of
shipyard sites have shown that the operations at the site have had no adverse impacts on public health
or safety. Additional discussion of these monitorin g programs is found in Section 4. 1.3 of
Appendix D of Volume I of this EIS .

4.6.4 Peart Harbor Naval Shipyard

The Code of Federal Regulations (40 CFR Part 81 ) states that the Air Quality Control Region
for this site is in moderate nonattainment fo r ozone and is better than national standards for total
suspended particulate matter and sulfur dioxide. The area has no specific classification for carbon
monoxide and nitrogen dioxide. The nearest Class I Area to the site is the Presidential Range-Dry
River Wilderness Area. which is approximately 120 kilometers (75 miles) from the shipyard .
The Piscataqua Ri ver, formed by the confluence of the Cocheco River and the Salmon Falls
River. flows southeasterly for 21 kilometers (13 miles) until it enters the ocean at Portsmouth Harbor .
The entire 21 kilo meters (13 miles) of the river is tid al. The river is one of the fastest flowing tidal
waterways of any commercial port in the northeastern United States. The Piscataqua River is

The Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard is located in the Southeast Loch of Pearl Harbor, Oahu ,
Hawaii (see Figure 4-10). The population of the island of Oahu was approximately 820,000 people
in 1990.
The population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard has been
characterized for the purposes of identifying whether any disproportionately high and adverse impacts
exist to mino rity and low-income communities. The population surrounding the Pearl Harbor Naval
Shipyard is shown to be 68 percent minority and 7 percent low-income, based on U.S. Bureau of
Census information and the definitions and approach presented in Append ix L.

designated as having acceptable water qUality .
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The shipyard employs about 5,000 civilian employees, and, combined with other
U.S. Depanment of Defense civilian employees, it accounts for 10,900 local jobs.
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Pearl Harbor has been the site of several important historical events, and it is most noted for
its role in the Pacific Theater Defense during World War It. Naval Base Pearl Harbor was designated
as a National Historic Landmark in 1964; in 1974, it was listed on the National Register of His/oric
Places. There are no archaeological sites located within the boundary of the shipyard. There are no
Native Hawaiian properties or ceremonial sites in the shipyard areas where naval SNF activities
would be conducted.
Pearl Harbor estuary lies on the coastal sedimentary plain of southern Oahu . Streams,
springs, and groundwater flow into the harbor. The estuary was formed by freshwater flows that
have eroded the coastal plain and retarded coral growth . The west side of the harbor is primarily
comprised of limestone reef material. The ea.,t side of the harbor is mainly compacted volcanic ash.
Hard , dense volcanic rock forms the bulk of the rock material to the north. Much of the land area in
Pearl Harbor is fill land created by dredge spoils. There are no geologic resources of economic value
at the shipyard.
The Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard is located in Uniform Building Code Seismic Risk Zone I.
Except for the island of Hawaii , the islands are not a highly seismic area. Even on Hawaii, most of
the earthquakes originate from volcanic activity and do little or no damage, although a few have been
quite severe. The Hawaiian Islands were formed by volcanic eruptions; however, the only active
volcanic area is on the island of Hawaii . There are no volcanic hazards on the Island of Oahu .
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Past tsunami inundation levels have been about I meter (3 feet) above mean sea level.
Projected tsunami wave elevations for the 10-, 100-, and 500-year event are 0.2, 0.6 , and 1.2 meters
(0.8, 2.0, and 3.8 feet), respectively, for adjacent coastal areas. Maximum reaso nably foreseeable
typhoon storm water level rise would be approximately 4.3 meters (14.5 feet) above mean sea level.

.

The predominant winds are from the northeast, particularly from Feb ruary to November. At
certain times of the year, south to southwest winds and mild offshore breezes can be expected .
Winds with speeds up to 22 meters per seco nd (49 miles per hour) occasionally strike from the north
or northeast, but they rarely reach gale velocities. Southerly winds are usually accompanied by wet
tropical air and frequent heavy showers. Destructive hurri canes with high tidal surges have hit the
Hawaiian Islands twice in the past 25 years (both times cent ered on Kauai), in 1982 and 1992.

,
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The Code of Federal Regulations (40 CFR Part 81) states that the Air Quality Control Region
for this s ite is better than national standards for total suspended paniculate matter and 3ulfur dioxide.
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Figure 4-10, Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard location and vicinity map .

The area has no specific classification for ozo ne, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen dioxide . The
nearest Class I Area is Haleakala National Park, on the Island of Maui, which is 188 kilometers (117
miles) from the Shipyard .
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Eight streams discharge into Pearl Harbor. Some flooding occurs along the major streams,
but it is not a problem at the naval complex , affecting only a narrow strip along Aiea Stream . Naval
Base Pearl Harbor receives most of its water from the Koolau Aquifer and a small portion from the
Waianae Aquifer, which are located in south central Oahu.
Nil federally or state-listed threatened or endangered species or critical habitats are known to
exist within the confines of the shipyard. Because the area has been greatly disrurbed and native
vegetation completely eliminated, there is little remaini;;g tf:rrestrial habitat of any consequence.
Some migratory birds and indigenous waterfowl occasionally frequent the shoreline areas of the
shipyard , but none are residents.
There are several wetland areas within the Pearl Harbor area, including the Pearl Harbor
National Wildlife Refuge, which provides habitat for the endangered Hawaiian Coot and Hawaiian

4.6.5 Kesselring Site
The Kenneth A. Kesselring Site is located about 24 kilometers (15 miles) north of the City of
Schenectady, New York, and \3 kilometers (8 miles) west of Saratoga Springs (see Figure 4-11). It
contains three operating naval nuclear propulsion prototype plants and support facilities. The site also
includes one prototype plant that is being permanently shut down and one prototype that has been
permanently shut down. All operating facilities are located in a secure area near the center of the
1,578-hectare (3 ,900-acre) reservation.
In 1993, the site employed about 1,450 civilian workers. About 1.15 million people live
within an 80-kilometer (50-mile radius) of the site according to rhe 1990 Census, but most of the land
immediately adjacent to the site is either wooded or used for agriculrure. The nearest cities include
those previously mentioned and Gloversville, Amsterdam, and Albany.

Stilt.
The traffic into and out of the base is a combination of commuting traffic, residential-related
traffic, and service traffic. Kamehameha Highway is the primary access route to the base from the
EwaiPearl City/central Oahu direction. Both Kamehameha Highway and Interstate Highway H- I
provide access to the Naval Base from Honolulu.

The population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the Kesselring Site has been characterized
for the purposes of identifying whether any disproportionately high and adverse impacts exist to
minority and low-income communities. The population surrounding the Kesselring Site is shown to
be 6 percent minority and 9 percent low-income, based on U.S. Bureau of Census information and
the definitions and approach presented in Appenuix L.

Naval SNF has been removed from Navy nuclear-powered ships and transported to the
Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory . Naval SNF shipments to the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory were initiated in 1962. Since then, 20 shipments have been
made. The shipments were taken by ship to the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, where the containers

The Kesselring Site reservation was used primarily for agriculrural purposes before Federal
Government acquisition in 1948. There are no known archaeological, architecrural, culrural, or
Native American Indian sites in the secure area where SNF storage would take place.

were then transported to the Idaho National Engineerirg Laboratory by rail.

The site lies on primarily unconsolidated material , primarily of glacial origin, that overlies
bedrock. Where it exists, the overburden can be up to several hundred feet thick. The overburden
consists of three basic kinds of depositional units : glacier debris, lake, and ice-contact/outwash
deposits. Deposits from gla~iers overlie much of the bedrock and form the elliptical hills throughout
most of the reservation . The glacier deposits are a dense and poorly sorted mixrure of clay, silt,
sand, gravel , and boulders. Thinly stratified lake clay and silt deposits are mapped over the
southeastern quadrant of the site. The ice-contact/outwash deposits mostly consist of stratified sands
and gravels.

The annual airborne emissions from the site do not result in any measurable radiation
exposure to the general public. Emissions of radionuclides from the site result in a calculated
effective dose equivalent of less than 0.0001 rem (0.1 millirem) per year to any member of the
general public.
In addition, normal acti·/ities associated with current naval nuclear operations at the site do
not result in the intentional discharge of any radioactive liquid effluent. Environmental monitoring
programs conducted by the site and independent U.S. Environmental Protection Agency monitoring of
shipyard sites have shown that the operations at the site have had no adverse impacts on public health
or safety . Add itional discussion of these monitoring programs is found in Section 4. 1.1 of
Appendix D of Volume I of this EIS .
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The general ar .. of the site is in Uniform Building Code Seismic Risk Zone 2, with a
moderate risk of damage caused by earthquakes. There is a Zone I (minor damage) area to the south
and a Zone 3 (major damage) area to the north of the site. The maximum intensity earthquake within
161 kilometers (100 miles) of the site had a Modified Mercalli Intensity Scale value of VII. The most
recent earthquake of that intensity occurred at Lake George, New York, on April 30, 1931 . Because
the site is located near the fault system that caused this quake, an earthquake of similar intensity could
occur at the site. There are no volcanic hazards in the vicinity of the site.
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The general climate of the site is cold in winter and cool to warm in summer. Winds
originate mostly from the west or northwest during the winter, but come from the south in the
warmer months. Wind velocities are moderate and generally average less than 4.S meters per second
(10 miles per hour). Destructive winds [greater than 36 meters per second (80 miles per hour)) occur
infrequently, and tornadoes are rare.

STATE OF NEW YORK

The Code of Federal Regulations (40 CFR Part 81) states that the Air Quality Control Region
that includes this site is in marginal nonattainment for ozone and is better than national standards for
total suspended particulate matter and sulfur dioxide. The area has no specific classification for
carbon monoxide and nitrogen dioxide. The nearest Class I Area is at Lye Brook Wilderness,
Suarderland, Vermont, which is 74 kilometers (46 miles) from the site.

• SYRACUSE

The Kesselring Site is located in a predominately rural area. There are 13 wetlands on the
Kesselring Site; current operations do not impact these wetlands . Federally or state-listed threatened
and endangered species located in the Saratoga County area include the bald eagle, the karner blue
butterfly, the peregrine falcon, and the red-shouldered hawk. There are, however, no records of any
of these species on the site.

NEW YORK CITY
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Only secondary roads follow the boundary of the site. They are used primarily by Kesselring
Site employees and as delivery routes for small products and produce. State Route 29 runs 3
kilometers (2 miles) to the north , State Route 147 runs 6 kilometers (4 miles) to the west, and State
Route 67 runs 6 kilometers (4 miles) to the south. State Route SO, 10 kilometers (6 miles) east,
ruMing from Saratoga Springs to Scotia, carries the only appreciable amount of truck and bus traffic.
The majority of through traffic uses either Interstate 87 or parallel route U.S. Highway 9,
16 kilometers (10 miles) to the east .
Two lines of the T)elaware and Hudson Railroad cross the region within 16 kilometers
(10 miles) of the site. The mai n north-south line runs through Ballston Spa, just over 8 kilometers
(S miles) to the east, and a trunkline runs just over 8 kilometers (S miles) to the northeast into the
central Adirondack area.

.,
I

SNF from the Kesselring Site has been sent to the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory since 196 1. Shipping containers are transponed by truck to a
nearby commercial rail line where the containers were loaded onto rail cars. Since 1961,
20 shipments of naval SNF have been sent to the Expended Core Facility from the Kesselring Site.
The annual airborne emissions from the site do not result in measurable r2diation exposure to
the general public. Emissions of radionuclides from the site result in a calculated effecti ve dose
equivalent of less than 0 .0001 rem (0. 1 millirem) per year to any member of the general public.
Figure 4-11. Kesselring Site location and vicinity map .
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In addition, normal activities associated with current naval nuclear operations at the site do
not result in the intentional discharge of any rad ioactive liquid effluenl. Environmental monitoring
programs conducted by the site have shown that the operations at the site have had no adverse impacts
on public health or safety.

In terms of meteorology. the laboratory can be characterized, like most Eastern Seaboard
areas, as a well-ventilated site. The annual preci pitation during 1991 was 45.3 inches (115
centi meters), which is about 3. 1 inches (8.0 centimeters) below the 4O-year annual precipitation
average of 48.4 inches (123 centimeters).

4,7 Other Generator/Storage Locations

Suffolk County, in which the site is located , is classified as being in nonattainment of the
standards for the criteria pollutant ozone. The county is in attainment of standards for carbon
monoxide, paniculates, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide, and lead .

In addition to the five major sites, DOE is responsible for the management of SNF generated
at several other DOE sites and other locations . These sites include DOE reactors at sites other than
the Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, the Savannah River Site, and the Oak
Ridge Reservation ; university and domestic research reactors; and three locations where specific types
of commercial power reactor SNF for which DOE is responsible ate stored. This section summarizes
environmental characterization information for these sites that might be affected by programmatic
decisions on SNF managemenl. More detailed information characterizing the sites is presented in
Appendix E, under separate cover.
The facilities and installations included in th is category preclude the definition of their
affected environments in a consistent and uniform manner without describing each site. The
information available in existing facility documents varies widely depending on the nature of the
installation and the requirements for describ ing the environment by the overseeing or regulatory
agencies. For example, the environmental parameters required to be described by the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission for licensing of small research reactors or material processing and storage
facilities are fewer in number and less detailed than those required for larger reactor installations at
DOE facil ities. Thus, the abil ity to represent these environmental parameters in a consistent manner
based on existing documentation is limited, and several parameters addressed for the major DOE sites
are not discussed at all or are discussed only to a limited degree for many of these other generator/
storage locations. Because alternatives evaluated will not require alteration of these sites, the sites are
nOl described in detail. See Appendi x E, Chapter 4 for more information.
4.7.1 DOE Test and Experimental Reactors
In add ition to facil ities at the Hanfo rd Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Savannah
River Site, and Oak Ridge Reservation, experime1tal reactors are located at, and small quantities of
SNF are in storage at, the following fo ur DOE sites: Brookhaven National Laboratory , Los Alamos
National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, and Argonne National Laboratory-East.
4.7.1.1 Brookhaven National Laboratory. Brookhaven National Laboratory is located on
a 2, 131-hectare (5,265-acre) site on Long Island, New York , approximately 97 kilometers (60 miles)
east of New York City, in a primarily suburban area. About 410,000 people reside in Brookhaven
Township, which houses the Laboratory, and 8,000 people live within 0 .8 kil ometer (0.5 mile) of the

No active earthquake-producing faults are known in the Long Island area. The area lies in a
Uniform Building Code Seismic Risk Zone 2A (moderate seismic hazard) area.
Groundwater flow under the Laboratory site is complex, moving in different directions in
different sections of the site, but generally with a velocity estimated to range from 30 to
45 centimeters per day (12 to 18 inches per day), flowing either toward the Peconic River or in
deeper layers recharging the Atlantic Ocean. The Nassau/Suffolk Aquifer System underlying the
Brookhaven National Laboratory has been designated a sole source aquifer by the U.S . Environmental
Protection Agency.
The releases of radioactive gaseous and liquid effluents fro m Brookhaven National Laboratory
from 1988 to 1992 have resulted in calcul ated average doses to hypothetical maximally exposed
individuals of 0.000113 and 0.000722 rem (0. 11 3 and 0.722 millirem) per year, respectively.
4.7.1.2 LO$ A/amos National Laboratory. Los Alamos occupies an area of about 11,000
hectares (28,000 acres) located primarily in Los Alamos county in northern New Mexico, about 39
kilometers (24 miles) northwest of Santa Fe. The resident population of Los Alamos county in 1990
was 18, 115; about 3,900 Los Alamos National Laboratory employees reside in the adjacent Rio
Arriba and Santa Fe counties .
The climate at Los Alamos National Laboratory is characterized as semi-arid steppe, with an
average annual rai nfall of about 21 centimeters (8. 1 inches) . Severe weather affecti ng facility design
or operation is extremely rare. Los Alamos National Laboratory is located in the New Mex ico
Intrastate Air Quality Control Region. Areas in Los Alamos National Labo ratory and its surrounding
counties are designated as in attainment with respect to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards.
The Los Alamos National Laboratory is located on the Pajarito Pl ateau, which is dissected by
deep canyons separated by long narrow me.'as . It lies within Seismic Zone 2B, and seismic hazards
studies have identified three active fau lts in the area. Studies suggest seismic events with a magnitude
of 6.5 to 7 .8 have been produced in the last 500,000 years.

Laboratory boundary.

VOLUME I

4-50

Il./t

4-51

VOLUME I

Surface water at Los Alamos consists of intermittent streams; several canyons receive treated
industrial or sanitary effluents that rarely extend aboveground beyond Los Alamos National
Laboratory boundaries. The depth to the main groundwater aquifer, which supplies nearly all water
at Los Alamos National Laboratory, ranges from about 366 meters (1,200 feet) in the west to about
183 meters (600 feet) in the east part of the site, and groundwater discharges to springs along the

The climate in the Argonne National Laboratory-East area is characterized as continental, with
an average annual precipitation of 80 centimeters (31.5 inches). The area experiences about 40
thunderstorms annually, occasionally accompanied by hail , damaging winds, or tornadoes. The
theoretical probability of a tornado strike at Argonne National Laboratory-East is about one every
1,200 years, although the site was struck by tornadoes in 1976 and 1978, with minor damage.

Rio Grande.
The releases of radioactive effluents from Los Alamos National Laboratory over the period
1987 to 1991 have resulted in a calculated average dose to the hypothetical maximally exposed
individual of about 0.004 rem (4 millirem) per year.
4.7.1.3 Sandia National Leboratorie&. The Sandia National Laboratories reactor and SNF
operations are located on about 3,360 hectares (8,300 acres) of Kirtland Air Force Base allocated to
DOE, approximately 10 kilometers (6.5 miles) southeast of downtown Albuquerque, New Mexico.
The 1990 population of Albuquerque was about 385 ,000.
The climate at Sandia National Laboratories is characteristic of a semi-arid steppe, with an
average annual rainfall of about 21 centimeters (8.1 inches). Severe weather affecting facility design
or operation is extremely rare. The Sandia National Laboratories is within the Albuquerque-Mid Rio
Grande New Mexico Intrastate Air Quality Control Region, portions of which are designated as
nonattainment by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for Colorado.
The Sandia National Laboratories is located on the Albuquerque East Mesa in a Seismic
Zone 2B, in a region of high seismic activity but of low magnitude and intensity. More than
1,1 00 earthquakes have occurred during the last 127 years, but only 3 have caused damage in
Albuquerque.
The Rio Grande is the main surface drainage route for the area, with an average flow of about
28.5 cubi c meters per second (37.3 cubic yards per second). No perennial streams flow throug" the
Sandia National Laboratories area, and fl ooding is not a high probability at Kirtland Air Force Base.
The groundwater is distinguish,.:d by a fault complex underlying the area; depths range from IS to
30 meters (50 to 100 feet) on the east side of the complex and from liS to 152 meters (380 to
500 feet) on the west side. Groundwater fl ow west of the complex is generally toward the north and
northwest, and groundwater flow east of the fault complex is typically west toward the fault system.
4.7.1.4 Argonne National Laboratory-Eart Argonne National Laboratory-East occupies
about a 688-hectare (1 ,700-acre) site located in DuPage County, Illinois, within the Chicago
metropolitan area. The site is surrounded by a 826-hectare (2,04O-acre) green belt forest preserve
operated by DuPage County. The 1990 population of the Chicago metropolitan area was about

The Argonne National Laboratory-East site is located above about a 30-meter- (IOO-foot)-thick
glacial till deposit on top of dolomite bedrock. The site is in Uniform Building Code Seismic Zone I.
Several areas of seismic activity are present at moderate distances from the site, but ground motions
induced by these seismic sources are expected to be minimal at the site.
The Argonne National Laboratory-East site contains a number of small ponds and surface
streams that enter the Des Plaines River about 2.0 kilometers (1.25 miles) southeast of the site center.
Groundwater is extracted from two underlying aquifers . No aquifers in the region are considered
sole-source aquifers by the U.S . Environmental Protection Agency .
4.7.2 Domestic Research and Test Reactors
Appendix E also identifies 55 non-DOE facilities representing domestic, licensed , small
generators of SNF. They include training, research, and test reactors at universities, commercial
establishments, and several Government installations. These facilities have been licensed by the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for reactor operation and the storage of the SNF they generate.
Although they are not DOE facilities, past practices and long-term plans and agreements have always
called for the SNF they generate to be transported to DOE facilities. In the past, this SNF was
generally processed at the Savannah River Site, Hanford Site, or Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory for recovery of the highly enriched uranium in their fuel. Under all but the No Action
and Decentralization alternatives, these fuels would be transported to a DOE site for storage until
ultimate disposition .
These 55 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensed facilities, 40 of which are operated
by universities, are located in 28 states. They are located in a wide variety of areas, ranging from
rural locations to industrial research parks and urban university campuses, which does not permit a
description of a typical affected environment for these facilities. Information on the environments of
three of the larger of these U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission-licensed research reactors [the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (former National Bureau of Standards), the
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the University of Missouri reactors) is summarized in the
following sections.
4.7.2.1 Natlonelln&tltufe of Standard& end Technology. The National Institute of
Standards and Technology reactor is located on the Institute's 233-hectare (576-acre) campus in the

6.6 million people.

city of Gaithersburg, Maryland, about 20 miles northwest of downtown Washington. D .C. The 1990
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population of Gaithersburg, a Washington suburban area, was about 39,500. The nearest site
boundary is about 0.40 kilometer (0.25 mile) southwest of the reactor.
The climate of the area is moderate, with infrequent occurrences of severe weather. Although
a number of winter storms and hurricanes have affected the general area, the site is not subject to
flooding, and the recurrence interval for a tornado at the site is about one in 2,000 years. Air quality
is primarily determined by the presence of 12-lane Interstate Highway 270, used by commuters to and
from the duwntown Washington, D.C ., area and suburban residential areas.
There are no known major faults in the site vicinity, although the site region is moderately
seismic (Seismic Zone I) . The maximum ground acceleration for the site area was estimated to be
0.07g.
There are no discharges from the National Institute of Standards and Technology reactor to
surface streams or groundwater; liquid wastes are processed before discharge to the local sanitary
sewer system and have averaged 2.7 curies of tritium and 1.9 miilicuries of other beta-gamma
emitters per year from 1988 to 1992. Over the same period , the site released airborne emissions
containing an average of 710 curies of argon-41 and 353 curies of tritium per year, well below the
license limits for the site. However, individual or collective doses are not reponed, and because site
meteorological data are not monitored, doses cannot be reliably estimated .
4.7.2.2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The Massachusetts Institute of
Technology reactor, housed in a gas-tight building with 0.6-meter (2-feet) concrete shielding, is
located on a 0.39-hectare (I-acre) site in a heavily industrialized section of Cambridge,
Massachusetts, a few blocks from the main Massachusetts Institute of Technology campus and about
1.6 kilometer (I mile) from Boston across the Charles River. The population of Cambridge was
about 95,800 in 1990.
The meteorological conditions vary from highly stable with light winds to unstable
atmospheric conditions with strong winds. Severe weather conditions are uncommon, and flooding of
the area is not expected even un<ler record rainfall conditions. Air quality is typical of an urban area.
The Cambridge area has been relatively free of eanhquakes over the past 150 years, but it did
experience an eanhquake in 1755, which destroyed some buildings. The region is located in
Seismic Zone 2, and the reactor is conservatively designed to withstand projected seismic activity.
There are no discharges from tht Massachusetts Institute of Technology reactor to surface
streams or groundwater; liquid wastes are processed before discharge to the local sanitary sewer
system and have averaged 0.074 curies of tritium and 9.5 millicuries of other beta-gamma emitters
per year from 1988 to 1992. Over the same period. the reactor released airborne effluents containing
an annual average of 1,215 curies of argon-4l . well below the license limits for the reactor.
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However, individual or collective doses are not reponed, and because site meteorological data are not
monitored, doses cannot be reliably estimated, panicularly given the highly urbanized vicinity.
4.7.2.3 University of Missouri. The Columbia Research Reactor is sited within a
34·hectare (85-acre) Research Park about 1.6 kilometers (I mile) southwest of the main campus of the
University of Missouri, located south of the main business district of Columbia, Missouri. The
population of Columbia was about 69,000 in 1990. Agriculture is the predominant regional activity,
although there are a number of small industrial activities in the area.
The climate of the region is continental, and high windspeeds are not uncommon;
150 kilometer per hour (94 mile per hour) winds have a recurrence interval of once in 100 years, but
tornadoes are very uncommon . Air quality is representative of the nonurban midwest. Surface
drainage from the site moves eventually to the Missouri River
Columbia is located in the stable area of Missouri and, despite the proximity to the New
Madrid area, the probability of seismic damage in the area is low as reflected by its location in
Seismic Zone I.
There are no discharg from the University of Missouri/Columbia Research Reactor to
surface streams or groundwater; liquid waste is processed before discharge to the local sanitary sewer
system and has averaged 0.21 curie of tritium and 25.6 millicuries of other beta-gamma emitters per
year from 1988 to 1992. Over the same period , the reactor released airborne effluents containing an
annual average of about 660 curies of argon-41 and about 7 curies of tritium, well below the license
limits for the reactor. However, individual or collective doses are not reponed , and because site
meteorological data are not monitored , doses cannot be reliably estimated.
4.7.3 Spent Nuclear Fuel from Special Nuclear Power Plants
Three facilities house SNF from power reactors for which DOE has assumed responsibility.
Unlike the facilities discussed previOUSly, no additional SNF is either being generated at or being
transponed to these storage facilities. These facilities include the West Valley Demonstration Project,
in West Valley, New York; the former Fon St. Vrain Nuclear Power Plant in Colorado; and the
Babcock & Wilcox Research Center, Lynchburg, Virginia. Their environmental characterizations are
summarized in the following sections and presented in more detail in Appendix E.
4.7.3.1 West Valley Demonstration Project The West Valley Demonstration Project
occupies an 88-hectare (220-acre) site formerly housing the first United States commercial nuclear
fuel processing plant, within a larger 1,341-hectare (3,345-acre) site known as the Western New York
Nuclear Service Center. The Center is located in Cattaraugus County, a rural area of western New
York State, about 50 kilometers (31 miles) south of Buffalo . New York, and 40 kilometers (25 miles)
east of Lake Erie.
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A 6O-meter (200-foot) onsite meteorological tower is operated by DOE at the West Valley
Demonstration Project. A review of the West Valley Demonstration Project tower's 1992 data
indicates that the prevailing wind was from the south-southeast with a mean wind speed of 2.4 meters
per second (5.4 miles per hour). The precipitation for 1992 was 18 centimeters (7. 1 inches) above
the annual average of 104 centimeters (40.9 inches). The onsite 1992 wind data and National
Weather Service wind data collected at the Buffalo airport did not compare well, thereby indicating
that the Buffalo airport is not representative for predicting conditions at the West Valley
Demonstration Project.
The West Valley Demonstration Project is located within the Cattaraugus Highlands, which is
a transitional zone between the Appalachian Plateau Province and the Great Lakes Plain. No fold or
fault of any consequence is recognized within the site. The Clarendon-Linden structure is the closest
active "capable" earthquaJce- (fault-) producing feature known to exist in the region. It is
approximately 37 kilometers (23 miles) from the site. The site has experienced a moderate amount of
relatively minor seismic activity. During historical times, ground motion at the site probably has not
exceeded a Modified Mercalli Intensity of IV or a horizontal acceleration of 0.05g. It is estimated
that the maximum earthquaJce on the Clarendon-Linden structure would produce an earthquaJce of
Modified Mercalli Intensity of VI or VII and a maximum horizontal acceleration of approximately
0. 12g at the site.
The West Valley Demonstration Project is located in the Cattaraugus Creek drainage basin,
which is part of the Great LaJces - St. Lawrence watershed. AIl surface drainage from the West
Valley Demonstration Project is to Buttermilk Creek, which flows into Cattaraugus Creek and
ultimately into Lake Erie. The uppermost water-bearing unit underlying the West Valley
Demonstration Project is a hydrologically isolated part of the Cattaraugus Creele Aquifer System,
which has been designated a sole source aquifer by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. This
unit is included in the sole source designation due to its hydrologic similarity and proximity to the
producing Cattaraugus Creek Aquifer.

4.7.3.2 Fort St Vrain. The Fort SI. Vrain site is located in Weld County in northeastern
Colorado, approximately 5.6 kilometers (3.5 miles) northwest of the town of Platteville, 0.8 kilometer
(0.5 mile) west of the South Platte River, and 56 kilometers (35 miles) north of Denver. The
Fort St. Vrain site consists of 1, 132 hectares (2,798 acres). Based on the 1980 census, the
population within an 8-kilometer (5-mile) radius of the site was estimated to be 3,148, with 1,662
residing in the town of Platteville (USBC 1982). Most of the land in the immediate area of the site is
disturbed, agricultural land.
The general climate around the Fort St . Vrain site is generally mild. In this semi-arid region,
the precipitation averages 25 to 38 centimeters (10 to 15 inches) a year, mostly from thunderstorms in
late spring and summer. Northeastern Colorado has moderate thunderstorm activity. The region
typically experiences 5 tornadoes per year per 25,900 square kilometers (10,000 square miles), with
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peale tornado activity occurring during the month of June. A study of tornadoes in the area concluded
that 161-lcilometer-per hour- (IOO-mile-per-hour) winds should constitute maximum wind forces to be
expected at Fort St. Vrain.
The Fort St . Vrain site is located on the east flank of the Colorado Front Range, a complexly
faulted anticlinal arch. Numerous faults and smaller folds are superimposed on the arch and are
related to the uplift of the Front Range. The Fort SI. Vrain site bas not experienced any observed
earthquaJce activity. A field examination of the area produced no evidence of recent movement along
any of the known faults. The closest area of recent activity is about 40 kilometers (25 miles) south of
the site. The site is located in Seismic Zone I .
The nearest major surface water features to the Fort St. Vrain site are the South Platte River,
about 0.8 kilometer (0.5 mile) east of the site, and the St. Vrain Creele, about 1.2 kilometer
(0.75 mile) west of the site. Local surface water diversions from these rivers, which feed irrigation
ditches to support agriculture, are somewha: doser, about 0 .5 kilometer (0.33 mile) east and west of
the site and about 0.64 kilometer (0.4 mile) to the north of the site, and an irrigation ditch is located
0. 16 kilometer (0. 1 mile) to the south of the site.

4.7_3.3 Babcock & Wilcox R..e.n:h Center, Lynchburg. The Babcock & Wilcox
Research Center occupies a l.6-hectare (4-acre) fenced area within Babcock & Wilcox's 374-hectare
(925-acre) Mount Athos site. The research center is in Campbell County, Virginia, near the James
River, approximately 6 .5 kilometers (4 miles) east of the city of Lynchburg. The research facility
and the nearby city of Lynchburg are centrally located within the area of Amherst, Appomattox,
Bedford, and Campbell Counties. The combined population of these counties is about 180,000.
The climate of the Lynchburg area is influenced by cold and dry polar continental air masses
in the winter and warm and humid gulf maritime air masses in the summer. Rainfall amounts can be
expected to reach 102.4 centimeters (40.3 inches) in any given year. Severe weather is limited to
thunderstorms with a low probability of tornadoes. The mean number of thunderstorms occurring at
Lynchburg is approximately 22 per year. The probability of a tornado actually striking the site is
3.0 x 10-4 per year, with a recurrence interval of 3,333 years.
The land at the Babcock & Wilcox Research Center is characterized by scattered hills of
various dimensions lying eastward from the main chain of the Blue Ridge Mountains. The site is
located in a western part of the central Virginia cluster region, which is classified as Seismic Zone 2.
Approximately 121 earthquaJces with epicenters in Virginia have occurred during the last 236 years.
Two earthquaJces have been recorded with intensities sufficient to cause some damage, but these were
not in the area of the Center. EarthquaJces are not expected to cause serious damage to the
Lynchburg facilities nor result in release of hazardous materials.
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The James River is formed about 154 kilometers (96 miles) upstream of the site by the
confluence of the Jackson and Cowpasture Rivers. The James River flows generally south-southeast
from the Valley and Ridge Province to the Atlantic Ocean through the Hampton Roads and
Chesapeake Bay. The annual average flow rate of the James River at the plant is estimated to be
about 110 cubic meters per second (3,900 cubic feet per second) . The largest recent flood occurred
in November 1985 and had a flood stage of 163 meters (534 feet) above mean sea level at Lynchburg.
The groundwater elevation is between 134 and 140 meters (440 and 460 feet) above mean sea level ,
which is 3 meters (10 feet) below surface elevation at the annual average flow rate. Because of the
relative impermeability of the silt and clay topsoils, neither the water in surface soils nor river flood
water has a major effect on the groundwater supply or qUality.

5. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES
This chapter presents the potential environmental consequences of implementing each of the
alternatives described in Chapter 3. To focus on the most significant issues in the design of the SNF
Program, this chapter summarizes and simplifies the more detailed site-specific analyses of
environmental consequences presented under separate cover as self-contained appendices to Volume I.
The intent is to provide a collection of summary information across DOE sites, SNF interim storage
alternatives, and issue areas without recounting the detail of the separate appendices.
The Centralization alternative generally produces the greatest impacts, with somewhat smaller
impacts associated with the 1992/1993 Planning Basis and Regionalization alternatives. The
No Action alternative may appear to have the least impact in some of the categories analyzed, such as
transportation, but it also produces larger impacts in others, such as estimated radiation doses as the
result of accidents . In addition, the increased exposure of workers to radiation and the increased risks
of release of radioactive material to the environment with the continuing degradation of certain types
of DOE SNF are potential impacts that cannot be completely analyzed.
This chapter is organized into eight sections. The disciplines (topical areas) studied that result
in potential impacts, are of general public interest, or may help to discriminate among sites for
alternatives are discussed in Section 5. 1. In general, the consequences presented in Section 5. 1 relate
to socioeconomic impacts, electricity use, waste generation, and radiological and transportation
impacts. The disciplines that were studied that showed small impacts or clearly did not discriminate
among sites or alternatives are discussed in Section 5.2. Sections 5.3 through 5.8 address cumulative
impacts, unavoidable adverse environmental effects, the relationship between short-term use and
long-term productivity, irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources, potential mitigation
measures, and environmental justice, respectively.
The period covered in this EIS is the 40 years from 1995 to 2035. Detailed impact analyses
are performed for the time period from 1995 to 2005. Normal operation impacts at the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory are then projected for the remaining 30 years covered by this EIS .
The level of site-specific detail presented in Sections 5. 1 and 5.2 is commensurate with the size of the
SNF inventory and the number and types of sites where SNF would be stored. Therefore, the
analyses of the major DOE and naval sites are more detailed than the analyses for the other
generator/storage locations that would have limited inventories under the No Action and
Decentralization alternatives . There are five major DOE sites that are or may be responsible for
managing the great majority of SNF: Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,
Savannah River Site, Oalc Ridge Reservation, and Nevada Test Site. The DOE did not consider the
Nevada Test Site to be a preferred site for the management of SNF because of the State of Nevada's
current role as the host site for the Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project and the Nevada Test
Site's lack of SNF management facilities and high-level waste infrastructure. Minor sites are the
university and government reactor sites and the three facilities that store small quantities of SNF for
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which DOE has responsibility: West Valley Demonstration Project, Babcock & Wilcox Research
Center, Lynchburg, and Fort St. Vrain.

background discussion providing perspective for each discipline and a presentation of consequences
by alternative, discipline, and site.

For more detailed information on analyses of environmental impacts, and for a discussion of
the analyses supporting the consequences reported here, refer to the appropriate site-specific
appendix . These site-specific appendices, under separate cover, are organized as follows :

5.1.1 Background

Appendix

Focus of Appendix

A

Hanford Site

B

Idabo National Engineering Laboratory

C

Savannah River Site

D

Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program

E

Other Generator/Storage Locations

F

Nevada Test Site and Oak Ridge
Reservation

Appendix K presents site-specific data compiled from Appendices A through F that were used
in developing the discussion of environmental consequences. The summary tables in Appendix K
allow comparison .>f quantitative impacts (for example, increases or decreases in direct employment
resulting from implementation of an alternative) among sites.
Appendix L presents an evaluation of environmental justice considerations at each of the
alternative :;'es considered in this EIS . Environmental consideration and exposure pathways were
evaluated within a SO·kilometer (50·mile) radius surrounding each of 10 potential sites of proposed
activities. This SO-kilometer (50-mile) radius is in keeping with analysis conducted under the
National Environmental Policy Act regarding proposed DOE activities to identify environmental
impacts from proposed activities. This SO-kilometer (50-mile) radius represents the limit in which
any impacts are considered to be of any potential significante. Minority and low-income
communities surrounding each alternative site were identified through the use of a Geographical
Information System, based on 1990 U.S. Census data. Demographic maps are provided for each site
under consideration in Appendix L.

5.1 Environmental Consequences of Key Discriminator Disciplines
This section presents the environmental consequences of the alternatives, focusing on the key
discriminator disciplines-those that may differentiate among sites, have the potential for a more
significant impact, or are of general public interest. This section is organized in two parts: a
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The following discussion provides background and perspective for the environmental
consequences presented in Section 5 . 1.

5.1.1.1 Socioeconomics. Socioeconomic impacts are defmed in terms of direct and
secondary effects. Direct effects include changes in site employment and expenditures resulting from
SNF-related construction and operation. Secondary effects include cbanges that result from regional
p::rchases, nonpayroll expenditures, and payroll spending by site employees. For the major DOE
sites, existing projectio~ (regardless of SNF management decisions) indicate that jobs will be lost
during the next few years for all sites. Potential SNF management impacts onsite and regional
employment were considered in light of this trend.
For the sites considered, only minor increases in site employment over the declining job
baseline would result from SNF management; therefore, secondary effects were considered as a
lessening of the rate of job loss, without substantial impacts on associated regions. At the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory, the potential for appreciable job losses exists under certain
alternatives. These reductions would contribute to an overall regional decline. The reductions are
not anticipated to be significant, however, because they would occur over several years. For the
naval sites, the number of staff required to manage SNF management facilities would be
approximately less than I percent of site employment and less than 1/25 of I percent of regional
employment, so secondary impacts were also considered small in this analysis. For other
generator/storage locations, job creation was expected to be minimal even under the No Action
alternative where long-term management of SNF would be required should operating reactors be
required to shut down. The number of staff involved for long-term SNF management would be small
in relation to existing staffing levels at these reactors.
With employment as an indicator, small changes in population are anticipated, creating
minimal changes in demand on regional supporting infrastructures. The number of direct jobs that
would be created under each alternative as a result of SNF management activities was estimated for
each site. The employment graphs shown on Figures 5-1 through 5-9 (presented and discussed fully
with the alternatives) represent the 10-year average of the incremental change in direct employment
resulting from SNF management. Secondary effects. such as the need for additional housing and
improved community services are discussed if an impact is indicated . Details on the socioeconomic
impact analysis, as well as the baseline projections from which comparisons were made, are provided
in Appendices A through F. Employment increases and decreases that are presented in the text are
to-year averages rather than the actual maximum increase or decrease in any single year as presented
in Appendix A through F. Please see the specific site appendix for actual annual employment values.
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5.1.1.2 UtllltJe. (Electricity). New facilities (or the restarting of idle faciliti~) would
result in increased demands on water, power, and sewage. Water and sewage requirements are
considered minima] and are discussed in Section 5 .2.9. However, power consum~tion under some of
the alternatives would exceed existing capacity at cenain sites and this is discussed in more detail in
this section. Electricity requirements by site and by alternative vary significantly depending on
whether a site is processing or storing SNF. For example, at the Hanford Site, the annual increase in
power use from SNF management activities could vary from 0 megawatt-hours per year under the No
Action alternative when storing only, to a maximum of about 130,000 megawatt-hours per year under
the Centralization alternative when processing (Appendix K, Volume 1). In addition, the operation of
an expended core facility consumes approximately 10,000 megawatt-hours per year of electricity.
Therefore, the power requirements would be highest under alternatives where both processing and
operating an expended core facility occur simultaneously. The graphs of electricity use in Figures
5-1 through 5-9 show the maximum and minimum incremental change in power consumption that
would result from implementing the alternative. Current capacities and baseline usage of utilities and
energy from which comparisons are made are discussed in Appendices A through F of Volume 1.
5.1.1.3 "'ateria/. and Waste "'anagament There are few impacts on materials and
waste management activities except when SNF is processed. Stabilization of SNF, depending on the
technology, may yield high-level, transuranic, low-level, mixed, and hazardous wastes. The wastes
must usually be further treated to make them safe for transport, storage, or disposal. The capacity of
sites for additional storing of high-level and transuranic wastes is generally limited. Low-level wastes
are normally disposed of onsite at the major DOE facilities. Hazardous wastes are normally treated
in some way and then disposed of in approved disposal facilities onsite or offsite. A few categories
of mixed waste are being treated, but most are in storage awaiting development of treatment
capabilities. The graphs of waste generation in Figures 5-1 through 5-9 illustrate the estimated
annual average of low·level waste and high-level, transuranic, and mixed waste that each alternative
would generate between 1995 and 2005 . Site-specific details on materials and waste management and
the current status of waste management activities at the sites are discussed in Appendices A
through F.
5.1.1.4 Occupational and Public Health and Safety.
Radiation Effect.-Radiation exposure and its consequences are topics of interest to
the general public near nuclear facilities. Therefore, this EIS places more emphasis on the
consequences of exposure to radiation than on other topics, even though the effects of radiation
exposure under most of the circumstances evaluated in this EIS are small. This subsection explains
basic concepts used in the evaluation of radiation effects to provide the background for later
discussions of impacts.

The effects on people of radiation that is emitted during disintegration (decay) of a radioactive
substance depends on the kind of radiation (alpha and beta particles, and gamma and x-rays) and the
VOLlIME I

total amount of radiation energy absorbed by the body. The total energy absorbed per unit quantity
of tissue is referred to as absorbed dose. The absorbed dose, when multiplied by cenain quality
factors and factors that take into account different sensitivities of various tissues, is referred to as
effective dose equivalent, or where the context is clear, simply dose. The common unit of effective
dose equivalent is the rem (1 rem equals 1,000 millirem).
An individual may be exposed to ionizing radiation externally, from a radioactive source
outside the body, andlor internally, from ingesting or inhaling radioactive material . The external
dose is different from the internal dose. An external dose is delivered only during the actual time of
exposure to the external radiation source. An internal dose, however, continues to be delivered as
long as the radioactive material remains in the body, although both radioactive decay and elimination
of the radionuclide by ordinary metabolic processes decrease the dose rate with the passage of time.
The dose from internal exposure is calculated over 50 years following the initial exposure.
The maximum annual allowable radiation dose to an individual of the public from
DOE-()perated nuclear facilities is 0. 1 rem (100 millirem) per year (DOE Order 5400.5)
(DOE 1993b). All DOE and naval facilities covered by this EIS operate well below this limit (see
Chapter 4). It is estimated that the average individual in the United States receives a dose of about
0.3 rem (300 millirem) per year from natural sources of radiation. For perspective, a modem chest
x-ray results in an approximate dose of 0.008 rem (8 millirem), while a diagnostic hip x-ray results
in an approximate dose of 0.083 rem (83 millirem). A person must receive an acute (short-term)
dose of approximately 600 rem (600,000 millirem) before there is a high probability of near-term
death (NAS/NRC 1990).
Radiation can also cause a variety of ill-health effects in people. The most significant
ill-health effect to depict the consequences of environmental and occupational radiation exposures is
the induction of latent cancer fatalities . This effect is referred to as latent cancer fatalities because the
cancer may take many years to develop and for death to occur.
The collective (or population) dose to an exposed population is calculated by summing the
estimated doses received by each member of the exposed population. This total dose received by the
exposed population is measured in person·rem. For example, if 1,000 people each received a dose of
0.001 rem (I millirem), the collective dose is 1,000 persons x 0.001 rem (I millirem) =
I person-rem. Alternatively, the same collective dose (I person-rem) results from 500 people e3ch of
whom received a dose of 0.002 rem (2 millirem) (500 persons x 0.002 rem = I person-rem).
The factor that this EIS uses to relate a dose to its effect is 0.0004 latent cancer fatalities per
person-rem for workers and 0.0005 latent cancer fatalities per person-rem for individuals among the
general population. The latter factor is slightly higher because of the presence of individuals in the
general public that may be more sensitive to radiation than workers (for example, infants) .
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These concepts may be applied to estimate the effects of exposing a population to radiation.
For example, in a population of 100,000 people exposed only to background radiation [0.3 rem
(300 millirem) per year) , IS latent cancer fatalities per year would be inferred to be caused by the
radiation [100,000 persons x 0.3 rem (300 millirem) per year x O.OOOS latent cancer fatalities per
person-rem = IS latent cancer fatalities per year).
Sometimes, calculations of the number of latent cancer fatalities associated with radiation
exposure do not yield whole numbers, and, especially in environmental applications, may yield
numbers less than 1.0. For example, if a population of 100,000 were exposed as above, but to a
total dose per individual of only 0 .001 rem (I millirem), the collective dose would be 100
person-rem, and the corresponding estimated number of latent cancer fatalities would be O.OS
[100,000 persons x 0.001 rem (I millirem) x O.OOOS latent cancer fatalities/person-rem = O.OS
latent fatal cancers).
How should one interpret a noninteger number of latent cancer fatalities , such as 0.OS7 The
answer is to interpret the result as a statistical estimate. That is, O.OS is the average number of
deaths that would be expected if the same exposure situation were applied to many different groups of
100,000 people. In most groups, nobody (0 people) would incur a latent cancer fatality from the
0.001 rem (I millirem) dose each member would have received. In a small fraction of the groups,
I latent fatal cancer would result; in exceptionally few groups, 2 or more latent fatal cancers would
occur. The average number of deaths over all the groups would be O.OS latent fatal cancers Gust as
the average of 0,0,0, and I is 'A , or 0.2S). The most likely outcome is 0 latent cancer fatalities .
These same concepts apply to estimating the effects of radiation exposure on a single
individual . Consider the effects, for example, of exposure to background radiation over a lifetime.
The "number of latent cancer fatal ities" correspond ing to a single individual's exposure over a
(presumed) n -year lifet ime to 0.3 rem (300 millirem) per year is the following :
I person x 0.3 rem (300 millirem)/year x 72 years
fatal ities/person-rem = O.ot I latent cancer fatalities .

x O.OOOS latent cancer

Again, this should be interpreted in a statistical sense; that is, the estimated effect of background
radiatio n exposure on the exposed individual would produce a 1.1-percent chance that the individual
might incur a latent fatal cancer caused by the exposure. Said another way, about 1. 1 percent of the
population is estimated to die of cancers induced by the radiation background.
The dose· to-risk conversion factors presented above and used in this EIS to relate radiation
exposures to latent cancer fatalities are based on the "1990 Recommendations of the International
Commission on Radiatio n Protection" (ICRP 1991 ). These conversion factors are consistent with
those used by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission in its rulemaJeing "Standards for Protection
Against Radiation" (FR 199 1). In developing these conversion factors, the International Commission
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on Radiological Protection reviewed many studies, including Health Effects of Exposure to Low Levels
of Ionizing Radiation (BEIR V) and Sources, Effects and Risks of IOnizing Radiation. These
conversion factors represent the best-available estimates for relating a dose to its effect; most other
conversion factors fall within the range of uncertainty associated with the conversion factors that are
discussed in NAS/NRC (1990). The conversion factors apply where the dose to an individual is less
than 20 rem (20,000 millirem) and the dose rate is less than 10 rem (10,000 millirem) per hour. At
doses greater than 20 rem (20,000 millirem), the conversion factors used to relate radiation doses to
latent cancer fatalities are doubled. At much higher doses, prompt effects, rather than latent cancer
fatalities, may be the primary concern. Unusual accident situations that may result in high radiation
doses to individuals are considered special cases.
In add ition to latent cancer fatalities, other health effects could result from environmental and
occupational exposures to rad iation. These effects include nonfatal cancers among the exposed
population and genetic effects in subsequent generations. Table S-I shows the dose-to-effect factors
for these potential effects, as well as for latent cancer fatalities. For clarity and to allow ready
comparison with health impacts from other sources, such as those from chemical carcinogens, this
EIS presents estimated effects of radiation only in terms of latent cancer fatalities . The nonfatal
cancers and genetic effects are less probable consequences of radiation exposure. Estimates of the
total detriment (fatal cancers, nonfatal cancers, and genetic effects) due to rad iation exposure may be
obtained from the estimates of latent cancer fatalities presented in this EIS by multiplying by 1.4 for
workers and by 1.46 for the general pUblic.

Table 5-1. Risk of latent cancer fatalities and other health effects from exposure to radiation. o.b
PopulationC

Latent cancer
fatality

Nonfatal cancer

Genetic effects

Total detriment

Workers

0.0004

0.00008

0.00008

0.OOOS6

General public

O.OOOS

0.0001

0.00013

0.00073

a. When applied to an individual , un its are lifetime probability of latent cancer fatalities per rem
(or 1,000 millirem) of radiation dose. When applied to a population of individuals, units are
excess number of cancers per person-rem of radiation dose. Genetic effects as used here apply to
populations, not individuals .
b. Source: ICRP (1991 ).
c. The difference between the worker risk and the general public risk is attributable to the fact that
the general population includes more individuals in sensitive age groups (that is, less than 18 years
of age and over 6S years of age).

Hi

155

S-7

/51.0

VOLUME I

During SNF handling and transportation, the principal radiation hazard is the direct radiation
emitting from the SNF. In comparison, the hazard from release of radioactive fission products (gases
and paniculates) from within the solid SNF is small. Without adequate shielding, the radiation levels
at the surface of the SNF are often high enough to induce a prompt fatality. Fortunately, this
rad iation is easily attenuated or stopped with the insenion of Shielding materials such as lead, steel,
or water between the SNF and the worker. Because rad iation intensity decreases with distance,
maintaining a distance of a few hundred meters also offers adequate protection from the radiation
from unshielded SNF. For example, 10 CFR 71 requires sufficient shielding on shipping casks to
reduce radiation levels at 2 meters (7 feet) from the cask to 0.01 rem (10 millirem) per hour or less.
At 100 meters (328 feet), the distance effect would reduce this 0.01 rem (10 millirem) per hour by a
factor of about 2,500, which would not be detectable.
During SNF interim storage, trace quantities of radioactive isotopes (principally gases and
paniculate fission products) may also be released to the environment from severely corroded SNF.
These releases would result in small doses to the workers in the immediate vicinity of the SNF and,
through atmospheric dispersion and groundwater pathways, would ultimately result in very small
doses to members of the nearby general population.
Accidents involving SNF can also result in radiation releases and exposures. For most
accidents, a very small fraction of the radioactive material within the SNF is released. This is
because the SNF is in a solid form and the radioactive elements are intermingled within the solid
SNF. Significant quantities of these radioactive elements can be released only when the accident
generates enough energy to break up or cause panicles of SNF to be released to the atmosphere. For
most accidents, the energy is not high enough to cause much damage to the SNF and a small fraction
of the radioacti ve material is released.
One type of accident, an accidental nuclear criticality (uncontrolled chain reaction), can
release large quantities of direct radiation, as well as fission products and heat. Within a few tens of
meters of the incidents, doses from direct radiation can be fatal. Funher away, doses are principally
from the released fission product gases and paniculates. This type of accident is well understood and
is easily prevented when handling solid materials such as SNF.
Risk-Another concept important to the presentation of results in this EIS is the
concept of riSK. RiSK is most imponant when presenting accident analysis results. The chance that
an accident might occur during the conduct of an operation is called the probability of occurrence.
An event that is certain to occur has a probability of I (as in 100 percent certainty). The probability
of occurrence of an accident is less than one because accidents, by definition, are not cenain to
occur. If an accident is expected to happen once every 5 years, the frequency (and probability) of
occurrence is 0.2 per year (I occurrence + 5 years = 0.2 occurrences per year).
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Once the frequency (occurrences per year) and the consequences (for radiation effects,
measured in terms of the number of latent cancer fatalities caused by the radiation exposure) of an
accident are known, the riSK can be determined. The risk per year is the product of the annual
frequency of occurrence times the number of latent cancer fatalities . This annual risk expresses the
expected number of latent cancer fatalities per year, taking account of both the annual chance that an
accident might occur and the estimated consequences if it does occur.
For example, if the frequency of an accident were 0.2 occurrences per year and the number
of latent cancer fatalities resulting from the accident were 0.05, the risk would be 0.01 latent cancer
fatalities per year (0.2 occurrences per year x 0.05 latent cancer fatalities per occurrence =
0.01 latent cancer fatalities per year). Another way to express this ri~k (0.01 latent cancer fatalities
per year) is to note that if the operation subject to the accident continued for 100 years, one latent
cancer fatality would be likely to occur because of accidents during that period. This is equivalent to
I chance in 100 that a single latent cancer fatality would be caused by the accident sourCe for each
year of operation.
A frame of reference for the risks from accidents associated with SNF management
alternatives can be developed in the same way. For an average resident in the vicinity of the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory, the risk of a latent cancer fatality caused by the water draining
from the Expended Core Facility after a large eanhquake would be approximately 1.7 x 10.7 per
year (see Chapter 5 of Appendix D). This risk can be compared with the lifetime risks of death from
other accidental causes to gain a perspective. For example, the risk of dying from a motor vehicle
accident is about 1 in 80. Similarly, the risk of death for the average American from fires is
approximately I in 500, and for death from accidental poisoning, the risk is about 1 in 1,000 (NNPP
1993). These comparisons are not meant to imply that risks of a latent canCer fatality caused by
DOE operations are trivial, only to shew how they compare with other, more COmmon risks.
Radiological risks to the general public from DOE operations are considered to be involuntary risks,
as opposed to voluntary risks such as operating a motor vehicle.
Radiological Accidents-Activities associated with transponing, receiving,
handling, processing, and storing SNF involve substantial quantities of radioactive materials and
limited quantities of toxic chemicals. Either routine SNF operations or accidents involving either
radioactive materials or toxic chemicals can result in exposure to workers or members of the public,
or contamination of the surrounding environment.

A number of existing accident analyses were evaluated to find a small group with relatively
severe consequences or risks. These accidents included events such as small fires; severe accidents
that a facility is designed to withstand; and beyond-design-basis events, which a facility is not
designed to withstand. These accidents included those initiated by internal events, such as operational
errors; those initiated by natural external phenomena, such as floods, tornados, and eanhquakes; and
those initiated by human-influenced external events, such as aircraft crashes and nearby explosions or
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toxic material releases. The accidents evaluated included those with an estimated probability ranging
from I chance in 1,000,000 to I chance in 10,000,000 per year.
Appendices A through F summarize the possible accidents involving SNF operations at each
of the sites and evaluate the potential consequences of the accidents that present the highest risk, in
terms of estimated frequency of occurrence multiplied by consequences, to the workers and the
general public. As might be expected , the highest consequences, though frequently not the highest
risk, were often found to be associated with the accidents with the lowest probabilities.
The accidents selected, the amount of radioactive and toxic materials released under the
accident conditions, and the estimated probabilities were based on existing safety analyses for the
SNF-related operations at each site, or for comparable operations at other sites. The accident
evaluations also considered the 40 to SO years of operational experience with SNF at the sites.
Accident consequences were analyzed utilizing radioactive and toxic material release estimates
for each accident. The downwind concentrations of materials released in accidents were then
calculated for a range of potential receptor locations and potential doses to individuals or people at
those locations evaluated. Doses were evaluated for (a) an individual 100 meters (328 feet)
downwind of the facility location where the release occurs, (b) a hypothetical resident at the site
boundary nearest to the facility where the release occurs (called the maximally exposed offsite
individual), and (c) the general population within 80 kilometers (SO miles) of the release location.
The potential impacts to workers in the immediate vicinity of the accident were analyzed
qualitatively .
Dispersion in air from the release site was estimated with both typical (50th percentile) and
unlikely (95th percentile) meteorological conditions. The unlikely weather conditions represent those
that would result in high air concentrations of the material released, elevating the exposure of affected
individuals. Concentrations and human exposures are lower than these values 95 percent of the time.
Dispersion was calculated using the GENII computer code (Napier et al . 1988) for all sites except
Savannab River Site, for which the site-specific AXA[R89Q code was used (including 95 percent
meteorologic conditions). Although the modeling for the Savannah River Site was performed using a
different code, that code has been validated and shown to be consistent with the GENII code and
conservative in its model results . The dispersion of nonradioactive materials was modeled using
EP[code (Homann 1988).
Nonradl%gica/ Accidents-Accidents with nonradiological effects include
industrial hazards fro m construction and normal operation. Accidents that may affect occupational or
public health were evaluated for each of the alternatives at each of the potentially affected sites and
facility locations . The maximum reasonably foreseeable accidents include chemical spills, fires, and
worker accidents . The accidents estimated to exceed the most widely accepted accident exposure
(toxicological) guidelines, such as the Emergency Response Planning Guideline-3 and the Threshold
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Limit Value of the American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists, are summarized in
Section 5. 1, Volume I. Exceeding these concentrations would result in an unacceptable likelihood
that the worker or public would experience or develop life-threatening or very serious toxicological
effects . The analysis methodologies and the accident descriptions are discussed in Appendices A
through F.
Industrial accidents that do not involve the release of chemicals could occur at each of the
existing or proposed storage and generation locations during the transition/construction phase at
approximately current rates. Construction accidents would primarily occur during the construction
period (estimated to be approximately 8 years under the Centralization alternative). Construction
fatali ties are estimated to be approximately one per year at the centralized site for the Centralization
alternative only. After the SNF is transported to the centralized facility, normal operations would not
be expected to be fatal accident-free, but fatal accident frequency is estimated to be less than one
accident per year. The sites that are not selected for the centralized facilities would be expected to
have less than one fatal accident per year throughout the SNF interim management period.
5.1.1.5 Transportation. In this E[S, one of the ways that may be used to discriminate
between alternatives is through the transportation impacts associated with each alternative. Some
alternatives, such as the No Action alternative, would involve limited transportation of SNF and have
few transportation impacts; while other alternatives, such as the Centralization options, would involve
extensive transportation of SNF and have greater transportation impacts.

SNF is transported in large, heavy containers called shipping casks. Shipping casks must
meet stringent Federal standards and are designed and constructed to contain the radioactivity in SNF
during severe transportation accidents. There are also standards that describe the routing
requirements for SNF sbipments. Because of the stringent standards for SNF shipping casks, the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has estimated that shipping casks will withstand 99.4 percent of
truck and rail accidents without sustaining damage sufficient to breach the shipping cask. Only in the
worst physically conceivable conditions, which are clearly of low probability, can the shipping cask
be so damaged that there is a significant release of radioactivity to the environment.
Transportation impacts may be divided into two parts : (1) the impacts due to incident-free
transportation and (2) the impacts due to transportation accidents. For incident-free transportation
and transportation accidents, impacts may be further divided into two parts: (I) nonradiological
impacts and (2) radiological impacts. The nonradiological impacts are composed of the vehicular
impacts of transportation, such as vehicular emissions and traffic accidents, and are not related to the
radioactivity present in the shipments.
In contrast to the nonradiological impacts, the radiological impacts are due to the radioactivity
present in SNF shipments . [n the case of incident-free transportation, the radiological impacts result
from the rad iation field that surrounds the SNF shipping cask. These impacts are estimated for
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workers and the general population along the transportation route. In the case of transportation
accidents, the radiological impacts would result from the radioactivity released from the SNF shipping
cask during an accident. These impacts are also estimated for the general population along the
transportation route.
This EIS evaluated a full range of transportation accidents, up to and including accidents with
very low probability, estimated to be on the order of one in I million years. In addition, the
consequences of severe transportation accidents were evaluated . The probability of these severe
accidents was estimated to be on the order of one in 10 million years.
For both incident-free transportation and transportation accidents, methodology developed by
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission was used to estimate impacts. These impacts were
quantified in terms of the estimated number of radiation-related cancer fatalities and the estimated
number of nonradiological fatalities from vehicular emissions and traffic accidents associated with
each alternative. Appendices A, B, C, D, F, and I contain more details on the methodology, data,
and assumptions used to develop these estimates.
5.1.1.6 UncertJllntles end Conservetlsm. The calculations in this EIS have generally
been performed in such a way that the estimates of risk provided are unlikely to be exceeded during
either normal operations or in the event of an accident. For routine operations, the results of
monitoring actual operations provide realistic estimates of source terms, which when combined with
conservative estimates of the effects of radiation, produce estimates of risk that are very unlikely to
be exceeded. The effects for all alternatives have been calculated using the same source terms and
other factors, so this EIS provides an appropriate means of comparing potential impacts on human
health and the environment.

The analyses of hypothetical accidents are based on the calculations that in tum must be based
on sequences of events and models of effects that have not occurred. The models have attempted to
provide estimates of the probabilities, source terms, pathways for dispersion and exposure, and the
effects on human health and the environment that are as realistic as possible. In many cases, the
probability of the accidents postulated is very low and little experience is available; thus, the
consequences are uncertain . This has required the use of models or values for input that produce
estimates of consequences and risks that are higher ti,an would actually occur because of the desire to
provide results that will not be exceeded.
All the alternatives have been evaluated using the same methods and data, allowing a fair
comparison of all the alternatives on the same basis. It should be observed that, even using these
conservative analytical methods, the risks associated with implementing any of the alternatives are
small.
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5.1.2 No Action Alternative
Under the No Action alternative, minimal actions would be taken for safe and secure
management of SNF. SNF would not be transponed to or from DOE facilities after a transition
period, and facility upgrades or replacements and onsite fuel movements at DOE sites would be
limited. Existing research and development activities at DOE sites would continue, but no new
projects would be initiated. Naval SNF would be stored at naval sites at or near the point of
refueling or defueling without examination at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. SNF from
smaller DOE sites and university and other Government reactors would be stored at those reactors,
and the special-case commercial fuels would remain at their current location. No foreign research
reactor fuels would be accepted .
If this alternative were implemented, the Expended Core Facility at the Idabo National
Engineering Laboratory would be shut down, the naval sites would store SNF in transpon casks at
naval sites, and the smaller DOE and university and other Government reactcr sites would store the
SNF they generate onsite. After a period of time, some smaller reactors would shut down to avoid
the expense of building storage facilities, and the spent fuel would be stored in the reactcr vessel.
In reviewing the impacts of the No Action alternative, it should be recognized that the
consequences summarized in Figure 5-1 only approximately represent the consequences of this
alternative. These consequences fall within four categories that may apply to one or more sites:
increasing the potential for higher radiation exposures because of degrading fuels, increasing the
potential for higher radiation exposures because of the location of SNF in or near major population
centers, causing a potential loss of employment because research reactcrs would be shut down, and
postponing the generation of wastes associated with research and convening SNF to a form acceptable
for disposition. These issues are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Because there would be minimal actions taken to stabilize fuel under the No Action
alternative, the frequency of an SNF-related radiation accident could increase as the stored fuels
deteriorate with time. The lack of structural integrity of the fuel in some instances could result in an
increase in handling-related accidents. In addition, releases from stored fuels could increase,
increasing population doses, as the number of cladding failures increase. While the DOE is
committed under the No Action alternative to ensure safe and secure management of SNF, future
deterioration of fuels and facilities may increase accident risks over current risk estimates .
Under this alternative, DOE-managed SNF would be stored in over 50 locations around the
country, many of which are in areas of relatively high population density. While the risk of exposure
would be small for this alternative as with other alternatives, and the worst consequence accident is
expected to be associated with one of the major DOE sites, the potential consequence of accidents
could be greater because of the proximity of a larger population at many of the potential storage sites.
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The employment associated with SNF management at other generator/storage locations would
be higher under this alternative than others because economies of scale would not be achievable with
storage facilities being distributed among more than 50 sites. At the same time, however, nonSNF-related employment would decrease because of SNF management-related concerns. Several
hundred reactor operations and research jobs could be lost if research reactors were forced to close
because of the inability to store SNF onsite. This job loss is not represented in the SNF management
employment consequences presented in Section 5.1.2.1.
Under the No Action alternative, no new research would be initiated on appropriate
technologies for converting fuels to an acceptable form for ultimate disposition and no new facilities
would be built over the next 40 years for that purpose. Because this research was not initiated,
potential adverse environmental impacts associated with research activities were not assessed under
the No Action alternative. The lack of adverse environmental impacts malces the No Action
alternative appear to be more environmentally acceptable than the other alternatives, when in fact the
adverse impacts cannot be assessed until the research projects are planned.
The sites that would be affected by the No Action alternative are the Hanford Site, Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory, Savannah River Site, naval sites, and other generator/storage
locations. The environmental consequences at these sites are described below.
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Figure 5-1. Summary of impacts for the No Action alternative. (lbe maximum incremental change
from baseline is illustrated in graphs. Input data are summarized in Appendix K.)
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5.1.2.1 Socioeconomics. As shown in Figure 5-1, the graph of the maximum incremental
change in employment from SNF management activities for the major DOE sites, except the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory, indicates there would be little socioeconomic impact associated with
the No Action alternative between 1995 and 2005. Implementation of the No Action alternative
would result in the shutdown of the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory, resulting in the loss of approximately 500 permanent jobs from a region with a relatively
low population and few jobs. Closure of the Expended Core Facility would initially result in an
increase in direct employment at the facility by 50 jobs over 3 years to bandle the transport of
containers, but then the 500-person work force would decrease to a caretaker work force of 10 (see
Appendix 0 , Volume I). This results in the loss of an average of approximately 240 jobs over the
10-year perind or 3 percent of the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory's work force, as shown in
Figure 5-1. At the Hanford and Savannah River Sites, there would either be no change or less than a
I percent increase in direct employment, respectively, from implementing the No Action alternative.
The peak employment would be 50 add itional workers at the Savannah River Site, approximately
0.3 percent of the 1995 baseline.

Naval sites would require very few additional workers to secure the naval SNF in storage and
monitor its condition. The' incremental labor required for SNF management at the naval sites would
be drawn from the existing work force and would be insignificant with respect to current employment
levels at those sites. At the university and other Government reactors, there would be ,a need for
security and maintenance personnel for reactors that would shut down. While th i:; would not be an
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increase in employment at those sites because the staff required to run the reactors would no longer
be required, it would be an increase in the staff that would be involved directly in SNF management.
Across all sites, there would be a decrease in employment of less than 0. 1 percent of the total
worlcforce. Therefore, implementation of the No Action alternative would have no socioeconomic
effect on a nationwide scale.
5.1.2.2 UtIlities (Electricity). Figure 5-1 illustrates the maximum incremental power use
with the No Action alternative in terms of percentage increase or decrease over baseline site use. For
each of the sites, this change is very small and easily accommodated. Ongoing SNF operations are
included in the baseline electric power usage, and the proposed actions under the No Action
alternative are not power-intensive. At the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, the shutdown of
the Expended Core Facility would result in about a 5 percent reduction in electric power consumption
below existing site usage. At naval and other generator/storage locations, there would be no
discernable increase in power consumption over baseline use.
5.1.2.3 Mllterilllsllnd Wllste Mllnagement Figure 5-1 illustrates the annual average
volume of high-level, transuranic, and mixed wastes and low-level waste that would be generated
from SNF management over the next 10 years under the No Action alternative. Day-to.<Jay SNF
management and storage activities would annually generate approximately 20 cubic meters per year
(26 cubic yards per year) of transuranic wastes and approximately 400 cubic meters per year
(520 cubic yards per year) of low-level waste at the Savannah River Site. These volumes would be
generated by activities required to safely store SNF, including the onsite consolidation of existing
fuels and refurbishment of existing SNF storage pools . No high-level waste would be generated at
any of the sites under the No Action a1ternath " and very small levels of all wastes would be
generated by the Hanford Site and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.

At the naval sites, implementation of the No Action alternative would result in the production
of limited amounts of solid municipal wastes and low-level radioactive waste. Wastes produced from
the storage of naval SNF would be controlled and managed in accordance with existing site
management programs. These small amounts of waste are shown as zero :~ Figure 5-1.
5.1.2.4 Radio/ogicllllmpllcts. For the No Action alternative, the radiological impacts
from normal operations and accident risks are expected to be small at each of the major DOE and
naval sites that handle and store SNF. Radiological impacts from normal operations and accidents are
discussed by site below .
Rlldio/oglcllllmpacts From Normlll Openttlon_The airborne releases from the
SNF interim storage pools at the Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and Savannah
River Site were estimated to resul t in low-level exposures to the population in the vicinity of the site
with no additional latent cancers within that population expected . For naval sites, there would be no
airborne releases; direct radiation is the onl y mechanism of exposure associated with the dry SNF
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interim storage technologies that would be used under this alternative. The estimated annual latent
cancer fatalities for the general population are illustrated in Figure 5-1.
Radlologlcllllmpacts From AccIdent.-

Hanrord Site. Under the No Action alternative, a wide range of accident scenarios
was considered, including accidents initiated by operational events, external hazards such as aircraft
crashes, and natural phenomena such as earthquakes. The highest risle SNF-related accidents
identified in Section 5. 15 of Appendix A are a liquid metal (sodium) fire in the Fast Flux Test
Facility fuel storage area (highest to general population) and a spent fuel casle drop at the 10S-K
Basi n (highest to workers). Major seismically induced accidents were also identified in buildings
containing SNF (324 Building and 325 Building). Releases from these buildings were associated with
materials other than SNF and therefore are not discussed bere. Aircraft-crasb initiated accidents were
not considered to be reasonably foreseeable because of their very low frequency.
For both of the SNF-related accidents identified, the probahilities of occurrence are estimated
to be less than one chance in 10,000 per year of operation. The estimated population doses, using
very conservative meteorology and assuming no protective action, for the Fast Flux Test Facility
sodium fire accident corresponds to an estimated 37 latent cancer fatalities in the general population
within 80 kilometers (SO miles). The estimated risle per year, talcing into account the probability of
occurrence of this accident, is less than 3.7 x 10.3 potential latent cancer fatalities in the general
population.
Th ' potential dose to the maximally exposed offsite individual t:lrresponds to an estimated
probability o)f a latent cancer fatality of 2.5 x 104 for the Fast Flux Test Facility sodium fire.
Emergency actions would likely reduce the actual exposures to any offsite individuals.
A,., onsite worker at the maximum exposure locatioll downwind of the spent fuel cask drop is
estimated to receive doses that correspond to an estimated probability of a latent cancer fatality of
1.4 x 10.3 . The estimated risk for a worker is 1.4 X 10.7 latent cancer fatalities per year.
Workers (up to 12) in the immediate vicinity of the cask drop accident could receive doses on
the order of 70 to 140 rem (70,000 to 140,000 millirem). Acute doses of this magnitude are in the
lower end of the range of doses that might produce symptoms of acute rad iation syndrome in humans.
For that accident, workers could be near the cask when it drops and receive direct rad iation and
inhale airborne fi ssion products .
Potential secondary impacts identified for the Fast Flux Test Facility liquid metal fi re
(Table 5. 15-2 of Appendix A) include temporary closure of the Hanford Reach of the Columbia River
to boat traffic , temporary restriction of water use locally, possible loss of crops, environmental
contamination in the vicinity of the facility and near .offsite environs , potential restriction on land use
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for agriculture, temporary restriction on fishing access, and cleanup costs. The secondary impacts
associated with the K Basin cask drop would be somewhat lower but similar in nature.
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Under the No Action alternative, a wide
range of accident scenarios were also considered, including accidents initiated by operational events,
external hazards such as aircraft crashes, and natural phenomena such as earthquakes. A number of
SNF-related accidents are identified in Section 5. 15 of Appendix B.
The highest risk to the general population is associated with the melting of a small number of
assemblies as a result of a major earthquake and hot cell breach at the Hot Fuel Examination Facility .
The estimated probability of this accident is about I chance in 100,000 per year of operation.
General population consequences are estimated to be approximately 7 latent cancer fatalities, with an
estimated risk of a latent cancer fatality of 7.0 x 10.5 latent cancer fatalities per year.
The highest risk to workers is an inadvertent nuclear criticality in the Idaho Chemical
Processing Plant CPP.ffl3 Underwater Fuel Storage Facility, which has an estimated probability of
I chance in 1,000 per year of operation. The estimated probability of a latent cancer fatality in a
worker approximately 100 meters (about 330 feet) downwind of the accident would be 3.9 x 10-5.
The estimated risk for a worker is 4.0 x 10-1 latent cancer fatalities per year.
If workers were in the immediate vicinity, doses under some circumstances could be very
high but are not likely to be fatal immediately. In the criticality accident, the criticality would occur
under approximately 6 .1 meters (20 feet) of water. Shielding by the water would be sufficient to
prevent exposure of nearby workers. Expulsion of a cone of water above the criticality might lead to
significant exposure to any workers who were directly above the location of the criticality.
Fuel-handling accidents have the highest estimated frequency of occurrence at 1.0 x 10-2 per
year, but because of their lower consequences, fuel -handling accidents do not represent the highest
risk accidents under the No Action alternative. The frequency of fuel-handling accidents is directly
related to the amount of fuel handled and the annual number of SNF shipments projected under the
alternative.
Potential secondary impacts identified (Table 5.15-8 of Appendix B) for the criticality
aCCIdent at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant are limited adverse effects to vegetation or wildlife
and local contamination requ iring cleanup around the accident site. More extensive contamination
and impacts are expected should a cell breach occur at the Hot Fuels Examination Facility.
Additional secondary impacts identified include the potential for a I-year restriction in agricultural
use of up to 10,000 acres on and off the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory site, the potential
interd iction of affected agricultural products on nearby lands, and the potential for temporary
restricted access to affected public land (less than 10,000 acres).
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The Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would be shut
down after a transition period of approximately 3 years. Potential accidents during this period are
presented in Attachment F of Appendix D under the subheading of the Decentralization alternative.
Savannah River Site. Under the No Action alternative, a wide range of accident
types and accident initiators were considered for the existing SNF wet storage activities, including
accidents initiated hy operational events, external hazards such as aircraft crashes, and natural
phenomena such as earthquakes. Five types of SNF-related accidents are identified in Section 5.15
and Attachment A of Appendix C. These include (a) a fuel assembly breach because of dropping,
objects falling onto the assembly, or accidental cutting into the fuel part of an assembly, (b) an
inadvertent nuclear criticality in an SNF interim storage pool, (c) a fire and explosion in an adjacent
facility, and (d) spills of contaminated storage pool water either within the storage facility or to the
ground outside of the facility . The initiators for these accidents include both operational events and
natural phenomena such as earthquakes. Aircraft-crash-initiated accidents were not considered to be
reasonably foreseeable because of their very low frequency.
The highest risk accident, both to the general population and workers, was identified as the
fuel assembly breach accident with an estimated frequency of 0. 16 per year. The estimated
population dose for this accident corresponds to 8.5 x 10-3 latent cancer fatalities in the general
population within 80 kilometers (50 miles). The estimated risk, taking into account the probability of
occurrence of this accident, is 1.4 x 10-3 latent cancer fatalities per year. The estimated dose to the
maximally exposed offsite individual corresponds to an estimated probability of a latent cancer fatality
of 1.6 x 10-7 per year.
A co-located worker downwind of the accident is estimated to receive a dose that corresponds
to an estimated probability of 4.8 x 10-li latent cancer fatalities . The estimated risk for a worker is
7.7 x 10-7 latent cancer fatalities per year.
Based on past experience at the Savannah River Site (two fuel cuttinglbreach accidents have
occurred in the Recei vi ng Basin for Offsite Fuels), no fatalities nor high exposures to facility workers
are expected for this type of accident. This type of accident would likely occur with the assembly
under 0.3 to 6 meters (I to 20 feet) of water and result in small amounts of fuel and fission products
being released to the pool water. The shielding effects of the pool water would attenuate most of the
radiation released, but the noble gases released would rise to the surface of the water and enter the
room atmosphere, causing a direct radiation exposure to workers in the area. Upon releases into the
room's atmosphere, radiation alarms would sound requiring evacuation of nearby workers. Timely
evacuation would likely prevent substantial radiation exposure.
Potential secondary impacts identified for the SNF-related accidents (Table 5-25 of
Appendix C) are land contamination around the site of the accident, with minor contamination outside
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of the immediate facility area. This would not likely require cleanup of more than 4 hectares
(10 acres).
Naval Facilities. Under the No Action alternative, newly generated SNF would be
stored at naval sites, which differs from the historical practice of SNF management at the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory. The naval sites are generally located in densely populated areas.
As a result, the consequences of an accident involving naval SNF at a naval site would be higher than
the same accident at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory .
After a limited transition period, naval SNF would be stored dry in shipping containers at
Puget Sound , Pearl Harbor, Norfolk, and Portsmouth Naval Shipyards and the Kesselring Site. A
review of a wide range of potential accidents (see Attachment F of Appendix D) indicated the limiting
hypothetical accident scenario with the potential to release radioactive material from the storage
containers was an airplane crash into the dry storage area. This accident is the highest risk accident
for the general population and workers among all of the sites .
The highest risk to the general population occurs at Pearl Harbor. The probability of an
aircraft crash at the Pearl Harbor facility is estimated to be I chance in 100,000 per year of
operation. The estimated population consequences, using very conservative meteorology, is estimated
to be 26 latent cancer fatalities in the general population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the site.
The estimated risk to the general population, taking into account the probability of occurrence of this
accident, is 2.6 x 10 4 latent cancer fatalities per year. The probability of a latent cancer fatality in
3

the maximally exposed offsite individual is estimated to be 9 .5 x 10- .
The highest risk to workers occurs at Norfolk. The probability of an airplane crash at
Norfolk is estimated to be I chance in 1,000,000 per year of operation. An onsite worker
approximately 100 meters (about 330 feet) downwind of the accident is estimated to receive a dose
that corresponds to a probabil ity of a latent cancer fatality of7.4 x 10-2 . The estimated risk for a
worker is 7.4 x 10-8 latent cancer fatalities per year.
It is not likely that any fatalities would occur in workers in the vicinity because workers are
normally near the contai ners for only brief periods when a container is being placed in the dry
storage array. At most, two or three nearby workers mig!:t receive significant radiation exposure
from inhalation of airborne radioactivity if the container seal were breached . The low probability of
the airplane crash itself, coupled with the probability that workers would be close enough to be
affected , coupled with the probability that the wind would be blowing in the direction of the workers,
makes it very unlikely that any worker would receive substantial radi ation exposure.
Secondary impacts are principally land contamination around the site of the accident and
temporary contamination of naval vessels at the shipyard. A total of approximately 43 hectares
(106 acres) might requ ire cleanup. The contamination could extend about 0.6 kilometers (0.4 miles)

Other Generator/Storage Locations. Accident analyses were evaluated for these
facilities. These accidents included (a) handling accidents that resulted in fuel drops with potential
for fuel cladding breaches that could release portions of the more volatile fission products, such as
noble gases and iodine, (b) accidental nuclear criticalities, (c) building collapse due to natural
phenomena or external events such as major earthquakes or aircraft crashes, and (d) release of
contaminated storage pool water. The analysis of these accidents indicated that they were similar in
kind and consequence to those described for the major DOE sites and, therefore, these problems are
not presented for each of the 57 other generator/storage locations. For the No Action alternative, no
accidents related to SNF management were identified for the Nevada Test Site because no SNF is
currently managed at the site. Two accidents were evaluated for the No Action alternative at the Oak
Ridge Reservation. The first involved a dropped dam during refueling at the High Flux Isotope
Reactor fuel pool. This accident resulted in an estimated 9.2 x 10-6 latent cancer fatalities to the
worker and 1.7 latent cancer fatalities to the general population with a risk to the worker of
9.2 x 10-10 and to the general population of 1.7 x 10-4. A beyond design basis accident at the High
Flux Isotope Reactor could result from a roof collapse triggered by a tornado. This accident could
result in an estimated 2.0 x 10-2 latent cancer fatalit: ~ to the worker and 2.3 latent cancer fatal ities
to the general population with a risk to the worker of 3.8 x 10-9 and to the general population of
4.4 x 10-6.

5.1.2.5 Nonradlologlc.llmp.ct6. A series of the maximum reasonably foreseeable
accidents was evaluated at each of the SNF management sites that would potentially release hazardous
or toxic chemicals to the workplace or the environment. The specific accident was defined and
effects were estimated based on the characteristics of the specific facility, potentially affectild public
adjacent to the facility , and local residents (at the site boundary).
The maximum reasonably foreseeable chemical accident at SNF management facilities at the
Hanford Site could result in the release of polychlorinated biphenyls and sulfuric acid at the 105-KE
and 105-KW Basins. Should these releases occur, workers and the general public travelling adjacent
to the accident could be subjected to chemical concentrations that might cause fatalities or serious
health effects . The general public at the reservation boundary would be subjected to approximately
20 percent or less of the guideline value.
A maximum reasonably foreseeable chemical accident at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant
would be expected to release chlorine and nitric acid. Should such an event occur, workers would be
subjected to chemical concentrations that migh t cause fatalities or serious health effects. The general
publ ic at the site boundary wou ld be subjected to approximately 7 percent or less of the guideline
value (Emergency Response Planning Guideline-3). The expected concentration on public access
adjacent to the spill would be approximately 30 percent of the guideline value. Because these
accidents would occur in each of the al ternatives evaluated and do not discriminate among
alternatives, they are not discussed furth er.

beyond the closest site boundary.
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The release of nitrogen dioxide vapor from the interaction of target cleaning solution and
sodium nitrite at the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuel is the maximum reasonably foreseeable
chemical accident at the Savannah River Site. Should this accident occur, the estimated concentration
would be approximately I percent of the concentration that would be expected to cause fatalities or
serious health effects for the worker and 0.1 percent for the maximally impacted offsite individual.
A diesel spill and fire was identified as the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident at each
of the naval sites. Such an accident would be expected to produce toxic gas concentrations. Such an
incident, should it occur, would be expected to cause fatalities or serious health effects from three
chemicals (sulfur dioxide, oxides of nitrogen, and nitric acid) that are produced during the fire.
Workers and the public on the nearest public access point at each of the five naval sites would be
affected . The releases might also be expected to adversely affect the public immediately outside the
facility boundary at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard site.

rural population zone, the likelihood of a single latent cancer fatality was estimated to be about I in
500.
Onsite transportation of SNF would occur under the No Action alternative at the Hanford
Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and Savannah River Site. The maximum reasonably
foreseeable accident for this alternative would occur at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,
with a latent cancer fatality risk of about 7.5 x 10-7 for a rural population zone and about 1.1 x 10.5
for a suburban population zone. In the extremely unlikely event that this accident occurred under
stable (worst,;ase) weather conditions, it could result in 6 latent cancer fatalities in a rural population,
such as around the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, within 80 Idlcmeters (SO miles) of the
accident, or 85 latent cancer fatalities in a suburban population zone. For comparison, the rural
population zone would be expected to experience 350 cancer fatalities and the suburban population
zone would experience 42,000 cancer fatalities from other causes.

5.1.2.6 Transporflltlon.

Shlpmenf$-Under the No Action alternative, the only offsite transportation of SNF
involves shipments of naval SNF from the Newport News Shipyard to the Norfolk Naval Shipyard
and shipments of irradiated test specimens from the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory to offsite locations. Onsite transportation of SNF would occur at the
Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and Savannah River Site.
Incident-Free Transporflltlon-For the No Action alternative, the incident-free
transportation of SNF was estimated to result in a total of 0.0089 fatalities over the 4O-year period
1995 through 2035. These fatalities were the sum of the estimated number of radiation-related latent
cancer fatalit ies and the estimated number of nonradiological fatalities from vehicular emissions. The
estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for transportation workers was 0.0026,
the estimated number of radiation-related cancer fatalities for the general population was 0.00032,
and the estimated number of nonradiological fatalities from vehicular emissions was 0.0059.

Onsite shipments of SNF were estimated to result in 0.0022 fatalities . Offsite shipments of
SNF were estimated to result in 0.0067 fatalities. These fatalities represent the sum of the estimated
number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities and the estimated number of nonradiological
fatalities from vehicular emissions.
Transporflltlon Accidents-The cumulative transportation accident risks over the
4O-year operational period were estimated to be 4.1 x 10-6 latent cancer fatalities and 0.047 traffic
fatalities. If an accident occurred, it would be unlilcely to result in the release of any radioactivity.
The maximum reasonably foreseeable accident has a chance of occurrence between I x 10-6
and I x 10-7 per year. If it occurred in an urban or suburban population zone, the likelihood of a
single latent cancer fatality within the exposed population was estimated to be about I in 100. In a
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5.1.3 Decentralization Alternative
Under the Decentralization alternative, SNF currently stored or generated at DOE sites would
remain at those sites, and SNF generated by university, other Government reactors, and foreign
research reactors would be transponed to either the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory or the
Savannah River Site. Special-case commercial SNF would be transponed to the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory. Storage facilities would be upgraded or replaced at DOE sites to improve
the safe and secure storage of SNF. Existing research and development of technologies improving
the safe and secure storage of SNF at DOE sites would continue, and new projects would commence.
The Navy would store SNF at or near the point of refueling or defueling (Option A), transpon about
10 percent of its SNF to the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard for limited examinations and storage with
the remainder stored at or near the point of fueling or defueling (Option B), or transpon all naval
SNF to the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory for examination and
then transpon it back to naval sites for storage (Option C).

Note: ORR. NTS, and Other
sires are not aHected by this
altemative.

The implications of this alternative would be the closure of the Expended Core Facility at the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory under Options A and B and the modification of an existing
facility at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard to provide limited examination under Option B. Major DOE
sites might build new storage facilities to replace existing facilities or to accept newly generated SNF
from other sites. Degraded fuels at the major DOE sites might be stabilized to improve safe storage.
The sites affected by the Decentralization alternative include the Hanford Site, Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory, Savannah River Site, and naval sites. The environmental consequences at
these sites are described below.

5.1.3.1 Soc/ollConomlca. For the Decentralization A and B options, one socioeconomic
consequence would be similar to that described for the No Action alternative-closing the Expended
Core Facility would result in the loss of an average of approximately 240 direct jobs over 10 years at
the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (Figure 5-2), with an ultimate loss of about 500 jobs.
This represents a decrease in employment at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory of
approximately 6 percent. Under the Decentralization C option, the Expended Core Facility would
cont inue to operate at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory with no socioeconomic
consequences . At the Hanford and Savannah River Sites, this alternative would result in significant
new construction, employing an additional 80 to 640 workers at the Hanford Site and 200 to
220 workers at the Savannah River Site over a 100year period depending on the options chesen for
SNF management at those sites. The higher value reflects an increase above baseline site
employment of approximately 3 percent at the Hanford Site and approximately I percent at the
Savannah River Site. The peak in employment would be an additional 1, 100 workers at the Hanford
Site, approximately 6 percent of the 1995 baseline.
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Figure 5-2. Summary of impacts for the Decentralization alternative. (The maximum incremental
cbange from baseline is illustrated in all graphs. Input data summarized in Appendix K).
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Increases in construction activity over the shon-term at the Hanford Site could strain the
housing market and put additional demands on school capacity. Operations after the construction
period would have very small consequences through the overall project timeframe. No secondary
effects on the local community are expected at the Savannah River Site.
At the naval sites, the Decentralization alternative would require construction workers and
laborers to construct fuel storage areas and to staff these areas, but it is expected that these workers
would come from the sites or the local area, and there would not "e a significant socioeconomic
impact on the surrounding communities. Nevertheless, staff required would be approximately
1 percent increase over existing naval site staffing.
5.1.3.2 UtllftiN (Electricity). Figure 5-2 illustrates the minimum and maximum
incremental change in power use with respect to existing site usage from implementing the
Dtcentralization alternative. As previously discussed in Section 5.1.1.2, the variation in power use
by site shown on this graph reflects whether processing occurs or not. As an example, if the
Hanford Site were to choose a storage option over a processing option, the power required for the
storage option would be less than I percent of the overall site use; however, if a processing option
were selected, then power use could increase to 37 percent above existing site use (see Appendix K).
At each of the sites, the increase in electricity consumption could be accommodated with the existing
site electric power infrastructure. At Hanford, if a processing option were selected, an extension of
existing utilities in the 200 Area to the project area would be necessary. The maximum potential
electricity usage shown at the Savannah River Site would be associated with the processing option
that requires the operation of the F- and H-Canyons. These bave operated for many years, and onsite
and offsite utilities are adequate for their operation. At the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,
the principal differences among options are due to the operation or shutdown of the Expended Core
Facility as was discussed in Section 5 . 1.2.2.
5.1.3.3 Materials and Waste Management. The minimum and maximum volumes of
high-level , transuranic, mixed, and low-level wastes that would be generated by SNF management
activities over the next 10 years relative to the baseline are shown in Figure 5-2 . The combined
volume of high-level, transuranic, and mixed waste generated annually, if processing options were
implemented, is estimated to average from approximately 18 to 44 cubic meters per year at the
Savannah Ri ver Site and Hanford Site, respectively. In contrast, if wet storage options for N-Reactor
fuel were selected at the Hanford Site then no high-level , transuranic, or mixed waste would be
expected to be generated . Figure 5-2 also illustrates the volume of low-level waste that would be
generated fr0m implementation of the Decentralization options. It should be noted that the volume of
low-level waste would increase if a processing option were selected at either the Hanford Site or the
Savannah River Site. Additional volumes of low-level waste would be generated at the Savannah
River Site from the limited receipt of SNF shipments from offsite and by the addition of a new
canning facility. Low-level waste would only be generated at the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory under the Decentralization alternative, where the Expended Core Facility would continue
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10 operate. Operarion of an Expended Core Facility could result in the annual production of
approximately 430 cubic meters (526 cubic yards) of low-level waste (Appendix D).
At the naval sites, the implementation of the Decentralization alternative would have the same
impact as that described in Section 5. 1.2.3 for the No Action alternative because interim storage
would be at the naval sites under both alternatives.
5.1.3.4 Radiological Impacts. Radiological exposures to both workers and the public
from normal operations for the Decentralization alternative W~(e estimated to be small, similar to the
No Action alternative, with the principal differences associated with possible implementation of the
processing options at the Hanford and Savannah River Sites because of higher radionuclide releases to
the atmosphere. This increases the offsite population doses and potential for latent cancer fatalities.
Figure 5-2 illustrates the estimated latent cancer fatalities associated with SNF operations at the major
sites. The estimated latent cancer fatalities from 40 years of SNF operation would be less than one
for each site.
Hanford Slt&-The Decentralization alternative considers several options for
construction of new facilities at the Hanford Site, including a new wet storage facility for N-Reactor
SNF and a new dry storage facility for fuels currenUy stored at other onsite locations. A second
option for implementation of the Decentralization alternative at the Hanford Site is processing of the
N-Reactor SNF followed by dry storage.
Under this alternative, one of the highest risk SNF-related accidents identified for the
No Action alternative remains- the spent fuel cask drop at a wet storage facility. Because of the
locations of the new storage facility, the offsite consequences and risks associated with this accident
could be reduced to 25 percent of those described under the No Action alternative. The other highest
risk accident, the sodium fire in the Fast Flux Test Facility fuel storage area, is no longer applicable
because the Fast Flux Test Facility SNF would be moved to a new dry storage facility.
Potential accidents at the proposed new facilities include a severe cask impact followed by a
fire at a new dry storage facility and a uranium metal fire at a new facility for processing N-Reactor
SNF. Appendix A indicates that the cask impact and fire accident scenario presents the highest
estimated risk to both the onsite workers and the general public of the accident scenarios identified
for this alternative at Hanford .
For the severe cask impact accident, the estimated probability is 6 in 1,000,000 per year of
operation. The estimated population dose, using very conservative meteorology, corresponds to 81
latent cancer fatalities in the general population within 80 kilometers (50 miles). The estimated risk
per year, taking into account the chance of occurrence of this accident, would be 4.9 x 10 4 latent
cancer fatalities per year in the general popul ation. The potential dose to the maximally exposed
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offsite individual, assuming no protective actio n, corresponds to an estimated probability of a latent
cancer fatality of 2.5

The highest risk accident for both the general population and workers, however, would be the
fuel assembly breach accident that was discussed under the No Action alternative.

x 10"".

An onsite individual approximately 100 meters (about 330 feet) downwind of the accident
who remains within the plume while the fire burns could receive a dose of 120 rem
(120,000 millirem). Acute doses Ilf this magnitude are in the lower end of the range of doses that
might produce symptoms of acute radiation syndrome in humans . Because a fire is also involved , the
close-in dose is highly dependent on the meteorological conditions at the time, the amount of plume
rise that is generated by the heat fro m the fire, the exact location of the accident relative to buildings,
etc. An individual 100 meters (about 330 feet) downwind is estimated to receive a dose that is
sufficient to cause immediate health impacts, but probably would not be lethal . This dose
2
corresponds to an estimated worker probability of a latent cancer fatality of 9.4 x 10. . The
estimated risk for a worker is 5.6 x 10.7 latent cancer fatalities per year.
Workers in the immediate vicinity of this accident could receive very high doses that could be
lethal unless they immediately evacuated the area of the accident. There are likely to be t ..o time
scales for releases associated with this accident: immediately following the accident and while the
fire burns. Nearby workers may not be able to avoid the immediate radiological impacts but could
likely evacuate the area and avoid most of the fire-relatoo radiological releases unless incapacitated by
the accident.
Potential secondary impacts identified for the severe cask impact with fire accident
(Table 5.15-2 of Appendix A) include possible restriction of use of the Hanford Reach of the
Columbia River for recreation, potential loss of crops, moderate environmental contamination in the
vicinity of the facility and near offsite environs, temporary restriction on land use for agriculture,
possible short-term restriction on fishing access, and cleanup costs .

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory-Under the Decentralization alternative
at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory the highest consequence and highest risk SNF-related
accidents are associated with SNF storage and are the same as described under the No Action
alternative. Under the Decentralization alternative, there are more SNF shipments, and consequently
more handling of SNF compared to the No Action alternative. As a result, the potential frequency of
fuel-handli ng accidents could be about 20 percent higher than under the No Action alternative, but

The accident frequency is expected to be about 0 .35 fuel assembly breaches per year of
operation with implementation of this alternative. The risks to the general public, the maximally
exposed offsite individual , and co-located workers were estimated to be 3 x 10.3, 3.5 x 10.7, and
1.7 x 10-6 latent cancer fatalities rer year of operation, respectively.

Naval Facllltie_The accident risks for the three subalternatives were evaluated for
the naval facilities under the Decentralization alternative: (a) decentralization with SNF retained at
the shipyards and the Kesselring Site without examination of the SNF, (b) decentralization with
limited examination at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, and (c) decentralization with performance
assessment examination at the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
followed by storage at naval sites . Attachment F of Appendix D presents a full discussion of the
accident risks at each of the naval sites.
The accident risks associated with this alternative would be the same as with the No Action
alternative, with the highest risk accident being an aircraft crash into a dry storage container. The
consequences and risks of this max imum risk accident would be the same as those described under
the No Action alternative.

Other Generator/Storage Location_For the Decentralization alternatives, the
accident risks at the Oak Ridge Reservation and other SNF interim storage sites that do not transport
their SNF elsewhere WOUld be expected to be similar to and bounded by the accident risks under the
No Action alternative.

5.1.3.5 Nonradlologlcal Accldenu. The maximum reasonably foreseeable chemical
accident at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Savannah River Site, naval sites, and other
generatorlstorage locations would be similar to those described under the No Action alternative. An
accident at the wet storage facility on the Hanford Site could release sulfuric acid vapor and subj ect
workers to up to 130 percent of the chemical concentrations that are associated with fatalities or
serious health effects.

because of lower consequences, fuel -h""dling accidents would not rep resent the highest risk accidents
under the Decentral ization alternative (see DOE-lO 1994).
Savannah River Sit&-The Decentralization alternative considers several options
fo r SNF management at the Savannah River Site, includ ing wet storage (Option 2b), new facilities for
dry storage (Optio n 2a), and processing the SNF followed by dry storage (Option 2c), which were
not cons idered under the No Action alternative.

VOLUME t

5.1.3.6 Transportation.
Shlpmenfs- Under the Decentralization alternative, university, foreign, and
non-DOE research reactors would transport SNF to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and
the Savannah River Site. In add ition, naval SNF shipments would be equal to or greater than those
under the No Action alternative, depending on the choice of subalternative with respect to fuel
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IncIdent-Free Tnmspon.tlon-For the Decentralization alternative, the
incident-free transportation of SNF was estimated to result in total fatalities that ranged from 0. 12 to
0.38 over the 4O-year period 1995 through 2035. These fatalities represent the sum of the estimated
number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities and the estimated number of nonradiological
fatalities from vehicular emissions .
The reason for a range of fatalities was because of three factors: (a) different examination
options for naval SNF (see Appendix D), (b) the option of using truck or rail transport for DOE SNF
(see Appendix I), and (c) different SNF management options at the Savannah River Site (see
Appendix C). Navy shipments would be made using a combination of truck and rail; DOE shipments
were assumed to be made using 100 percent truck or 100 percent rail.

area and is estimated to result in 0.065 latent cancer fatalities. (A more complete discussion of this
apparent anomaly is presented in Section A.5.2 of Volume I, Appendix D, Part B, Attachment A.)
Onsite transportation of SNF would occur under the Decentralization alternative at the
Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and Savannah River Site. The maximum
reasonably foreseeable accident for this alternative occurs at the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory, and the potential impacts would be the same as those described under the No Action
alternative.

The estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for transportation workers
ranged from 0.026 to 0.090, the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for the
general population ranged from 0.041 to 0.24, and the estimated number of Donradiological fatalities
from vehicular emissions ranged from 0 .047 to 0 .050 for this alternative.
Onsite shipments of SNF were estimated to result in 0.0025 to 0.0036 fatalities. Offsite
shipments of SNF were estimated to result in 0 . 12 to 0 .37 fatalities. These fatalities also represent
the sum of the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities and the estimated number
of nonradiological fatalities from vehicular emissions.

Transportation Accldenb-The cumulative transportation accident risks over the
4O-year operational period were estimated to be in the range of 0.00085 to 0.0009 latent cancer
fatalities, and 0.20 to 1.01 traffic fatalities, if all SNF were transported by truck. If all SNF were
transported by rail, the corresponding risks were estimated to be in the range of 0.00029 to
0.00034 latent cancer fatalities, and 0.26 to 1.07 traffic fatalities . The range of fatality estimates
reHects the different fuel examination options for naval SNF (see Appendix D).
The max imum reasonably foreseeable offsite transportation accident under the
Decentralization alternative involves transport of naval SNF by rail in a suburban area. The
consequences of such an accident were estimated to be 1.7 latent cancer fatalities . The probability of
occurrence of such an accident would be slightly greater than 1.0 x 10.7 per year. This probability
accounts for the accident rate per mile traveled , the number of miles traveled, the percentage of the
total distance that occurs in a suburban area, the meteorological conditions, and the severity of the
accident. Based on DOE guidance (DOE 1993b), accidents with a probability of occurrence less than
1.0 x 10,7 per year are not reasonably foreseeable and are not evaluated in this EIS . Consistent with
this guidance, an accident of similar severity to that above for the suburban area, but occurring in an
urban area, would not be reasonably foreseeable. This is because the total miles traveled in an urban
area would be only a few percent of the total transportation route, resulting in a probability of
occurrence of less than 1.0 X 10,7 per year. Thus, the maximum reasonably foreseeable offsite
transportation accident in an urban area would be less severe than postulated to occur in a suburban
VOLUM E I
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5.1.4 199211993 Planning Basis Alternative
Chaoge ..... rellmQloy"'·'l!u'Ilbelween 1995Irod200Slo.SNF

Under the 199211993 Planning Basis alternative, SNF currently stored at major DOE sites
would remain at those sites, and newly generated SNF from DOE, university, and other Government
reactors would be transported to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory or the Savannah River
Site for storage. Special-case commercial SNF and naval SNF would be transported to the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory for storage. Existing research and development of technologies
improving the safe and secure storage of SNF at DOE sites would continue, and new projects would
commence. Examination of naval fuels would be conducted at the Expended Core Facility at the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.

Note: ORR, NTS, Naval,
and Other sites are not
affected by this a/temafive.

The implications of this alternative for major DOE sites would be similar to those described
for the Decentralization alternative. New storage facilities would be built at the major DOE sites to
replace existing facilities or to accept newly generated SNF from other siles. Degraded fuels at the
Savannah River Site and the Hanford Site might be stabilized to improve safe storage.
The sites that would be affected by the 199211993 Planning Basis alternative are the Hanford
Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and Savannah River Sile. The environmental
consequences at these sites are described below.

5.1.4.1 Socioeconomics. Implementation of the 199211993 Planning Basis alternative
would not have a significant socioeconomic impact at any of the major DOE or naval sites
(Figure 5-3). The impacts at the Hanford and Savannah River Sites would be similar to those
described for the Decentralization alternative in Section 5. 1.3.1 and shown on Figure 5-2. Proposed
new construction and maintenance activities at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would
result in the addition of approximately 130 workers over 10 years, less than a 2 percent increase
above baseline site employment. The peak employment at Hanford would be the same as that
described for the Decentralization alternative, a maximum of about 1,100 additional workers at the
Hanford Site, an increase of approximately 6 percent above the 1995 baseline. Secondary
socioeconomic impacts at the Hanford Sile would be similar to those described under the
Decentralization alternative.
There would be no socioeconomic impact at the naval sites because current practices would
not be altered. Storage facilities would not need to be constructed at the individual naval siles, and
no employment would be generated at naval siles .

5.1.4.2 UtIlities (Electricity). The minimum and maximum change in power use from
implementing the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative with respect to the site baseline is shown in
Figure 5-3 . The impact on power consumption at the sites would be the same as that described for
the Decentralization alternative in Section 5.1.3.2 (compare with Figure 5-2) except at the Idaho
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Figure 5-3. Summary of impacts for the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative. (The maximum
incremental change from baseline is illustrated in all graphs . Input data are summarized in
Appendix K).
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National Engineering Laboratory. The variation in power use over site baseline use at the Savannah
River and Hanford Sites reflects whether a storage or processing option is selected for SNF
management. The increase in power use at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would be
because of the Electrometallurgical Process Demonstration Project. If processing options were
implemented at the Hanford Site. an extension of existing utilities to the project area would be
necessary.

5.1.4.3 "'ateria/. and Wute "'anagement Figure 5-3 illustrates the combined average
annual volumes of high-level. transuranic. and mixed wastes and of low-level wastes that would be
generated over the next 10 years as a result of SNF management activities with the implementation of
the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative. The volume of low-level waste and the combined volume
of high-level . transuranic. and mixed waste would be similar to the volumes generated under the
Decentralization alternative for the Hanford and Savannah River Sites (see Figures 5-2 and 5-3). The
minimum and maximum values shown for these sites reflect whether a storage option or a processing
option would be implemented. respectively.
At the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. implementation of the 199211993 Planning
Basis alternative would result in the generation of high-level. transuranic. and mixed wastes. These
wastes would be generated by the Electrometallurgical Process Demonstration Project. The volume
of low-level waste generated at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would be from the
construction and operation of new storage and characterization facilities at the site. Adequate storage
capacity exists at the site for these wastes until 2005. when additional capacity would be expected to
be required for managing low-level waste (Appendix B).

5.1.4.4 Radlologlc81lmpacU. Radiological exposures to both worleers and the public
from normal SNF management operations and onsite accidents for the 199211993 Planning Basis
alternative would be essentially the same as estimated for the Decentralization option. Figure 5-3
illustrates the estimated latent cancer fatalities associated with SNF operations at the major sites .

Savannah River Sile. The implementation of the 199211993 Planning Basis
alternative at the Savannah River Site would not result in accident consequence estimates
that differ from those identified under the Decentralization alternative (Section 5 . 15 and Attachment
A of Appendix C). Because of increases in amount of SNF handled. the accident frequencies would
be expected to increase.
The accider.t frequency for the highest risle accident. the fuel assembly breach. would be
expected to be about 0.40 fuel assembly breaches per year of operation with ir:tplementation of this
alternative. This results in estimated risle to the general public. maximally exposed offsite individual.
and co-located worker of 3.4 X 10-3. 4.0 X 10.7• and 1.9 x 10-<1 latent cancer fatalities per year of
operation. respectively.
Naval Facilities. With implementation of the 199211993 Planning Basis alternative
for naval facilities . all storage and examination activities occur at the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory. The maximum risk accident at this facility was not the maximum risle accident at the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. so it is not discussed further in this volume. See Attachment
F of Appendix D for details.
Other Generator/Storage Locations. For the 199211993 Planning Basis allernative.
the accident risles at the Oak Ridge Reservation and other SNF interim storage sites that do not
transport their SNF elsewhere would be similar to the accident risles under the No AClion alternative.

5.1.4.5 Nonrtldiologlc81 Accldent&. The maximum reasonably foreseeable chemical

th~

Idaho National Engin~ng Laboratory. Under the 199211993 Planning Basis
alternative at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. the consequences and risles of accidents
assoc iated with SNF storage would be the same as described under the No Action alternative
(Section 5.15 of Appendix B). The consequences of fuel -handling accidents would be the same as
described under the No Action alternative. but increased SNF shipments. and consequently more
handling of SNF. could result in a frequency of fuel-handling accidents about three times higher than
for the No Action alternative (Slaughterbecle et aI . 1995). Because of the increased frequency of
VOLUM E I

fuel-handling accidents. risk to the public from fuel-handling accidents may exceed the risk from SNF
storage accidents.

accident at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Savannah River Site. and other
generator/storage locations wou ld be similar to those described under the No Action alternative. The
Hanford Site accidents would be similar to those in the Decentralization alternative.

SNF Facility AccIdent&Hanford Site. The implementation of the 199211993 Planning Basis alternative at
Hanford Site would not result in accident risles Significantly different from those identified for the
Decentralization alternative (Section 5. 15 of Appendix A).

199211993 Planning Basis alternative

Two independent accidents were evaluated to describe the maximum reasonably foreseeable
chemical hazards during the operation of the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory. Such a release could subject workers to chemical concentrations that could
cause fatalities or serious health effects but would not subject the public to such concentrations.

5.1.4.6 rrtlnsporfJltlon.
Shlpment&-Under the 199211993 Planning Basis alternative. university. foreign.
and non-DOE research reactors would transport SNF to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
and the Savannah River Site. Commercial SNF stored at the West Valley Demonstrat ion Project and
graphite SNF stored at the Fort St. Vrain site would be transported to the Idaho National Engineering
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Laboratory. DOE research reactor SNF stored at various DOE sites would he transoorted to the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and the Savannah River Site. Naval SNF would bt
transported from naval shipyards to the Expended Core Facility and irradiated test specimens would
be transported between the Expended Core Facility and offsite locations. Onsite transportation would
relocate SNF from one facility to another for stabilization or storage.

199211993 Planning a.sfs altamatlve

Onsite transportation of SNF would occur under the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative at
the Hanford Site, the Idabo National Engineering Laboratory, and the Savannah River Site. The
maximum reasonably foreseeable accident for this alternative occurs at the Idabo National
Engineering Laboratory, and the potential impacts would be the same as those described under the No
Action alternative.

IncIdent-Free TransportAUon-For the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative, the
incident-free transportation of SNF was estimated to result in total fatalities that ranged from 0. 14 to
0.45 over the 4O-year period 1995 through 2035 . These fatalities were the sum of the estimated
number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities and the estimated number of nonradiological
fatalities from vehicular emissions.

The reason for a range of fatalities was due to two f~ctors : (a) the option of using truc\; or
rail transport for DOE SNF (see Appendix I) and (b) different SNF management options at the
Savannah River Site (see Appendix C). Navy shipments would be made using a combination of truck
or rail; DOE shipments were assumed to be made using 100 percent truck or 100 percent rail.
The estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for transportation workers
ranged from 0.029 to 0.11 , the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fataliti es for the
general population ranged from 0.044 to 0.30, and the estimated Dumber of nonradiological fatalities
from vehicular emissions ranged from 0.045 to 0.07\.
Onsite shipments of SNF were estimated to result in 0.0028 to 0.0036 fatality . Offsite
shipments of SNF were estimated to result in 0. 14 to 0.45 fatality. These fatalities were also the sum
of the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities and the estimated number of
nonradioiogical fatalities from vehicular emissions.
TransportAUon Accident.-The cumulative transportation accident risks over the
4O-year operational period were estimated to be 0.0010 latent cancer fatality and 0.70 traffic fatality
if all SNF were transported by truck. If all SNF were transported by rail, the corresponding risks
were estimated to be 0.00035 latent cancer fatality and 0.73 traffic fatality.

The maximum reasonably foreseeable offsite transportation accident involves a rail shipment
of special-<:ase commercial SNF in a suburban population zone under neutral (average) weather
conditions. The accident has a probability of occurrence of about 2.0 x JO.7 per year and would
resul t in an estimated 7 latent cancer fatalities in the exposed population. For comparison, the same
population would be expected to experience about 100,000 cancer fatalities from other causes. The
probability of this accident occur-ing in an urban population zone would be less than I x JO.7 per
year. In a rural population zone, the accident consequences would be estimated to be about 0.2 latent
cancer fatalities .
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5.1.5 ReglonaHzallon Alternalive
There are two alternatives under Regionalization: Regionalization 4A would relocate SNF
according to fuel type; Regionalization 4B would relocate SNF according to location.

Note: ORR, NTS, Naval.
and Other sites are not
affected byrhis

subaltem ativs.

Under Regionalization 4A, certain types of SNF from other DOE sites, and SNF from
university and other Government reactors, special-ease commercial SNF, and foreign research reactor
SNF would be transported to either the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory or Savannah River
Site for storage. Existing research and development of technologies improving the safe and secure
storage of SNF at DOE sites would continue, and new projects would commence. Naval SNF would
be examined at the Expended Core Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, then stored
at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant.
The implications of Regionalization 4A are essentially the same as those of the 1992/1993
Planning Basis alternative because there would be minor differences in the amounts of fuel
transported to eacb destination under these alternatives (see Figure 5-4).
Under Regionalization 4B, bowever, two regional sites would be selected, and SNF would be
moved to one site or the other. In the west, either the Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory, or Nevada Test Site would be the regional site; in the east, either the Savannah River
Site or Oak Ridge Reservation would be designated. SNF stored or generated west of the Mississippi
River would be transported to the Western Regional Site, and SNF stored or generated east of the
Mississippi River would be transported to the Eastern Regional Site. An expended core facility
would be built at either the Eastern or Western Regional Site (unless the Western Regional Site were
the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, in wbich case no new facility would be required).
Research and development would be conducted at the regional sites.
Regionalization 4B affects more sites than Regionalization 4A. Only one site would have
SNF management responsibility in the east and in the west; thus, SNF management activities would
be phased out at those sites not selected as regional sites. If the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory were not selected as the Western Regional Site, the Expended Core Facility in Idaho
would be closed, and a new facility would be built at either the Eastern or Western Regional Site. If
the Oak Ridge Reservation were chosen as the Eastern Regional Site, SNF now at Savannah River
would be transported to the Oak Ridge Reservation. This would require the development of new
storage facilities at the Reservation. Some fuels might need to be stabilized before transport. If the
Savannah River Site were selected as the Eastern Regional Site, there would be few differences
between Regionalization 4B and Regionalization 4A except that an expended core facility might be
built at the site. In the west, transport of Hanford SNF to another site would require stabilization of
the N-Reactor fuels, the great majority of the SNF now stored there. Some Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory fuels would also require stabilization if they were transported to another site.
New SNF management facilities would be required at any Western Regional Site selected because of
the large volumes of SNF that would be received.
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Figure 5-4. Summary of impacts for Regionalization 4A (by fuel type). (The maximum incremental
cbange from baseline is illustrated in all grapbs. Input data are summarized in Appendix K.)
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Regionalization alternative
This alternative would affect only the five major DOE sites. The environmental
consequences at these sites are described below.

Regionalization alternative

,

5.1.5.1 Socioeconomics. Under Regionalization 4A, the socioeconomic impacts at the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would be the same as those described for the 1992/1993
Planning Basis alternative described in Section 5. 1.4. 1. The peak employment under Regionalization
4A would be an additional 470 workers at the Hanford Site, approximately 3 percent above the 1995
baseline. Implementation of Regionalization 4A would have no socioeconomic consequences at either
the Oak Ridge Reservation or the Nevada Test Site because this would result in no changes to
existing operations at either site.
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Note: Nava l and Other sites arB not
affected by this altemative.
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Impacts of Regionalization 4A on the naval sites would be the same as that described for the
199211993 Planning Basis alternative because naval SNF would be transported to the Expended Core
Facility in Idaho for examination and storage at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
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If either the Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, or Savannah River Site
were not selected as a regional site under Regionalization 4B, there would be an eventual reduction in
employment equal to existing employment for SNF management at these sites. This would add to the
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currently predicted loss of jobs at eacb of these sites. In the short term, additional jobs would be
required to prepare SNF for transport offsite (see Figurp 5-S). The closure of the Expended Core
Facility at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, bowever, would lead to a short-term loss of
jobs as well, increasing the rate of job loss at that site.
Sites that were selected as regional sites would have generally increased employment over
baseline levels (see Figure 5-6). Site employment levels would also increase at whatever site an
expended core facility were constructed (Figure 5-7). Employment at the Oak Ridge Reservation and
Nevada Test Site would increase if these sites were chosen as the Eastern and Western Regional
Sites . Operation of storage facilities at both the Oak Ridge Reservation and Nevada Test Site could
ultimately result in the creation of approximately 500 jobs per year at both sites, a 3-percent increase
above current site employment at Oak Ridge Reservation and a 6-percent increase above current site
employment at the Nevada Test Site without the expended core facility or a 7- and 13-percent
increase with an expended core facility , respectively (Figure 5-6). The peak annual employment
from implementation of Regionalization 4B would be an additional 1, 100 workers at the Nevada Test
Site. The secondary impacts of increased employment at either the Oak Ridge Reservation or the
Nevada Test Site could result in an increased housing demand. At the Nevada Test Site, overall
socioeconomic impacts could be absorbed within the projected expansion of the local economy,
infrastructure, public service, and real estate development. At the Oak Ridge Reservation, increased
employment could result in increases in capital expenditures to meet the increased demand of
housing, transportation, and educational facilities.
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Figure.5-S. ~ummary of i~pacts .for Regionalization 4B (by geography) if the site is not selected as
the regIOnal ~lte . . (The maxImum mcremental change from baseline is illustrated in all grapbs. Input
data summarized m Appendix K .)
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Figure 5-6. Summary of impacts for RegionaJization 4B (by geography) if sites were selected as a
regional site and do not have the expended core facility . ('The maximum incremental change from
baseline is illustrated in all graphs. Input data are summarized in Appendix K.)
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Figure 5-7. Summary of impacts for Regionalization 4B (by geography) if sites were selected as a
regional site and have the expended core facility. ('The maximum incremental change from baseline
is iiiustrated in graphs. Input data are summarized in Appendix K.)
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Regionalization alternative
For the naval sites, implementing Regionalization 4B would have no socioeconomic
consequences.

Reglonallzatlon aitemative

5.1.5.2 Utilities (Electricity). As shown in Figure 5-4, implementing Regionalization 4A
would have a similar impact on power consumption as the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative
(compare Figures 5-3 and 5-4). There would be no effect on power consumption at the Oak Ridge
Reservation, Nevada Test Site, or naval sites from the implementation of Regionalization 4A.

selected site, and Regionalization 4B with an expended core facility located at the selected site. The
annual average waste volumes generated from SNF management activities at a nonselected site would
decrease over the next 10 years, but at the selected sites the annual generation rate of waste from
SNF management activities would increase with implementation of the Regionalization alternative.
The construction of an expended core facility at any site would also increase the annual volume of
low-level waste generated.

Figures 5-5, 5~, and 5-7 illustrate the minimum and maximum change from baseline site
power use from implementing Regionalization 4B with and without an expended core facility and if
the site were not selected as the regional site. Regionalization at the Hanford Site or the Nevada Test
Site could produce an impact on power consumption at these sites.

The annual waste volumes generated from SNF management activities associated with
Regionalization 4A are illustrated in Figure 5-4. The effects of Regionalization 4A would be similar
to those described for the 199211993 Planning Basis alternative in Section 5 .1.4.3 (see Figures 5-3
and 5-4).

Figure 5-5 illustrates the impact or. power consumption if a site were not selected as a
regional site. The increase in electricity consumption at the Hanford Site and the Savannah River Site
reflects the power required to prepare or process the SNF for transport as required. The decrease in
power consumption at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory would be from shutdown of the
Expended Core Facility.

Figure 5-5 illustrates the effect of not being selected as a regional center. In comparison to
the Decentralization and 199211993 Planning Basis alternatives, the annual generation rate of
high-level, transuranic, mixed, and low-level wastes would ultimately decrease at the affected site
because the SNF inventory would be transported offsite. However, characterization and stabilization
activities prior to transport would generate transient increases in waste volumes .

Figure 5~ shows the minimum and maximum percent change, without an expended core
faCility, over baseline site power consumption if a site were selected as a regional center. At the
Hanford Site and Savannah River Site, the power consumption increases slightly with the transport of
naval fuel to the site. Regionalization at the Oak Ridge Reservation would result in a small (less than
3 percent) increase in electric power demand. The site electricity supply at each of these sites would
be more than adequate. However, regionalization at the Nevada Test Site would increase power
consumption about 13 percent above existing site usage and may require additional transmission lines
or another substation at the site (see Appendices F and K).

The effect of being selected as a regional center without a replacement expended core facility
is illustrated in Figure 5~. Implementation of this Regionalization 4B alternative would have similar
effects at the Hanford Site and Savannah River Site as the 199211993 Planning Basis alternative. The
Oak Ridge Reservation and Nevada Test Site would generate waste from SNF management activities
under the alternative. Regionalization at either of these two sites would be expected to generate
approximately 16 cubic meters (21 cubic yards) of transuranic waste and approximately 200 cubic
meters (260 cubic yards) of low-level waste annually from operating an SNF management complex .

Regionalization 4B with an expended core facility onsite is illustrated in Figure 5-7. The
electricity requirements at each of the major DOE sites would increase with the addition of an
expended core facility for examination of naval SNF. Power consumption at the Nevada Test Site
would increase approximately 18 percent above baseline and about 40 percent at Hanford if the
processing (tigure maximum) option were selected. The storage only options (figure minimum) at the
Hanford site would result in only a 3·percent increase in electricity consumption. The Nevada Test
Site would require additional transmission lines or another substation to handle additional loads. The
increased load could be handled at the Savannah River Site, and relatively minor increases could
occur at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
5.1.5.3 Materta/s and Weste Managemfmt. Figures 5-4 mrough 5-7 illustrate the effects
of implementing the different Reg ionalization alternatives: Regionalization 4A, Regionalization 4B
with SNF transported offsite, Regionalization 4B without an expended core facility located at the

Figure 5-7 illustrates the effect on annual waste volume generation of being selected as a
regional center with the addition of an expended core facility to examine naval SNF. The addition of
the expended core facility would have no effect on the annual volume of high-level, transuranic, or
mixed waste generated, but would increase the volume of low-level waste that would have to be
managed at any site.
The effects from implementing either of the Regionalization alternatives at the naval sites
would be the same as that described for the 199211993 Planning Basis alternatives in Section 5. 1.4.3.
5.1.5.4 Radio/ogicallmpacts. Radiological exposures to both workers and the public for
Regionalization 4A would to be similar to the 199211993 Planning Basis alternative. These are not
discussed further in this section. Figure 5-4 illustrates the potential latent cancer fatalities to the
population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) from SNF operations at the major sites for
Regionalization 4A .
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Radiological exposures to both workers and the public for Regionalization 4B woul<! to be
similar to the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative if the Savannah River Site, Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory, or Hanford Site were selected as regional sites. Figures 5-5, 5-6, and 5-7
illustrate the potential latent cancer fatalities to the population within 80 kilometers (SO miles) from
SNF operations for Regionalization 4B if SNF is transported offsite, or if the site is selected as the
regional site without and with the expended core facility, respectively.
For any of the Regionalization alternatives, the maximum estimated latent cancer fatalities in
the general population from normal operations are estimated to be 7.6 x 10.3 per year.
SNF Facility Accldem.-

Hanford Site. Accident risks under Regionalization 4A are the same as those for the
Decentralization alternative. The selection of the Hanford Site as the regional site would not result in
accident risks significantly different from those identified for the Decentralization alternative
(Section 5. 15 of Appendix A), although higher activity ur.der this alternative would increase the
annual frequency of accidents. The probahility of the cask impact and fire accident scenario was
estimated to be 7 in 1,000,000 if the Hanford Site were selected as a regional site.
Selecting a different site as the regional s;te would reduce the estimated accident risks from
those identified for the Dec~ntralization alternative because the existing wet storage facilities would be
shut down and the amount of SNF handled at the dry storage facility would change slightly. The
accident probability for the dry storage cask impact and fire was estimated to be 5 in 1,000,000 such
that the estimated risk from this, the highest risk accident, would be 4. 1 x 10-4 latent cancer
fatalities in the general ~opulation per year of operation.
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. While the consequences of potential SNF
storage and handling accidents would be similar for all alternatives, the estimated frequency of
handling accidents depends on the amount of SNF handled under the alternatives. For alternatives
wh ~re all stored SNF is transported to another site, SNF storage and handling risks would be reduced
to those associated with SNF generated at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory research
reactors. Under Regionalization 4A, the consequences and risks of accidents associated with SNF
storage would be the same as described under the No Action alternative (Section S.IS, Appendix B) .
The consequences of fuel-handling accidents would be the same as described under the No Action
alternative, but increased transporting and handling of SNF would result in a frequency of
fuel-handling accidents about five times higher than for the No Action alternative (Slaughterbeck et
al . 1995). Because of the incre:.sed frequency of fuel-handl ing accidents, ri~" to the public from fuelhandling accidents may exceed thn risk from SNF storage accidents.
If the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory were selected as a regional site under
Regionalization 4B, the highest consequences to the offsite population result from accidents involving
stored SNF and would be the same as described under the No Action alternative (Section 5. 15 of
VOLUME I
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Appendix B). With the resumption of processing at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, the
postulated accident with the highest consequence and risk to workers would be an inadvertent nuclear
criticality during processing that has an estimated probability of I chance in 1,000 per year of
operation. The estimated probability of a latent cancer fatality iD a worker approximately 100 meters
(330 feet) downwind of the accident would be 3.6 x 10.3, corresponding to an estimated risk to a
worker of 3.6 x 10-6 latent cancer fatalities per year of operation. The consequences of fuel-handling
accidents would be the same as described under the No Action alternative, but increased transporting
and handling of SNF results in a frequency of fuel-handling accidents about 20 times higher than for
the No Action alternative (Slaughterbeck et al. 1995). Because of the increased frequency of
fuel-handling accidents, risk to the public from fuel-handling accidents may exceed the risk from SNF
storage and processing accidents.
If the Idaho National EngineeriDg Laboratory were Dot selected as a regional site under
Regionalization 4B, the consequences and risks of accidents associated with SNF storage would be
the same as described under the No ActioD alternative (Section S. IS of Appendix B). The
consequences of fuel-handling accidents would be the same as described under the No Action
alternative, but increased transporting and handling of SNF would result in a frequency of
fuel-handling accidents about nine times higher than for the No Action alternative (Slaughterbeck et
al . 1995). Because of the increased frequeDcy of fuel-handling accidents, risk to the public from
fuel-handling accidents may exceed the risk from SNF storage accidents.
Savannah River Site. Accident risks under Regionalization 4A would be essentially
the same as those for the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative. The accident frequency for the
highest risk accident, a fuel assembly breach, would be expected to be about 0.44 fuel assembly
breaches per year of operation with implementation of this alternative. The estimated risk of latent
cancer fatalities to the general public, maximally exposed olrsite individual, and co-located worker
would be 3.7 x 10.3, 4.4 X 10.7, and 2 . 1 X 10-6 per year of operation, respectively.
The implementation of Regionalization 4B at the Savannah River Site, including the three
options of dry storage, wet storage, and pr.:>cessing followed by dry storage, would Dot result in
accidents significantly different from those identified for the same options UDder the Decentralization
alternative (Section 5. 15 and Attachment A of Appendix C). Because of an increase in the amount of
SNF handled, however, the accident frequency for some accidents would increase.
Under Regionalization 4B, the accident frequency for the highest risk accident, a fuel
assembly breach, would be expected to be about 0.41 fuel assembly breaches per year of operation
with implementation of this alternative. This results in a proportioDal increase in risk to the general
public and the workers. The estimated risk of latent cancer fatalities to the general public, maximally
exposed offsite individual, and co-located worker would be 3.S x 10.3, 4.1 X 10.7 , and 2.0 x 10-6
per year of operation, respectively. With regionalization elsewhere, the highest risk accident would
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still be the fuel assembly breach with an estimated risk approximately the same as with the No Action
alternative.
Naval Facilities. The accident risks associated with the implementation of the
Regionalization alternative at sites other than the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory are
presented in detail in Attachment F of Appendix D. That evaluation considered the accidents
associated with operation of an expended core facility 1Dd wet and dry storage facilities at the
Hanford Site, Savannah River Site, Oak Ridge Reservation, and Nevada Test Site. Accidents
evaluated were the same set of accidents identified for the Decentralization alternative. The
maximum risk accidents, for either the general population and workers at sites where an expended
core facility might be located if they are associated with an expended core facility, are discussed
under the affected sites.
Oak Ridge Reservation. The Oak Ridge Reservation would not be affected by
Regionalization 4A. The impl.~mentation of Regionalization 4B at the Oak Ridge Reservation would
be expected to be similar to implementation of the Centralization alternative, except that less storage
requirements would be needed. Section 5.15 (part 3) of Appendix F indicates that the accident
consequences would be similar for both alternatives and that it is reasonable to assume that the
accident consequences and risks described for the Centralization alternative would envelop the
Regional ization alternative.
A wide range of accident scenarios were considered, including accidents initiated by
operational events, external hazards such as aircraft crashes, and natural phenomena such as
earthquakes. The highest risk SNF-related accidents identified were (a) a fuel assembly breach as a
result of dropping the assembly, objects falling on the assembly, or cutting into the fuel portion of the
assembly, (h) a dropped fuel cask, (c) a severe impact that results in breach of a transport cask and
fire, (d) an aircraft crash into the SNF dry storage facility, (e) an aircraft crash into the SNF dry cell
facility, (I) a wind~riven missile impact into storage casks, and (g) and aircraft crash into a ",ater
storage pool.
The highest risk to the general population would be a fuel assembly breach, with an estimated
frequency of 0. 16 per year. General population consequences were estimated to be approximately
2.1 x 10-2 latent cancer fatal ities per year. The estimated risk to the general population, taking into
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Workers in the immediate vicinity of the cask drop accident could receive very high doses;
however, the doses would not result in a fatality. For that accident, workers could be expected to be
very near the cask when it drops and receive both direct radiation as well as inhale airborne fission
products. Worleers would be expected to quicldy evacuate the area and thus reduce their potential
radiation exposure.
Nevada Test Site. The implementation of Regionalization 4B at the Nevada Test Site
would also be expected to be similar to implementation of the Centralization alternative, except that
storage requirements would be less. Section 5.15 (part 2) of Appendix F indicates that the accident
consequences would be similar for both alternatives and that it is reasonable to assume that the
accident consequences and risks described for the Centralization alternative would envelop the
Regionalization alternative.
A wide range of accident scenarios were considered for the Centralization alternative, which
also apply to Regionalization 4B, including accidents initiated by operational events, external hazards
such as aircraft crashes, and natural phenomena such as earthquakes . The highest risk SNF-related
accidents identified for the Nevada Test Site were a fuel assembly breach (highest risk to the general
public) and a dropped fuel cask (highest risk to workers).
The fuel assembly breach is the highest risk to the general population with an estimated
frequency of 0.16 per year and an estimated offsite population dose corresponding to 6.6 x 10-4
latent cancer fatalities . The estimated risk to the general population, taking into account the
probability of occurrence of this accident, would be l.l x 10-4 latent cancer fatalities per year. The
potential dose to the maximally exposed offsite individual would correspond to a probability of a
latent cancer fatality of 1.6 x 10-7 .
The dropped fuel cask accident was the highest risk accident to worleers with an estimated
frequency of less than I in 10,000 per year. A worker approximately 100 meters (330 feet)
downwind of the accident would have a probability of a latent cancer fatality of 1.9 x 10-3• The
estimated risk to a worker would be 1.9 x 10.7 latent cancer fatalities per year of operation.

account the probability of occurrence of this accident, would be 3.4 x 10.3 latent cancer fatalities per
year. The estimated probability of maximum latent cancer fatalities to the maximally exposed
individual would be 6.0 x 10-6.

Workers in the immediate vicinity of the cask drop accident could receive very high doses;
however, the doses would not result in a fatality . For that accident, workers could be expected to be
very near the cask when it drops and receive both direct neutron and gamma radiation as well as
inhale airborne fission products. Workers would be expected to quicldy evacuate the area and thus
reduce their potential radiation exposure.

The dropped fuel cask accident has the maximum risk to workers with an estimated frequency
of less than I in 10,000 per year. A worker downwind of the accident was estimated to receive a
dose that corresponds to an estimated probability of 1.9 x 10.3 latent cancer fatalities . The estimated
risk for a worker would be 1.9 x 10-7 latent cancer fatal ities per year.

Other Generator/Storage Locations. For Regionalization 4A and 4B, the accident
risks would be expected to be similar to the accident risks under the No Action alternative.
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5.1.5.5 Non,.dlo/oglcal Accidents. The maximum reasonably foreseeable chemical
accident at the Idaho Engineering National Laboratory, Savannah River Site, and other
generator/storage locations would be similar to those described under the No Action alternative. An
accident during the operation of a wet storage facility at the Hanford Site could release sulfuric acid
and subject workers to fatalities or serious health effects.

Transportation Accidents_ The cumulative transportation accident risks over the
4O-year operational period were estimated to be 0 .0011 latent cancer fatality and 0.77 traffic fatality
if all SNF were transported by truck. If all SNF were transported by rail, the corresponding risks
were estimated to be 0.00037 latent cancer fatality and 0.76 traffic fatality.

Two independent accidents have been evaluated to describe the maximum reasonably
foreseeable chemical accident during the operation of the expended core facility at each of its
potential locations. Such a release could subject workers to chemical concentrations that could cause
fatalities or serious health effects but would not subject the public to such concentrations except at
potential locations on the Oak Ridge Reservation and adjacent to the Savannah River Site.

As in the 199211993 Planning Basis alternative, the maximum reasonably foreseeable offsite
transportation accident involves a rail shipment of special-ease commercial SNF in a suburban
population zone under neutral (average) weather conditions. The accident has a probability of
occurrence of about 2.8 x 10-7 per year, and the consequences are the same as those described under
the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative.

5.1.5.B r,.nsporf8t/on.
Reg/onallz.uon 4A (by fuel type)Shipments. Under Regionalization 4A, the same SNF lypes would be transported as
under the 199211993 Planning Basis alternative with differences occurring in the destinations of some
SNF based on fuel type. Onsite shipments would relocate SNF for continued safe storage or
stabilization.
Inddent-Free Transportation. For Regionalization 4A, the incident-free
transportation of SNF was estimated to result in total fatalities that ranged from 0. 17 to 0.61 over the
4O-year period 1995 througb 2035 . These fat.&lities represent the sum of the estimated number of
rad iation·related latent cancer fatalities and the estimated number of nonradiologicai fatalities from
vehicular emissions .
The reason for a range of fatalities was due to two factors: (a) the option of using truck or
rail transport for DOE SNF (see Appendix I), and (b) different SNF management options at the
Savannah River Site (see Appendix C). Navy shipments would be made using a combination of truck
and rail; DOE shipments were assumed to be made using 100 percent truck or 100 percent rail.

Onsite transportation of SNF would occur under Regionalization 4A at the Hanford Site,
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and Savannah River Site. The maximum reasonably
foreseeable accident for this alternative would occur at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,
and the potential impacts would be the same as those described under the No Action alternative.
Reglonallnt/on 48 (by geog,.phy)Shipments. Under Regionalization 4B, the same SNF types would be transported as
under the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative with differences occurring in the destinations of the
SNF based on geographical considerations. Non-naval SNF originating from western United States
locations or points of entry would be transported to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,
Hanford Site, or Nevada Test Site. Non-naval SNF originating from eastern U.,ited States locations
or points of entry would be transported to the Savannah River Site or Oak Ridge Reservation. Naval
SNF would not be split on an east-west blSis because the Navy would operate a facility for examining
naval SNF at one of the DOE sites. Onsite shipments at major DOE sites may relocate SNF from
one facility or another for continued safe storage or stabilization, if applicable.

The estimated number of radiation·related latent cancer fatalities for transportation workers
ranged from 0.031 to 0.15, the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for the
general population ranged from 0.054 to 0 .41, and the estimated number of nonradiological fatalities
from vehicular emissions ranged from 0.052 to 0.084.

Inddent-Free Transportation. For the six Regionalization 4B alternatives, the
incident-free transportation of SNF was estimated to result in total fatalities that ranged from 0. 14
(Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and Oak Ridge Reservation alternative) to 0.90 (Nevada Test
Site and Oak Ridge Reservation alternative). The other four alternatives would result in fatalities
between these two alternatives. These fatalities were over the 4O-year period 1995 through 2035 and
represent the sum of the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities and the
estimated number of nonradiological fatalities from vehicular emissions .

Onsite shipments of SNF were estimated to result in 0.0025 to 0.0034 fatalities . Offsite
shipments of SNF were estimated to result in 0. 17 to 0.61 fatalities . These fatalities also represent
the sum of the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities and the estimated number
of nonradiological fatalities from vehicular emissions.

The reason for a range of fatalities was due to two factors : (1) the option of using truck or
rail transport for DOE SNF (see Appendix I), and (2) the six regionalization alternatives. Navy
shipments would be made using a combination of truck or rail ; DOE shipments were assumed to be
made using 100 percent truck or 100 percent rail.
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For regionalization at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and Oak Ridge Reservation,
the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for transportation workers was 0.033,
the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for the general population was 0.043,
and the estimated number of nonradiological fatal ities from vehicular emissions was 0.059.

ReglonaUzatlon alternative

foreseeable accident for this alternative would occur at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,
and the potential impacts would be the same as those described under the No Action alternative.

For regionalization at the Nevada Test Site and Oak Ridge Reservation, the estimated number
of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for transportation workers was 0.21, the estimated number
of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for the general population was 0.60, and the estimated
number of nonradiological fatalities from vehicular emissions was 0.091.
For regionalization at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and Oak Ridge Reservation,
onsite shipments of SNF were estimated to result in 0.0025 fatalities . Offsite shipments of SNF were
estimated to result in 0.13 fatalities. These fatalities also represent the sum of the estimated number
of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities and the estimated number of nonradiological fatalities from
vehicular emissions.
For regionalization at the Nevada Test Site and Oak Ridge Reservation, onsite SNF shipments
were estimated to result in 0.0023 fatalities . Offsite sbipments of SNF were estimated to result in
0.90 fatalities . These fatalities also represent the sum of the estimated number of radiation-related
latent cancer fatalities and the estimated number of nonradiological fatalities from vehicular
emissions.
Transportation Attldents. Cumulative accident risks for transportation by truck
would range from 0.00090 latent cancer fatalities and 0.72 traffic fatalities for regionalization at the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and Savannah River Site, to 0.0012 latent cancer fatalities and
1.0 traffic fatal ities for regionalization at the Nevada Test Site and Oak Ridge Reservation.
Cumulative accident risks for transportation by rail would range from 0.00024 latent cancer fatal ities
and 0.72 traffic fatal ities for regionalization at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and Oak
Ridge Reservation, to 0.00035 latent cancer fatalities and 0.91 traffic fatalities for regionalization at
the Nevada Test Site and Oak Ridge Reservation.
As in the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative, the maximum reasonably foreseeable offsite
transportation accident would involve a rail shipment of special-case commercial SNF in a suburban
population zone under neutral (average) weather conditions . The accident has a probability of
occurrence that ranges from about 2.7 x 10.7 per yur for regionalization at the Hanford Site and
Savannab River Site, to about 3.7 X 10-7 per year for regionalization at the Nevada Test Site and
Savannah River Site. Accident consequences would be the same for each alternative and would be
the same as those described under the 199211993 Planning Basis alternative.
Onsite transportation of SNF would occur under Regionalization 4B at the Hanford Site,
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and Savannah River Site. The maximum reasonably
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5.1 .6 Centralization Alternative
Under this alternative, all stored and newly generated SNF would be transponed to and stored
at one of five sites: the Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Savannah River Site,
Oak Ridge Reservation, or Nevada Test Site. SNF management activities at unselected sites would
cease. All SNF-related research and development activities would be conducted at the selected site,
and the expended core facility would also be located there.
The implications of this alternative would be similar to those of Regionalization 4B alternative
for western sites, but if an eastern site were selected, considerahly greater volumes of SNF would be
stored there than under any other alternative because the site would receive fuels from the Hanford
Site and the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Therefore, substantially larger storage facilities
would be needed under this alternative than under any other. New facilities with the largest capacity
for SNF would be built at the Oak Ridge Reservation and Nevada Test Site because they do not now
bave the capacity to accept additional fuels and do not currently store significant volumes of SNF.
The potential environmental consequences at these sites are described below.
5.1.6.1 Socioeconomic• • The Centralization alternative would result in the largest
socioeconomic impact in terms of the number of direct jobs created (or lost) on a local basis by SNF
management activities (see Figure 5-7). The change in site employment would range from a decrease
of less than 3 percent of total site employment at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory to a
maximum increase of about 13 percent above existing site employment at the Nevada Test Site when
an expended core facility were constructed at the site. The intensity of this impact at the major DOE
sites would depend on (a) wbether the SNF management programs used existing personnel or
required workers to move into the region, and (b) future actions at each site competing for the
available labor pool. Under Centralization if the site were selected, the peak in employment would
occur at the Savannah River Site where an additional 1,700 workers would be required for the
proposed SNF management activities, an increase of approximately 11 percent above the projected
1995 baseline. If the site were not selected, the peak in employment would be an additional
580 workers at the Hanford Site or approximately 3 percent above the projected 1995 baseline. If
either the Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, or Savannah River Site were not
selected as a central site under the Centralization alternative, there would ultimately be a reduction in
employment equal to existing employment for SNF management at these sites. This would add to the
forecast loss of jobs at each of these sites. In the sbon term, additional jobs would be required to
prepare SNF for transpon off'site (see Figure 5-S). The closure of the Expended Core Facility at the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, however, would lead to a long-term loss of jobs as well,
increasing the rate of job loss at that site.
Sites selected as central sites would generally have increased employment over baseline levels
(see Figure 5-6) . This increased direct employment would also result in an indirect increase in
employment in the surrounding communities. At the Oak Ridge Reservation, the associated

VOLUME 1

population growth could result in increases in capital expenditures to meet the increased demand of
housing, utilities, including electricity generation, wastewater treatment, and water, transpoMation,
and education facilities. At the Hanford Site, centralization activities could strain the bousing market
and add to school-capacity concerns. For centralization at the Savannah River Site or the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory, DOE expects that potential impacts on the demand for community
resources and services would be minimal . For centralization at the Nevada Test Site, there is a
potential increase in housing demand. Overall socioeconomic impacts for centralization at the Nevada
Test Site could be absorbed within the projected expansion of the local economy, infrastructure,
public service, and real estate development.
5.1.6.2 UtIlities (Electricity). The effect on power consumption from
implementing th~ Centralization alternative would be generally similar to that described for
Regionalization 4B where It,e SNF is transponed offsite or where the SNF is transponed to the
regional site except at the Savannah River Site. Power consumption minimum increase would be
about 8 percent over the site baseline usage at the Savannah River Site from the construction and
operation of additional wet storage facilities under the Centralization alternative. Figures 5-8 and 5-9
illustrate the Centralization impacts for the two cases: if a site were selected or not selected as the
central site (compare with Figures 5-5 and 5-7). The impacts would be the same as those described
in Section 5. 1. Thus, for example, electric power requirements with centralization at the Nevada
Test Site would be similar to Regionalization 4B at the Nevada Test Site with a replacement expended
core facility also located at that site (Figure 5-6).
Under the Centralization alternative at Hanford, the power consumption would rise by
approximately 3 percent if SNF were only stored and could rise as mucb as 40 percent if processing
were required. While the increase in power required for processing appears large (as a percent of
baseline) when compared to the Savannah River Site, much of the difference would be the result of a
higher Savannah River Site baseline with power consumption.
5.1.6.3 Materials and Waste Management The Centralization alternative would bave
similar effects at the major DOE sites to those described in Section 5. 1.5.3 for the Regionalization
alternative (see Figures 5-5 and 5-7). If a site were not selected as the central site, the annual volume
.of waste generated from SNF management activities would ultimately decrease; bowever, transient
activities to stabilize and package the fuel could be substantial . The site selected as the central site
would increase the annual vc ,ume of wastes generated from SNF management activities. The
increase in waste would not necessarily be proponional to the larger amount of SNF being managed
onsite because the originating sites would characterize and can their fuel before transpon so it could
be placed directly into storage at the receiving site. The waste volumes would be geeerated from
transferring fuel from water pools at some sites, characterizing and canning small amounts of new
fuel, and operating the expended core facility . Figures 5·8 and 5·9 show the effects of not being
selected as well as being selected as the central site for SNF management activities.
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affected by this alternative.
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Figure 5-8. Summary of impacts for the Centraliution option if sites were DOt selected as a central
site. (The maximum incremental change from baseline is illustrated in graphs. Input data are
summarized in Appendix K.)
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graphs . Input data are summarized in Appendix K.)
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5.1.6.4 Radlologlcllllmpllct:J. For the Centralization alternative, the radiological impacts
from both normal operations and accidents at both the originating site and the central storage site
would be expected to be low and similar in magnitude. Accident analysis for both existing and
proposed SNF interim storage facilities indicates that the probabilities of accidents with the potential
for significant impacts would be extremely low.
Figure 5-7 illustrates the estimated latent cancer fatalities among the population within
80 kilometers (50 miles) from SNF operations at each of the major sites. For each major site, this
figure includes the potential impacts associated with site SNF operations with centralization at another
site, as well as with centralization at that site.
Accident risks from SNF activities would be principally because of handling and storage
activities and, therefore, would be expected to be similar for each of the centralization sites. The
principal differences would be due to activities at the existing SNF sites necessary to prepare the SNF
for transport to the central site.

SNF Fllcllity AccldentsHanrord Site. The implementation of the Centralization alternative at the Hanford
site would be expected to result in accident risks for some accidents slightly different from those
identified for the Decentralization alternative (Section 5. 15 of Appendix A). The amount of SNF
handled at the dry storage facility would be greater, resulting in an increase in the accident
probability for the dry storage cask impact and fire to approximately 8 in 1,000,000. The estimate of
risk from th is, the highest risk accident to the general population, would be 6.5 x 10-4 latent cancer
fat:.lities ir. the general populatio.: per year of operation. The corresponding risk to an individual
worker would be 7.5 x 10.7 potlntial latent cancer fatalities per year of operation.
Implementation of the Centralization alternative (or Regionalization 4B) elsewhere reduces the
estimates of accident risks from those identified for the Decentralization alternative because the
existing storage facilities would be shut down and the amount of SNF handled at the site decreases
slightly. The accident probability for the dry storage cask impact and fire would be expected to
decrease slightly, to approximately 5 in 1,000,000. This yields an estimated accident risk to the
general population of 4.1 x 10-4 latent cancer fatalities per year of operation. The corresponding
highest risk accident to a worker would be 4.75 x 10.7 potential latent cancer fatalities per year of
operation.
Idaho National Enginee.-ing Laboratory. The implementation of the Centralization
alternative at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory is estimated in Section 5.15 of Appendix B
to result in additional accident scenarios and accident risks from those identified for the No Action
alternati ve due to the assumed resumption of chemical processing of SNF at the Idaho Chemical
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Processing Plant. The consequences and risks from SNF-related accidents would be the same as
Regionalization 4B if the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory is selected as a regional site.
The implementation of the Centralization alternative at a site other than the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory would result in potential accident consequences and risks the same as the
Regionalization 4B when the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory is not selected as a regional site.
Savannah River Site. TIle implementation of the Centralization alternative at the
Savannah River Site, including the three options of dry storage, wet storage, and processing followed
by dry storage, is assessed in Section 5.15 and Attachment A of Appendix C to result in accidents not
significantly different from those identified for the same options under the Decentralization
alternative. Because of an increase in the amount of SNF handled, however. the accident frequency
for some accidents would increase.
The accident frequency for llIe highest risk accident, a fuel assembly breach, would be
expected to be about 0.84 fuel assembly breaches per year of operation with implementation of this
alternative. The estimated risk of latent cancer fatalities to the general public, maximally exposed
offsite individual, and co-located worker would be 7.2 x 10-3,8.4 X 10-7, and 4 x 10-6 per year
of operation, respectively. With centralization elsewhere, the highest risk accident would still be the
fuel assembly breach with an estimated risk approximately the same as with the No Action
alternative.

Oak Ridge Reservation. The accident risks associated with implementation of the
Centralization alternative at the Oak Ridge Reservation are presented in detail in Section 5. 15 (part 3)
of Appendix F. These accident risks are summarized under Regionalization 4B.
Nevada Test Site. The accident risks associated with implementation of the
Centralization alternative at the Nevada Test Site are presented in detail in Section 5.15 (part 2) of
Appendix F. These accident risks are summarized under Regionalization 4B.
Other Gmerator/Storage Locations. The accident risks under the Centralization
alternative would be expected to be the same as the accident risks under the No Action alternative.

5.1.6.5 Nonnldiologlcal Accidents. Abnormal operational events could result in the
rel ease of toxic or hazardous substances from the centralized facility or from SNF management
facilities at the other storage/generator sites prior to the shipment of SNF to the central site. The
events that would be expected to exceed exposure guidelines would be similar to those described
under the 199211993 Planning Basis alternative.
Two independent accidents have been evaluated to describe the maximum reasonably
foreseeable chemical hazard during the operation of the expended core facility at each of its potential
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locations. Such a release could subject workers to chemical concentrations that would exceed the
Emergency R~ponse Planning Guideline value but would not subject the public to such
concentrations except at potential locations on the Oak Ridge Reservation and adjacent to the
Savannah River Site.
5.1.6.6 Transportation.
Shlpmem.-Under the Centralization alternative, all stored and newly generated
SNF would be transported to one of five sites: the Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory, Savannah River Site, Oak Ridge Reservation, or Nevada Test Site.
Incident-Free Transportatlo~For the five Centralization alternative sites, the
incident-free transportation of SNF was estimated to result in total fatalities that ranged from 0.21
(centralization at the Oak Ridge Reservation) to 1.7 (centralization at the Savannah River Site).
These fatalities were over the 4O-year period 1995 through 2035 and represent the sum of the
estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities and the estimated number of
nooradiological fatalities from vehicular emissions.
The range of fatalities was due to two factors: (a) the option of using truck or rail transport
for DOE SNF (see Appendix 1) and (b) the five centralization options. Navy shipments would be
made using a combination of truck and rail ; DOE shipments were assumed to be made using
100 percent truck or 100 percent rail.
For centralization at the Oak Ridge Reservation, the estimated number of radiation-related
latent cancer fatalities for transportation workers was 0.050, the estimated number of radiation-related
latent cancer fatalities for the general population was 0.073, and the estimated number of
nooradiological cancer fatalities from vehicular emissions was 0.083.
For centralization at the Savannah River Site the estimated number of radiation-related latent
cancer fatalities for transportation workers was 0.43, the estimated number of radiation-related latent
cancer fatalities for the general populat:on was 1.2, and the estimated number of nooradiological
fatalities from vehicular emissions was 0. 11.
For centralization at the Oak Ridge Reservation, onsite shipments of SNF were estimated to
result in 0.0023 fatalities. Offsite shipments of SNF were estimated to result in 0 .20 fatalities .
These fatalities were also the sum of the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities
and the estimated number of nooradiological fatalities from vehicular emissions .
For centralization at the Savannah River Site, onsite shipments of SNF were estimated to
result in 0 .0035 fatalities. Offsite shipments of SNF were estimated to result in 1.7 fatalities . These
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fatalities were also the sum of the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities and the
estimated number of nooradiologica1 fatalities from vehicular emissions.
Transportation Accldent.-Cumulative accident risks for transportation by truck
would range from 0.0048 latent cancer fatalities and 1.0 traffic fatalities for centralization at the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, to 0.0020 latent cancer fatalities and 1.44 traffic fatalities for
centralization at the Savannah River Site. Cumulative accident risks for transportation by rail would
range from 0.0013 latent cancer fatalities and 0.95 traffic fatalities for centralization at the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory, to 0 .0014 latent cancer fatalities and 1.19 traffic fatalities for
centralization at the Nevada Test Site.
For centralization at either the Hanford Site or Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, the
maximum reasonably foreseeahle offsite transportation accident would involve a rail shipment of
special-case commercial SNF in a suburban population zone under neutral (average) weather
conditions. The accident has a probability of occurrence of about 5 x 10.7 per year and the
consequences would be ~ie same as those described under the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative.
For centralization at the Oak Ridge Reservation or the Nevada Test Site, the maximum
reasonably foreseeable offsite transportation accident involves a rail shipment of special case
commercial SNF in an urban population zone under neutral (average) weather conditions. The
accident has a probability of occurrence of about I x 10-7 per year and could result in an estimated
36 latent cancer fatalities in the exposed population for Oak Ridge Reservation; for the Nevada Test
Site, the accident would result in approximately 36 latent cancer fatalities . For comparison, the same
population would be expected to experience about 540,000 cancer fatalities from other causes. The
probability of this accident occurring under stable (worst-case) weather conditions is less than
I x 10.7 per year for urban and suburban zones; the probability of occurrence is 5.7 x 10.7 per year
if the accident occurred in a rural population zone and could result in an estimated 2 latent cancer
fatalities.
For centralization at the Savannah River Site, the bounding offsite transportation accident
would involve a rail shipment of commercial SNF in a suburban population zone under stable
(worst-case) weather conditions. The accident has a probability of occurrence of about
1.2 x 10.7 per year and could result in an estimated 55 latent cancer fatalities in the exposed
population. For comparison, the same population would be expected to experience about 42,000
cancer fatalities from other causes. The probability of this accident occurring in an urban population
zone is less than I x 10-7 per year. In a rural population zone, the accident consequences would be
approximately 3 percent of the suburban zone consequences.
Onsite transportation of SNF would occur under the Centralization alternative at the Hanford
Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and Savannah River Site. The bounding accident
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among the three sites occurs at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and the potential impacts
would be the same as those described under the No Action alternative.

CentralizatIon alternatIve

Table 5-3. Comparison of estimated transportation accident risks for alternatives over the 4O-year
period .

Tahle S-2 summarizes the comparison of incident-free transportation fatalities for each of the
SNF management alternatives. Table S-3 provides the comparison of transportation accident risks for
each of the SNF management alternatives.
Table 5-2_ Comparison of incident-free transportation total fatalities for alternatives over the 4O-year
perind.
Minimuma,b

Maximumb.e

Iotal

falaliti<o

Iotal
ratalitiCi

0.0089

0.0089

0.1210 O.IS

0.3S 10 0.38

1992/1993 Plannins BuiJ

0.14

0.4S

Rceionalization 4A (fuel type)

0. 17

0 .61

No Action

Decentralization

Truek Accident RilU'
Alternative

La.-<:an<:cT

Rail Accident Rilua
Lalent

falaliti<o

TraIT.. CataIitica

cancer ......liti<o

Tramcfalaliti<o

No Action

4.1 x I~

0.047

UXI~

0.047

Deccntralizationb

O.OOO8S 10
0.00090

0.2010 1.01

0 .0002910
0.00034

0 .2610 1.07

199211993 Plannins BuiJ

0 .0010

0.70

O.OOO3S

0 .73

Regionalization 4A (fuel type)

0 .0011

0.77

0 .00037

0.76

Idaho National Enginccrin,
Laboratory and Savannah
River Site

0.00090

0.72

0 .00034

0.73

Idaho National Engineering

O.OOO9S

0 .73

0.00024

0.72

Han(ord Site and Savannah
River Site

0 .0013

0.84

O.OOO7S

0.82

Hanronl Site and Oak Rid,e

Regionalization 48 (gcoB"phy)

Laboralory and Oak Rid",
Reservation

Regionalization 48 Cacography)
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and Savannah
River Site

O.IS 10 0.17

O.SIIo 0.S3

0.0013

0.81

O.OOOSO

Idaho National Laboratory and Oak Jijdge Reservation

0.1410 O.IS

0.S3 10 0.S4

Rcsc:rvalion

0.78

Nevada Tell Site and
Savanilah River Site

0.0012

0 .99

O.OOO4S

0.91

Nevada Test Site and Oak
Rid¥e Reservation

0 .0012

1.00

O.OOO3S

0 .91

Hanford Site and Savannah River Site

0.17

O.SS 10 0.S6

Hanford Site and Oak Ridge Reservation

O.IS

0.S7

Nevada Teat Site and Savannah River Site

0.19

0.88

Nevada Test Site and Oak Ridge Reaervation

0.17

0.90

Hanford Site

0.0050

1.10

0 .0013

1.05

Hanford Site

0.23

1.3

Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory

0.0048

1.00

0.0013

0.9S

Ccnlnlization

Centralization

Idaho Nattonal Engineering Laboratory

0.21

1.1

Savannah River Site

0.0020

1.44

0 .00080

1.09

Savannah River Site

0.26

1.7

Oak Ridge Rc.scrvation

0 .0017

I.3S

O.OOOSS

1.00

Oak Ridge Reaervation

0.21

1.6

Nevada TCiI Site

O.OOSO

1.33

0.0014

1.19

Nevada Teal Site

0.26

1.6

•. The minimum total ratatitiea would be Uloeiated with tnnlport of DOE fuel by rail;, naval SNF IhipmcntJ would be
by both truck (ansite) and rail (off'itc).
b. Total fatalities were calculated (or the ~yur period 1995 tbroueh 2035 and were the sum of the eatimatcd number
of radiation-related latent Cl.llCCT ral&litica for worken and the general population and the estimated number o f
nonndiological fal.l.lities fro m vehicle emissions.

a. An umCi SNP shipments would be 100 pcrc:cnt by truck or 100 percent by rail, except for naval SNP shipments that
would be by both truck (onsile) and rail (orr.ite).
b. Range o( vatuCl in each column (or the Decentralization ahcmative rcncctJ the different fuel examination option. for
naval SNP.

c. The m.ax.imum lOl.I.l fal.l.litic:s would be usociated with transport o( DO£ fuel by truck. naval SNP .hipmcntJ would
be by both truck (onsite) and rail (offsite).
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5.2 Issues Not Discussed in Detail
This section discusses potential impacts for issues that are not discussed in detail because they
are small and do not distinguisb among alternatives, but about which the public may have general
interest. The discussion for each discipline generally concentrates on sites and alternatives that have
the largest expected impacts, demonstrating that the environmental consequences for that discipline
are not of sufficient importance to be given strong consideration in the programmatic decisionmaking

during construction, earth-moving activities would stop and the State Historic Preservation Officer
would be contacted immediately. If Native American or Native Hawaiian resources were to be
involved, their leaders would also be contacted. Impacts to cultural resources were determined not to
be an important discriminator among sites and alternatives; therefore, they are not considered further
in this chapter. Details on cultural impacts are given in Appendices A througb F.

5.2.3 AesthetIc and Scenic Resources

process.

5.2.1 Land Use
The proposed alternatives would not result in major impacts on land use at either the DOE or
the naval sites. The largest amount of land that would b~ disturbed at any of the DOE sites would be
53 hectares (130 acres) at the Hanford Site. This would occur under the Centralization alternative
and would take less than 0 .5 percent of the land at that site. Less than 6.5 hectares (16 acres) of land
would be required at the naval sites for the No Action alternative for the storage of SNF on railcars,
and no additional land outside of the existing sites would be required. At all SNF sites, new facilities
would be located near existing facilities or new facilities would be built on previously disturbed or
industrialized land. Additional land might be required for infrastructure and buffer wnes if a new
SNF management facility is required. Because less than 0.5 percent of the land at any of the DOE
sites would be needed and the current land use at the naval sites would not change, land use was
determined not to be a discriminating factor (discriminator) among sites or alternatives and is not
considered further in this volume. Detail on land use impacts is presented in Appendices A
through F. The EIS does not explicitly consider land that is currently used for SNF operations or
land that might or might not be made available for other uses under some alternatives.

At all DOE sites, any proposed new SNF management facilities would be located far from
areas with public access. Where new facilities would be visible to the public, similar facilities are
already visible. At naval sites, SNF storage locations would be located at existing industrial facilities.
Aesthetic and scenic resources would not be significantly affected by SNF management activities and
are not considered further in this chapter. Discussion of impacts on aesthetic and scenic resources are
contained in Appendices A througb F .

5.2.4 Geologic Resources
None of the sites has known significant geologic resources that would be affected by the
alternatives. Except for the potential existence of gold, tungsten, and molybdenum at the Nevada
Test Site, geologic resources at the candidate sites consist of surficial sand, gravel, or clay deposits
that have low economic value. The alternatives that involve constructing new facilities would result
in disturbing or extracting surface deposits to construct the facilities. New construction would
increase the use of surface deposits (that is, sand and gravel deposits), but because of the large
volume of these materials on the sites, the impact is expected to be small.
All the major DOE sites have experienced earthquakes; however, they are located in areas

5.2.2 Cultural Resource.
Cultural, archaeological, historic, and architectural resources are defined as prehistoric and
historic sites, districts, structures, and evidence of human use that are considered important to a
culture, subculture, or a community for scientific, traditional, religious, or other reasons.

with low to moderate seismic potential with respect to more seismically active areas in the United
States (Algermissen et a1. 1982, 1990). Because any new facility would be constructed to meet
current seismic design criteria for a given area, seismic concerns are not a discriminating factor
among sites. Details on site geology are provided in Appendices A through F.

5.2.5 Air Quality
Most of the major DOE sites and some of the naval sites contain areas of archaeological,
cultural , or historical interest. Direct impacts to archaeological resources would be associated with
ground disturbance activities. Indirect impacts would result from improved visitor access, changes in
land status, or other actions that would limit future scientific investigation. Although the major DOE
sites have not been surveyed completely, the locations for the construction of proposed new facilities
have generally !>.;en evaluated for their cultural importance. No known cultural resources would be
affected by construction under any of the proposed alternatives. Specific surveys would be conducted
before beginning any construction to determine the impacts to cultural resources. As described in
Section 5.7.3, if cultural resources (for example, prehistoric or historic artifacts) were encountered
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SNF management activities under some alternatives would result in slightly increased releases
of pollutants to the atrnosphe: e. At the major DOE sites, the projected emissions from SNF
management activities would not contribute to nonattainment of state or Federal standards. There
would be no impact on nooradiological ambient air quality at the naval sites (Appendix D).
Construction activities at several different sites are expected to cause short-term, minor increases in
fugitive dust emissions, but the use of standard dust suppression techniques would be expected to
minimize this problem. These particulate emissions could temporarily affect visibility in localized
areas but would not cause nonattainrnent of state or Federal standards. Because SNF management
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activities would not be expected to cause either radiological or nonradiological air quality impacts to
exceed state or Federal standards at any site for any alternative considered, or to significantly affect
air quality in any other respect, air quality impacts are not discussed further in this chapter. The
potential radiological impacts on health are discussed in Section 5. J. The computer models used for
evaluating air quality impacts, and detailed results are discussed in Appendices A through F .
5.2.6 Water Resources
The proposed alternatives would have small impacts on water resources at each of the
candidate sites. Compared with existing activities at all proposed SNF sites, additional water
consumption would be minor and would relate primarily to the increased demand of a larger work
force because SNF water pools use recycled water. The maximum increase of water usage over
baseline at any candidate site would be approximately 5 percent. There would be net increases in
employment at the Oak Ridge Reservation, and the Nevada Test Site; however, water resources
would not be expected to be appreciably affected under any alternative. Nevertheless, at the Nevada
Test Site, where available water is limited, a cumulative water supply impact is possible. The effects
of groundwater withdrawal from the Frenchman Flat hydrographic area at the Nevada Test Site to
support a proposed SNF facility on groundwater yields are unknown and require additional study.
The Frenchman Flat hydrographic area is part of the Ash Meadows sub-basin whose perennial yield
has greatly exceeded its annual water withdrawals. Some potential also exists for minor, short-tenn
impacts of sedimentation during construction at the Oak Ridge Reservation and the Savannab River
Site.
Storing SNF in water pools creates a potential for radiological groundwater contamination
through undetected leaks or accidents that breach containment systems. Releases to groundwater
caused by accidental minor breaches of leak containment systems are very small compared with
accidental minor releases, which are presented in Appendices A through F under Occupational and
Public Health and Safety. Water resources are discussed in detail in Appendices A through F .
5.2.7 Ecological Resources
The major DOE sites under consideration are located on large reservations that are
predominantly "natural." The naval sites, on the other hand, are generally much smaller with
significant industrial infrastructure. Similarly, the majority of the other generator and storage sites
are in urban or suburban settings, where natural flora and fauna are limited to species that have
developed a tolerance to human activities. Therefore, the largest impacts to ecological resources are
expected to occur at the five major DOE sites where undisturbed or semi-4isturbed natural areas could
be converted to industrial activity. Under any of the alternatives involving the construction of new
facilities at DOE sites, individuals or smal l populations of some wildlife species may be disturbed,
displaced, or destroyed.

The development of new DOE facilities would affect some natural habitats. The size of the
areas affected would be small in relation to the size of the sites and the size of remaining natural
habitats. The type of habitats affected would vary but would be typical of the regional area in which
the sites are located. The habitat losses would probably not affect any threatened or endangered
species or critical habitats with the possible exception of the proposed facUities at the Nevada Test
Site and the Hanford Site. At the Nevada Test Site, the proposed SNF facilities could be constructed
within the range of the desert tortoise, a federally listed threatened species. At the Hanford Site,
construction related to SNF management could result in a habitat loss up to 28 hectares (70 acres) for
Federal and state-listed candidate species (for example, loggerhead shrike, sage sparrows, burrowing
owls, pygmy rabbits). As described in Section 5.7.7, mitigation plans would be developed in
consultation with the appropriate agencies if any threatened or endangered species were identified on
the project site. Habitat fragmentation is not expected because new facilities would be constructed
adjacent to existing facilities . Because minor impacts to ecological resources would occur at all sites
for all alternatives involving construction, ecology was not considered a significant discriminator
among sites and, therefore, is not discussed further in this chapter. Appendices A through F present
a detailed discussion of ecological impacts.
5.2.8 Noise
The construction of SNF management facilities at any of the sites would generate noise levels
consistent with light industrial activity. However, at the major DOE sites, noise generated onsite
does not propagate offsite at levels that would affect the general population. Noise at the naval sites
is primarily from truck and car traffic, shiploading, and diesel-powered equipment. Noise impact
analyses at the naval sites indicate that noise from construction or operation of facilities would not
cause the ambient noise levels to exceed U.S. Environmental Protection Agency or state guidelines.
Construction would occur at the naval sites under the No Action and Decentralization alternatives.
Noise impacts would be expected to be comparable at the major DOE sites for all alternatives except
for the No Action alternative, which does not involve construction of new facilities. Because these
new facilities would be located in industrialized areas, however, no impacts are expected. Because
noise impacts would be minor and do not differentiate among the sites or the alternatives, they are not
considered further in this chapter. Details on the noise impact analyses are provided in Appendices A
through F.
5.2.9 Utilities and Energy
New facilities (or the restarting of idle facilities) would result in increased demands on water
power, and sewage. The greatest resource requirements would result from the implementation of th:
Centralization alternative. Based on available data, the increased water usage would range from less
than I percent at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory to a maximum of less than 5 percent
above existing site usage at the Savannah River Site. Electricity requirements are discussed in
Section 5. 1. The increase in sewage generation result ing from implementation of the alternatives
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would range from less than I percent at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory to a maximum of
9 percent at the Savannah River Site. A central sewage treatment system would have to be
constructed for the SNF facilities at the Nevada Test Site under the Regionalization and Centralization
alternatives if the Nevada Test Site were selected as a regional or central site. "IlIe existing system
capacities at all sites could manage the estimated changes in utility usage rates for water.
Appendices A through F provide details on utilities and energy consumption.

5.3 Cumulative Impacts
A cumulative impact on the environment results from the incremental impact of the action
when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable actions. "Other" actions include DOE
projects at the potentially affected sites not related to SNF management, as well as projects proposed
by other Government agencies, private businesses, or individuals. This type of an assessment is
important because Significant cumulative impacts can result from several smaller actions that by
themselves do not have significant impacts. The programmatic cumulative impacts from the
implementation of the DOE SNF Management Program are discussed in Section 5.3. 1. The
site-specific cumulative impacts are described in Section 5.3.2.
5.3.1 Programmatic Cumulative Impacts
On a nationwide basis, the implementation of any of the SNF Management Program
alternatives would not be exp Cled to significantly contribute to cumulative impacts. There would be
a small change in regional employment, little use of nonrenewable resources, low radiological
emissions, and a low rate of radioactive waste generation. Under most alternatives, subalternatives,
and options, the activities required for SNF management would be very small in comparison to other
non-SNF-related activities already underway at almost all sites where SNF would be stored. Even in
those alternatives where there would be large changes in nonrenewable resource use at one or more
sites (Regionalization by geography or Centralization), on a national scale, increases at the selected
regional or central site would be compensated for by changes at nonselected sites, so the net change is

very small.
Reasonably foreseeable projects that could contribute to cumulative impacts are identified for
each of the DOE and naval sites in Appendices A, S, C, D, and F. For the major DOE sites, these
projects are primarily associated with environmental restoration and waste management activities, one
of the priorities being given to site management, and are being covered by the Waste Management
Programmatic EIS and site-specific EISs. It is expected that SNF management activities would have
consistently smaller impacts than the environmental restoration and waste management activities, and
that the overall impact of SNF management would not contribute significantly to cumulative impacts
on either a regional or a nationwide basis.
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The transport of DOE and naval SNF over highways and railways is only one of the sources
of radiological dose to the general public. The potential transport of commercial SNF for disposal in
a repository, assumed to be in Nevada for purposes of analysis, the proposed transport of transuranic
wastes to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico, and the expected transport of radioisotopes
used in medicine and other activities all would contribute to public exposures. Available historical
data and projected future doses are summarized in Appendix I.
During analysis, the potential for significant cumulative impacts to other resources was
considered; none were found. Cumulative impacts are described qualitatively because programmatic
considerations do not require detailed information that depends on specific facility location or design.
More detailed cumulative effects analysis will be performed for any actions that are proposed in the
course of implementing programmatic SNF management decisions.
5.3.2 Site-Speclfic Cumulative Impacts

All of the sites contain facilities unrelated to SNF that may continue to operate throughout the
duration of the SNF interim management program (approximately 40 years). Impacts from both
construction and operation of SNF facilities would be cumulative with the impacts of existing and
planned facilities or actions such as environmental restoration and waste management activities
unrelated to SNF. Cumulative effects involving site-specific projects that are planned to occur
simultaneously with SNF management activities at the major DOE sites are discussed in the site
appendices. Not all planned facilities were factored into the assessment of cumulative impacts
pending funding approval or resolution of DOE policy issues.
The following sections discuss cumulative impacts to those environmental resources identified
in Appendices A through F. During analysis, the potential for significant cumulative impacts to other
environmental resources (that is, geologic resources, aesthetic and scenic resources, and cultural
resources) was evaluated; none were found .
5.3.2.1 Land Uu. Implementation of any of the SNF alternatives at the major DOE sites
would have a minimal cumulative impact with respect to either the available land onsite or to the
continued mission of the sites. The largest proportion of any site that would be required for all
sitewide activities is less than I percent of the total site area.
5.3.2.2 Socioeconomics. Depending on the economic status and outlook for an area, SNF
activities coupled with other actions have the potential to strain or overburden the socioeconomic
resources of certain areas, particularly if either the Regionalization or Centralization alternatives were
selected with an expended core facility located at the site. For example, these cumulative effects
could contribute to housing shortages, the need for additional schools, and increased demand for
utilities and transportation.
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Each site is anticipating an overall decline in site employment over the next few years;
therefore, the existing work force could be reassigned to SNF management activities. However, it
was assumed that the construction activities associated with the proposed SNF management
alternatives would require the in-migration of construction workers. Although these construction
activities are short-term with a duration of a few years, when addressed cumulatively with other
reasonably foreseeable activities, there could be a socioeconomic impact in the communities
surrounding the Hanford Site, Nevada Test Site, and Oak Ridge Reservation. For exampl~, at the
Hanford Site cumulative employment, housing requirements, and needs for schools would mcrease up
to I percent over those based on present Hanford employment for SNF management activities only.
Impacts to socioeconomic resources associated with the implementation of proposed SNF
actions at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Savannah River Site, naval sites, and other
generator sites are not expected to be sufficient to have a cumulative effect on the regional social
infrastructure within each site's region of influence.
5.3.2.3 Air Quality. The availahle data in AppendiCes A through F indicate that the
cumulative air emissions from the Savannah River Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, and
naval sites, including those from the proposed SNF management alternatives, would not exc~ th~
limits for nonradioactive air pollutants and would not threaten to exceed the limits for nonradIoactive
pollutants or the 40 CFR Part 61 limit of 0.01 rem (10 millirem) per year for radioactive emissions .
5.3.2.4 Water Resources. Based on data available in App<ndices A through F, the
implementation of any of the SNF alternatives at the major DOE sites would result in m.~i~al
cumulative impacts to water resources under normal operations. The proposed SNF faclhtles and
related management operations are designed to generate no liquid releases of wastewater to the
subsurface or water resources containing radiological constituents or hazardous chemicals. The
facilities would be constructed using state-of-the-art technologies, including secondary containment
and leak detection and water balance monitoring equipment. Liquid effluent discharges from SNF
activities will be monitored for the presence of radioactive and chemical constituents and determined
suitable for land disposal as required under Federal and State regulations.

threatened species. For example, at the Hanford Site the cumulative impact from planned activities
including construction related to SNF management could result in habitat loss for Federal and state
candidate species (for example, loggerhead shrike, sage sparrows, burrowing owls, pygmy rabbits).
At the Nevada Test Site, the proposed SNF facilities would be constructed within the range of the
desert tortoise, a federally listed threatened species. Therefore, the proposed SNF management
activities in addition to other planned actions could result in a small cumulative loss of habitat for the
desert tortoise.
5.3.2.6 Occupational and Public Health. The sources of radiation exposure to
individuals consist of natural background radiation from cosmic, terrestrial, and internal body
sources; medical radiation; and radiation from manmade sources, including consumer and industrial
products, nuclear facilities, and weapons test fallout. At the Savannah River Site, for example,
natural background radiation contributes about 82 percent of the dose received !>y an average member
of the population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of the site, medical exposure accounts for
15 percent of the annual dose, and the combined doses from weapons test fallout, consumer and
industrial products, and air travel account for approximately 3 percent. DOE nuclear facilities at the
Savannah River Site account for less than 0.1 percent of the total radiation exposure.
The radiological impacts from SNF management operations are exposures to both workers and
the general public from normal operations and the risk of additional radiation exposures due to
accidents. The major concerns with these exposures are whether the doses are sufficient to cause
immediate harm and how much they will increase the probabilities, among the exposed population, of
latent cancer fatalities , nonfatal cancers, and genetic effects . Of further concern is that these SNF
management-related exposures are in addition to those exposures and risks affecting the same workers
and members of the general public from other sources. The cumulative impact of both the
SNF-related increment and other possible sources is also a concern.

5.3.2.5 Biotic Res ources. Construction of the proposed SNF facilities in addition to other
planned activities could disturb as much as 9 hectares (24 acres) of terrestrial habitat at ~e Hanford
Site and as much as 13 hectares (31 acres) of previously disturbed land at the Idaho NatIOnal
Engineering laboratOry. No impacts to biotic resources would be expected at the Sav~ah River
Site or Oak Ridge Reservation. However, construction activities at the Nevada Test Site and Hanford
Site could result in habitat loss for either Federal and state candidate species or federally listed

Cumulative ImpacU to the General Public-The principal regulatory limit
affecting emissions from DOE and naval sites is the Clean Air Act standard (40 CFR Part 61 ,
Subpart H for DOE; Subpart I for the Navy) for airborne radionuclide emissions from DOE facilities.
This rule limits ai rborne emissions to those amounts that would not cause any member of the public
to receive in any yesr
effective dose equivalent of more than 0.01 rem (10 millirem) per year.
Implementation of any of the al ternatives at any of the sites is not expected to result in normal
releases exceeding this limit. The naval sites have demonstrated to the U.S . Environmental Protection
Agency that, at 0.000 1 rem (0.1 mill irem) per year, they lfe at 1 percent of the limit and operation of
SNF management fac il ities is not expected to change that conclusion. Data available for each of the
sites (see Append ices A th rough F) indicate that over the 4O-year planning period, the cumulati ve
radioactive emissions from the existing, the potential SNF management activities, and reasonably
foreseeable futu re site activities at any of the sites would not be expected to result in an additional
latent cancer fatal ity among the general population surrounding the site, except for the Oak Ridge
Reservation. With centralization at the Oak Ridge Reservation, operation of the proposed SNF
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Water usage from SNF activities would also have a small cumulative effect on overall
quantities of water available at the major DOE sites. The maximum increase over baseline water use
would be approximately 5 percent for any of the proposed locations.
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management facilities over their expected 4O-year lifetimes is estimated to result in a total population
dose of approximately 2,500 person-rem. This equates to approximately two latent cancer fatalities
over the period.
Cumulative Impacts on the Site Worlc

FoI"C~The

cumulative impact of
selection of either of the alternatives coupled with the existing and reasonably foreseeable actions has
the potential to increase the radiological exposure to workers at the sites transporting and receiving
the SNF. Por both the transporting and receiving sites, the routine exposure to the workers is
expected to increase because much of the dose to the workers is associated with SNF handling
operations.
Because occupational worker exposures are easily monitored and controlled to levels a factor
of 10 or more below the current standards, the overall average exposure per worker is expected to
remain approximately constant at each of the SNF transporting and receiving sites with each of the
alternatives. However, with options that involve more SNF activities, the number of SNF-related
workers is expected to increase, thus increasing the collective radiation dose to the site work force.
As reported in Appendices A through F and summarized in Appendix K, the increases in collective
dose to the work force varies from site to site and with the alternatives. At the Oak Ridge
Reservation, for example, the increases due to SNF-related actions range to 3,200 person-rem over
the 4O-year planning period. The maximum SNF-related increase is equivalent to approximately one
additional latent cancer fatality among the workforce.
5.3.2.7 Transportation.
Radiological Impacts-Table 5-4 summarizes the existing and reasonably

foreseeable actions assessed to determine the cumulative impact for transportation for the SNF
alternatives. The cumulative radiological impacts of incident-free transportation of SNF are presented
in terms of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities. These results are summarized in Table 5-5 and
more details are contained in Appendix I. Over the 93-year period from 1943 through 2035, the total
number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities was estimated to be 290, or approximately three
latent cancer fatalities per year. General transport of radioactive material accounted for about
90 percent of these radiation-related latent cancer fatalities. The radiation-related latent cancer
fatalities would be indistinguishable from other cancer fatalities and would be 0.001 percent of the
total number of cancer fatalities that would be expected to occur. The radiation-related latent cancer
fatalities associated with the alternatives evaluated in this EIS would be 5 x 1O~ percent of the total
number of cancer fatalities that would be expected to occur.
Traffic Accident Impa~Fataiities involving the transport of radioactive

materials for 1971 through 1993 were surveyed based on data in the Radioactive Material Incident
Report database. This database contains information on radioactive materials transportation incidents

VOLUME 1

5-72

Table 5-4. Other activities included for assessment of cumulative impacts for transportation.
Activity

Table 5-5. Summary of transponation radiological cumulative impacts.

Description

Existing activities:

Occupational latent
cancer fatalities

Category of shipment"

Historical shipments

Historical shipments of SNF, Hanford Site,
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,
Savannah River Site, Oak Ridge Reservation,
and Nevada Test Site

General transponation

Nationwide transport of radioactive materials
for medical, industrial, fuel cycle, and disposal
purposes

Reasonably foreseeable activities:

General population latent
cancer fatal ities

Projected SNF shipments for all

alternatives
Truck

0.00060 to 0.40

0.000 17 to 1.2

Train

0.00060 to 0.060

0.000 17 to 0.085

Historical SNF b

0.080

General transponation (1943 to 2035)'

120

0.055
140

Reasonably foreseeable actionsd

Geologic repository

Shipments of commercial SNF and defense
high-level waste to the geologic repository at
Yucca Mountain, Nevada

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

Shipments of transuranic waste to the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant at Carlsbad, New Mexico
(including a 5-year Test Phase and 20-year
Disposal Phase)

Submarine reactor compartments

Sh ipments of reactor compartments from Puget
Sound Naval Shipyard to Hanford

Return of isotope capsules

Shipments of cesium-137 isotope capsules to the
Hanford Site

Uranium billets

Shipment of low-enriched uranium billets from
the Hanford Site to the United Kingdom

Truck

4.4

Train

0.33

130

Total cancer fatalities"

25
0.85

160

a. See Table 5-4 and Appendix I for more details .
b. Shipments to Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Savannah River Site, Oak
Ridge Reservation, and Nevada Test Site. Includes transport of naval SNF to the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory.
c. Shipments are a combination of truck and train.
d. Shipments to the geologic repository, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, and shipments of
submarine reactor compartments, isotope capsules, and uranium billets
e. Numbers may not sum due

:~

rou_n_d_in..:g:..._ __ _ __ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

and accidents from the U.S. Department of Transponation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
DOE, state radiation control offices, and media coverage. From 1971 through 1993,21 traffic
accidents involving 36 fatalities have occurred. These fatalities resulted from traffic accidents and
were not associated with the radioactive nature of the cargo. No radiological fatalities because of
transponation accidents have ever occurred in the United State.s. During the same time period, over
1,000,000 persons were killed in traffic accidents in the United States.
For the alternatives evaluated in this EIS , about one traffic accident fatality was estimated to
occur. During the 40-year time period from 1995 through 2035 evaluated in this EIS, approximately
1,600,000 persons would be killed in traffic accidents in the United States.
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5.3.2.B EnergyIUtJlltl8iJ. Under certain SNF management alternatives, energy or utility
requirements for SNF management in combination with other present for future projec ,could stress
or exce.ld the existing capacity at a site. The existing energy and capacity would e adequate for the
SNF management alternatives at all sites with the possible exception of the Hanford Site and the
Nevada Test Site.

The increased volume of transuranic waste that could be generated from SNF management
activities could exceed 100 percent above baseline at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory.
SavaMah River Site, Oak Ridge Reservation, and Nevada Test Site based on centralization and
processing options. This percentage is high at both Nevada Test Site and the Oak Ridge Reservation
hecause neither of these sites is currently generating transuranic waste and because both sites have
projected that future transuranic waste volumes will only be produced by SNF management activities.

If all SNF were transported to the Hanford Site under the Centralization alternative, then
existing utilities, including water mains, power lines, sewage facilities, and telephone lines, would
need to be extended to the project area. If the Centralization alternative was implemented in addition
to other power-intensive activities (for example, operating a vitrification plant), existing capacity
might be inadequate based on current consumption.

However, adequate storage capacity exists at both sites.

If the Centralization alternative were implemented at the Nevada Test Site, additional
transmission lines might ne.ld to be constructed. In addition, a sewage treatment facility for the SNF
management facility would have to be constructed at the Nevada Test Site if SNF management
activities were implemented under the Regionalization and Centralization alternatives. Water supplies
at the Nevada Test Site have been developed from local groundwater sources within the Ash Meadows
Sub-basin. Existing withdrawals of groundwat~r from this sub-basin may have already exceeded its
localized pereMial yield (Appendix F). SNF management facilities at this site may result in the need
for additional water.
5.3.2.9 Waste Generation. Waste volumes generated from SNF management activities
depend on the alternative chosen. In general, the Regionalization and Centralization alternatives at
the Idaho National Engineeri g Laboratory, and the alternatives at the SavaMah River Site involving
processing, would result in the largest clllliulative impact on waste generation. Under some options,
the total increase in waste generation could be four times the current facility baseline and require the
construction of additional facilities.
To evaluate the adequacy of existing storage capacity, waste volumes generated from the SNF
management alternatives were con.pared with current generation rates at the major DOE sites . At the
Navy sites, the rate of low-level waste generation would be small and not stress existing capacity. No
mixed, transuranic, or high-level waste would be generated from SNF activities at the Navy sites
(Appendix D).
At the major DOE sites, increased low-level waste generated from SNF management activities
wou ld range from about I percent above baseline generation rates at the Oak Ridge Reservation to
approximately four times above baseline at the SavaMah River Site for centralization and processing
options, respectively. Adequate storage capacity exists '1 all sites except at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory, where beyond the year 2005 low-level waste storage capacity may be
strained (Appendix 0 ).
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The volume of high-level waste generated from SNF management activities has been estimated
to range from approximately 21 percent to greater than 100 percent above current site baseline
generation rates at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and the SavaMah River Site.
respectively. Again, the percentage is high at the SavaMah River Site because essentially no
high-level waste i. currently being generated onsite, but with processing approximately 2 cubic meters
per year of high-level waste could be generated . Adequate storage capacity exists at the sites. No
high-level waste would be generated at either the Nevada Test Site or the Oak Ridge Reservation.

5.4 Adverse Effects That Cannot Be Avoided
Adverse impacts would result, no matter the alternative, from radiation exposure associated
with maintaining facilities that are at or near the end of their design life, until completion of the
construction of new facilities. However, these exposures would be kept within applicable regulatory
requir~ments and other applicable guidelines and would be controlled to levels that are as low as
reasonably achievable. Implementation of any alternative except the No Action alternative would
increase the volume of radioactive waste, in particular, low-level waste generated at the major DOE
sites. Under the action-based alternatives, where SNF is transported to other sites, there would be a
small increased potential for exposure to the general population when the SNF is in transit.
Under the No Action alternative, there would be several adverse effects that could not be
avoided. These include the continuation of the environmentally degraded state of the three major
DOE sites because existing facilities would deteriorate further. Naval and research reactor SNF
would be stored near population centers, potentially increasing the consequences of an SNF handling
or management accident. This alternative also presents a greater persoMel requirement for managing
SNF interim storage facilities. (Under other alternatives, the apparently higher persoMel requirement
would be for additional management activities th at would not be done under the No Action
alternative-they are not just related to storage facilities.) In addition, the shutdown of research
reactors that could not store SNF onsite would result in the loss of several hundred reactor operator
and research positions.
Under Regionalization 40 and Centralization alternatives, one or more major DOE sites
would transport all its SNF to another major DOE site, the facilities at the transport sites would be
shut down, and facilities at the receiving site(s) would be built. This would cause the relocation of
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many jobs associated with SNF management and dupl icate some existing facilities. While new
facilities are generally required at each DOE site under many alternatives, there are existing facilities
that can be used for storage at major sites that would be shut down prior to the end of their useful
design life.
The construction and operation of any of the facilities under consideration for storage of SNF
would result in some adverse impacts to the environment. Although 10cation.<Jependent, changes in
project design and other measures (for example, sound engineering practices during construction)
would eliminate, avoid, or minimize these impacts . In general, most of the adverse impacts would be
of short duration and would result from the construction of proposed facilities . For example, noise,
atmospheric emissions, fugitive dust, sediment runoff, and solid waste would be expected to increase
during construction. Section 5.7 discusses potential mitigation measures that could be used to control
or minimize impacts to the environment. See Appendices A through F for site-specific discussion on
adverse effects that cannot be avoided .

5.5 Relationship Between Short·Term Use ofthe Environment
and the Maintenance and Enhancement of Long.Term Productivity
The implementation of any of the SNF management alternatives would cause some adverse
impacts to the environment and permanently commit certain resources. This section descr ibes the
relationship between short-term influences from the implementation of an SNF management
alternative and the associated long-term effects.

In the medical arena, research reactors have proven to be vital to cancer therapy, diagnostic
imaging, studies of the biological effects of radiation, and other important medical applications.
Demand for medically important radioisotopes would not decrease merely because the source was shut
off. The continued demand for radioisotopes would be met by placing orders with remaining
reactors, which may be farther away from the place where they are needed. Many medically
important isotopes (for example, iodine-13I) have such short half-lives that the a-",ount transported
must include enough to allow for radioactive decay during shipment. Therefore, shutdown of reactors
would result in the need to produce and transport larger quantities of radiopharmaceuticals.
Shutdown of research reactors could produce an impact on commercial enterprises that are
engaged in the doping of silicon crystals through neutron irradiation. The doped silicon chips are
widely used in electronic components such as the computers used in automobile engines.
Graduates trained at these facilities contribute to a wide variety of nuclear industries and to
Government agencies involved with (a) monitoring nuclear technology, for example, regulatory
agenc ies, Federal and international inspections, (b) hardware for inspections, and (c) remote

monitoring .
Development of new SNF interim management facilities would commit lands to those uses
from the time of construction through cessation of operations. At that time, these facilities could be
converted to other uses or decontaminated, decommissioned, and the site restored to its original land
use. Existing SNF management facilities could also be converted to other uses or the lands restored
following their decommissioning.

The proposed alternatives for SNF management would require the short-term use of multiple
resources; for e<ample, energy, materials of construction, and labor to achieve the objective of safely
securing SNF to minimize the risk to workers, to the public, and to the environ'llent. For example, if
no action were taken, degradation of the fuel and SNF facilities would occur with the potential for
releases to the environment. Releases to the environment could contaminate land near the point of
storage, thereby reduc ing the potential ruture use. By consolidating and containing the SNF at
specific locations, the potential for impacting the environment would be reduced at the other
locations. After the implementation of a comprehensive SNF management strategy, those areas
currently used for SNF management could be released to allow oUter productive use, such as for
research or technology development.
The premature shutdown of research reactors due to a lack of sufficient SNF interim storage
space under the No Action alternative could have an impact upon the national and regional
communities in which they are located. Most of these reactors are the only regional source of
radiopharmaceuticals and often they are important centers of medical and biological research. The
sites where these reactors are located, many of them universities, are unique training facilities for
students in many fields of research and devel opment:
aterials science, environmental science,
physics, biology, and electronics.
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See Appendices A through F for site-specific discussions on the relationship between
short-term use of the environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity.

5.6 Irreversible and Irretrievable Commitment of Resources
The irreversible and irretrievable commitment of resources resulting from the construction and
operation of SNF management facilities would involve materials that could not be recovered or
reCYCled, or resources that would be consumed or reduced to unrecoverable forms. For example, the
construction and operation of an SNF facility at any of the locations under consideration would
consume irretrievable amounts of electrical energy, fuel , construction materials, and miscellaneous
chemicals . Some construction materials are recyclable and, therefore, should not be considered
irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources. Furthermore, some of the resources would
be irretrievable because of the nature of the commitment or the cost of reclamation. For example,
human resources used for the construction and operation of the proposed SNF facilities would be
irretrievably lost since these resources would be unavailable for use in other work activity areas. On
the whole, however, SNF management is not particularly resource intensive. See Appendices A
through F for site-specific discussions on irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources.
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5.7 Potential Mitigation Measures

the mitigation measures described below could be used to further minimize the effect on the
community.

This section summarizes measures that DOE" could implement to avoid or reduce impacts to
the environment. Possible mitigation measures are generally the same for all alternatives and are
summarized by resource category below. Although the environmental effects described in
Sections 5.1 through 5.3 may not require mitigation, the range of potential mitigation actions is
described below. For all sites, impacts to land use and aesthetic and scenic resources would be small;
therefore, mitigation measures for these attributes would not be required.

5.7.1 Pollution Prevention
Implementation of the SNF management alternatives WQuid generate waste with the potential
for releases to air and water. To control both the volume and toxicity of waste generated and to
reduce impacts on the environment, pollution prenntion practices would be implemented.
DOE is responding to Executive Order 12856, Federal Compliance with Right to Know Laws
and Pollution Prevention Requirements, and associated DOE orders and guidelines by reducing the
use of toxic chemicals; improving emergency planning, response, and accident notification; and
encouraging the development and use of clean technologies and the testing of innovative pollution
prevention technologies. Pollution prevention programs have been implemented at each site.
Program components include waste minimization, source reduction and recycling, and procurement
practices that preferentially procure products made from recycled materials. Portions of the pollution
prevention program have been implemented at the existing DOE and naval sites for nearly 10 years.
For example, the waste minimization program at the Savannah River Site has decreased the amount of
all waste types generated by material substitutions.
Implementation of the pollution prevention plans minimizes the amount of waste generated
during SNF management activities.

5.7.2 Socioeconomics
The SNF management alternatives would require additional workers for construction,
stabilization, monitoring, and maintenance of SNF. This would produce a socioeconomic effect
depending on the available site work force, regional labor pool, and community infrastructure. Minor
socioeconomic impacts would be expected from implementation of the SNF management alternatives ;
a. Because this is an EIS issued by the DOE, it contains language concerning compliance with
applicable environmental requirements, taking appropriate mitigative measures to reduce
environmental impacts, and other matters phrased in the context of DOE as the party taking the
actions. As a cooperative agency, and because Navy sites are also evaluated in this EIS, the Navy
will also assure compliance with applicable environmental requirements and take other appropriate
measures for its facilities in a consistent and appropriate fashion.
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Construction and operation-related impacts resulting from increased labor and capital
requirements could be reduced by coordinating with local communities and county planning agencies.
Effective planni"g would address changes in community services, housing, infrastructure, utilities,
and transportation. DOE would coordinate, in an appropriate manner, with the local and regional
planning agencies to address impacts on the work force and community infrastructure. This could be
facilitated through the development of citizen advisory boards. The timing of certain activities that
have been proposed to proceed concurrently could also be adjusted to minimize socioeconomic
impacts.

5.7.3 Cultural Resources
Impacts to cultural resources could occur during construction and earth-moving activities
associated with the SNF management alternatives. Areas of proposed ground disturbance would be
assessed for the potential to contain important archaeological and paleontological resources. Each
DOE operations office is responsible for establishing and maintaining mitigation agreements including
actions to be taken in the event of discovery of archaeological resources or human remains during
construction. These agreements will be negotiated with their potentially affected tribes and state
historic preservation officers. These agreements would be referenced in future site-specific National
Environmental Policy Act documentation when appropriate. An example of a possible mitigation
measure for archaeological resources would be avoidance or data recovery prior to construction .
Other measures would be necessary to mitigate potential impacts to val ues of Native American or
Native Hawaiian populations, including involvement in the selection of a mitigation strategy for
impacts to archaeological sites, spiritual geographical features, and land use. This could include the
SNF Program's participation in liaison programs to understand Native American or Native Hawaiian

concerns.
For paleontological resources, assessments could include literature searches, surface surveys,
and consultation with recognized paleontological experts in the region or limited test excavations in
geologically similar disturbed areas. If significant paleontological resources were identified, a
mitigation plan for recovery, stabilization, and caring of the resources would be implemented before
construction.
For example, at the Hanford Site, certain site activities would have the potential to adversely
affect prehistoric archaeological sites . In this case, the specific activity plans would be reviewed to
determine potential effects before initiation of activities. The activity will then be designed to avoid
these sites. If avoidance of these sites would not be possible, mitigation measures would be
developed in conjunction with the appropriate state agencies and Native American tribes.
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To avoid impacts during operation such as unauthorized artifact collection, workers could be
educated through programs and briefing sessions to inform personnel of applicable laws and
regulations for site protection. These educational programs would stress the importance of cultural
resources and specifics of the laws and regulations for site protection.
5.7.4 Soils
Soils could be affected from implementation of the SNF management alternatives if there were
leaks or a release to soils as a result of SNF activities. DOE would appropriately remediate any soils
contaminated from SNF management activities.
5.7.5 Air Resources

To avoid potential impacts to endangered, candidate, or state-identified sensitive species,
preconstruction surveys would be completed to determine the presence of these species or their
habitat. If protected species or primary habitat for these species are located near or within an area to
be disturbed , DOE would evaluate the project design and other program activities to determine if
mndifications would avoid negative impacts. DOE would consult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service to develop the most appropriate action-specific mitigation mo!asures.
Wetland habitat would be delineated in accordance with applicable U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers procedures and wetlands located near proposed activities would be avoided. However, if
avoidance were not possible, specific mitigation measures could be developed in consultation with the
U.S . Army Corps of Engineers. For example, mitigation could include construction of new wetland
acreage equivalent to the acreage of disturbed wetland habitat or enhancement of existing wetland
habitat at another location onsite.

Certain actions under the SNF management alternatives would impact air quality. For
example, the construction of new facilities could negatively impact air quality through the emission of
fugitive dusts and from pollutants from diesel- and gasoline-powered equipment. The increase in
offsite ambient levels would be small because of the large dist:lnce to the nearest public access, and
use of the mitigation measures described below would further minimize the potential impact.
DOE would meet applicable regulations regarding the maintenance of air quality from both
rad iological and nonradiological emission sources. DOE rloes not foresee impacts to air quality from
SNF management that would warrant measures beyond those employed consistent with good
construction, engineering, and operations, and management practices.

5.7.8 Noise
Construction and operation from SNF management would result in the generation of noise
consistent with light industrial activity. DOE does not foresee noise impacts from SNF management
that would warrant mitigation measures beyond those employed consistent with good construction
engineering, operational, and management practices.
Noise impacts to the public and other noise-sensitive receptors could be reduced by providing
noise buffer areas between sources and receptors, constructing noise walls and other attenuation
structures, and limiting the emissions to daytime periods.

5.7.6 Water Resources
The implementation of some of the SNF management alternatives would require larger
volumes of water for the stabilization of SNF. DOE would control water consumption through the
appropriate application of water recycling, water conservation measures and equipment, stormwater
catchment basins, and worker training programs. Constant process monitoring and mass-balance and
design to current standards, includ ing double-wall confinement of all vessels and piping, would be
included in design and operating standards by DOE to limit potential operational releases from a SNF
processing or storage facility to essentially zero.

5.7.9 Traffic and Transportation
The number of workers in SNF management activities under some of the alternatives would
add to the current work force and to additional commuting traffic. At sites with increasing traffic
concerns, roads could be widened with the addition of lanes or implementation of traffic demand
management. DOE would also consider using high-<lccupancy vehicles (such as vans or buses),
implementing car-pooling or ride-sharing programs, or staggering schedules to reduce the potential
for increased traffic congestion. See Section 5.7.12 for discussion of tran.'portation accident
mitigation .

5.7.7 Ecological Resources
Implementation of the SNF management alternatives could imp.l ct terrestrial resources,
wetlands, aquatic resources, and threatened and endangered species either directly by earth-moving
activities that disturb habitat or indirectly through construction activities that result in increased runoff
into wetlands or aquatic environments .
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5.7.10 Occupational and Public Health and Safety
Implementation of the SNF management alternatives would increase the potential for radiation
exposure either through direct exposure or through air emissions. Although these effects are small, as
discussed in Section 5.2, the as low as reasonably achievable prinCiple would be used for controlling
radiation exposure of workers and the public. Pollution prevention practices would be implemented
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to avoid or reduce production of potentially harmful substances. Waste minimization would be
practiced to reduce the toxicity and volume of secoodary wastes to be managed. Furthermore, sites
would update their current worker training. emergency planning, emergency preparedness. and
emergency response programs as needed to address new SNF Dlanagement actions for the protection
of both workers and the public.
5.7.11 Site Utilities and Support Services

The SNF management alternatives would put increased demands on utilities at the sites.
Under certain alternatives. additional transmission lines or substations may need to be added to the
infrastructure and. at the Nevada Test Site. a sewage treatment facility for the SNF management
facility would need to be constructed. However. DOE would reduce the need for certain utilities
(such as water and electricity) through the implementation of resource conservation. pollution
prevention. and energy efficiency measures.
5.7.12 Accidents

The potential exists for an accident associated with either the handling or transportation of
SNF with the consequence being a significant release of radioactive or other hazardous materials to
the environment. Although the probability is very small. as discussed in Section 5.2, each of the
locations considered for SNF management have emergency action plans and equipment to respond to
accidents and other emergencies to limit the magnitude of potential impacts from any accident. These
plans include training of workers. local emergency response agencies (such as fire depanments). and
the public; communication systems and protocols; readiness drills; and mutual aid agreements. The
plans would be updated to cover any new SNF facilities and activities. DOE would coordinate
activities with state and local agencies to establish and implement an appropriate emergency response
training program for potential accidents .

5.8 Environmental Justice

The overall review indicated that the potential impacts calculated for each discipline under
each of the alternative sites considered for the management of all or some ponion of DOE SNF (01
naval SNF only) present no significant risk and do not constitute a reasonably foreseeable adverse
impact to the surrounding population. This includes both the impacts of facility operations and the
transpon of SNF, and the risle of reasonably foreseeable accident scenarios postulated for both, all of
which are small. Therefore. the impacts of the programmatic management of DOE SNF under all
alternatives evaluated in this EIS do not constitute a disproponionately high and adverse impact on
any panicular segment of the population. minorities or low-income communities included.
Characterization of the numbers and location of minority and low-income populations is
dependent on how these populations are defined and what assumptions are used in conducting the
analysis. As discussed in Appendix L. at the time this EIS and the Draft Environmental Impact
Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research
Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (Draft FRR SNF EIS) were prepared, the Federal Interagency Working
Group on environmental justice had not issued final guidance on the definitions of minority and
low-income populations, or the approach to be used in analyzing environmental justice, as directed by
the Executive Order (FR 1994). Final internal DOE guidance on environmental justice also has not
been adopted. As a result, both the definitions and assumptions used by and within agencies for
conducting environmental justice analyses can vary and the resulting demographic results can differ
on a case-by-case basis. For example. this EIS and the Draft FRR SNF EIS present demographic
characterizations derived from the same United States Census Bureau database. but these documents
used different definitions and assumptions. Several of the same candidate interim SNF management
sites were evaluated in both documents . As discussed in Appendix L, variations in these definitions
and assumptions led to differences in the characterization of minority and low-income populations
surrounding these potential interim SNF management sites. Nevertheless. although the
characterizations differ. the impacts resulting from the proposed action under all alternatives present
no significant risk to the population as a whole. Therefore. no disproponionately high and adverse
effects would be expected for any panicular segment of the population. including minority and
low-income populations, regardless of which set of definitions and assumptions were applied.

In February 1994. Executive Order 1289b. titled Federal Acrlons 10 Address Environmental
Justice in Minority Popularions and Low-lnco11U! Popularions (FR 1994). was released to Federal
agencies. This order directs Federal agencies to incorporate environmental justice as pan of their
missions. As such. Federal agencies are specifically directed to identify and address. as appropriate.
disproponionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of their programs.
policies. and activities on minority populations and low-income populations. Appendix L of this EIS
provides an assessment of the areas surrounding the 10 sites under consideration for the management
of SNF under all programmatic alternatives considered in this volume. Because DOE is still in the
process of developing guidance. the approach used in thi. analysis might depan somewhat from the
guidance eventually issued.
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6. LIST OF PRE PARERS
This EIS was prepared under the supervision of the DOE Idaho Operations Office. The
organ izations and individuals who contributed to the preparation of this document are listed below
accompanied by each person's project role and level of experience and training. Table 6-1 at the end
of this section summarizes, for each contributor, the chapters of the EIS for which inputs were
prepared .

Vicki L. Johnson, General Engineer
AS, 1984, Mechanical Engineering, Olympic College
EIT, 1987, State of Washington
DoD Nuclear Fluid Systems Mechanical Engineering Qual ification
Years of Experience: 16
DEIS Volume 1 Manager

U.S . Department of Energy Idaho Operations Office

Robert Brown, PE, General Engineer
BS , Electrical Engineering
MA, Busi ness Administration
Years of Experience: 24
Analytical Lead·Utilities and Energy

Thomas L. Wichmann, Manager EIS, U.S. DOE
U.S. Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program Graduate
Light Water Breeder Reactor/Expended Core Facility Project Officer
S I W Naval Nuclear Reactor Prototype Project Officer
Years of Experience: 25
EIS Project Manager

Robert Creed, Jr., PG , Physical Scientist/Geologist
AS, 1980, Geology, Santa Barbara City College
AS, 1980, Geoscience Technology, Santa Barbara City College
BA , 1983, Earth Sciences, University of California, Santa Cruz
Years of Experience: 7
Analytical Lead·Geology and Water Resources

Kathleen B. Whitaker, Public Affairs Specialist
BA, 1973, English, University of Utah
Years of Experience: 17
EIS Stakeholder Involvement Manager

Denise M. Glore, Attorney
BA , 1978, Geography and Anthropology, University of New Mexico
MS, 1980, Biology, University of New Mexico
JD, 1985, University of New Me .. co
Years of Experien,e: 15
FEIS Analytical Lead· Con,ultations, Laws, Requirements

Robert C. Stump, Environmental Engineer
BS , 1987, Environmental Engineering, Montana Tech.
Years of Experience: 7
FEIS Volume 1 Manag,.r

Jan Hagers, General Engineer
BS, 1968, Mechanical Engineering, North Carolina State University
MBA, 1974, College of Will iam and Mary
Years of Experience: 27
Analytical Lead · Environmental Justice

John E. Medema, Health Physicist
BS, Biology, Central Michigan University
MS, Biology, Central Michigan University
Years of Experience: 15
Volume 2 Manager
Analytical Lead·Spent Nuclear Fuel and Materials and Waste Management

John A. Herritt, Health Physicist
BS , 1968, Physics, Pennsyl vania State University
MS, 1976, Nuclear Physics, Pennsylvania State University
Years of Experience: 13
Analytical Lead·Occupational Health and Safety

Mary V. Willcox , Physical Scientist
BS , 1990, Chemistry, University of New Mexico
Years of Experience: 5
EIS Techni cal Sections Manager

Mark W. Howard, Packaging and Transportation Program Manager
BS, 1989, Mechanical Engineering, University of Idaho
Years of Experience: 6
Analytical Lead·Traffic and Transportation, Transportation Accidents

Peter J . Dirkmaat, Senior Engineering Adviser
BS, Electri cal Engineering, Calfornia State College, Long Beach
MS , Nuclear Engineering, Stanford University
Years of Experience: 30
Review, Approval, and Decision Process

Mary McKnight, Attorney
BA, 1982, Communications , University of Nebraska
10, 1989, Creighton University
Years of Experience: 6
DEIS Analytical Lead- Consultations. Laws, and Requirements
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Paul Martin, Environmental Protection Special ist
BA , English
BS, Wildlife
Years of Experience: 21
Analytical Lead-Land Use

Senior Environmental Scientist

BA , Mathematics
MA , Environmental Studies
Years of Experience: 15

Analyst-Environmental
Consequences

Mark A. Dagel
Senior Hydrogeologist

BS, Geology
MS, Geological Sciences
Years of Experience: 11

Analyst-Cumulative Impacts

William A. Owca, General Engineer
BS, 1974, Biology, Creighton University
BS , 1977, Engineering, University of Iowa
MS, 1980, Mechanical Engineering, University of Nebraska
Years of Experience: 15
Volume I Decision Process

Sandy Enyeart
Senior Engineering Specialist

BCE, Civil Engineering
BA, Fine Arts
Years of Experience: 15

Analyst-Ecology

Thomas D. Enyeart, CHP
Senior Staff Scientist

BS, Physics
MS , Nuclear Engineering
MS , Environmental
Engineering
Years of Experience: 19

FEIS Volume I Coordinator
Anal yst-Transportation
Accident Analysis
Analyst-Waste and Materials

Mason Estes
Geochemist

BS , Geology
Years of Experience:

Analyst-Water Resources

George A. Freund
Chemical/Nuclear Engineer

BS, Chemical Engineering
MS , Chemical Engineering
Years of Experience: 45

Analyst-Background
Analyst-Facility Accidents
Analyst-Information Supporting
the Alternatives
Analyst-Technical
Methodologies and Key Data
Analyst-Summary

Paul D. Freund
Records Administrator

BS, Human Resource
Management
Years of Experience: 5

Analyst-References

R. Kingsley House, PE,
Technical Staff Consultant

BS , Mechanical Engineering
MS, Engineering Science/
Nuclear Optio n
Years of Experience: 35

Technical Support Coordinator

Scot R. 1mus
Senior Environmental Scientist

BS, Physical Geography
MS , Forest Management
Years of Experience: 18

Analyst-Affected
Environmental , Impacts , and
Cumulative Impacts

Michael Ingram
Senior Communications
Specialist

BA , Journalism
Years of Experience: 17

Comment Incorporation

Irene Johnson
Environmentall Socioeconomic
Analyst

BS, Economics
MA, Economics
Years of Experience: 6

Analyst-Socioeconomic Impacts

Robert A. Kelly
Senior Project Manager

BS , Biology
PhD, Zoology/Ecology
Years of Experience: 24

Analyst-Environmental
Consequences

Robert H. Cole

Mark S. Pellechi, PE, Nuclear Engineer
BS, 1979, Nuclear Engineering, Polytechnic Institute of New York
Years of Experience: 16
Analytical Lead-Accident Analysis
Ralph W. Russell , Environmental Engineer
BS, 1970, Chemical Engineering, Texas A&M University
Years of Experience: 18
Analytical Lead-Air Resources, Air Quality
Roger Twitchell, Physical Scientist
BS, 1977, Botany, Weber State College
Years of Experience: 18
Analytical Lead-Cultural Resources, Ecological Resources
C. Brooks Weingartner, Environmental Engineer
BS , 1988, Geological Engineering, Montana Tech.
MS , 1991, Environmental Engineering, Montana Tech .
Years of Experience: 4
Analytical Lead-Socioeconomics

Science Applications International Corporation
Dee H. Walker
Vice President
Technical Staff Consultant

BS, Chemical Engineering
MS , Chemical Engineering
PhD, Chemical Engineering
Years of Experience: 40

SAIC Project Manager

Barry Nichols
Vice President
(former employee)

BS, Natural Science
Years of Experience: 27

DE IS Volume I Manager

Robert D. Thomson
Assistant Vice President

BS, Zoology
MS , Ecology
Years of Experience: 20

DEIS Volume 1 Deputy
Manager
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Pamel a L. Lassahn
Deputy Division Manager

BS, Technical Journalism
MS, Technical Journalism
Years of Experience: 30

Document Production Manager

Anne Lundahl
Scientist

BS , Geology
Years of Experience: 7

Analyst-Water Resources

Steven J. Maheras, CHP
Environmental Health
Physicist

BA , Zoology
MS , Health Physics
PhD, Health Physics
Years of Experience: II

Analyst-Transponation
Analyst-Incident-Free
Transponation Dose
Assessments

Diane Monon
Senior Engineer

BS, Chemical Engineering
Years of Experience: 14

Analyst-Alternatives
Analyst-Background

Lee Monon
Senior Engineer

BS, Nuclear Engineering
Years of Experience: 15

EIS Project Management Team

Mark D. Otis, CH"
Environmental Health
Health Physicist

BS, Physics
MS, Radiation Health
PhD, Radioecology
Years of Experience: 23

Analyst-Human Health Effects

Douglas Outlaw
Senior Project Manager

BS , Nuclear Physics
MS, Nuclear Physics
PhD, Nuclear Physics
Years of Experience: 26

Analyst-Radiological Impacts

Howard Pippen
Senior Scientist

BS , Biological Science
Years of Experience: 8

Analyst-Transponation
Analyst-Accidents

Angela Sewall
Environmental Geoscientist
(former employee)

BA , Eanh Science
MS, Geoscience
Years of Experience:

Analyst-Cumulative Impacts

Brenda Shim
Economist

BA , Economicsllnternational
Area Studies
Years of Experience: 3

Analyst-Socioeconomics

Donald C. Slaughterbeck
Senior Engineer

BS, Mechanical Engineering
MS , Mechanical Engineering
Years of Experience: 28

Analyst-Accident Analysis

Patricia Swain
Senior Scientist

BS, Geological Engineering
MS, Geology
Years of Experience: 19

Analyst-Environment
Consequences

Jane Tallman
Junior Engineer

BS, Mechanical Engineering
Years of Experience: 2

Analyst-Traffic and
Transponation
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Jeffrey Weiler
Division Manager
(former employee)

BA , Political Science
MS, Resource Economicsl
Environmental Management
Years of Experience: 23

Analytical Lead-Various
Sections

Tom Wierman
Senior Engineering Specialist

BS, Applied Mathematics
Years of Experience: 16

Analyst-Transponation

Sandy Williams
Environmental Scientist

BS , Geology
Years of Experience: 14
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Analyst-Water Resources
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Technical Suppon Specialist

Years of Experience: 6
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Program Manager

MS, Public Administration
Years of Experience: 31

Analyst-Environmental
Consequences
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Consultant
Consulting Engineer

BS, Mechanical Engineering
Years of Experience: 21

Analytical Lead-Spent Nuclear
Fuel, High-Level Waste

Wendy Green
Environmental Planner

MPA, Public Affairs
Years of Experience: 10

Public Information Coordinator

David J. Lechel
Environmental Consultant

BS , Fisheries Biology
MS , Fisheries Biology
Years of Experience: 22

Analyst-Summary

Roben Abernethy
Environmental Scientist

BS , Wildlife Biology
MS , Marine Science
Years of Experience: 15

Analyst-Ecological Resources

Edward Agoston
Senior Hydrologist

BS, Geology
MS , Geology
Years of Experience: 9

Analyst-Geology

Adel A. Bakr
Executive Hydrologist

BS, Geology and Physics
MS, Isotope Hydrology
PhD, Groun water Hydrology
Years of Experience: 32

Analyst-Geology and Water
Resources

Fred R. Bingaman , III
Junior Analyst

BA, Economics
Years of Experience:

Analyst-Materials and Waste
Management

Ecology and Environment, Inc.
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Teresa L. Brandt
Senior Project Administrator

Years of Experience: 13

Analyst-References, Acronyms
and Abbreviations,
Glossary

Steven J. Connor
Consulting Health Physicist

BS , Physics
MS , Physics
Years of Experience: 21

Hallibunon NUS Volume I ,
Appendix B Manager

William J. Craig
Senior Environmental Planner

BS , Forestry
MS, Planning
Years of Experience: 22

EIS Project Management DE IS
Volume I , Appendix C

Karin Crandall
Environmental Scientist

BA , Chemistry
Years of Experience: 16

Analyst-Air Resources

James Cross
Assistant Analyst

BS, Management Information
Systems
Years of Experience: 7

Analyst-Introduction, Site
Overview, SNF Alternatives,
Effects, Impacts

James M. Doenges
Environmental Scientist

BS , Biology
MS, BiolGgy
Years of Experience: 9

Analyst-Cumulative Impacts,
Mitigation

J. Peyton Doub
Environmental Scientist

BS , Plant Sciences
MS , Botany
Years of Experience:

Analyst-Overview, Cumulative
Impacts

Kevin S. Dunn
Environmental Scientist

BS, Geology
Years of Experience: 10

Analyst-Geology, Water
Resources

Alan A. Eckmyre
Environmental Engineer

BE, Nuclear Engineering
BS , Business Administration
Years of Experience: 23

Analyst-Materials and Waste
Management

Keven T. Folk
Environmental Scientist

BA , Geoenvironmental Science
Years of Experience: 6

Analyst-Geology

Edward Gorczyca
Environmental Scientist

BA, Chemistry
Years of Experience: 10

Site Lead-Nevada Test Site

Lawrence L. Greenfield
Senior Environmental
Scientist

BS , Soil Science
Years of Experience: 17

Analyst-Occupational Health ,
Materials and Waste
Management

Kristine A. Gunther
Environmental Planner

BA, Economics
MA, Business Administration
Years of Experience: 3

Analyst-Land Use,
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Resources, Aesthetic and
Scenic Resources, Site Services
Volume I, Appendix C
Assistant Manager

BS , Zoology
Years of Experience: 15

Coordinator-Spent Nuclear
Fuel Management

Ernest C. Harr, Jr.
Consulting Environmental
Scientist
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BS, Mechanical Engineering
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BS, Mechanical Engineering
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Richard S. Nugent
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BS, Biology
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PhD, Marine Science
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David G. Olsen
Senior Environmental Scientist

BS, Chemistry
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Richard F . Orthen, Ir.
Consulting Health Physicist

BS, Chemistry
Years of Experience: 13

Analyst-Occupational Health
and Safety
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BS, Atmospheric Science
Years of Experience: 13
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Years of Experience: 18

Analyst-Affected Environment
and Environmental Impacts

Jason Associates Corporation

Daniel A. Reny

Pacific Northwest Laboratory

Engineering

Years of Experience: 7
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BS , Electrical Engineer
Years of Exper 'ence: 19

Analyst-Accidents
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MS , Nuclear Engineering
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BS, Environmental Studies
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Years of Experience: 25

Analyst-Shipping Container
and Shipyard Operations

Andrew N. Richardson
Environmental Assistant,
Naval Reactors-ID
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Years of Experience: 20
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7. CONSULTATIONS. LAWS. AND REQUIREMENTS

property with respect to activities under its jurisdiction. Through a series of DOE orders, DOE has
established an extensive system of standards and requirements to ensure safe operation of its facilities .

7.1 Laws and Requirements
This section identifies and summarizes the major laws, regulations. executive orders, and
DOE orders that may apply to the programmatic alternatives for SNF.
Section 7. 1.1 discusses the major Federal statutes that impose environmental protection and
compliance requirements upon DOE. In addition, there may be other Federal, state, and local
measures applicable to the SNF Management Program because Federal law delegates enforcement or
implementation authority to state or local agencies. These state- and local-specific requirements are
addressed in the site-specific appendices. Section 7.1.2 acidresses environmentally-related presidential
executive orders that clarify issues of national policy and set guidelines under wh ich Federal agencies,
including DOE, must act. DOE implements its responsibilities for protection of public health, safety,
and the environment through a series of departmental orders that are mandatory for operating
contractors of DOE facilities . Section 7. 1.3 discusses those DOE orders related to environmental,
health, and safety protection. Hazardous and rad ioactive materials transportation regulations are
summarized in Section 7. 1.4.

7.1 .1 Federal Environmental Statutes and Regulations
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended (42 USC §4321 et seq.)
The National Envi ronmental Policy Act establishes a national policy promoting awareness of the
environmental consequences of the activity of humans on the environment and promoting
consideration of the environmental impacts during the planning and decisionmaking stages of a
project. The National Environmental Policy Act requires all agencies of the Federal Government to
prepare a detailed statement on the environmental effects of proposed major Federal actions that may
significanUy affect the quality of the human e. vironment.
This EIS has been prepared in response to these National Environmental Policy Act
requirements and policies. It discusses reasonable alternatives and their potential environmental
consequences of proposed SNF activities at various locations in the country and has been prepared in
accordance with the Council on Environmental Quality Regulations for implementing the procedural
provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act Implementing Procedures (40 CFR Parts 1500
through 1508) and DOE National Environmental Pol icy Act Implementing Procedures
(10 CFR Pan lOll).
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 USC §2011 et seq.). The Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 authorizes DOE to establ ish standards to protect health or minimize dangers to life or
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The Atomic Energy Act and the Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970 [5 USC (app . at 1343)]
and other related statutes gave the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency responsibility and authority
for developing generally applicable environmental standards for protection of the general environment
from radioactive material. The U.S . Environmental Protection Agency has promulgated several
regulations under this authority, among which are the Environmental Radiation Protection Standards
for the Management and Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive
Wastes, at 40 CFR Pan 191.
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, (42 USC §10101-10270). The Act

authorizes the Federal agencies to develop a geologic repository for the permanent disposal of SNF
and high-level radioactive waste. The Act specifies the process for selecting a repository site and
constructing, operating, closing, and decommissioning the repository. The Act also establishes
programmatic guidance for these activities.
Clean AIr Act, as amended (42 USC §7401 .t seq.). The Clean Air Act, as amended, is
intended to "protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public
health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population." Section 118 of the Clean Air Act,
as amended, requires that each Federal agency, such as DOE, with jurisdiction over any property or
facility that might result in the discharge of air pollutants, comply with "all Federal, state, interstate,
and local requirements" with regard to the control and abatement of air pollution.

The Act requires the U.S. Environmental Prot,.ction Agency to establish National Ambient
Air Quality Standards as necessary to protect public health, with an adequate margin of safety, from
any known or anticipated adverse effects of a regulated pollutant (42 USC §7409). The Act also
requires establishment of nat ional standards of performance for new or modified stationary sources of
atmospheric pollutants (42 USC §7411) and requires specific emission increases to be evaluated so as
to prevent a significant deterioration in air quality (42 USC §7470) . Hazardous air pollutants,
including rad ionuclides, are regulated separately (42 USC §7412). Air emissions are regulated by the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency in 40 CFR Parts 50 through 99. In particular, radionuclide
emissions and hazardous air pollutants are regulated under the National Emission Standard for
Hazardous Air Pollutants Program (see 40 CFR Part 61 and 40 CFR Part 63).
Safe Drinking Water Act, as amended [42 USC §300 (F) et seq.] . The primary
objective of the Safe Drinking Water Act, as amended, is to protect the qu ality of the public water
supplies and all sources of drinking water. The implementing regul ations , administered by the U.S .
Environmental Protection Agency unless delegated to the states, establish standards applicable to
public water systems . They promulgate maximum contaminant levels, including those for
radioactivity, in public water systems, which are defined as public water systems th at serve at least 15
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service connections used by year-round residents or regularly serve at least 25 year-round residents.
Safe Drinking Water Act requirements bave been promulgated by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency in 40 CFR Parts 100 through 149. For radionuclides, the regulations in effect now specify
that the average annual concentration of beta particle and photon radioactivity from manmade
radionuclides in drinking water shall not produce an annual dose equivalent to the total body or any
internal organ greater than 0.004 rem (4 millirem)/year. The maximum contaminant level for gross
a1pba particle activity is 15 picocuries per liter. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
proposed revisions to limits on regulating radionuclides July 18, 1991. The proposed rule has not
been finalized. For purposes of analysis, however, the more conservative standards were used.
Other programs established by the Safe Drinking Water Act include the Sole Source Aquifer
Program, the Wellhead Protection Program, and the Underground Injection Control Program.
Clean Water Act, as amended (33 USC §1251 et seq.). The Clean Water Act, which
amended the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, was enacted to "restore and maintain the chemical,
physical and biological integrity of the Nation's water." The Clean Water Act prohibits the
"discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts" to navigable waters of the United States . Section 313
of the Clean Water Act, as amended, requires all branches of the Federal Government engaged in any
activity that might result in a discharge or runoff of pollutants to surface waters to comply with
Federal, state, interstate, and local requirements .
In addition to seni ng water quality standards for the Nation's waterways, the Clean Water Act
supplies guidelines and limitations for effluent discharges from point-source discharges and provides
authority for the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency to implement the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System permining program. The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System program is administered by the Water Management Division of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency pursuant to regulations in 40 CFR Part 122 et seq. Idaho has not applied for
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System authority from the U.S . Environmental Prote<.tion
Agency. Thus, all National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permits required for the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory are obtained by DOE through the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency Region 10 (40 CI'R Part 122 et seq.).
Sections 401 and 405 of the Water Quality Act of 1987 added Section 402(P) to the Clean
Water Act. Section 402(P) requires th at the Environmental Protection Act establish regulations for
issuing permits for stormwater discharges associated with industrial activity. Stormwater discharges
assoc iated with industrial activity are permined through the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System. General Permit requirements are published at 40 CFR Part 122.

Resourr:e Conservation and Recovery Act, as amended (42 USC §6901 et seq.) .
The treatment, storage, or disposal of hazardous and nonhazardous waste is regulated under the Solid
Waste Disposal Act, as amended by the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and the Hazardous
and Sol id Waste Amendments of 1984. Pursuant to Section 3006 of the Act, any state that seeks to
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administer and enforce a bazardous waste program pursuant to the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act may apply for U.S. Environmental Protection Agency authorization of its program.
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency regulations implementing the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act are found in 40 CFR Parts 260 througb 280. These regulations define hazardous
wastes and specify hazardous waste transportation, handling, treatment, storage, and disposal
requirements.
The regulations imposed on a generator or a treatment, storage, andlor disposal facility vary
according to the type and quantity of material or waste generated, treated, stored, andlor disposed of.
The method of treatment, storage, andlor disposal also impacts the extent and complexity of the
rec;uirements (see also Section 7.2.5).
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Ac~ as
amended (42 USC §9601 et seq.). The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act, as amended, provides a staMory framework for the cleanup of waste sites
containing hazardous substances and-as amended by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization
Act-provides an emergency response program in the event of a release (or threat of a release) of a
bazardous substance to the environment. Using the Hazard Ranking System, Federal and private sites
are ranked and may be included on the National Priorities List. The Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, as amended, requires such Federal facilities having such
sites to undertake investigations and remediatio n as necessary. The Act also includes requirements for
reporting releases of certain hazardous substances in excess of specified amounts to state and Federal
agencies.
Emergency Planning and Community Right-ta-Know Act of 1986 (42 USC §11001
11/'1. Under Subtitle A of this Act, Federal facilities,

et seq.) (also known as "SARA Title

including those owned by DOE, provide various information (such as inventories of specific
chemicals used or stored and releases that occur from these sites) to the State Emergency Response
Commission and to the Local Emergency Planning Comminee to ensure that emergency plans are
sufficient to respond to unplanned releases of hazardous substances. Implementation of the provisions
of this Act began voluntarily in 1987, and inventory and annual emissions reporting began in 1988
based on 1987 activities and information. DOE also requires compliance with Title III as mane r of
Agency policy. The requirements for this Act were promulgated by the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency in 40 CFR Parts 350 through 372 .
Toxic Substances Control Act (15 USC §2601 et seq.). The Toxic Substances Control
Act provides the U.S . Environmental Protection Agency with the authority to require testing of
chemical substances, both new and old, entering the environment, and regulates them where
necessary. The law co mplements and expands existing toxic substance laws such as § 112 of r~e
Clean Air Act and §307 of the Clean Water Act. The Toxic Substances Control Act came about
because there were no general Federal regulations for the po tential environmental or health effects of
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the thousands of new chemicals developed eacb year before they were introduced into the public or
commerce. The Toxic Substances Control Act also regulates the treatment, storage, and disposal of
cenain toxic substances, specifically polychlorinated biphenyls, chlorofluorocarbons, asbestos,
dioxins, cenain metal-working fluid s, and bexavalent chromium. The asbestos regulations under the
Toxic Substances Control Act were ultimately overturned. However, regulations penaining to
asbestos removal, storage, and disposal are promulgated through the National Emission Standard for
Hazardous Air Pollutants Program (40 CFR Part 61 , Subpart M). For chlorofluorocarbons, Title VI
of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 requires a reduction of chlorofluorocarbons begiMing
1991, and prohibits production begiMing 2000.
Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 (42 USC §13101 et seq.). The Pollution Prevention
Act of 1990 establishes a national policy for waste management and pollution control that focuses first
on source reduction, followed sequentially by environmentally safe recycling, treatment, and lastl y,
disposal . Disposal or releases to the environment should only occur as a last resort. In response,
DOE has committed to participation in the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act Section
313, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 33/50 Pollution Prevention Program. The goal, for
facilities already involved in Section 313 compliance, is to achieve a 33 percent reduction in the
release of 17 priority chemicals by 1997, from a 1993 baseline. On August 3, 1993, Executive Order
12856 was issued, expanding the 33/50 program such that DOE must reduce its total releases of all
toxic chemicals by 50 percent by December 31, 1999. The DOE is also requiring each DOE site to
establish site-specific goals to reduce generation of all waste types.

impacts. Coordinations with the State Historic Preservation officer are also undertaken to ensure that
potentially significant sites are properly identified and appropriate mitigative actions are implemented.
Archaeological Resource Protection Act, es amended (16 USC §470.. et seq.).
This Act requires a permit for any ex::avation or removal of archaeological resources from public or
Indian lands. Excavations must be undertaken for the purpose of furthering archaeological knowledge
in the public interest, and resources removed are to remain the propetty of the United States .
Consent must be obtained from the Indian tribe owning lands on which a resource is located before
issuance of a permit, and the permit must contain terms or conditions requested by the tribe.
Native Americen Grave Protection and Repatriation Act of 1990 (25 USC §3001).
This law directs the Secretary of Interior to guide responsibilities in repatriation of Federal
archaeological collections and collections held by museums receiving Federal funding that are
culturally affiliated to Native American tribes. Major actions to be taken under this law include (a)
establishing a review committee with monitoring and policy-making responsibilities, (b) developing
regulations for repatriation, including procedures for identifying lineal descent or cultural affiliation
needed for claims, (c) oversight of museum programs de.- igned to meet the inventory requirements
and deadlines of this law, and (d) developing procedures to handle unexpected discoveries of graves
or grave goods during activities on Federal or tribal land .
American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1978 (42 USC §1996). This act reaffirms

Federal Facility Compliance Act The Federal Facility Compliance Act, enacted on
October 6, 1992, waives sovereign immunity for fines and penalties for Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act violations at Federal facilities. However, a provision postpones fines and penalties
after 3 years for mixed waste storage prohibition violations at DOE sites and requires DOE to prepare
plans for developing the required treatment capacity for mixed waste stored or generated at each
faCility . Each plan must be approved by the host state or the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
after consultation with other affected states, and a consent order must be issued by the regulator
requiring compliance with the plan. The Federal Facility Compliance Act further provides that the
DOE will not be subject to fines and penalties for land disposal restriction storage prohibition
violations for mixed waste as long as it is in compliance with such an approved plan and consent
order and meets all other applicable regulations.
National Historic Preservation Act, as amended (16 USC §470 et seq.). The National
Historic Preservation Act, as amended, provides that sites with significant national historic value be
placed on the Nalional Rtgister of Historic Places. There are no permits or certifications tequired
under the Act. However, if a particular Federal activ ity may impact a historic propetty resource,
consultation with the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation will generally generate a
Memorandum of Agreement, including stipulations that must be followed to minimize adverse
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Native American religious freedom under the First Amendment and sets United States policy to
protect and preserve the inherent and constitutional right of American Indians to believe, express, and
exercise their traditional religions. The act requires that Federal actions avoid interfering with access
to sacred locations and traditional resources that are integral to the practice of relig ions.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (42 USC §2000bb et seq.). This Act
prohibits the Government, including Federal departments, from substantially burdening the exercise of
religion unless the Government demonstrates a compelling governmental interest and the action
furthers a compelling Government interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest .
Endangered Species Act, as amended (16 USC §1531 el seq.). The Endangered
Species Act, as amended, is intended to prevent the further decline of endangered and threatened
species and to restore these species and their habitats. The Act is jointly administered by the
U.S. Departments of Commerce and the [nterior. Section 7 of the Act requires consultation with the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to determine whether endangered and threatened species or their
critical habitats are known to be in the vicinity of the proposed action .
Mlgralory Bird Treaty Act, as "mended (16 USC §703 el seq.). The Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, as amended, is intended to protect birds that have common migration patterns between the
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United States and Canada, Mexico, Japan, and Russia. It regulates the harvest of migratory birds by
specifying things such as the mode of harvest, hunting seasons, and bag limits. The Act stipulates
!hat it is unlawful at any time, by any means, or in any manner to "kill ... any migratory bird."
Although no permit for this project is required under the Act, DOE is required to consult with the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service regarding impacts to migratory birds and to evaluate ways to avoid or
minimize these effects in accordance with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Mitigation Policy.

Noise Control Act of 1972, as amended (42 USC §4901 et seq.). Section 4 of the
Noise Control Act of 1972, as amended, directs all Federal agencies to carry out "to the fullest extent
within their authority" programs within their jurisdictions in a manner that furthers a national policy
of promoting an environment free from noise that jeopardizes health and welfare.

Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, as amended (16 USC §668-668d). The Bald
and Golden Eagle Protection Act makes it unlawful to take, pursue, molest, or disturb bald
(American) and golden eagles, their nests, or their eggs anywhere in the United States (Section 668,
668c). A permit must be obtained from the U.S . Department of the Interior to relocate a nest that
interferes with resource development or recovery operations.

Executive Order 12088 (Federal Compliance with Pollution Control Standards)
(October 13, 1978), as amended by Executive Order 12580 (January 23, 1987) Federal Compliance
with Pollution Control Standards, directs Federal agencies, including DOE, to comply with applicable
administrative and procedural pollution control standards established by, but not limited to, the Clean
Air Act, the Noise Control Act, the Clean Water Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Toxic
Substances Control Act (15 USC §2061 et seq.), and the Resource Conservatio n and Recovery Act.

Wild and ScenIc RIvers Act, as amended (16 USC 1271 et seq. 71:8301 et seq.) .
The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, as amended , protects certain selected rivers of the Nation, which
possess outstanding scenic, recreational , geological, fish and wildlife, historical, cultural, or other
similar values. These rivers are to be preserved in a free-flowing condition to protect water quality
and other vital national conservation purposes. The purpose of the Act is to institute a national wild
and scenic rivers system, to designate the initial rivers that are a pan of that system, and to develop
standards for the addition of new rivers in the future.
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, as amended (29 USC §651 et seq.).
The Occupational Safety and Health Act establishes standards to enhance safe and healthful working
conditions in places of employment throughout the United States. The Act is administered and •
enforced by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, a U.S. Department of Labor agency.
While the Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the U.S . Environmental Protection
Agency both have a mandate to reduce exposures to toxic substances, the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration's jurisdiction is limited to safety and health conditions that exist in the
workplace environment. In general, under the Act, it is the duty of each employer to furnish all
employees a place of employment free of recognized hazards likely to cause death or serious physical
harm. Employees have a duty to comply with the occupational safety and health standards and all
rules, regulations, and orders issued under the Act. Occupational Safety and Health Administration
regulations (published in Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regulations) establish specific standards
telling employers what must be done to achieve a safe and healthful working environment. DOE
places emphasis on compliance with these regulations at DOE facilities and prescribes through DOE
orders the Occupational Safety and Health Act standards that contracts shall meet, as applicable to
their work at Government-owned, contractor-operated facilities (DOE Order 5480.IB, 5483 . IA).
DOE keeps and makes available the various records of minor illnesses, injuries, and work-related
deaths as required by Occupational Safety and Health Administration regulations.
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7.1 .2 Executive Orders

Executive Order 11593 (National Historic Preservation) (May 13, 1971) directs Federal
agencies, including DOE, to locate, inventory, and nominate propenies under their jurisdiction or
control to the NaJiona/ Register of Historic Places if those propenies qualify. This process requires
DOE to provide the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation the opponunity to comment on the
possible impacts of the proposed activity on any potential eligible or listed resources.
Executive Order 11514 (National Environmental Policy Act) directs Federal agencies to
continually monitor and control their activities to protect and enhance the qu al ity of the environment
and to develop procedures to ensure that fullest practicable provision of timely public infonoation and
understanding of the Federal plans and programs with environmental impact to obtain the views of
interested panies. The DOE has issued regulations (10 CFR Pan 1021) and DOE Order 5440. IE for
complionce with this executive order.
Executive Order 11988 (Floodplain Management) directs Federal agencies to establish
procedures to ensure that the potential effects of flood hazards and floodplain management are
considered for any action undenaken in a floodplain and that floodplai n impacts be avoided to the
extent practicable.
Executive Order 11990 (protection of Wetlands) directs governmental agencies to avoid, to
the extent practicable, any shon- and long-teno adverse impacts on wetlands wherever there is a
practicable alternative.
Executive Order 12344 (Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program) [enacted as penoanentlaw by
Public Law 98-525 (42 USC §7l58)] prescribes the authority and respons ibility of the Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Program, a joint NtvylDOE organization, for maners pertaining to Naval nuclear
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propulsion. These responsibilities include all environmental and occupational safety and health
aspects of the program.

mechanisms through which DOE manages its facilities are the promulgation of regulations and the

Executive Order 125BO (Superfund Implementation) delegates to the heads of executive
departments and agencies the responsibility for undenaking remedial actions for releases, or
threatened releases that are not on the National Priority List and removal actions other than
emergencies where the release is from any facility under the jurisdiction or control of executive
departments and agencies.

The DOE regulations are generally found in Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations .
These regulations address such areas as energy conservation, administrative requirements and
procedures, nuclear safety, and classified information. For purposes of this EIS, relevant regulations
include 10 CFR Part 820, Procedures for DOE Nuclear Activities; 10 CFR Part 830.120, Quality
Assurance; 10 CFR Part 834, Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment (proposed);
10 CFR Part 835, Occupational Radiation Protection; 10 CFR Part 1021, Compliance with the
National Environmental Policy Act; and 10 CFR Part 1022, Compliance with FloodplainslWetlands

Executive Order 12B56 (Right to Know Laws and Pollution Prevention Requirements) This
order directs all Federal agencies to reduce and report toxic chemicals entering any wastestream;
improve emergency planning, response, and accident notification; and encourage clean technologies
and testing of innovative prevention technologies. The executive order also provides that Federal
agencies are persons for purposes of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
(SARA Title UJ), which obliges agencies to meet the requirements of the Act.

issuance of DOE orders .

Environmental Review Requirements.
DOE orders generally set forth policy and the programs and internal procedures for
implementing those policies. The major DOE orders pertaining to the eventual construction and
operation of SNF facilities within the DOE Complex are listed in Table 7-1. The following sections
provide a brief discussion of selected orders:

Executive Order 12B9B (Environmental Justice) This order directs Federal agencies to
achieve environmental justice by identifying and addressing, as appropriate, disproportionately high
and adverse human health or environmental effects of its programs, policies, and activities on
minority populations and low·income populations in the United States and its territories and
possessions. The order creates an Interagency Working Group on Environmental Justice and directs
each Federal agency to develop strategies within prescribed time limits to identify and address
environmental justice concerns. The order further directs each Federal agency to collect, maintain,
and analyze information on the race, national origin, income level , and other readily accessible and
appropriate information for areas surrounding facilities or sites expected to have a substantial
environmental, human health, or economic effect on the surrounding populations, when such facilities
or sites become the subject of a substantial Federal environmental administrative or judicial action and
to malee such information publicly available.
Executive Order 12114 (Environmental Effects Abroad of Major Federal Actions) This
order declares that Federal agencies are required to prepare environmental analyses for "major
Federal actions significantly affecting the environment of the global commons outside the jurisdiction
of any nation (e.g., the ocean or Antarctica).· According to the Executive Order, major Federal
actions significantly affecti ng the environment of foreign countries may also require environmental
analyses under certain circumstances. The procedural requirements imposed by the E7.ecutive Order
are analogous to those under the National Environmental Policy Act.
7.1.3 Department of Energy Regulations and Orders
Through the authority of the Atomic Energy Act, DOE is responsible for establishing a
comprehensive health, safety, and environmental program for its facilities. The regulato ry
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DOE Order 5440.1E, National EnvIronmental Policy Act Compliance Program. This
order establishes authorities and responsibilities of DOE officials and sets forth internal procedures for
implementing the National Environmental Policy Act. This order was issued by DOE on
November 10, 1992.
DOE Order 54BO.1 S, EnvIronment Safety and Health Program for Department of
Energy Operations. This order establishes the Environment, Safety and Health Program for DOE
operations.
7.1.4 Hazardous and Radioactive Materials Transportation Regulations
Transportation of hazardous and radioactive materials, substances, and wastes are governed by
the U.S . Department of Transportation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency regulations. These regulations may be found in 49 CFR Parts 171
through 178,49 CFR Parts 383 through 397, 10 CFR Part 71, and 40 CFR Part 262, respectively.
U.S . Department of Transportation regulations contain requirements for identifyi ng a material
as hazardous or radioactive. These regulations interface with those of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission or U.S. Environmental Protection Agency regulations for identifying material, but the
U.S. Department of Transportation hazardous material regulations govern the hazard communication
(such as marking, hazard labelling, vehicle placarding, and emergency response tel ephone number)
and shipping requirements (such as required entries on shipping papers or U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency waste manifests).
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Table 7-1. DOE orders relevant to the DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel Management Program.
DOE Order
1300.2A

Table 7-1. (continued).

Subject

136O.2B

Unclassified Computer Security Program (5-18-92)

1540.2

Hazardous Material Packaging for Transport-Administrative Procedures
(9-30-86; Chg. I, 12-19-88)

3790. IB

Federal Employee Occupational Safety and Health Program (1-7-93)

4330.4B

Maintenance Management Program (2-10-94)
(3~87 ;

Subject

DOE Order

Department of Energy Technical Standards Program (5-19-92)

5480.20

Personnel Selection, Qualification, Training, and Staffing Requirements at DOE
Reactor and Nonreactor Nuclear Facilities (2-20-91 ; Chg. 1,6-19-91)

5480.21

Unreviewed Safety Questions (12-24-91)

5480.22

Technical Safety Requirements (2-25-92; Chg. 1,9-15-92)

5480.23

Nuclear Safety Analysis Reports (4-30-92; Chg . 1,3-10-94)

5480.24

Nuclear Criticality Safety (8-12-92)

4700. 1

Project Management System

5480.28

Natural Phenomena Hazards Mitigation (1-15-93)

5000.3B

Occurrence Reporting and Processing of Operations Information
(1-19-93; Chg. 1,7-2-93)

5480.31

Startup and Restart of Nuclear Facilities (9-15-93)

5400. 1

General Environmental Protection Program (11-9-88; Chg. 1,6-29-90)

5481.1B

Safety Analysis and Rev iew System (9-23-86; Chg. 1,5-19-87)

5400.2A

Environmental Compliance Issue Coordination (1-31-89; Chg. l, 1-7-93)

5482. IB

Environment, Safety, and Health Appraisal Program (9-23-86; Chg. I, 11-18-91)

Chg. 1,6-2-92)

5400.4

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
Requirements (10-6-89)

5483.IA

Occupational Safety and Health Program for DOE Contractor Employees at
Government-Owned, Contractor-Operated Facilities (6-22-83)

5400.5

Radiation Protection of the Public and the Environment
(2-8-90; Chg. 2, 1-7-93)

5484. 1

Environmental Protection, Safety, and Health Protection Information Reporting
Requirements (2-21-81; Chg. 7, 10-17-90)

5440. IE

National Environmental Policy Act Compliance Program (11 - 10-92)

5500.1B

Emergency Management System (4-30-91; Chg. 1,2-27-92)

5480.IB

Environment, Safety and Health Program for DOE Operations (9-23-86; Chg. 5,
5-10-93)

5500.2B

Emergency Categories, Classes, and Notification and Reporting Requirements
(4-30-91; Chg. 1,2-27-92)

5480.3

Safety Requ irements for the Packaging and Transportation of Hazardous Materials,
Hazardous Substances, and Hazardous Wastes (7-9-85)

5500.3A

Planning and Preparedness for Operational Emergencies (4-30-91; Chg. 1,2-27-92)

5500.4A

Public Affairs Policy and Planning Requirements for Emergencies (6-8-92)

5480.4

Environmental Protection, Safety, and Health Protection Standards
(5-15-84; Chg. 4, 1-7-93)

5500.7B

Emergency Operating Records Protection Program (10-23-91)

5480.6

Safety of Department of Energy-Owned Nuclear Reactors (09-23-86)

5480.7A

Fire Protection (2-17-93)

5480.8A

Contractor Occupational Medical Program (6-26-92; Chg. I, 10-19-92)

5480.9A

Construction Project Safety and Health Management (4-13-94)

5480. 10

5500. 10

Emergency Readiness Assurance Program (4-30-91; Chg. 1, 2-27-92)

5630.I IB

Safeguards and Security Program (8-2-94)

5630.12A

Safeguards and Security Inspection and Assessment Program (6-23-92)

5700.6C

Quality Assurance (8-21-91)

5820.2A

Radioactive Waste Management (9-26-88)

6430. IA

General Design Criteria (4~89)

Contractor Industrial Hygiene Program (6-26-85)

5480.11

Radiation Protection for Occupational Workers (12-21 -88; Chg. 3, 6-17-92)

5480. 15

Department of Energy Laboratory Accreditation Program for Personnel Dosimetry
(12-14-87)

5480.17

DOE Site Safety Representatives (10-05-88)

5480.18B

Nuclear Facility Training Accreditation Program (08-31-94)

5480.19

Conduct of Operations Requ irements for DOE Facilities (7-9-90; Chg. 1, 5-18-92)
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Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations applicable to radioactive materials
transportation are found in 10 CFR Pan 71, which includes detailed packaging design requirements
and package certification testing requirements. Complete documentation of design and safety analysis
and results of the required testing is submitted to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to certify
the package for use. This certification testing involves the following components: heat, physical
drop onto an unyielding surface, water submersion, puncture by dropping package onto a rigid spike,
and gas tightness. Some of the required tests simulate maximum reasonably foreseeable accident
conditions.

Consultations with Federal and state agencies and native America tribes were initiated by
DOE. Table 7-2 shows the dates and locations of the meetings held. Volume 2, Appendix B,
contains meeting correspondence generated as a result of these meetings.

Table 7-2. Meetings held in response to agency or nation comments on the Department of Energy
Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and Idabo National Engineering Laboratory
Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Programs Draft Environmental Impact Statement.
Date

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency regulations pertaining to hazardous waste
transportation are found in 40 CFR Pan 262. These regulations deal with the use of the
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency waste manifest, which is the shipping paper for transporting
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act hazardous waste.

Defense Nuclear Facilities

Washington, D.C.

November 9, 1994

Washington, D.C.

December IS, 1994

Safety Board
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency

7.1 .5 Applicability of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act to Spent Nuclear Fuel

Center for Disease Control

Conference call

November 22, 1994

Historically, DOE chemically reprocessed SNF to recover valuable products and fissionable
materials, and as such, the SNF was not a solid waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act.

Council on Environmental

Washington, D.C.

December 21, 1994

Seneca Nation of New York

New York

January 10, 1995

World events have resulted in significant changes in DOE's direction and operations. In
panicular, in April 1992 DOE announced the phase-<lut of reprocessi ng for the recovery of special
nuclear materials. With th ese changes, DOE's focus on most of its SNF has changed from
reprocessing and recovery of materials to sto rage and ultimate disposition. This in tum has created
uncertainty in regard to the regulatory status of some of DOE's SNF relative to the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act.

Shoshone-Bannock Tribes of

Fort Hall, Idaho

December 2,21, and 29, 1994
January 10, 1995
February 13, 1995

Quality

Idaho

DOE has initiated discussion with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency on the potential
app licability of the Resou rce Conservation and Recovery Act to SNF. Further discussions with U.S .
Environmental Protection Agency Headquaners and regional offices and state regulators are ongoing
to develop a path forward toward meeting any Resource Conservation and Recovery Act requirements
that might apply.

7.2 Con ultation
The National Environme ntal Policy Act requires that Federal, state, and local agencies with
jurisdiction or special expertise regardi ng any environmental impact be consulted and involved in the
National Environmental Policy Act process . Agencies involved include those with authority to issue
applicable pennits, licenses, and other regulatory approvals, as well as those responsible for
protecting significant resources (for example, endangered species, critical habitats, or historic
resources). These agencies will be sent copies of the Final EIS .
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No Action alternative
consequences, 5. 1.2
description , 3. 1. 1
SNF distribution. location • • nd inventory. Fig. 3-1
summary, Table 3-1
No Action alternative. by site
Hanford Site, 3.\.1.1
Idaho National Engineering I..aboratory , 3.1.1.2
Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program . 3. 1.1.6
Nevada Test Site. 3. 1.1.5
Oak Ridge Reservation, 3 .1.1.4
Other generator/storage site. , 3.1.1.1
Savannah River Site, 3.1.1.3
noise
characterization. Stt site appendices
impacts. 5.2.8
mitigation measures . 5.1.8
Noise Control Act, 1 . 1.1
nonprogrammatic EISs (DOE), 1.2.4, 1.2.5. 1.2.6
nonradiological impacts
199211993 Planning Basis , 5. 1.4 .5
Centralization. 5. 1.6.5
O«entralization.5. 1.3.5
No Action. 5. 1.2 .5
Regionalization , 5. 1.5.5
Norfolk Naval Shipyard
characterization, 4 .6.2
loc.t ion. Fig. 4-1
supporting analy.es, App. D
nonnal operations, cancer fatalities. 3.3.2. 1,
Fig . 3·8, Table 3-7
Nuclear Regu latory Commission licensing
standard,3 .3.1
Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 , 1. 1.1

.p.
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard
characterization. 4.6.4
loc.tion , Fig. 4-10
supporting analyses, App. D
planning buis alternative
Stt 1992/1993 Planning Basis at beginning of index.
poUution prevention mitigation. 5.1 . 1
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard
characterization , 4.6.3
location. Fig. 4-9
supporting analyses. App. D
preferred .ltemative. Chaptcr 3 introduction
prcpa«:n list, Chapter 6
programmatic EISs (DOE) . 1.2. 1, 1.2.2. 1.2.3
public comment rcsponse , 1.4
changes to EIS, 1.4.2
National Environmental Protection Aet process .
1.4. 1
public health cffecll. S~~ occupation.1 and public hc.a.IU
and . arcty
Puget Sound Naval Shipyard
characlerization. 4.6. 1
location, Fig. 4-6

Oak Ridge Reservation
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Savannah River Site (continued)
199211993 Planning Basis . 3.1.3 .3
Centralization , 3.1.5.3
Decentralization, 3.1 .2.3
No Action. 3.1.1.3
Regionalization, 3.1.4.3
characterization. 4.3, App. C
location, Fig. 4-3
5NF management and inventory, 1.1.2.2,
Fig. 1-2, Table 1-1
supporlirlg analyses , App. C. App. K
scope, EIS Volume 1, 1.3.2
scoping process. 1.3.1
shipments of SNF
by alternative, see alternative summaries
comparisons, 3.3.1 , Fig. 3-7, Table 3-6
historical, Fig. 3·7
short-term use and long-te"" productivity , 5 .5
site services
characterization. su lite appendices
impacts on, 5.2.9
mitigation measures, 5.7.11
lites, alternative , App. F
Nevada Telt Site, 4.4
Oak Ridge Reservation, 4.5
socioeconomics
characterization, su site appendices
impacts
cumulative, 5.3.2.2
u key discriminator, 5.1.1.1
199211993 Planning Ba.is , 5.1.4.1
Centralization, 5.1 .6 .1
Decentralization, 5.1 .3.1
No Action, 5.1.2.1
Regionalization . 5.1.5 .1
mitigation , 5.7.2
soils , mitigation measures , 5.7.4
special-<:ase nuclear fuel power plants. 4.7.3, App. E
Babcock and Wilcox, 4.7.3.3
Fort St. Vrain , 4.7.3.2
SNF management and inventories at, 1.1.2.5,
Table 1-3
West Valley Demonstration Project, 4.7.3 .1
spent nuclear fuel
alternatives
consequences , Chapter 5
description . Chapter 3
see also alternative.
deftnition, 1. 1.1
disposition technoiogiCl, 1.1.3 .4
foreign research racton, 1.1.2.4
generation , 1.1.2, Fig. 1· 2
inventories , 1.1.2.1, Table 1-1 , Fig. 3-1 through

Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (continued)
supporting analyses, App. 0
purpose and need , Chapter 2

flO

en/ries

·R·
radioactive materials
transportation regulations, 7.1.4
radiological impacts
from alternatives
1992/1993 Planning Basis , 5.1.4.4
Centralization, 5.1.6.4
Decentralization , 5.1.3.4
No Action , 5 .1.2.4
Regionalization, 5.1.5.4
transportation , 5,3.2.6. App. 1
radiation
health effects . App . K
from lpent nuclear fuel . 1.1.1
radioactive waste generation comparison, 3.3.4
references, Chapler 9
Regionalizaeion alternative
consequences, 5.1.5
description, 3,1.4
SNF distribution . location , and
inventory, Fig . 3-4, -S
l ummary. Table 3-4
Regionalization alternatives, by site, 3.1.4
Hanford Site, 3.1.4,1
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, 3.1.4.2
Nava l Nuclear Propu lsion Program , 3.1.4.6
Nevada Test Site. 3.1.4.5
Oak R.idge Reservation, 3 .1.4.4
Other generator/storage sites. 3.1.4.7
Savannah River Site . 3 .1.4.3
regulatory requirements, 7.1
DOE regulationl and o rders, 7.1.3 , Table 7-1
Executive Orders , 7 . 1.2
Federa l, 7.1.1
transportation regUlations. 7.1.4
research and development alternative summaries
199211993 Planning Basis, Table 3-3
Centralization, Table 3-5
Decentralization. Table 3-2
No Action . Table 3-1
Regionalization, Table 3-4
research reactors (non·OOE), Table 1-2, App. e
Reso urce Conse rvation and Recovery Act, 7 . 1. 1
resources commitment. 5.6

3-6

spent nuclear fuel (continued)
overview , 1. I
radioactivity , 1.1.1
regulatory requlremenl.!l , Chapter 7
regulatory status, 7.1.5
shipments
by alternative, su alternative summaries
hislorical, Fig. 3-7
special-<:ase, 1.1.2.5, 1.3.2.5, Table 1-3
stabiliution (technologies), 1.1.3.2
see also stabilization of SNF
storage
historical , 1.1.2, Fig. 1-2
technologies, 1.1.3.1
su also storage of SNF
transportation (technologies), 1.1.3.3
vulnerability assessment , 1.1.1.3
stabilization of SNF
alternative .ummaries
199211993 Planning Basis, Table 3-3
Cenll1.lization, Table 3·5
Decentralization, Table 3-2
No Action. Table 3-1
Regionalization, Table 3-4
EIS .cope, 1.3.2.2
technologies , 1.1.3.2
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatio
EIS , 1.2.2
storage of SNF
alternative summaries
1992/1993 Planning Sasis, Table 3-3
Centraliution. Table 3-5
Decentralization, Table 3-2
No Action . Table 3-1
Regionalization , Table 3-4
EIS ,cope, 1.3 .2.3
other sites , 4.7
sites, historical , 1. 1.2
technologies , 1.1 .3 . 1

·T·
technologies for SNF management. 1. 1.3
disposition , 1.1.3 .4
stabiliz.ation . 1.1.3 .2
stonge. 1.1.3.1
transportation, 1.1.3.3
test and experimental reacton , 1.1.2.5, 4.7.1
Tollic Substances Control Act . 7 . 1. 1
traffic, su transportation
transportation, AppendiJe. 1
acc idents comparison. 3.3.5, Table 3-9
altern..tive lummaries
199211993 Planning Bas it , Table 3-3

location and inventory by alternatives. Fig. 1·2
management
current ooe, 1.1.2.3
current Naval , 1.1.2.3
foreign reaearch reactan, 1.1.2.4
inventoria , 1.1.2.1
non-DOE domestic reacton , 1.1.2.5
overview, 1, 1
technologies , 1.1.3
vulnerabilitiea, 1. 1. 1.3

.sSafe Drinking Water Act, 7 . 1.1
Sandia National Laboratories
characterization. 4.7.1.3 , App. E
Savannah River Site
alternatives , 3. 1

8-5

CJ.'Ic9...

VOLUME I

VOLUME I

transportation (continued)
Centralization, Table 3-5
Decentralization. Table 3-2
No Action, Table 3· 1
Regionalization, Table 34
as leey discriminator, 5.1 .1.1
1992/1993 Planning Sasis, 5.1.4.6
CentraliZ9.tion, 5.1.6.6
Decentralization, 5.1.3 .6
No Action, 5.1.2.6
Regionalization, 5. i .5 ,6
impacts
comparison. 3.3.5
cumulative impacts , S . ~ . 2.7, Table 5-4
mitigation, 5.1.9
traffic accidents , 5.3 .2.6
regulations, 1. 1.4
shipments. 3.3.1, Table 3-6
technologiu , 1.1.3.3
Tritium Supply and Recycling Programmatic E15, 1.2.2

·u·
Univeraily of Mislouri reactor
characterization. 4.7 .2.3, App. E
SNF management and inventories, 1.1.2.5,
Table 1·2
utilities and energy
characterization. ue site appendices
impactJ, 5.1.1.2, 5.2.9
cumulative, 5.3.2.8
mitigation , 5.1.11
su auo electricity

.V.,.W·
waste generation (radioactive)
comparison, 3.3.4
impacts, 5.3.2 .9
Waste Management Programmatic EIS . 1.2.1
water resources, S.2 .6, 5.7.6
characterization . su site appendices
impacts, 5.2.6, 5.3.2.4
mitigation, 5.7.6
West Valley Demonstration Project
characterization, 4.7 .3.1, App, E
SNF management and inventories . 1.1.2.5.
Table 1-3
WUd and Scenic Rivera Act, 7 . 1.1
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Appendix E: Spent Nuclear Fuel
Management Programs at Other
Generator/Storage Locations
,

Appendix F: Nevada Test Site and
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Appendix G
Acronyms/Abbreviations
CFR

DOE
EA
ECF
EIS
HS
INEL
MEl
MTHM
NNPP

NTS
ORR

PElS
PUREX
SNF
SRS
TRIGA

Appendix H
Glossary

Code of Federal Regulations
U.S. Department of Energy
environmental assessment
Expended Core Facility
Environmental Impact Statement
Hanford Site
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
maximally exposed individiual
metric tons of heavy metal
Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program
Nevada Test Site
Oak Ridge Reservation
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement
Plutonium Uranium Extraction
spent nuclear fuel
Savannah River Site
training, research, and isotope reactors built by General Atomics

Terms in this glossary are defined based on the context in which they are used in this EIS .
100-yearflood A flood event of such magnitude it occurs, on average, every 100 years (equates to
a I percent probability of occurring in any given year).
SOO-year flood A flood event of such magnitude it occurs, on average, every 500 years (equates to
a 0.2 percent probability of occurring in any given year).
abnormal condition Any deviation from normal conditions.
accident An unplanned sequence of events that results in undesirable consequences.
actinide Any of a series of chemically similar, mostly synthetic, radioactive elements with atomic
numbers ranging from actinium-89 through lawrencium-103 .
alpha .. mitter A radioactive substance that decays by releasing an alpha particle.
alpha-low-level waste Waste that was previously classified as transuranic waste but has a
transuranic concentration lower than the currently established limit for transuranic waste. Low-level
waste requires additional controls and special handling. This waste stream cannot be accepted for
onsite disposal under the current waste acceptance criteria; therefore, it is special-case waste.
alpha particle A positively charged particle ejected spontaneously from the nuclei of some
radioactive elements. It is identical to a helium nucleus that has a mass number of 4 and an
electrostatic charge of +2.
as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) A process by which a graded approach is applied to
maintaining dose levels to workers and the public, and releases of radioactive materials to the
environment as low as reasonably achievable.
atomic number The number of positively charged protons in the nucleus of an atom and the
number of electrons on an electrically neutral atom.
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background radiation Radiation from cosmic sources; naturally occurring radioactive materials,
including radon (except as a decay product of source or special nuclear material), and global fallout as
it exists in the environment from the testing of nuclear explosive devices.
baseline For purposes of this EIS, the conditions projected to exist in Iune 1995, the scheduled
date for the Record of Decision, against which the environmental consequences of the various
alternatives are evaluated .

characterization The determination of waste composition and properties, whether by review of
process knowledge, nondestructive examination or assay, or sampling and analysis, generally done for
the purpose of determining appropriate storage, treatment, handling, transport, and disposal
requirements.
cladding The outer jacket of fuel elements and targets usually made of aluminum, stainless steel,
or zirconium alloy, used to prevent fuel corrosion and retain fission products during reactor
operation, or to prevent releases into the environment during storage.

beta-4mitter A radioactive substance that decays by releasing a beta panicle.
beta particle A charged panicle emitted from a nucleus during radioactive decay, with a mass
equal to 111837 that of a proton. A negatively charged beta panicle is identical to an electron. A

co-iocated workers Workers in a fixed population outside the day-UHIay proces.~ safety
management controls of a given facility area. In practice, this fixed population is normally the
workers at an independent facility area located some distance from the reference facility area.

positively charged beta panicle is called a positron.
boiling water reactor A type of nuclear reactor that uses fission heat to generate stearn in the
reactor to drive turbines and generate electricity.

committed dose equivalent (Hao) The dose equivalent to organs or tissues of reference that will
be received from an intake of radioactive material by an individual during the 50-year period
following the intake. The International Commission on Radiological Protection defines this as the
committed equivalent dose.

breader reactor A type of nuclear reactor that creates more fissionable fuel than it uses.
by-product material (a) Any radioactive material (except special nuclear material) yielded in, or
made radioactive by, exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing special
nuclear material, and (b) the tailings or wastes produced by the extraction or concentration of uranium
or thorium from any ore processed primarily for its source material content [Atomic Energy
Act II(e»). By-product material is exempt from regulation under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act.
calcination The process of converting high-level waste to unconsolidated granules or powder (also
called calcining).
calcine The material produced by a calcination.
canning The process of placing spent nuclear fuel in canisters to retard corrosion, contain
radioactive releases, or control geometry.
capable fault In pan, a capable fault is one that may have had movement at or near the grouod
surface at least once within the past 35,000 years, or has had recurring movement within the past
500,000 years. Further definition can be found in 10 CFR 100, Appendix A.
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committed effective dose equivalent (H E,50) The sum of the products of the weighting factors
applicable to each of the body organs or tissues that are irradiated and the committed dose equivalent
to these organs or tissues. The International Commission on Radiological Protection defines this as
the committed effective dose.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Uabllity Act of 1980
(CERCLA) A Federal law (also known as "Superfund") that provides a comprehensive framework
to deal with past or abandoned hazardous materials. The Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) provides for liability, compensation, cleanup,
and emergency response for hazardous substances released into the environment that could endanger
public health, welfare, or the environment, as well as the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste disposal
sites. CERCLA has jurisdiction over any release or threatened release of any "hazardous substance"
to the environment. Under CERCLA, the defmition of "hazardous" is much broader than under the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, and the hazardous suhstance need not be a waste. If a site
meets the CERCLA requirements for designation, it is ranked along with other "Superfund" sites and
listed on the National Priorities List. This ranking and listing is the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency's way of determining which sites have the highest priority for cleanup.
contact-handled waste
200 mill irem per hour.

Packaged waste whose external surface dose rate does not exceed

H-2

H-3
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contamination The deposition of unwanted radioactive material on the surfaces of structures,
areas, objects, or personnel.

dose (or radiation dose) A generic term that means absorbed dose, dose equivalent, effective
dose equivalent, committed dose equivalent, committed effective dose equivalent, or total effective
dose equivalent, as defined elsewhere in this glossary.

coolant
co~

A gas or liquid circulated through a nuclear reactor to remove or transfer beat.

The central portion of a nuclear reactor containing the fuel elements, moderator, neutron

poisons, and support structures.
curie (ei) The basic unit used to describe the intensity of radioactivity in a sample of material . The
curie is equal to 37 billion disintegrations per second, which is approximately the rate of deca! ~f
I gram of radium. A curie is also a quantity of any radionuclide that decays 41 a rate of 37 billion
disintegrations per second.
decay, radioactive The decrease in the amount of any radioactive mat~rial with the p~ge of
time, due to the spontaneous emission from the atOmic nuclei of either alpha or beta particles, often

driver fuel These fuel tubes or assemblies usually contain enriched uranium, plutonium, or thorium
materials, which can be fissioned (or split) by neutrons. Because this fuel drives neutron
bombardment of targets in a production or researcb reactor, these fuels are called drivers.
dry storage Storage of spent nuclear fuel in environments where the fuel is not immersed in liquid
for purposes of cooling and/or sbielding.
effective dose equivalent (EDE) The sum of the products of the dose equivalent to the organ or
tissue and the weighting factors applicable to each of the body organs or tissues that are irradiated. It
includes the dose from radiation sources internal and/or external to the body and is expressed in units
of rem. The International Commission on Radiation Protection defines this as the effective dose.

accompanied hy gamma radiation (see balf-life, radioactive).
decommissioning The process of removing a facility from operation, followed by
decontamination, entombment, dismantlement, or conversion to another use.
decontamination The actions taken to reduce or remove substances that pose a substantial present
or potential bazard to buman bealth or the environment, such as radioactive.contamination fro~
facilities, soil, or equipment by washing, chemical action, mechanical cleanlDg, or other tecbruques.
degraded (spent nuclear fuel)

Spent nuclear fuel whose external cladding bas cracked, pitted,

oorroded, or potentially allows the leakage of radioactive materials.
DOE orders

Requirements internal to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) that establish DOE

policy and procedures, including those for compliance with applicable laws.
DOE site boundary A geographic boundary within which public access is controlled and activities
are governed by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and its contractors, not by local authorities.
Based on the definition of exclusion zone, a public road traversing a DOE site is considered to ~
within the DOE site boundary if DOE or the site contractor has the capability to control the road at
any time necessary.
dosage

The concentration-time profile for exposure to toxicological hazards.
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enriched uranium Uranium that bas greater amounts of the fissionable isotope uranium-235 than
occurs naturally. Naturally occurring uranium is 0 .72 percent uranium-235.
environmental monitoring The process of sampling and analysis of environmental media in and
around a facility being monitored for the purpose of <a) confirming compliance with performance
objectives, and (b) early detection of any contamination entering the environment to facilitate timely
remedial action.
existing facilities Facilities that are projected to exist as of the Record of Decision for this EIS,
scheduled for June 1995.
external accident Accidents initiated by manmade energy sources not associated with operation of
a given facility . Examples include airplane crashes, induced fires, transportation accidents adjacent
to a facility, and so forth.
facility worker Any worker whose day-to-day activities are controlled by process safety
management programs and a common emergency response plan associated with a facility or facility
area. This definition includes any individual within a facility/facility area or its O.4-mile exclusion
zone. This definition can also include those transient individuals or small populations outside the
exclusion zone but inside the radius defined by the maximally exposed co-located worker if reasonable
efforts to account for such people have been made in the facility or facil ity area emergency plan. For
facility accident analyses, the facility worker is defined as an individual located 100 meters <328 feet)
downwind of tlle facility location where an accidental release occurs.
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fissile material Although sometimes used as a synonym for fif, ;ionable material, this term has
acquired a more restricted meaning; namely, any material fissionable by thermal (slow) neutrons.
The three primarily fissile materials are uranium-233, uranium-235, and plutonium-239 .
fission

The splitting of a nucleus into at least two other nuclei and the release of a relatively large

amount of energy. Two or three neutrons are usually released during this type of transformation.
fission products

hazardous substance

Any substance that when released to the environment in an uncontrolled or

unpermitted fashion becomes subject to the reporting and possible response provisions of the Clean
Water Act and the Comprehensive EnviroiUTlentai Response, Compensation, and Liability Act.

The nuclei (fission fragments) formed by the fission of heavy elements, plus the

nuclides formed by the fission fragments' radioactive decay.
fissionable material Commonly used as a synonym for fissile material, the meaning of this term
has been extended to include material that can be fissioned by fast neutrons, such as uranium-238.
gamma-4mitter

hazardous material A substance or material, including a hazardous substance, which has been
determined by the U .S. Secretary of Transportation to be capable of posing an unreasonable risk to
health, safety, and property when transported in commerce.

A radioactive substance that decays by releasing gamma radiation.

gamma ray (gamma radiation)

hazardous waste Under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, a solid waste, or
combination of solid wastes, which because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or
infectious characteristics may (a) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an
increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversibile, illness; or (b) pose a substantial present
or potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported,
or disposed of, or otherwise managed. Source, special nuclear material, and by-product material, as
defined by the Atomic Energy Act, are specifically excluded from the definition of solid waste.

High-energy, short wavelength electromagnetic radiation (a

packet of energy) emitted from the nucleus . Gamma radiation frequently accompanies alpha and beta
emissions and always accompanies fission. Gamma rays are very penetrating and are best stopped or
shielded against by dense materials, such as lead or uranium. Gamma rays are similar to x-rays, but
are usually more energetic.

heterogeneous

Pertaining to a substance baving different characteristics in different locations. A

synonym is nonuniform.
high-4fficiency particulate air (HEPA) fiHer

A filter with an efficiency of at least 99.95 percent

used to separate particles from air exhaust streams prior to releasing that air into the atmosphere.
geologic repository

A system that is intended to be used for, or may be used for, the disposal of

radioactive v. aste or spent nuclear fuel in excavated geologic media. A geologic repository includes
(a) the geologic repository operations area, and (b) the portion of the geologic setting that provides
isolation . A near-surface disposal area is not a geologic repository.
groundwater Generally, all water contained in the ground. Water held below the water table
available to freely enter wells.
grouting

Grouting is the process of immobilizing or fixing solid forms of waste so they can be

more safely stored or disposed.

high-level waste The highly radioactive waste material that results from the reprocessing of spent
nuclear fuel , including liquid waste produced directly from reprocessing and any solid waste derived
from the liquid that contains a combination of transuranic and fission product nuclides in quantities
that require permanent isolation. High-level waste may include other highly radioactive material that
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, consistent with existing law, determines by rule requires
permanent isolation.
hot celUhot cell facility

A heavily shielded enclosure for bandling and processing (by remote

means or automatically), or storing highly radioactive materials.

half-life The time in which half the atoms of a particular radioactive substance disintegrate to
another nuclear form . Measured half-lives vary from millionths of a second to billions of years.

hydrogeology

Also called physical half-life.

hydrology

hazardous chemical A term defined under the Occupational Safety and Health Act and the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act as any chemical that is a physical hazard or

incineration The efficient burning of combustible solid and liquid wastes to destroy organic
constituents and reduce the volun:e of the waste. Incinerators are designed to bum with an extremely
high efficiency. The greater the burning efficiency, the cleaner the air emission. Incineration of

a health bazard.
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The study of the geological factors relating to water.

The study of water, including groundwater, surface water, and rainfa!1.
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rad ioactive materials does not destroy the radionudides but does significantly reduce the volume of
these wastes. High-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters are used to prevent radionuclides and
heavy fr.etals from going out of the stack and into the atmosphere.
inconel

A rr.,ta1 alloy containing nickel. chromium, and iron, which exhibits good resistance to

corrosion in 3.queous environments .
interim action (NEPA) An action that may be undertaken while work on a required program EIS
is in progress, and the action is not covered by an existing program statement. An interim action
may not be undertaken unless such action: (a) is justified independently of the program; (b) is itself
accompanied by an adequate EIS or has undergone other NEPA review; and (c) will not prejudice the
ultimate decision on the program. Interim action prejudices the ultimate decision on the program
when it tends to determine subsequent development or limit alternatives.
intermittent surface water A stream, creek, or river that does not contain water during part or
all of the year.
internal accidents Accidents that are initiated by man-made energy sources associated with the
operation of a given facility. Examples include process explosions, fires, spills, criticalities, and so
forth .
involved worker Workers that would be involved in a proposed action as opposed to workers that
would be on the site of a proposed action but not involved in the action.
isoto,Je One of two or more atoms with the same number of protons, but different numbers of
neutrons, in their nuclei. Thus, carbon-12, carbon-13, and carbon-14 are isotopes of the element
carbon, the numbers denoting the approximate atomic weights . Isotopes have very nearly the same
chemical properties, but often different physical properties (for example, carbon-12 and -13 are
stable, carbon-14 is radioactive).
life cycle The entire time period from generation to permanent disposal or elimination of waste.
liquid metal cooled breeder reactor A reactor that creates more fissionable material than it
consumes and uses liquid metal as a coo!dIlt. Liquid sodium is a common metal used to cool this type
of reactor.
liquid metal fast breeder reactor A reactor that operates using a type of fission known as fast
fission where the neutrons that are used to split the atoms are not slowed down or moderated as is
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usually the case with normal fission. It creates more fissionable material than it consumes and uses
liquid metal as a coolant. Liquid sodium is a common metal used to cool this type of reactor.
long-term storage The storage of hazardous waste (a) onsite (a generator site) for a period of
9O-days or greater, other than in a satellite accumulation area, or (b) offsite in a properly managed
treatment, storage, or disposal facility for any period of time.
low-level waste Waste that contains radioactivity and is not classified as high-level waste,
transuranic waste, or spent nuclear fuel. Test specimens of fissionable material irradiated for research
and development only, and not for the production of power or plutonium, may be classified as lowlevel waste, provided the concentration of transuranic elements is less than 100 nanocuries per gram
of waste.
major radionuclides The radioisotopes that together comprise 95 percent of the total curie content
of a waste package by volume and have a half-life of at least I week. Radionuclides that are
important to a facility'S radiological performance assessment andlor a safety analysis and are listed in
the facility' s waste acceptance criteria are considered major radionuclides.
management (of spent nuclear fuel) Emplacing, operating, and administering facilities,
transportation systems, and procedures to assure safe and environmentally responsible handling and
storage of spent nuclear fuel pending (and in anticipation of) a decision on ultimate disposition.
maximally exposed co-located worker (MeW) A hypothetical individual defined to allow dose
or dosage comparison with numerical criteria for co-located workers. This individual is located at
whichever is the greater of 0.4 miles from the facility area boundary (that is, the exclusion zone
boundary) or 75 percent of the distance to the nearest independent facility area (that is, the low
population zone boundary). The MCW is irrelevant if the DOE site boundary is closer than the
MCW location.
maximally exposed individual (MEl) A hypothetical individual defined to allow dose or dosage
comparison with numerical criteria for the public. This individual is located at the point on the DOE
site boundary nearest to the facility in question. Sometimes called maximally exposed offsite
individual (MOl).
maximally exposed offsite individual (MOl) A hypothetical individual defined to allow dose or
dosage comparison with numerical criteria for the public. This individual is located at the point on
the DOE site boundary nearest to the facility in question. Sometimes called the maximally exposed
individual (MEl).
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maximum contaminant level (Mel) Under the Safe Drinking Water Act, the maximum
permissible concentrations of specific constituents in drinking water th at is delivered to any user of a
public water system that serves 15 or more connections and 25 or more people. The standards set as
maximum contaminant levels take into account the feasibility and cost of attaining the standard.
metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) Quantities of unirradiated and spent nuclear fuel and targets
are traditionally expressed in term. of metric tons of heavy metal (typically uranium), without the
inclusion of other materials, such as cladding, alloy materials, and structural materials.
A metric ton is 1,000 kilograms, which is equal to about 2,200 pounds.
millirem

normal conditions All activities associated with a facility mission, whether operation,
maintenance, storage, and so forth, which are carried out within a defined envelope. This en',elope
can be design process conditions, performance I .. accordance with procedure, and so forth .
normal operation

All normal conditions and those abnormal conditions that frequency estimation

techniques indicate occur with a frequency greater than 0. 1 events per year.
NO x A generic term used to describe the oxides of nitrogen (see nitrogen oxides).
nuclear criticality A self-sustaining chain reaction, which releases neutrons and energy, and
generates radioactive by-product material.

One thousandth of a rem (see rem).

mixed waste Waste that contains both hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act and source, special nuclear, or by-product material subject to the Atomic Energy Act of
1954.
mitigation Those actions that avoid impacts altogether, minimize impacts, rectify impacts, reduce or

nuclear fuel

Materials that are fissionable and can be used in nuclear reactors to make energy.

nuclide A general term referring to all known isotopes, both stable (279) and unstable (about
5,(00), of the chemical elements.

eliminate impacts, or compensate for the impact.
nanocurie

One billionth of a curie (see curie).

off-link doses
railway.

Doses to members of the public within 800 meters (2,625 feet) of a road or

A formal listing of the nation's most hazardous waste sites, as

offsite facility

A facility located at a different site or location than the shipper.

established under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA), that have been identified for remediation.

on-link doses

Doses to members of the public sharing a road or railway.

natural phenomena accidents

onsite

National Priorities List (NPl)

Accidents that are initiated by phenomena such as earthquakes,

tornadoes, floods, and so forth .
near-surface disposal

Disposal in the uppermost ponion of the earth, approximately 30 meters.

Near-surface disposal includes disposal in engineered facilities that may be built totally or panially
above-grade provided that such facilities have protective earthen covers. A near-surface disposal
facility is not considered a geologic repository.
nitrogen oxides (NO.)

onsite facilities Buildings and other structures, their functional systems and equipment, and other
fixed systems and equipment installed onsite.

Gases formed in great pan from atmospheric nitrogen and oxygen when

combustion takes place under conditions of high temperature and high pressure; considered a major
air pollutant. Two major nitrogen oxides, nitric oxide (NO) and nitrogen dioxide (NOz> are
imponant airborne contaminants . In the presence of sunlight, nitric oxide combines with atmospheric
oxygen to produce nitrogen dioxide, which in high enough concentrations can cause lung damage.
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The same or geographically contiguous propeny that may be divided by public or private

right-of-way, provided the entrance and exit between the properties is at a cross-roads intersection,
and access is by crossing as opposed to going along the right-of-way. Non-rontiguous properties
owned by the same person but connected by a right-of-way that he/she controls and to which the
public does not h.lYe access is also considered onsite propeny.

operator

The organization that operates a facility.

passivation The process of making metals inactive or less chemically reactive. For example, to
pass ivate the surface of steel hy chemical treatment.
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perennial stream

A water course that flows year-round.

performance objectives
acceptable.

processing (of spent nuclear fuel) Applying a chemical or physical process designed to alter the
characteristics of the spent nuclear fuel matrix.

Parameters within which a facility must perform to be considered
production reactor A nuclear reactor that is used to irradiate target material to produce special
nuclear material or by-product material.

permeability The degree of ease with which water can pass through a rock or soil.
playa The shallow central basin of a desert plain in which water gathers and then evaporates.
picocurie

public Anyone outside the DOE site boundary at the time of an accident or during normal
operation. With respect to accidents analyzed in this EIS, anyone outside the DOE site boundary at
the time of an accident.

One trillionth of a curie (see curie).
rad The special unit of absorbed dose. One rad is equal to an absorbed dose of 100 ergs/gram.

pollutant migration The movement of a contaminant away from its initial source.
pollution prevention The use of any process, practice, or product that reduces or eliminates the
generation and release of pollutants, hazardous substances, contaminants, and wastes, including those
that protect natural resources through conservation or more efficient utilization.
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) A class of chemical substances formerly manufactured as an
insulating fluid in electrical equipment that is highly toxic to aquatic life. In the environment, PCBs
exhibit many of the characteristics of dichloro diphenyl trichloroethane (DDT); they persist in the
environment for a long time and accumulate in animals.
population dose The overall dose to the offsite population.

radiation (ionizing radiation) Alpha particles, beta particles, gamma rays, x-rays, neutrons, highspeed electrons, high-speed protons, and other particles capable of producing ions. Radiation, as it is
used here, does not include nonionizing radiation such as radio- or microwaves, or visible, infrared,
or ultraviolet light.
radiation worker A worker who is occupationally exposed to ionizing radiation and receives
specialized training and radiation monitoring devices to work in such circumstances.
radioactive waste Waste that is managed for its radioactive content.
radioactivity The property or characteristic of material to spontaneously "disintegrate" with the
emission of energy in the form of radiation. The unit of radioactivity is the curie (or becquerel).

porosity (n) Porosity is an index of relative pore volume. It is the total unit volume of the soil or
rock divided into the void volume.
pressurized water reactor A nuclear power reactor that uses water under pressure as a coolant.
The water boiled to generate steam is in a separate system.
probable maximum flood The largest flood for which there is any reasonable expectancy in a
specific area. The probable maximum flood is normally several times larger than the largest flood of
record.
process knowledge The set of information that is used by trained and qualified individuals who
are cognizant of the origin, use, and location of waste-generating materials and processes in sufficient
detail so as to certify the identity of the waste.
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radioisotope An unstable isotope of an element that decays or disintegrates spontaneously,
emining radiation. Approximately 5,000 natural and artificial rad ioisotopes have been identified.
radiological survey The evaluation of the radiation hazard accompanying the production, use, or
existence of radioactive materials under a specific set of conditions. Such evaluation customarily
includes a physical survey of the disposition of materials and equipment, measurements or estimates
of the levels of radiation that may be involved, and a sufficient knowledge of processes affecting these
materials to predict hazards resulting from unexpected or possible changes in materials or equipment.
radionuclide

See radioisotope.

Record of Decision (ROD) A public document that records the final decision(s) concerning a
proposed action. The Record of Decision is based in whole or in part on information and technical
analysis generated either during the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
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Liability Act (CERCLA) process or the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) process, both of
which take into consideration public comments and community concerns.
recycling Recycling techniques are characterized as use, reuse, and reclamation techniques
(resource recovery). Use or reuse involves the return of a potential waste material either to the
originating process as a substitute for an input material or to another process as an input material .
Reclamation is the recovery of a useful or valuable material from a waste stream. Recycling allows
potential waste materials to be put to a beneficial use rather than going to treatment, storage, or
disposal .
regulated substances A general term used to refer to materials other than radionuclides that are
regulated by Federal, state, (or possibly local) requirements.

storage, and disposal of RCRA defined hazardous waste. Subtitle D of the law addresses the
management of nonhazardous, nonradioactive, solid waste such as municipal wastes.
retrieval

The process of recovering wastes that have been stored or disposed of onsite

SO

they may

be appropriately characterized, treated, and disposed of.
risk Quantitative expression of possible loss that considers both the probability that a hazard causes
barm and the consequences of that event.
safety analysis report A repon, prepared in accordance with DOE Orders 5481 . IB and 5480.23,
that summarize the hazards associated with the operation of a panicular facility and defines minimum
safety requirements.

rem The dosage of an ionizing radiation that will cause the same biological effect as 1 roentgen of
x-ray or gamma-ray exposure.

sanitary waste

Liquid or solid wastes that are generated as a result of rout-ine operations of a

facility and are not considered hazardous or radioactive.
remote-handled waste
per hour.

Packaged waste whose external surface dose rate exceeds 200 millirem
saturated zone

That pan of the eanb's crust in which all naturally occurring voids are filled with

water.
remote handling The handling of wastes from a distance
unnecessary exposure.

so as to protect human operators from
scaling factor

A multiplier that allows the inference of one radionuclide concentration from

another that is more easily measured.
repository A permanent deep geologic disposal facility for high-level or transuranic wastes and
spent nuclear fuel.

scientific notation

reprocessing (of spent nuclear fuel) Processing of reactor irradiated nuclear material (primarily
spent nuclear fuel) to recover fissile and fenile material, in order to recycle such materials primarily
for defense programs. Historically, reprocessing has involved aqueous chemical separations of
elements (typically uranium or plutonium) from undesired elements in the fuel.

very small numbers by moving the decimal point to the right or left so that only one number above
zero is to the left of the decimal point. Scientific notation uses a number times 10 and either a
positive or negative expoDent to show how many places to the left or right the decimal place has been
moved . For example, in scientific notation, 120,000 would be wrinen as 1.2 x 105, and 0 .000012
would be wrin~n_ as 1.2 x IO. S. In a variation of scientific notation often used in computer printouts,
the multiplication'sign and number 10 are replaced by the lener E. The above numbers would be
wrinen as 1.2E5 and 1.2E-5, respectively.

research reactor

A notation adopted by the scientific community to deal with very large and

A nuclear reactor used for research and development.
segregation

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) A Federal law addressing the management
of waste. Subtitle C of the law addresses hazardous waste under which a waste must either be
"listed" on one of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) hazardous waste lists or meet
one of EPA's four hazardous characteristics of ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, or toxicity, as
measured using the toxicity characterization leaching procedure (fCLP). Cradle-to-grave management
of wastes classified as RCRA hazardous wastes must meet stringent guidelines for environmental
protection as required by the law. These guidelines include regulation of transpon, treatment,

The process of separating (or keeping separate) individual waste types andlor forms in

order to facilitate their cost-effective treatment and storage or disposal .

seismicity The phenomenon of eanb movements; seismic activity. Seismicity is related to the
location, size, and rate of occurrence of eanbquakes.
seiche

A wave that oscillates in panially or totally enclosed bodies of water from a few minutes to

a few hours, caused by seismic or atmospheric disturbances.
VOLUME I, APPENOOC H
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sole source aquifer A designation granted by the U.S . Environmental Protection Agency when
groundwater from a specific aquifer supplies at least 50 percent of the drinking water for the area
overlying the aquifer. Sole-source aquifers have no alternative source or combination of sources that
could physically, legally, and economically supply all those who obtain their drinking water from the
aquifer. Sole-source aquifers are protected from federally financially assisted activities determined to
be potentially unhealthy for the aquifer.
solid waste Any garbage, refuse, or sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment
plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid,
or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural
operations and from community activities. It does not include solid or dissolved material in domestic
sewage, or solid or dissolved materials in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges, which are
point sources subject to permits under Section 402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as
amended, or source, special nuclear, or by-product material as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended [Public Law 94-580, 1004(27) (Resource Conservation and Recovery Act)].
solvents Liquid chemicals, usually organic compounds, that are capable of dissolving another
substance. Exposure to some organic solvents can produce toxic effects on body tissues and
processes.
source material (a) Uranium, thorium, or any other material that is determined by the U.S .
Nuclear Regulatory Commission purs ant to the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
Section 61, to be source material; or (b) ores containing one or more of the foregoing materials, in
such concentration as the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission may by regulation determine from
time-to-time [Atomic Energy Act II (z)J. Source material is exempt from regulation under to
Resource Conservatio n and Recovery Act.
SOx

A generic term used to describe the oxides of sulfur. The combination of sulfur oxides with

water vapor produces acid rain (see sulfur oxides).
special-case commercial reactor spent nuclear fuel Complete or partial spent nuclear fuel
assemblies from commercial nuclear power plants that were to be used to support DOE-sponsored
research and development programs. This includes spent nuclear fuel from development reactors
(Shippingport, Peach Bottom Unit I, and Fort SI. Vrai n); spent nuclear fuel used for destructive and
nondestructive examination and testing; spent nuclear fuel remaining at the West Valley
Uemonstration Project; and spent nuclear fuel remnants (Three-Mile Island Vnit 2) .
special nuclear material

specimen A small sample of material (fuel or non-fuel) inserted into a reactor for testing to
characterize the material's performance. Test specimens may be constructed of plant materials,
reactor structural materials, or fuel materials.
spent nuclear fuel Fuel that has been withdrawn from a nuclear reactor following irradiation, the
constituent elements of which have not been separated. For the purposes of this EIS, spent nuclear
fuel also includes uraniumfneptunium target materials, blanket subassemblies, pieces of fuel, and
debris.
stabilization (of spent nuclear fuel) Actions taken to further confine or reduce the hazards
associated with spent nuclear fuel , as necessary for safe management and environmentally responsible
storage for extended periods of time. Activities that may be necessary to stabilize spent nuclear fuel
include canning, processing, and passivation.
stakeholder Any person or organization with an interest in or affected by DOE activities.
Stakeholders may include representatives from Federal agencies, State agencies, Congress, Native
American Tribes, unions, educational groups, industry, environmental groups, other groups, and
members of the general public.
storage The collection and containment of waste or spent nuclear fuel in such a manner as not to
constitute disposal of the waste or spent nuclear fuel for the purposes of awaiting treatment or
disposal capacity (that is, not short-term accumulation).
subsurface The area below the land surface (including the vadose zone and aquifers).
sulfur oxides Pungent, colorless gases formed primarily by the combustion of fossil fuels ;
considered major air pollutants; sulfur oxides may damage the respiratory tract as well as vegetation
(see SO.).
target A tube, rod, or other form containing material that, on being irradiated in a nuclear reactor
would produce a designed end product (that is, uranium-238 produces plutonium-239 and neptunium237 produces plutonium-238).

(a) Plutonium, or uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or in the isotope

235, and any other material that the V .S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, pursuant to the provisions
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Section 51, determines to be special nuclear material; or (b) any
VOLUME I , APPENDIX H

material artificially euriched by any of the foregoing, but does not include source material . Special
nuclear material is exempt from regulation under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA).
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t otal effective dose equivalent The sum of the external dose equivalent (for external exposures)
and the committed effective dose equivalent (for internal exposures).
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transient A change in the reactor coolant system temperature and/or pressure. Transients can be
caused by adding or removing neutron poisons, by increasing or decreasing the electrical load on the
turbine generator, or by accident conditions.
transuranic waste Waste containing more than 100 nanocuries of a1pha-emitting transuranic
isotopes, with half-lives greater than 20 years, per gram of waste, except for (a) high-level radioactive
waste' (b) waste that the U.S. Department of Energy has determined, with the concurrence of the
Admi~istrator of the U .S. Environmental Protection Agency, does not need the degree of isolation
required by 40 CFR 191 ; or (c) waste that the U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission has approved for

waste acceptance criteria (WAC) The requirements specifying the characteristics of waste and
waste packaging acceptable to a waste receiving facility; and the docum~nts and processes the
generator needs to certify that waste meets applicable requirements .
waste certification

A process by which a waste generator certifies that a given waste or waste

stream meets the waste acceptance criteria of the facility to which the generator intends to transport
waste for treatment, storage, or disposal . Certification is accomplished by a combination of waste
characterization, documentation, quality assurance, and periodic audits of the certification program.

disposal on a case-by-ease basis in accordance with 10 CFR 61.

waste characterization

trans uranium radionuclide

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) A facility near Carlsbad, New Mexico, authorized to
de!ll')nstrate safe disposal of defense-generated transuranic waste in a deep geologic medium.

tsunami

Any radionuclide baving an atomic number greater than 92.

See characterization.

A huge ocean wave caused by an underwater earthquake or a volcanic eruption.

ultimate disposition

The final step in whicb a material is either processed for some use or

disposed of.
vadose zone

The zone between the land surface and the water table. Saturated bodies, such as

perched groundwater, may exist in the vadose zone. Also called the zone of aeration and the
unsaturated zone.
vitrification

waste management The planning, coordination, and direction of those functions related to
generation, handling, treatment, storage, transport, and disposal of waste, as well as associated
surveillance and maintenance activities.
waste management facility

All contiguous land, structures, other appurtenances, and

improvements on the land, used for treating, storing, or disposing of waste or spent nuclear fuel. A
facility may consist of several treatment, storage, or disposal operational units (for example, one or
more landfills, surface impoundments, or combinations of them).

The process of immobilizing waste material that results in a glass-like solid.
waste management program

volatile organic compound (VOC) Chemical containing mainly carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen
that readily evaporates at ambient temperature. Exposure to some organic compounds can produce
toxic effects on body tissue and processes.
Volcanic Rift Zones Linear belts of basaltic vents marked by open fissures, monoclines, and small
normal faults. Volcanic rift zones were produced during the propagation of vertical molten basaltic
dikes that fed surface eruptions .
vulnerabilitie. Conditions or weaknesses that may lead to radiation exposure to the public,
unnecessary or increased exposure to the workers, or release of radioactive materials to the
environment. For example, some DOE facilities have bad leakage from spent fuel storage pools,
excessive corrosion of fuel causing increased radiation levels in the pool, or degradation of handling
systems. Vulnerabilities are also caused by loss of institutional controls, sucb as cessation of facility
funding or reductions in faCility maintenance and control.
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A systematic approach to organize, direct, document, and assess

activities associated with waste generation, treatment, storage, or disposal . A waste management
program consists of all the functional elements, organizations, and activities that comprise the system
needed to properly manage waste. These functions and activities can be performed by various
organizations.
waste management systems assessment

A systems assessment of the entire low-level waste

management (or all of waste management) structure/program at a given site that considers treatment,
storage, disposal, as well as onsite and offsite points of generation with an emphasis on optimization
of all aspects of the operations, including, but not limited to, protection of human health and the
environment, regulatory compliance, and cost effectiveness.
waste minimization An action that economically avoids or reduces the generation of waste by
source reduction, reducing the toxicity of hazardous waste, improving energy usage, or recycling .
These actions will be consistent with the general goal of minimizing present and future threats to
human health , safety, and the environment.
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water pool A type of facility usually used for the storage of irradiated nuclear materials and spent
fuel. The water shields the material being stored while allowing it to be accessible for handling.
Sometimes referred to as a water pit.
wet storage

Storage of spent nuclear fuel in a pool of water, generally for the purposes of cooling

and/or shielding.
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Appendix I
Offsite Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel
1-1 INTRODUCTION
This appendix summarizes the methods and results of analysis for determining the
environmental impacts of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) transponation on public highways and rail systems
outside the boundaries of U.S. Depanment of Energy (DOE) sites (offsite) . The impacts are
presented by alternative and include doses and health .. ffects .

assessed in the Draft EnvironmeruaJ Impacr S/atemeru on a Proposed Nuclear Weapons

Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reacror Speru Nuclear Fuel.
The impacts of historical shipments of SNF to the Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory, Savannah River Site, Oak Ridge Reservation, and the Nevada Test Site and cumulative
transportation impacts are also discussed in this appendix. The historical impacts and cumulative
impacts include shipments of naval SNF and test specimens.

This appendix does not address th e impacts of SNF transpon within the boundaries of DOE
sites (onsite). Onsite transpon impacts are addressed in site-specific Appendices A through F . This
appendix addresses offsite shipments of naval-type SNF stored at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant
as of June 1995 to storage locations at other sites as identified by cenain alternatives. Trans!Xlrt of
naval SNF from shipyards and prototypes to the equivalent expended core facility at the alternative
sites are addressed ill this EIS in Appendix D in Volume I, along with transport of naval test
specimens.
This appendix also includes the impacts of shipments of foreign research reactor SNF from
the six points of entry identified in the Implementation Plan for this EIS (Hampton Roads, Virginia;
Charleston, South Carolina; Savannah, Georgia; Seattle-Tacoma, Washington; Portland, Oregon; and
Oakland , California) and the points of entry at the Military Ocean Terminal at Sunny Point, North
Carolina; and Gal veston, Texas. The six points of entry identified in the Implementation Plan were
chosen using the following criteria: (a) adequacy of harbor and dock characteristics to satisfy the
cask-carrying ship requirements, (b) availability of safe and secure lag storage, (c) adequacy of
overland transponat io n systems from poi nts of entry to the storage sites, (d) experience in safe and
secure ha ndling of hazardous cargo, (e) emergency preparedness starus at the point of entry and
nearby communities, and (I) prox imity of the proposed storage sites. The Military Ocean Terminal at
Sunny Poi nt, No rth Carolina, was chosen because it was recently used for foreign research reactor
SNF ship ments . Galveston. Te1.as was chosen as a point of entry because it was on the Gulf Coast
and has container-handling experience. A fu ll range of alternative points of entry, including these and
other po,"ts of entry, is being evaluated in th e Environmental Impact Statement on a Proposed
Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel.and no
decision concerning the choice of points of entry will be made until both the Programmatic Spent
Nu clear Fuel Management and th e Idaho National Engineering Laborato,y Environmental Restoration
and Waste Management Prog rams Envi ronm ental Impact Statement and the Environmental Impact
Statement on a Proposed Nuclear No nproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent
Nuclear Fuel are completed . The ocean-goi ng pon io n of foreig n research reactor SNF shipments and
a detailed evaluation of point of entry activi ti es are also not assessed in this appendix, but will be
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1-2 TRANSPORTATION REGULATIONS

marki ng, and placarding. There are also requirements that specify the maximum dose rate associated
with radioactive material shipments, which help to reduce incident-free transportation doses.

The regulatory standards for packaging and transport of SNF are designed to achieve four
primary objectives:
Protect persons and property from ra1iation emitted from packages during
transportation, by specific limitations on the allowable radiation levels
Provide proper containment of the SNF in the package (achieved by packaging design
requirements based on performance-()riented packaging integrity tests and
environmental criteria)
Prevent nuclear criticality (an unplanned nuclear chain reaction that may occur as a
result of concentrating too much fissile material in one place)

The Federal Emergency Management Agency is responsible for establishing policies for and
coordinating civil emergency management, planning, and interaction with Federal executive agencies
that have emergency response functions in the event of a SNF transportation incident. The Federal
Emergency Management Agency coordinates Federal and state participation in developing emergency
response plans and is responsible for the development of the interim Federal Radiological Emergency
Response Plan. The Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan is designed to coordinate
Federal support to state and local governments, upon request, during the event of a SNF
transponation incident.

The Interstate Commerce Commission is responsible for the regulation of the economic
aspects of SNF transportation for land shipments. The Comission issues operating authorities to
carriers and also monitors and approves freight rates.

Provide physical protection against theft and sabotage during transit.
The U.S. Department of Transportation regulates the transportation of hazardous materials
(including SNF) in interstate and intrastate commerce by land, air, and on navigable water. As
outlined in a 1979 Memorandum of Understanding with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
the U.S. Department of Transportation specifically regulates the carriers of SNF and the conditions of
transport, such as routing, handling and storage, and vehicle and driver requirements. The U.S .
Department of Transportation also regulates the labeling, classification, and marking of all SNF
packages.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulates the packaging and transport of SNF fo r
its licensees, which includes commercial shippers of SNF. In addition, under an agreement with the
U.S. Department of Transportation, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission sets the standards for
packages containing fissile materials and SNF.
The DOE, through its management directives, orders, and contractual agreements, assures the
protection of public health and safety by imposi ng on its transportation activities standards equivalent
to those of the U.S. Department of Transportation and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
The DOE has authority, granted by a 1973 Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S.
Department of Transportation and the Atomic Energy Commission, to certify DOE SNF packages.
The DOE may design, procure, and certify its own SNF packages to be used by the DOE and its
contractOrs if the packages provide equivalent safety to that provided in \0 CFR Part 71.
The U.S. Department of Transportation also has requirements that help to reduce
transportation impacts. For example, there are requirements for drivers, routing, packaging, labeling,
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Spent nuclear fuel is transported in Type B packages, which are designed and constructed to
retain their radioactive contents in both normal and severe accident conditions.
Under normal conditions a cask must withstand:
Hot [IOO'F (38'C)] and Cold [-40 'F (-40'C)] temperatures
External pressure changes frorn 3.5 to 20 pounds per square inch (24.5 to 140
kilopascal)
Normal vibration experienced during transportation

Simulated rainfall of 2 inches (5 centimeters) per hour for I hour
Free drop from I to 4 feet (0.3 to 1.2 meters), depending on the package weight
Compression loading (the greater of 5 times the weight of package or 1.85
pounds per square inch ( 12.75 kilopascal) times the vertical projected area of the
package) app lied uniformly to the top and boltom of the package for a period of 24
hours .
Impact of a 13-pound (6-ki logram) steel cylinder with rounded ends dropped fro m 40
inches ( I meter) onto the most vu lnerable surface of the cask.
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Under accident conditions a cask must withstand:

1-3 SNF TRANSPORTATION MODES AND ROUTES

Free drop for 30 feet (9 meters) onto an unyielding surface in a way most likely to
cause damage to the cask

1-3.1 SNF Transportation Routing Models

Free drop from 40 inches ( I meter) onto the end of a 6-inch-<1iameter (15-centimeterdiametor) veni cal steel bar

To assess incident-free and transponation accident impacts, route characteristics were
determined for each of the origins and destinations associated with SNF shipments . Each origin
represents a facility that generates or stores SNF that must be transponed, and each destination

Exposure for not less than 30 minutes to temperatures of 1475 °F (802 °C)

represents a facility that stores SNF. For offsite transpon, representative highway and rail routes
were analyzed using the routing computer codes HIGHWAY (Johnson et a1 . 1993a) and INTERLINE
(Johnson et a1. 1993b). The routes were calculated conforming to current routing practices and
applicable routing regulations and guidelines . Route characteristics include total shipment distance
between each origin and destination and the fractions of travel in rural, suburban, and urban
population density zones (see Table I-I). The HIGHWAY and INTERLINE routing computer codes
are described below.

Immersion in at least 50 feet ( 15 meters) of water for 8 hours and, for criticality
considerations, immersion in at least 3 feet (0.9 meters) of water for 8 hours in the
attitude for which maximum leakage is expected.
Compliance with these requirements is demonstrated by using a combination of simple
calculational methods , computer modeling techniques, or full-scale or scale-model testing of casks.

The HIGHWAY computer code predicts highway routes for transponing radioactive materials

I

within the United States. The HIGHWAY database is a computerized road atlas that currently
describes approximately 240,000 miles of roads. A complete description of the Interstate Highway
System, United States highways, most of the principal state highways, and a number of local and
community highways are identified in the database. The HIGHWAY computer code calculates routes
that maximize the use of interstate highways. This feature allows the user to predict routes for
transpon of radioactive materials that conform to U .S. Department of Transponation regulations, as
specified in 49 CFR Part 177 , (CFR 1994a). The routes calculated conform to applicable guidelines
and regulations; therefore, they represent routes that could be used. However, they may not be the
actual routes used in the future. The code is updated periodically to reflect current road conditions,
and it has been bench marked against reponed mileage and observations of commercial truck firms .
The INTERLINE computer code is designed to simulate routing of the United States rail
system. The INTERLINE database consists of 94 separate subnetworks and represents various
competing rail compan ies in the United States. The database used by INTERLINE was originall y
based on Federal Rai lroad Administration data and refl ected the United States rail road system in
1974. The database has since been ex panded and mod ified over the past two decades. The routes
used for this study used the standard assu mptions in the INTERLINE computer code th at simulate the
selection process railroads use to direct transpon of radioactive material. Currently, th ere are no
specific routing regul ations for transponing radioactive material by rail. INTERLINE is upd ated
periodically to refl ect current track conditions, and it has been benchmarked against reponed mileage
and observations of commercial rail firms.
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Table \-1. (continued).

Table 1-1. Transportation distances between facilities for spent nuclear fuel shipments.
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658.0

91.4

7. 1

1.4

Idaho Nllional Enainccrina
Laboratory

Nevlda Tell Site

756.0

92.1

S.9

Idaho Nltional Enaincerina
Laboratory

Savannah River Site

2407.0

82.1

15 .2

2 .5

20SS .0

90.7

7. 8

0.6

Idaho Nltional En,inccrina
Laboratory

O.k Rid,c RelCfV.tion

1.2

Oat Ridge ReacfVltion

Sandia Nltional Laboratoriel - Albuquerque

1.6

Idaho Nltional Enainccrina
Laboratory

12.0

1.2

81.7

15.9

1582.0

91.2

Labol'lotof)'

Idaho National Enaioeel"inj:
LabonlOf)'

Idaho National Enalneerina:
Laboratory

Idaho National Enainccrina:
Labonillory

Jd&bo National En,inecrilll

Laboratory

2 .0

2607 .0

71.3

22 .6

6.1

t.o. ALlmot National Labontory

1144 .0

88.7

9.1

1.4

Idaho Nllional En,inceritIJ
Labontory

Brookhaven N.lional Laboratory

Idaho National Enainecrina
Laboratory

16SS .0

93 .4

6 .0

0.6

Sandia NILionai ubontonu • Albuquerque

1161 .0

88 .6

9.1

1.6

Idaho N.lional Enaincerina
Laboratory

Ataonne Nltional Labonlory-Eall

Idaho National EnJinecrilll
Laboratory

1179 .0

92.2

6 .1

1.0

Nevada Tea Site

1121 .0

86.S

10.9

2 .6

Idaho Nllional Enaincerina
Laboratory

Lol A1amoa NltionaJ Labontory

Hanford Site

Han(ord Site

Savannah River Site

2727.0

14.3

14.2

1.5

1247.0

91.0

7.6

1.4

Oalr:R..idac Rcaervltion

Idaho N.tiol'lll En,incerina
Laboratory

Sindia Nltional Labontoriel - Albuquerque

H.nford Site

2464.0

17.1

11.0

1.2

I].]

14.5

2 .3

H.nford Site

Broollivco NatioRiI lAbontor)'

2IS3.0

H3 nford Silc

Arionne National Laboratory-Ell'

19911.0

91.5

7.8

0.7

Hanford Site

l.oJ AlImo. N.tionll Laboratory

1S60.0

19.1

1.1

1.3

Hanford Site

Sandi. N.tional Labontoriu • Albuquerque

1S14.0

19.7

1.8

1.4

Nevada Tell Site

Savannah River Site

2414 .0

Sl .1

15 . 1

1.8

Nc....d. Tell Site

0 ..: Ridae Rucrv,lioD

21.51.0

Nev.d. Tell Site

Brookhaven NatioNiI Labon.tory

Ncv.d. Tut Site

Araonne National Laboratory-E...

2670.0

IIIS .O

86 .9
82.3
91.0

1t.S
15.1

8.0

997.0

93.2

5.7

1.1

909.0

93 .'

4 .8

1.4

Sannnah River Site

Oat Ridp RelCrvltion

379 .0

S9. 1

lB .S

2.4

197.0

58 .4

36.6

4.9

892.0

r..o. Alamoa NltionaJ Labantory

1742.0

68 .8
80.0

29.3
17.9

Sandia NatioMl Labontoricl - Albuquerque

1644.0

80.1

17.8

2. 1

LaWTtnce Uvermorc National LaboRlOfy

2750.0

80.1

16.8

3 .1

Oat Rid,e RelCrv.lton

Brookhaven NationaJ Laboratory

1-7

~IV

37.9

1.1

Il .S

1.8

H. nford Site

Oat Rid,e RucfV.lion

2601.0

91.2

7.4

I.l

Hanford Site

Brookhaven Nltional Labonto ry

)153.0

75 . 1

19 .7

5 .2

H.nford Site

AtaoMe National Labontory-Eall

2200.0

93 .3

6.0

0.7

Hlnford Site

Lo. AI.fDOII Nlliol'lll Laboratory

Ins.O

92 .5

0 .5

0.9

Hanford Site

s.ndia N,lional Labon toriu - Albuquerque

1793.0

91.7

7. 1

1.2

Nev.dlTutSite

S.Vlnnah River Site

2139.0

84 .S

Il .S

1.9

Nev.d. Tnl Site

O.t Rid, e ResefVltion

2487.0

91.4

7 .2

Nev.d. Tell Site

Brookh.ven NltiOMI Labontory

3039.0

74 .6

20 .0

SA

Nev.daTcslSite

Ataonnc Nltiona1 Labontory-Ellt

2348 .0

92 .8

6.4

0.8

Nevldl Tell Site

Lol A1lmol Nlliol'lll Labontory

1169.0

92 .8

5 .9

Nevada Tell Site

Si ndia NltioNiI labon toriu - Albuquerque

1065 .0

94 .6

4.5

Slvlnnah Ri ve r Site

Olk Rid,e RelCrvltion

411 .0

68 .8

29 .8

1.4

Savlnnah Ri ve r Site

Broo khaven Nltional labontory

1239.0

48.0

31.4

14.S

976 .0

64 .3

31.6

4 .0

llS2 .0

80.3

I7.S

2.1

0.9

2.1

Savlnnah River Site

56 .9

S .9

84.7

1.9

Slvlnnah Rive r Site

821 .0

93 .0

1.0

Lol Alamo. NltioMI Labantory

SaVlnnah Rivcr Site

1302.0
29S3 .0

2 .6

Sandia NltionaJ LabantoriCI - Albuquerque

Savlnnah River Site

Nevlda Tell Site
Slvlnnah River Site

1.6

Nevada Tcte Site

Savlnnah River Site

Hlnford Site
Hanford Site

Sivannah River Site

Ataonnc NllioNiI Labon tory-E.l1l

Slvlnnah River Site

Lo, A1lmol Nltional LaboBtOry

5.2
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rable 1-1. (continued).
Table I-I. (continued).
R. .1e

SaVlMlh River Sil.o

Od: Rid,., RoteNalion

MilCi

Sanditl N.lionel I..bon.toriea • Albuquerque

Brool:h.IYcn N,liooaJ Labonlor)'

2315 .0

IU2.0
648 .0

OIk IUdp RClervation

t..o.

ALlmot N.tionIl ubonlot'y

1686.0

Rutll

Suburban

Urban

<lIl

<lIl

<lIl

79 .9

39.5
70.7
88.9

18.1

44.7
25 .3
9.3

Route
H.nford Site

SuDle-T.C:OINI, WA

87.9

10.3

H.nford Site

CharlnCOn. SC

Savannah River She

Fort St. V,.iD Nuclut
Ocnen'ine Stalioa

HlJlfotd Site

FOf1 51. Vnin Nude.,
Gcoctltilll Station

1636.0

1101 .0

Idaho National En,inurinr Llbofllofy

Fort St. V,.in Nucklr
Genetltina Station
Fo., St. Vni.a Nuclear
Genera,"" Stt.tioa

Fort 51. Vnio Nuclear

92.'

19.1

6.1

76.8

20.9

2.3

2862.0

85 .5

13.2

1.3

2804.0

8" .9

13.1

I."

815.0

18.1

17.8

" .1

1.8
O.kland, CA

1.8

2.0

0.1

236.0

86 .0

10.7

3 .•

Militaf)' Ocean Terminal. SUMY Point, NC

2868 .0

85.1

13 .1

1.3

Aleundril Bay. NY

2168.0

82.8

15 .6

1.6

Port1lnd. OR

H.nford Site
Idlho N.tional £nainec:rina
Laborstof}'

H.mpton Road., VA

2327.0

86.0

24117 .0

83.1

14.5

1.8

193 .0

88.3

10.5

1.1

tI .1I

2.3

692.0

92.3

1.1

0.'

un.a

84.1

14.3

1.6

Idaho N.tional Enfineeri.",
Laborstory

2....0

84.2

I . ...

1.3

90.2

1 .9

1.9

Idaho N.tional EnJincerina
Laborstol)'

Charleston, SC

152.0

Idaho Nttional Enzineerina
Laborstof}'

S.v.nnah . GA

2311 .0

83 .6

15.0

1.5

TI.3

20. 1

2.1

Idaho N.tional Enaineerina
Laborstc.ry

O.kl.nd. CA

963 .0

84 .5

11.0

4.4

Hanfont Site

1111.0

94.8

4.6

0.6

Idlho N.tional Enzineerina
Laboratof}'

Portl.nd. OR

nl .o

90.2

1 .1

1.6

672.0

96.0

3.'

0 .4

Idaho N.tional £naineerina
Laborstof}'

Military Oeean Tenninal, SUMY Poin!, Ne

2401 .0

115 .3

13.5

1.2

1S26.0

87.0

10.9

2.1

Idaho Natiou) Ena:inec:rina
Laboratory

Alexandri. Bay. NY

2352 .0

11.0

17.2

1.1

1104.0

95.4

3.8

0 .8

Idlho National Enainc:ering
Laborstory

G.lvnton, TX

505 .0

71.2

27.0

1.9
1.2

Fon 51. Vrlin Nuclear

FOri 51 . Vrain NlKlur
Gcneratin, Stltion
Fon SI . V,.in Nudur
')cneratina Stllion

Tnodo _ _
,Vlnnah River Site

River

(lIl

226.0

11.53 .0

Gcnerauna Stillion

IVUnah

Urb.n

<lIl

S.vannab River Site

Genenr.u.n, Statioa
Fort St. Vnin NlotCle.lr
Genetlti", Stlltion

78.9

Suburb.n

<lIl

4.0

H.nrord Site
Fort 51. Vnin Nuclear
GcnentiDf SUlioa

Rursl

15.8

H.nford Site
1149.0

Miln

2. 1

Sj~

I" annab Rive r Site

CMrielCon. SC

, y.nnah River Site

Sivlnftab , OA

1911.0

Ofk Rid,e Rnc ....... tion

2900.0

85.1

13 .•

209.0

13.1

24.1

84 .5

13 .0

2.5

548 .0

10.3

27.3

2 .3

2636.0

88.4

10.1

0 .8
1.8

Oak Rid,e ReICI'V.tion

Ch.rleston, SC

408.0

10.1

21 .5

O.k Rid,e Rue ....... tion

Savannah, OA

"6.0

61.1

31.1

'2.563 .0

86.3

10.1

2515 .0

11.1

11.0

1.3

3.0

265 .0

18.1

20.11

0 .5

v.nnah Ri ver Site

o.u.nd. CA

2791.0

19.5

17.0

3.5

Oat Rid,e Ruerv.tion

Port1lnd. OR

v.nn.h River Site

Portltnd.OR

21"9.0

84 .4

14.0

1.6

O.t Rid,e Rnerv.tion

Military Oecan Terrrlinal, SUMY Point, NC

"96 .0

13.4

26 .1

0.9

921.0

65 .9

33 .5

0.1

v.Mah River Site

Militaf}' Oeel" Terminal. SUMY Point, NC

v.nnah River Site

Aleundril Bay. NY

1V.nnab River Site

O.lvUltoo. TX

. "font Site

H.1I1"OO Roedl , VA

250.0

82 .5

17.2

0 .3

Oak Rid,c RelteN.Lion

Alexandria Bay, NY

1012.0

66 .8

32."

0 .1

O.k Rid,e ReacI'V.tioD

G.lve.con, TX

1000.0

70.5

21

2.5

Nev.da T nt Site

H.mpton Roada. VA

1.1

Nev.da Tell Site
Nev.da Te. Site

2900.0

1-9

15.0

13 .3
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24 .6

2590.0

83 .9

14.0

2.1

ScaDle-T.c:oma . WA

1322.0

85.5

12.1

2.4

Charleston , SC

2549 .0

84.5

1".0

1.6

963 .0

1-10
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Table 1·1. (continued).

Table 1·1. (continued).
Raul<

Nevada TIC. Site

NeVid. Telt Site

M ilu

Rural

Subutban

Urban

<")

<")

<")

SavalU'Ah, GA

249'2.0

83 .8

14 .4

1.1

Oakt.nd, CA

119.0

81.9

10.6

7 .5

Portland , OR

1250.0

86 .4

10.8

2.8

Military Occ.n Terminal, Sunny Poine. He

1457.0

83 .0

15.0

2.0

_N_._y_."__T._._S_;..________~~~.~u~~~~&~',~N~Y~____________~2~"~9~.0____~8~2.~0____~1~6.~0____~1.~9_
NeyulaTutSitc

G.I\I(IIOO, TX

1862 .0

Savannah River Site

Hampton Ra.d., VA

529 .0

8S.4

11.5

3.2

Milu

Roul<

Savannah River Site
Savannah R.ivcr Site

Charleston, SC

24. 1

SaVlnnah, GA

81.1

16 . 1

2.8

140.0

83.9

13 .6

2.5

87.9

10.9

1.6

Military Oceln Tenninal, SUMY Poinl, NC

2657.0

81.6

16.7

1.7

Idaho Natio nal Engineering
Labon tery

Aleundria 8.Iy, NY

2332 .0

76 ."

19.1

4.5

Idaho Naliont'l En,ineerin,
Laboratory

allvnton, TX

Idaho Natio nal Ena-ineerina
Labon toty

1&46.0

OakJand. CA

3192 .0

79.2

16.7

4. 1

Savannah River Site

PortiInd, OR

31.54 .0

82.0

15.4

2.6

Military Ocean Terminll. Sunny Point. NC

382.0

Alexandria Bay. NY

1281.0

Savannah River Site

GalvclIOn, TX

1174.0

Han(ord Silt:

Hampton Road" VA

H.nford Site

Sc.attJc ·T,~oll\ll .

WA

n .9
53 .8
69 .6

20.5

35 .5
26 .2

62.2

36.)

1.6

84 .6

12.8

2 .6

581.0

65 .2

33.3

1.5

517.0

66.2

32.1

1.7

Oakland, CA

2686 .0

89.4

1 .5

2 .1

Oak Ridee Reserva tio n

Portland . OR

2827 .0

85 .5

12.1

2 .4

Oak Rid,e RelCrva tio n

Military Ocean Tenninal. SUMY Poinl, HC

542 .0

61.5

)7 .1

1.5

O.k Rid,e RelCf'Yltio n

A1eundn. Bay, NY

57.5

35 .7

6 .8

Olk Ridee Ruervltio n

Gllveston. TX

Nevlda Tul Siu

Hlmpton Road" VA

Olk Rid,e Reservltio n

Chlfleston, SC

10.7

31117.0

83 .8

13 .6

2.7

416 .0

73.7

20. 1

6.2

ChtriCAon. SC

3059 .0

84.5

13 .7

1.8

Sivantl.',h. GA

3091.0

85 .3

13 .2

1.4

Hanford Siu
Hanfotd Siu

986 .0

PottLInd, O R

239 .0

Military Ocean Tenninal, SUMY Poinl, NC

3203 .0

78 .5
82.1
83 .6

1S .8
1).4
14.8

A1e u ndn. Bay, NY

Idaho Nalional EnJincerin,
Labontory

Hampton ROoId. , VA

2641 .0

81.8

1S .2

3 .0

Idaho N.tional En,incerin,
Labonto ry

Sut1le-Tacoma , WA

976 .0

85 .8

10.8

3 .4

Idaho N.tional En,incerin,
La bontory

Charleston, SC

l.S1) .0

82 .6

IS .)

2. 1

Idaho N.tio nal En,incerin,

SaVlnnah , GA

83 .6

14 .8

1.6

2545.0

89 .9

16.6
9 .1

O.kland, C A

1102 .0

(· 11

3620

90.0

7 .6

3 .3
2.8

Ne v.da Teat Site

Scawe-T.colTII, WA

1620.0

89 .3

8.4

2.3

Ch,rlellon, SC

2945 .0

84.3

13 .7

2 .0

Ne v.da Tell Siu

SIV.nnah, GA

29n.0

85 .2

13.2

Ne vlda Tell Siu

O.kJ.nd, CA

860.0

75 . 1

17.7

7 .2

Nevlda Teld Siu

Portl.nd . OR

1429.0

93 .5

5 .3

1.2

Nevl da Teld Siu

Military Ocun Tenninal. SUMY Poinl, HC

3089 .0

8).4

14 .9

1.1

Nev.da Te. Siu

Ale:undn. 8.Iy, He

2763 .0

79 .2

16 .7

4.0

Nevl dl Tnt Site

aalvesto n, TX

1955 .0

S.vannah Rive r Site

Cornell Uni venity

896.0

66 .5

32 .3

1.2

Slvlnnah Ri ver Site

GeofJla inMitute of TechnoloiY

197.0

6 1.1

34 .5

4.4

S. Vlnnah Ri ve r Site

Idaho Suu Uni venily

2248.0

82 .7

15 .7

1.5

S,Vl nnah Ri ve r Site

lowl SUte Uni ve n ilY

11 15 .0

n.9

2 1.0

1.2

S. vannah Ri ver Siu

Ka naal Suu Uni venily

11 1 1.0

Savannah Ri ver Silc

Ma nhl ttln Colle,e

S.v.nnah Ri ver Silc

MUllchutcUi ltutitulc of TechnoloiY

3 .8
92.0

7 .2

0 .8

1.0

LobonlDry

Idaho National En,incerin,
La boratory

26.2
13 .6

Nevlda Teld Site

1.5

Ca lvelton. TX

79.6

70.5
83 .6

4.5

Hanfo rd Siu

2392 .0

3073 .0

5 .7

Ha nford Siu

2878.0

1053.0

4.2

Han(ord Site

Oakland, CA

1.0

1.6

Ha n(ord Site

Hanford Siu

10.1

689.0
5eawe·T.coma, WA

1.2

Savannah River Site

Savannah JUvcr Site

88.9

2795 .0

Olk Rid,eRuef'Yltion

Oak Ridee ReKrvl tion

S.Vlnnah River Site

<"I

5.1

1.6

3123 .0

114.0

Urb. n

<")

92 .6

Portland, OR

Oak Rid,e Reservl tio n
Savannah River Site

SuhurtJln

<")

785 .0

Idaho Nltio nal En,ineerina
Labon lOry

Oa k Rid,e ReKrvation

74.3

Rural

2 .4
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830 .0

1040.0

---------------n .3

l.S .1

62 .1

35 .2

2.7

53 .2

39 .7

7.0

2 .7

SIVI nnah Ri ve r Site

No rth Clfo lina Sute Univenity

318 .0

68 .0

31.4

0 .6

Slvl nnah Ri ve r Site

Ohio SUU Univenity

703 .0

69.6

29 .6

0.7
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Table 1-1. (continued).
Table 1-1. (continued).
Rou ..

Miles

Sn.nnaI:! JUvcr Si..

Dreaon State Univeraity

S.va~Rivt:rSi ...

Pt:DDI)'Iv.niaSteccUnivcrwity

s.vannab River Site

s.....an&h Rjvcr Site

Suburban

Urban

($)

($)

($)

2937.0

13.7

14.6

1.7

149.0

69.6

29.5

0.9

,...

29.2

0 .8

14.0

1.6

64.3

34.5

1.2

768.0

Reed Cone,.

Runl

2849.0
955 .0

70.0

Savannah River Site

Rhode. bland N1JCIe.r Science Center

1009.0

55.0

38.5

6 .5

$tVlnMb River Sit.

SlAw UaiverailY of New York - Buff.lo

1001.0

61.1

29.1

1.S

1099 .0

70.6

26.7

2.7

SavIlDMll River 5ica

Tcxu A4M Univenity

SavallMh River Sill:

Univcnity of Ariz.onI

1926 .0

79.4

19.1

1.6

Savannah River Site

University of California - ltviM

2406.0

79.6

17.9

2.5

496.0

73 .4

26.0

0 .6

73 .9

24 .6

Savannah River Site
s.vannah River Site

Univcf'lity or Flori~

Univcnity orWiDOia

Savannah River Site

Univcnity of LoweU

Savannah River Site

UnivcnilJ of Mltyland

Savannah River Site

803.0

Univenily of Micbi,.n

4.9
3.0

S.vannah River Site

Purdue UnivenilY

900 .0

64.6

32.4

Savannah Kjvcr Site

Reed Colle,.

3154 .0

82.0

1S .4

2.6

Savannah River Site

RelLtlClaer Polytechnic Lut.itute

1044 .0

52 .3

34 .9

12.1

2!S.~v.!:MOh~!IU~
· v!!,,:..!S~;":....._ _...!Rh~od~.!!101~.nd~N~.~d..
~,S<~
i enc:.~.::C'~"'~':""'_ _.....:1.::
15:!2;::
.0_ _..:5~0.::6_ _~
31~.0~

12.4

S.v.nnah River Sile

State Univenity of Ne w yert • Buff.lo

1051.0

65 .1

30.1

4.1

S.v.nnah Kjver Sile

Teu. A&.M University

1194.0

66.5

29 .1

4.4

S.v.nnah Kjver Site

Univenity of Arizon.

2245 .0

79.4

17.5

3.1

S.v.nnah River Site

Unive n ity of C.lifornia • Irvine

3110.0

12.1

15 .3

2.6

S.vannah River Site

Univenity of Florida

321 .0

84.1

13 .6

1.7

S.v.ruah Rive r Site

Univenity of Dlinoia

10211.0

67.7

28 .6

3.7
11.2

Univenity of Low.U

1239 .0

51.6

37.2

S.vannah River Sitc

Univenity of Maryland

669 .0

67.1

27.6

4.6

900 .0

62.1

34.1

2 .5

S.vannah River Site

Univenity of Michi,an

913 .0

68 .2

29.2

2 .5

S.vannah River Site

Univ.nity of Miuouri - Columbil

1011.0

66 .6

29 .5

4.0

S.v.nnah River Sitc

Univenity of Miuouri - Rolla

966.0

65 .3

30.7

4.0

s.v.nnah River Sitc

University of New MeJUco

2315 .0

79 .9

11.1

2.1

27.0

2.3
1.9

80. 1

11.1

2. 1

16SJ.0

Sav.nnah River Site

University ofTeu.

1169.0

71.4

26.6

1.9

Savannah River Site

University of Utah

2121.0

82 .3

16 .0

1.1

Woreeater Polytechnic:. lnItitutc

1.9

29.6

S.v.nnah River Site

26 .9

Sav.nnah River Site

13.7

65.5

6.8

71.2

W.ahin,ton Slat.e UrUvenity

....

963 .0

3. 1

70.6

Sav.Mah River Site

"'1 .0

40.2

1S8.0

Univenity of VilJini.

Urban
(ll)

31.0

&35.0

University of Wi.konJin

($)

53 .1

Univcnity of Miuouri - Columbia

S.v.nnah River Site

PcMlylvani. State Univenity

Subutb4in

65.9

UnivcBity or Miuouri • Rolla

Sav.nnah River Site

ORaon SLete University

Savannah River Site

R.RI
(lI)

589 .0

S.Vlnnab River Site

Univcraity of New MClO(O

Savannah Rive r Site

Mil..

1045.0

Savannah JUver Site

Sa...aMab River Site

Rou..

S.v.nnah River Site

Univenity of Teul

1314.0

71.11

23 .6

4.6

s.v.nnah Rive r Site

Univenity of Utah

2371.0

10.3

17.5

2.2

41&.0

73.1

15 .9

1.0

S.v. nnah River Site

Univenity of Vil'Jini.

637.0

75 .1

22.11

1.1

100M

61.9

29 .4

2.8

S.v.nnah River Site

Univef"lity of WilConain

1092.0

62 .7

32.0

5.3

2699.0

84.8

14.1

1.2

S.v.nnah River Site

Waahinaton State UnivenilY

2164 .0

111.4

16 .0

2 .S

1002.0

54.2

38 .8

1. 1

s.v.nn.ah River Site

WorceaterPoIyt.cchnic lnItitute

1176.0

52 .1

35 .1

12.1

Traia ,..,..
S. v.Mah River Site

Cornell Univenity

S..... Mah River Site

Geol'Jia lnRiwte ofT«hnolOJY

Idaho SlaLe Univenity
S.vannah River Site

1098.0

61.2

" .1

5. 1

221.0

65 .5

28.3

6 .2

11.7

16 .2

2. 1

66.8

lB .4

4.8

2323 .0

low. State University

1281.0

S. va nnah River Site

Kanaal StaLe University

1274.0

69.3

21.0

3 .1

Sav. nnah River Site

M.nh.attan CoIle,.

11S6.0

51.1

37.0

11.9

1223.0

50.6

36 .6

11.'

Sav.nnah River Site
Sn.nnah River SiLe

North C.rmin. 5,,,,. Univenity

385 .0

71 .6

20.1

1.3

S.vennah Riv. r Sita.

Ohio Slate Univenity

126.0

13.6

15.0

1.4
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Hlnford Site

Cornell Univef"lily

2130.0

111.1

1S .4

1.9

Hlnford Site

GeOI'J" lnItirute of TechnololY

1550.0

115 .6

13 .0

1.4

H.nford Site

Idaho State Uruvenity

546 .0

90.2

' .1

1.1

H.nford Site

Iowa State UNvef"lit,

1703 .0

92.6

6.6

0 .8

Hlnford Silo

Kana.. Slate Univenity

1624.0

92.11

6 .S

0 .1

H.nford Site

Manhawn Coliel'

2786 .0

115 .0

13.5

1.5

H.nford Site

MauachUKt1IlnRitutc of TechnololY

2986 .0

'1.5

17.0

1.6

Hlnford Sil.c

North C.rolina Statc UniventlY

2862.0

'3 .2

15 .5

I.J

HlnfordSite

Ohio State Univef"lily

2342.0

.8.3

10.6

1.1

VOLUME I , APPENDIX I

1-14

Table I-I. (continued).

Table I-\. (continued).
Mile.

Raul<

<>rep Scale Univcnity
Hanfont Site

Rural
(lI)

Suburbln
(lI)

Urban
(lI)

Mil ..

Suburb'n

Uril."

(~)

(~)

340.0

10.6

ll .2

1 .2

PeMlylv.rUa SLate Univenity

2160.0

79.3

16.1

4.0

Purdue Univenily

lJS9.0

90.8

8.0

1.1

lJ9.0

12.1

11.4

4.5
4.0

324.0

79 .5

16.3

4.2

PennaytVlNa SLitc Univemty

2.571.0

86.2

12.7

\.I

Purdue Univcraily

1111.0

90.0

8.9

\.I

236.0

16.0

10.1

3.4

Hanrord Site.

Reed Collele

H.nro rd Site

Run)
(lI)

Orelon SLate Univenity

Hanfon! Site

Reed CoUcp

Hanford Site

Rcnucllcr

2119.0

12.0

16.1

1.9

H.nrord Site

Renaae).er Polytechnic lnatinne

2934 .0

18.6

11.3

Han(ord Site

Rhode b land Nuclear Science Center

2965 .0

81.2

15 .9

2.9

H.nrord Site

Rhode w.nd NUl:lur Science Center

3166.0

16.0

)9 .6

4.4

Hanford Site

StiLe Univcnity of New York - Buff.lo

2.SJ4.0

IU

13.4

I.B

State Univenily or New Yon: - Buff.lo

2631.0

11.1

14.6

3.1

Hanford Site

Texas A&M Univenity

2212.0

88.1

9.1

1.6

H.nrord Site

Tu.. A&M Univenity

2954.0

15.2

11.2

3.1

Hanron! Site

Univenity of Arizona

1699.0

SO.2

14.7

5.0

H.nrord Site

Univenity or Arizona

1804.0

SO.2

14.5

5.4

Hanford Site

Univertity o(CaJifornia - ltvinc

1210.0

79.3

14.5

6.2

H.nrord Site.

Univc:nity o(c.liromi. - Irvine

1521.0

88 .2

8.6

3.2

Hanford Site

University of Florida

1894.0

84.1

14.6

1.4

Hanrord Site.

Univenity or Florida

3138 .0

1S.5

13 .0

0.8

H.nrord Site

Univenity or Dlinei.

2158 .0

93 .0

6.0

1.0

H.nrord Site

Univenity or Lowell

3095 .0

11.6

11 .6

3.9
3.8

Pol~hnic

InItiQJtc

H.nford Site

UnivcnilY of miftOi.

2033 .0

91.2

8.0

Hanfont Site

Univeraity of Lowell

2991.0

81.4

17.1

Hanford Site

UnivenilY of Maryland

2153 .0

84.1

13.8

1.5

H.nrord Site

Univenity or M'r}I.nd

2900.0

12.6

1) .7

Hlnfotd Site

UnivenilY of Micbi,ln

lll1.0

81.0

11.8

1.2

Hanrord Site

Univenity o(M il:hilan

2369 .0

as.7

11.4

2.9

Hanford Site

Univcrwily of Miuouri - Columbi.

1810.0

90.6

1.3

1.1

Hanrord Site

Univenity or Miuouri • Columbia

1948.0

94.1

5.3

0.6

H.nford Site

Univcnity of Miuouri - RoU.

2082.0

88 .4

10.1

1.4

H.nron! Site

Univenity or Miuouri • Rolla

2246 .0

19.1

9.3

1.6

H.nford Site

Univcnily of New Mexico

1593.0

19.1

1.8

H.nro rd Site

Univenity or New Mexico

1196.0

91.5

1 .2

1.2

Hanford Site

UnivcnilY o(Teu.

2216.0

87 .0

1J.l

H.nrord Site

UnivenityorTen.

2473 .0

19.8

8.9

I.J

H.nronl Site.

Univenity or Utah

643 .0

81.5

10.6

H.nrord Site

Univcnity o( Utah

114.0

89 .6

u

1.1
2.1

1.9

H.nronl Site.

Univenity or Vittini8

2151.0

16.1

12."

H.nrord Site

Univenity or VirJini.

2902 .0

83 .9

13.4

H.nrord Sila

Univeniry or Wi...onai"

1943.0

88 .2

10.8

1.0

H.nrord Site

Univenity o( WiaeoNiin

2210.0

18.9

9.2

1.9

H.nroni Site

Wuhir'l'On SYIa Univenity

361.0

81.3

11.6

1.1

H.nrord Site

Wllhinpft State Univenit)'

151 .0

86 .0

9.4

4.5

2941 .0

82.2

16.3

H.nrord Site

Worcc.ur Polytechnic lnstirute

3019 .0

11.2

11.1

4.1

H.nronl Site

TnIa-..
H.nrord Site.

2142.0

81.0

" .4

3.6

2732.0

16.3

12.3

1.4

k1aho Stlte Univ.l"Iit,

602.0

92.2

6.6

1.2

Cornell Univerlity

H.nronl Site
H.nrord Site

Truc:k routes

H.nronl Site.

low. State. Univ.nity

1711.0

93 .1

5.6

0.1

H.nrord Site.

KAftIU SLate Univenity

1143.0

95."

4.1

0.6

H.nrord Site.

M.nhauan Colle,e

3010.0

11.0

19.1

3.9

H.nrord Site

Muucbuxl1I lnIlitl.lte or T echnoiOfY

H.nrord Site

Nonb

H.nrord Site

Ohio State Univenity

C.~iM

SLate UnivenilY

I-1 5

3105 .0

11.5

11.1

3.8

11n.0

83 .8

14.6

1.1

2482 .0

16.1

11 .0

2.9
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Idaho N.tional EnJincering
Labontory

Comell Univenity

2314.0

10.9

11. 1

2.1

Idaho N.tional En,inecrin,
Labol1ltor}

Geo!'ii. lNtitutc or Tcc:hnoloJY

2134.0

14.2

14.4

1.4

Idaho National Eneincc rina
Laborator}

Idaho State Uni/enilY

65 .0

83 .7

12.5

3.9

Idaho N.tional Engineeri ng
Labontor}

low. Sta t.c Univenity

1287.0

92.5

6.1

0.1

Idaho National En,ine!:"n,
LabOR-lOr}

Kinul Slate Univenity

1208 .0

92 .1

6.1

0.5
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Table I-I. (continued) .

Table 1-1. (continued).
Roo ..

Milea

Idaho National Engineering
Llboratory

Manhattan Colleae

Idaho National En,incerin,
Laboratory

M....chulCt1a

Jdaho Nation.a) Enainec:rin,

North Clfolina Stlte Univcf'lity

RUf'l1
(!O)

Suburban
(!O)

Urban
(!O)

2370.0

83 .6

14.8

1.6

2510.0

79 .6

18.1

1.6

2+16 .0

81.$

17.2

1.3

or Technology

1926.0

State Univenity

Idaho National Enaineerilll
Laboratory

Purdue Univenity

Idaho NatiORiI Enrinuring

87.3

11.6

1.1

809.0

87.2

10.7

2.2

Reed Collcac

2162.0

84.9

14.0

1.1

t695 .0

89.3

9.6

t.t

721.0

90.2

8.1

1.6

Idaho N.tiOMI £nFnurine
Llboratory

RCRNelaer Polytechnic lnItitute

2403 .0

80.1

17.9

2.0

Idaho National En,rincering
Llbontory

Rhode WI nd Nuclear Science Center

2549 .0

79.3

17.5

3.2

Idaho National Engineering
Labontory

Stile Univenity of New Yort • Buff.lo

2118 .0

83.2

14.8

2.0

Idaho National Enaincerina

Tun A&M Univenity

1796.0

87 .1

10.S

1.1

Univenity of Arizona

1301.0

83 .8

12.9

3.3

942.0

79.8

11.1

6.4

Uruvenity of A orida

2478 .0

82.6

16.0

1.4

UruvenilY of Dlinoi.

1617.0

90.8

8.5

0.7

Uruvenity of LoweU

2575 .0

79 .5

18.9

1.5

UruvenilY of Muyland

2337 .0

83 .3

15.2

1.6

University o f Michig.n

1811.0

85 .6

13.2

1.2

ldabo N.tional En,ineerina
Lobon""Y

Univenily of MillOUri • Columbia

145 • .0

90.0

8.9

1.1

Idaho N.tional En,ineerin,
Lobon""Y

UnivenilY of Miuouri • Rolla

1666.0

87.3

11.3

I..J

Idaho National En,ineerina
LAboratory

Univenily of New Mexico

Iln.o

88 .6

9.8

1.6

l.I borato ry

l.I bontory

Uruvenity of California· Irvine

LA bontory

LAbontory

LAbontory

Idaho NaliOnll En,ineerin,
La bontory

Idaho N.tional En,ineerinz
Labontory

Idaho National En,ineerina

t800.0

SS .7

12.7

1.6

Idaho National En,inecrina

UnivcnilY or Utah

227.0

n .7

18.9

3.4

Idaho National En,inecrina:

Univcnity of VitJinit

2341.0

85.0

t3 .5

1.5

Idaho National Enainurina:

Univcnity of WilCoRlin

1612.0

89.1

9.2

1.0

Idaho N.tional Enaine.erina

652.0

91.9

7.3

0.8

Worcuur Polytechnic: lnatitutc

2532.0

SO.4

11.0

1.6

Cornell Univenity

2296.0

78.1

17.6

4.2

Geoqilllnltitutc ofTechnolOl)'

2186.0

84 .S

13.9

1.6

56.0

82.5

t3 .2

4.3

low. State Univcnity

1242.0

93 .9

5.4

0.7

Kllnu.. State Univenity

1197.0

96.3

3.2

0.4

M.nMtlAn Collep

2524.0

73 .S

21.9

4.6

M.uachuaetta lNtitute of TechnololY

2559 .0

74. 1

21 .S

4.4

North Carolina State Univenity

2626.0

81.8

16.4

1.8

Ohio State Univenity

1936.0

84.1

12.5

3.4

878 .0

87 .2

9.7

3.1

Pennay lvarua Stlte Univenity

2214.0

7S .9

19.4

4.7

Punluc UniveBilY

1813.0

90.1

8.7

1.2

785 .0

92.6

5.8

1.6

Renaaelaer Polyt.echruc Institute

2388.0

75 .3

19.9

4.11

Rhode blind Nuclear Science Cenle r

2620.0

n .4

22 .J

S.I

Walhinaton State Univenily

Idaho N.tional En,ineerina
l..abontory

Llboratol')"

Idaho National Enginecrin,

Univenity otTuAi

l..abontory

PeMlylnnii Stile Univenity

Idaho National Enaineerina

Urb.n
(l5)

Laboratory
~,on

Idaho Nationll En,incerilli
Laboratory

Idaho N.tional Engineerina

Suburb.n
(!O)

Laboratory

Ohio Stale Univcnil),

Laboratory

Idaho National Enaineerina

Runl
(!O)

l..abontory

LaboOllOry

Idaho National Enainccrina

Idaho N.tio nal Enaineerins

Mile.

Labontory
lnalin..~

Laboratory

Idaho NabOnil Enginccrin,

Roo..

La bontory

[- \7
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Idaho N.tional Enainecrina
Labontory

Idaho N.tional Enainecrina
Llbol'ltory

Idaho N.tional Enaineerina

Idaho State Univenity

l..Ibol'ltory

Idaho N.tional EnginccriOi
Labol'ltory

Idaho N.tional Enaineerin,
Laboratory

Idaho National Enaincerin,
Laboratory

Idaho National Et\a"ineerina
Labontory

Idaho National Enainuring
Laboratory

Idaho National En,incerina
LabollitOry

Idaho National Enaincerina

DreaoR State Univenity

Labontory

Idaho National Enaineeri na
Labontory

Idaho Nltional Eneinecrina
lA bontory

Idaho N.tional Enaineering

Reed Colleae

Labontory

Idaho National Enainecri"i
lAboratory

Idaho National Enaineerina
Laboratory
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Table 1-1. (continued).

Table I-I . (continued).
Mile.

Idaho N.tional En,ineeri",

Stlte University o f New York· Burr.lo

Ru!')

Suburb.n

Urb.n

(~)

(~)

(~)

2091.0

78.7

16 .9

1920.0

89.6

9.4

t..borlltory

...........,.

Idaho National En,inecri"l

TIC .... A&M University

Univcnity of Arttona

...........,.

Idaho N,tionIl En,ineerina

1376.0

Univcl'1lity o(C.JiforrU. - levine

85.4

1 .3

10.0

1.0

1.9

4 .S

Milu

O.t Rid,e RelC,....tion

M.nh.nan Colle,e

O.k Rid,e RelC,....tion

Rural

Suburb.n

Urb.n

(~)

(~)

(~)

754.0

60.9

36.4

2.1

965.0

51.6

41.1

1.4

O.k Rid,e RelCrv.tion

North CtroJinI State University

408.0

54 .S

43.7

1.8

O.k Ridee RelC,....tion

Ohio State University

400.0

61.1

31.1

1.2

O.k Rid,e RelC,....tion

Oreron State University

2614.0

16.8

11.1

1.5

....:.O."k..;.Ri;;.
·d-".''-R;;.';;.''.;.''..;.'''-'
;o..;.n_ _~p._.''''_y:...lv_._ru_._S,,_,,_U_"'_·v_,_,,;..:ly_ _ _ _ _ _"_4._0_ _ _6_9._I_ _ _3_0_.I_ _ _
0._8_
University of Flori&!

1592.0

University of nJinoiJ

Idaho N.tional

982 .0

90.1

4.4

Enainecrina

1612.0

83.8

92.9

14 .6
6.0

1.6

2549.0

74.2

21.3

4 .S

University of MlI'yland

2354.0

SO.I

u.s

4.4

Univeraity of Michi,.a

ta23 .0

83 .4

13 .0

Purdue Uiliversity

Oak Rid,c RClCrvation

Reed Colle,e

O.k Rid,c RelC,....tion

O.t Rid,c RCIC,...ation

3.6

Univcnity of Miuouri - Columbia

1<402.0

94 .4

5.1

0.5

Univcraity of Miuouri - Rolla

1619.0

92 .6

6. 1

1.3

University of New Mc~co

1150.0

90.1

1.1

1.4

1921.0

11.8

9.1

1.4

221.0

SO.1

1S .6

3.1

2357 .0

.1..

15 .1

3. 1

University of Tcx..

...........,.
........N.tiooal
...,.
Idaho National Enainccrina
...........,.
Idaho
........
...,.
...........,.

Idaho National En,inccri",

University of Utah

Id.aho

University o(Viraini.

En,inccrin,

N.tiocal En,inccrin,

Idaho National En,inc.crina

Univcnity of WiKoruin

1664.0

Wlihini\On Slile University

WorccJler Polytechnic lNtitlltc

17.5

10.3

68 .6

30.2

1.3

81.1

11-0

1.3

Rcrwelaer Polytecbnic lnItiWl.C

819.0

63 .4

35.5

1.1

Rhode Wind Nuclear Scicncc Cenler

933.0

53 .4

39.8

6.8

O.t Rid,e 'RclC,...ation

State Univemty of Ncw York - Buff.lo

144.0

61.9

35 .6

2.5

O.t Rid,e Rue,...ation

Tcxa. A&M University

1004.0

81.5

11.2

1.3

O.t Rid,e RclC,....tion

University of Arizonl

1182.0

83 .2

15. 1

1.1

Univemty of California - Irvine

2209.0

16.0

10.9

3.0

O.k

Idaho N.liOOllI En,inecrilll
........
...,.

460.0
1585.0

1.1

University of Lowell

Labol'1llOry

O.t Rid,e RelCrv.tion

2.2

176.0

92 .2

6.2

1.6

1544.0

73 .1

21.5

4.1

Rid~e

RelCrvation

O.k IUd,c RelC,....tion

University of Florida

546.0

65 .4

33 . 1

1.5

O.k Rid,e RelC,....tion

University of Dlinoi.

516 .0

68 .0

29.9

2.2
1. 1

O.k Rid,e RelC,....llon

Uiliversity of Lowell

970.0

51.4

41.5

O.k Rid,e RelC,...ation

University of Muyland

531 .0

70.2

27 .2

2.6

O.k Rid,e RelC,...allon

Univenity of Micbilan

595 .0

51.8

38 .5

3.1

Oak Rid,e RelC,....tion

Univenity of Miaeouri - Columbia

594 .0

19.0

19 .5

I.S

O.t Rid,e RelC,....bon

Univenity of Mi..,...ri - Rolla

S71.0

SO.2

19 .0

0.9

O.k Rid,c RelC,....Lion

University of New Mexico

1391 .0

85 .4

12.9

1.1

O.t Rid,e RelC,....tion

University ofTeul

1026 .0

16.9

20.9

2.2

O.k Rid,e RelC,....tion

University of Utah

1864.0

86 .6

12. 1

I.J

O.k Rid,e RelC,....tion

University of Vil'Jinia

402 .0

n.1

26 .4

0.8

O.k Rid.e Rue,....tion

University of WiIConain

Oak Rid,e Rese,...ation

W.ahinaton State University

O.k Rid,e Resc,....tion

WcmeJtcr Polytechnic lnatiQlte

730.0

66. 1

30.0

3.9

2435 .0

11.3

10.8

0.9

927.0

52.5

40.0

1 .5

Track routfII
o.t JOdie RclClV.tion

o.t Rid,e Sluc,....tion

Traia routOi
Cornell Univenity

121.0

65 .1

33 .2

1.1

Oeotti. InJtiwte of Tcc:bnolofy

202 .0

53 .2

45 .1

1.1

Idaho State Univenity

1915.0

Jow. State Univenity
J(,,....

900.0

State Univenity

151.0

1-19

16.1
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12.0
23 .4
19.2

1.2
1.5
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O.k Rid,e Re lC,....tion

Cornell University

935 .0

60.9

32.8

6.3

O.k Rid.c Rese,....t1on

GeOlJia lIulitute of TechnolOl)'

228 .0

47 . 1

50.9

2.0

o.t Rid,c RelC,....tion

Idaho State University

1996.0

89 .9

8.S

1.6

o.t Rid.c Resc,...lIion

(ow. State University

954.0

71.7

22 .0

6.3

o.t Rid.e Rese,....Lion

J(,,...I

948.0

12.2

14 .7

3. 1

VOLUME I. APPENODC I

State University

\-20

Table I-I. (continued).

Table I-I. (continued).

x""..

Mile.

Rural
(\II)

Suburll.n

Urb.n

(\II)

(")

Rutsl

x"" ..

Urban
(")

14.0

1.8

Ma.."huKIla lrutiblte o f TechnoloJ)'

2802.0

8O.S

17.7

1.8

Nevada Tell Site

North Carolina State Univetlity

2549 .0

81.9

16.S

1.6

Nevada Tell Site

Ohio State UniverailY

209B.O

8S.8

12.3

2.0

39. 1

6.6

Nevada Tell Site

1199.0

56. 1

37.7

6.2

Nevada Tnl Site

North Caroli... Stille Univenity

511 .0

60.9

36 .9

2.2

Oak IUdp Rutrv.tion

Ohio Stile Univcnil,

<06 .0

66.9

27.8

S.3

O.k Ridge RCKI"YItion

Oregon Stile: Univenity

O.k JUdie Rucrv,lion

Pennsylvania Stlte Univcrtity

0111: Rid,c RCIoi:I'Yllion

Purdue University

M....achuK11I lnItitute ofTechnoloa:y

Suburbln
(")

84. 1

54.3

Rcxty.t~

(\II)

2603.0

1164.0
Chit Ridae

Milea

30SS .0

90.0

8.'

1.6

Nevada Te..: Site

ORion State Univetlity

1245.0

11.8

U .5

'.7

122.0

SS .2

37.4

7.3

Nevada Tnl Site

Pennsylvania Slate UNnnilY

2395.0

15.3

13.3

1.4

74.4

22 .6

3.0

Nevada Teal Site

Purdue Univenity

1928.0

19.3

9.2

I.S

2.8

Reed CollcJC

1127.0

8S .S

12.1

2.4

NevadaTuCSite

Reed Coller

1250.0

86.'

10.8

o.t Rid,c RetCrvltio n

Rcnucllcr Polytcchtlic lnIti1Utc

1021.0

SS .9

36 .8

7.3

Nevada Tnt Site

Renueller Polytechnic lnIlibite

2636 .0

81.0

16.9

0"; Rid,c Rcxrvation

Rl'Odc bJ.nd N'uelcu Science eCnle'r

12S9.0

53 .S

39 .0

7.S

Nevada Tell Site

Rhode bland Nuclear Science Center

2712.0

80.1

16.6

3.2

O.k Rid,c RClCrvation

State Univcnit), of New York · Burralo

731 .0

S7.7

34.9

7.4

Nenda Tefl Site

State University of New York · Buffalo

2350.0

83 .8

14.0

2.2

O.k ftidgc Reacrvation

Texa. A&M University

101J .0

80.,,0_ _ _
18:-.6_ _",1",
.S_

Nevada Tut Sitc

Teul AciM Univcraity

1852.0

8S .6

11.9

2.S

O.k Ridac RCICl"Yl tion

Univcnity of ArizoNi

2100 .0

as.1

723 .0

8S .0

11.1

3.9

o.t Ridic RucrVl tion

University of Clli(~ - ltvine

2615 .0

0 ..: Rid,c Ruervltion

University of F1orid.II

634 .0

University of Dlinoi.

S92 .0

Univcnity of Lowell

12.9

2.0

Nevada Tell Site

Univenily of Arizona

88 .0

9.S

2.S

Nevada Tell Site

Unive";ty of California · Irvine

364.0

76.1

11.6

12.4

61.2

29.9

1.9

Nevada Tell Site

UNveraity of Rorida

2l82.0

12.9

15.4

1.7

7,S .4

21.3

3.3

UnivenilY of Dlinoil

1850.0

90.6

8.3

1.1

1189.0

S6.2

37.4

6.4

Nevada Tnt Site

Unive"it)' of Lowell

2801.0

80.3

17.9

UnivenilY o f Mlryllnd

S82 .0

S3 .9

40.'

S.6

Nevada Tell Site

University of Maryllnd

2l09 .0

82.3

IS .S

UNver.ily o f Michiaan

591.0

63 .3

30.1

6.6

Nenda Tefl Site

University of Michi,ln

2044.0

86 .1

12.4

Oak Ridae ReKrvltion

UNvenilY o f Miuouri • Columbia

695 .0

82.S

14.2

3.3

Nevada Tell Site

Univenity of MillOUri • Columbil

1557.0

89 .9

8.5

1.6

o.k

Univer.ilY of Miuouri • Rolli

640 .0

82 .3

14.4

3.3

Nevlda TeSl Site

UNve..,it)' of Missouri · Rolli

1769.0

87.4

10.7

1.8

918 .0

93.8

4.8

I.S

1662.0

86.S

10.S

3.0

o•.t

Ridge RucrVltion

Olk Ridae RucrYitio n

Ridae ReKrvltion

2.2

Oak Ridge Retcrvalton

UNvenily of New Mui,o

1749.0

87.9

10.3

1.8

Nevada Tut Site

Univenity o f New Mexico

Olk Ridae Ruervl tion

UNvenilY ofTu "l

1045.0

7S .7

22 .1

2.1

NeYida Tefl Site

UNversily ofTen.

Oak Ridae Ruervltion

UNvenity of Utah

20SI.0

88 .0

10,3

1.7

Nevada T efl Site

Univenity o f Utah

487 .0

8S .0

11.4

3.6

Oa k Ridae Ruervalion

Univenity of VifJinia

451 .0

S3 .6

" .1

2.3

Nevada Tell Site

Univeraity of Virtinia

2444.0

8S .2

IJ .O

1.8

o.k Rid,e

UNvenit)' of WiKONIin

765 .0

67. 1

25 .S

7.'

University of Wi lConain

IB57.0

9O.S

8.2

1.3

2536 .0

85 .3

12.4

2.3

Nevada Tell Sil.e

Walhinaton State Univenity

1286.0

86 .6

11.1

2 .•

1183.0

SS .2

37.9

• .9

Nevada T ul Site

Worc:eaer Polytechnic lnItilUte

2765.0

81.2

11.0

1.8

Ruervllion

Oak Ridae Retcrvation

Wlltr.in,ton State UNvenity

o.k

Won:elter PoIyte,hnic lNtiWte

Ridae RClervation

Truck

TraiD route.

ro.ta;

Nevada Tnt Site

Cornell UNnnity

2547 .0

1 t.7

16.1

NevacS. TeSl Site

Cornell Univcraity

2727.0

80.7

IS .S

3.8

N~atS.Te.S ite

GeofJillnstirute o f TechnoloJy

2238 .0

14.4

13 .8

1.7

NevacS. Tul Site

Ceo..,,, lnJtibite ofTechnololY

26 18.0

86 .1

12.3

1.6

Ne-vada Tul Site

Id.ahoState Univenity

649 .0

82.S

13 .8

3 .•

Nevada Tell Site

Idaho Stale University

700.0

93 .6

S.'

1.0

NevJd.aTell Site

Iowa State Univel"Jit)'

iSZO.O

92 .0

6.8

Nev.da Telt Site

lowa State Univcrait),

1674.0

94 .0

S. I

0.9

Nevadl: Tell Site

K.anM. State Univeraity

1312.0

92 .S

6.4

Nevada Te. Sil.e

Kanu. State University

1628.0

9S .8

3.S

0.7
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Ie I-I. (continued).

Table 1-1. (continued).
Mile.

Roul<

-lcvld, Tul Site

~ nd.aTCIt

Silc

! vada Tnt Site

Vida

Tell Site

Subuman

Urban

(0;)

(0;)

(0;)

2956 .0

16.6

19.3

4. 1

M ....chulCtli lnItitutc ofTccbnol OlY

2990.0

17.0

19.0

4.0

NoM Carolina State University

3058 .0

83 .6

14.1

Ohio State Univcnily

2367.0

86.0

11.0

3. 1

Oreaon State University

1400.0

79.8

t4 .7

S.4

Pcntuylvani, State Univenity

2646 .0

78.9

16 .9

4.2

90.9

7.8

1.3

Purdue University

Reed CoUtp

-v.d, Tut Site
' Vld. Tnl Site

Rurw.1

1429.0

93 .5

5.3

1.2

2820.0

78 .2

17.5

4.3

Rhode blind Nuclear Science Center

3051.0

75 .6

19.9

4.6

Stale UnivcBity of New York· Buff,lo

2522 .0

81.4

14 .7

3.9

Tcxu A&M University

1967 .0

92 .0

6.6

1.4

Vida

Tell Site

UnivcBity of Arizona

8t8.0

90.6

7.4

2.0

Vida

Tnl Site

University of C.liforru. · lrvine

424.0

78 .0

13 .8

8.2

Milu

Roul<

RUrll
(lI)

Suburb.n

Urbln

(0;)

(:0)

76U

62 .1

36.0

1.8

2373.0

83 .7

14.3

2.0

455.0

11.0

28.2

0.9

2738 .0

85.9

12.1

1.4

2322.0

84.7

13 .8

I.S

350.0

65.4

33. 8

0 .8

Nev.da Tell Site

2491.0

84.0

14.5

I.S

Welt V.lley DemolUU'ation
PI.nt

S.v.nnah River Site

1211.0

62.'

32.4

4.9

Well V.lley Ocmonllnlion
PI.nt

H.nford Site

2654.0

78 .3

18 .0

3.7

West Valley Demonstralion
pt.nl

Idaho N.tional Enaineerina Laboratory

210'.0

74.9

20.5

4.7

Welt V.lley Ocmonll,..tion
Pl.nt

O.k Rid,e Reaerv.tion

889.0

64 .5

30 .1

5.5

2554.0

10.8

1$.1

4.0

Welt V.lley DcmoRltr.tion
P1.nt

O.k Ridae Ruervllion

Wert V.lIey OcmoRltMltion
P1.nt

Nev.d. Tert Sitc

&bcock &. Wilcox

s.v.nnah River Site

Babcock &. Wilcox

H.nford Site

Babcock &. Wilcox

Idaho N.tioRiI Enainecrina I...lboMltory

8abcock &. Wilcox

O.k Rid,c Ruerv.tion

Babcock &. Wilcox

Univenily of Flori<U

3024.0

85 .3

n.l

1.6

1Ict.. Tell Silc

Un!vcnity of Dlinoi.

1044.0

93 .2

5.6

1.2

Univcnity of Lowell

2980.0

17.2

11.8

4.1

West Villey Dcmonltn.tion
PI.nt

NeVida Tnl Silc

TeM Site

' I da Tell Site

University of MII'}lInd

2786.0

82.3

13.1

4.0

Babcock &. Wilcox

S..... nnah Ri"'er Sitc

661.0

76.'

21.5

1.6

I, d, Tnl Site

Univenily of Michi,ln

2255 .0

8S .5

11.3

3.2

Babcock &. Wilcol[

H.nford Sitc

2879.0

84 .2

13 .1

2.7

ad, TUI Site

University of Miuouri • Columbli.

t833 .0

94.4

4.8

0.7

Babcock &. Wilcol[

Idaho N.tional Engineering l...lbon.tory

2333.0

82.1

14 .8

3.2

. da Tell Site

Univef'lilY of Miuouri • Rolla

2050.0

93 .0

5.7

1.4

Babcock &. Wilcol[

O.k Ridge Rnc ......tion

386.0

48 .0

49.6

2 .4

Univef'lily of Ne.... Muieo

I06S .0

94.6

4 .S

0.9

Babcock &. Wikol[

Nev.d. Test Sitc

2765.0

84.0

!J .t

2.9

Univef'lilY o fTexu

2358 .0

89.9

' .7

1.4

Three Mile lJI.nd

Idaho NltioRiI Engineering .... bon.tory

2J1S .0

75 .8

19 .6

4.6

Univenily of Ulah

528 .0

98 .0

1.8

0.2

l ida

. da Teal Site

. d.TealSite

UnivenilY of Virginia

2781 .0

83 .7

13 .4

2.9

Pleasanton, CA

Idaho N.tional Engineerina:ubol"ltory

969 .0

84.0

12.2

3.'

, d. Tnl Site

Univef'lity of WiICoRiin

2096 .0

88.9

9.0

2.1

pteas.lnton, CA

H.nford Sitc

881.0

77.5

19. 1

3.4

W..hiftl\On StaLe Univef'lilY

1520.0

93.2

5.6

1.1

P1eulnlon, CA

S..... nnah River Site

2768 .0

80.1

t6 .8

3.1

WOtteilcr Polytechnic lnIlitute

2915.0

76.8

Ut9

4.3

Ple.santon, CA

O.k Ridae Ruerv.lion

2532.0

81 .0

10 .5

2 .S

Pleasanton. CA

Nevl dl Tell Site

687.0

84 .3

9 .6

6. t

O.ilhersbu rj'. MD

Idaho National Enaineerin, Laboratory

2316 .0

83 .9

t4 .9

1.2

O.ithersb urg.MD

H.nford Site

2732 .0

85 .3

13.S

1.2

Oaithemurr, MD

S.v.nnah River Site

597.0

66 .8

30 .7

2.5

Olithersb urg . MO

Olk Rid,e RCientltion

S36 .0

70.6

27 .4

2.0

G.ithel"lbufJ. MD

Nevlda Tnl Site

2488 .0

82 .9

15.2

1.9

III Tell Sitc

V. lley Demonstration

v .ney DemonJtnlton

S• .".nnah River Site

883 .0

10.3

2'.5

1.2

H.nford Silc

2556 .0

84.6

13 .1

t.7

Idaho N.tKmaI EA,ineerina: Labontory

2140.0

83 .0

15 .2

1.8
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Table I-I. (continued).

Table I-I. (continued).
Milu

Runlll
(\II)

Suburbln
(\II)

Urban
(\II)

S.n JUmoa, CA

962.0

84.4

12.0

3.6

San Ramon , CA

874 .0

77.9

18.9

3.2

Mile.
G.ilhcrtburJ.MD

o.It

Glithcmurg.MD

HCVld. TcliSite

Ridgc ReserY.lion

Rural
(\II)

Suburb.n
(\II)

Urb.n
(\II)

819.0

59.4

37 .3

3.3

2767.0

82 .1

13 .7

3 .•

San Ramon, CA

Savannah JUvcr Site

2771.0

80.0

16.9

3.1

S.n R.lmon. CA

Idaho H.tioMI En,inccring Laboratory

965 .0

85.6

10.4

'.0

San Ramon, CA

Ollie Rid,e Rucrvltion

2538.0

86 .8

10.5

2.6

Sin Rlmon, CA

Hlnford Site

1002.0

77.5

16.0

6.4

San Ramon, CA

Nevada Ttll Site

694.0

83.7

9.9

6.3

S.n Ramon, CA

S'Vlnnah Rivcr Site

3t70.0

79.6

16.6

3.8

Midlllld,MI

Idaho NllioNiI En,inccrina: Laboratory

1902.0

82.9

1S.8

1.3

S.n Ramon, CA

0.1t R..idac RCierYltion

3029.0

83.5

13.4

3.1

Midllnd, MI

Hanford Sitc

2318.0

84 .1

14.0

1.3

S.n Rlmon, CA

Ncv.da Tcll Site

838.0

76.2

17.4

6.3

MidLtnd. MI

Savannah River Site

1036 .0

58 .9

31.9

3.2

Midl,nd, MI

Idaho N.tional Enaincerin, Labontory

1961.0

82.3

14.2

3.5

Midland, MI

Oat Rid,c Rclerv.tion

719.0

52 .7

42.7

4 .•

Midllnd, Ml

H.nford Site

2507.0

84.7

12.4

2.9

2135 .0

83 .•

14.8

1.6

Midllnd, MI

SIVInnah River Site

99•. 0

65.9

31.2

2.9

97•.0

78.8

17.1

4.t

Midl.nd, MI

0.1t Ridgc RClCrv.tioo

645.0

58.4

37.3

4.3

76.3

1•.0

7.7

Midl.nd. MI

NeVida Tell Site

2392.0

84.5

12.4

3.1
6.0

Midland , MI

Enaincerina Laborltory

San Dicao. CA

Idaho National

Sin DielO, CA

Hanford Site

1352.0

Sin Dic,o, CA

Savannah River Site

2345 .0

81.0

17.0

2.0

Sin Dicgo, CA

Idaho NltioMI Engineering Labontory

1076.0

82.6

11.4

Sin Die,o, CA

Oak. JUdie RuerVition

2193.0

84.1

13.8

2.1

Sin Diego, CA

H.nford Site

t622.0

8• .2

9.5

4.3

Sin Dielo, CA

Nevld..I Tell Sitc

398.0

73.9

19.8

•. 3

S.n Dicgo, CA

S,Vlnnah Rivcr Site

3274.0

81.3

15.6

3.1

2709 .0

86.B

10.0

3.1

518.0

73.4

15.9

10.7

Denver, CO

Idaho National Enaincerina Llboratory

711.0

91.2

7.9

0.9

S.n Dicgo. CA

a,it Ridge

Denver, CO

Hlnford Site

1t33.0

91.8

7.2

1.0

San Diego, CA

NeVid. Tell Site

Denver, CO

Sannnah River Site

1613.0

79.2

18.9

1.9

Denver, CO

Idaho Nllional Engineerina ubol'1ltory

70B.0

94.7

4.6

0.6

Denver, CO

Od: JUdie Reae ...... tion

1340.0

84.5

14. 1

1.5

Denver, CO

H.nford Site

1254.0

94.1

5.2

0.7

Denver, CO

Nevada Tell Site

8t9 .0

90.7

7.5

1.8

Denvcr, CO

SIVInnah River Site

2125 .0

77 .0

20.5

2.6

McClellan AFB, CA

Jdaho National Engineering Laboratory

875.0

BR ••

8.8

2.6

Denver, CO

O.k Ridge RelCrv.tion

1560.0

85.0

12.6

2.3
0.9

Reservltion

McClellan AFB. CA

H.nford Site

830.0

80.5

17.0

2 .•

Denver, CO

Ncv.dI Tell Site

1140.0

94.6

4.4

McClcll.n AFB. CA

s'Vtnnah Rivcr Site

2780.0

84.4

13.7

1.9

McClellln AFB, CA

Idaho NltioMI Engineering ubol'1ltory

853 .0

90.3

7.8

1.9

McClcll.n AFB, CA

Q.1t Ridac RClCrVllion

2517.0

87.B

10.5

1.6

McCleilin AFB, CA

H.nford Site

890.0

BI.O

14.3

4.7

McClcll.n AFB, CA

Hev.da Tell Site

735.0

8t.!

11.2

7.6

McClclltn AFD. CA

S.Vlnnah River Site

3160.0

79 .4

16.7

3.9

McClelitn AFB. CA

O.k Ridgc Reserv.tion

2747.0

87 .8

10.2

2.0

McClellln AFB, CA

NevldlTeltSite

827.0

75.4

17 .7

6.9

PluSlnton. CA

fdaho H.tioMI Engineerina Llboratory

965 .0

85 .6

10.4

4.0

PfuSlnton, CA

H.n(ord Site

1002.0

77.5

16.0

•. 4

PlClSlnton, CA

S.v.nnah River Site

3170.0

79.6

16.5

3.8

PlClSlnton, CA

O.I. Ridge Rucrv.tion

3029 .0

83 .5

13.4

3.1

Plc.Slnto n, CA

Hev.d. TUI Site

838 .0

76 .2

17 .4

• .3

O.ithcrsburg, MD

Idaho H'lioMI Engineering Llboratory

2335.0

15 .4

4.0

G.ithcrsburJ, MD

H.nford Site

2881 .0

83.0

13 .6

3.'

G.ithcrsburJ. MD

S.v.nnah RivCf Site

659 .0

68 .4

27.7

3.8
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1-3.2 Spent Nuclear Fuel Shipments
In the transportation analyses. SNF was divided into a number of categories: (a) commercial,
(b) DOE research, (c) foreign research reactor, (d) graphite, (e) N Reactor, (I) naval-type, (g)
Savannah River Site production reactor, and (h) university research reactor. More details on these
fuel types may be found in Appendix J of Volume I of this EIS . The estimated number of SNF
shipments are presented by fuel type, origin-destination pair, and transport mode for each alternative
in Tahles 1-2 and 1-3 (Heiselmann 1995). Each shipment, whether by truck or rail , was assumed to
consist of one shipping container. However, the size of shipping container was variable, depending
on the type of SNF and the transport mode (truck or rail). At this time, insufficient data exist to
determine the transport mode for all shipments. Therefore, the number of truck or rail shipments was
based on either 100 percent transport by truck or 100 percent transport by rail to bound potential
impacts.
The shipments in this appendix include offsite transport of naval-type SNF stored at the Idaho
Chemical Processing Plant as of June 1995 to storage locations at other sites as identified in the
alternatives. Transport of naval SNF from shipyards and prototypes to the equivalent Expended Core
Facility at the alternative sites are addressed in Appendix D of Volume I of this EIS, along with
transport of naval test specimens.
This appendix also includes transport of foreign research reactor SNF from the six points of
entry identified in the Implementation Plan for this EIS (Hampton Roads, Virginia; Charleston, South
Carolina; Savannah , Georgia; Seattle-Tacoma, Washington; Portland, Oregon; and Oakland,
California) to sites as identified in the alternatives. Impacts of shipments to the Military Ocean
Terminal at Sunny Point, North Carolina, were analyzed because this terminal was recently used for
fo reign research reactor SNF shipments. Impacts of shipments to Galveston, TexlaS, were analyzed
because this point of entry is on the Gulf Coast and has container-handling experience. The
ocean-going portion of foreign research reactor SNF shipments and a detailed evaluation of point of
entry activities are not assessed in this EIS, but will be assessed in the Environmental Impact
Statement on a Proposed Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent
Nuclear Fuel.

For the Regionalization alternatives, SNF would be consolidated based on fuel type or
geography, More shipments of SNF would occur than for the 199211993 Planning Basis alternative
and all types of SNF would be transported. For the Regionalization by Fuel Type alternative,
N-Reaclor SNF, naval-type SNF, and Savannah River Site production reactor SNF and targets would
not be transported. Generally, aluminum SNF would be transported to the Savannah River Site and
slainless steel SNF would be transported to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, For the
Regionalization by Geography alternative, SNF from west of the Mississippi River would be
transported to the Hanford Site, the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, or the Nevada Test Site.
SNF from east of the Mississippi River would be transported to the Savannah River Site or the Oak
Ridge Reservation.
For the Centralization alternatives, all SNF would be transported to the Hanford Site, the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, the Savannah River Site, the Oak Ridge Reservation, or the
Nevada Test Site. The primary difference between these alternatives, in terms of shipments, is the
transport of N-Reactor SNF, naval-type SNF, and Savannah River Site production reactor SNF and
targets. For Centralization at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, the Savannah River Site,
the Oak Ridge Reservation, or the Nevada Test Site, N-Reactor SNF would be transported from the
Hanford Site. For Centralization at the Hanford Site, the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, the
Oak Ridge Reservation, or the Nevada Test Site, Savannah River Site production reactor SNF and
targets would be transported , For Centralization at the Hanford Site, the Savannah River Site, the
Oak Ridge Reservation, or the Nevada Test Site, naval-type SNF would be transported from the
Idaho Nat ional Engineering Laboratory. For Centralization at the Oak Ridge Reservation or the
Nevada Test Site, N-ReaClor SNF, naval-type SNF, and Savannah River Site production reactor SNF
and targets would be transported.

The No Action alternative considers only transport of naval SNF and test specimens. These
shipments are addressed in Appendi x D of Volume I of this EIS . For the Decentralization
alternative. un iversity research reactor, foreign research reactor, and non-DOE research reactor SNF
would be transported to the Idaho Natio nal Engineering Laboratory or the Savannah River Site.
For the 199211993 Planning Basis alternative, commercial. DOE research, and graphite SNF
would be transported to the Idaho National Engineering Laboralory or the Savannah River Site.
University research reactor. foreign research reactor. and non·DOE research reactor SNF would also
cOlllinue to be transported to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory or the Savannah River Site.
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Table 1-2. Spent nuclear fuel shipments for the Decentralization, 1992/1993 Planning Basis, Regionalization by Fuel Type, and
Centralization alternatives.
Centraliz.ltion

199211993

Oririn

DclliDition

Decentraliz.ltion

Planning a..i,

Regiolllliz.ltion
by Fuel Type

truct:

truck

truck

rail

rail

rail

HS

INEL

SRS

truck

rail

truck

rail

truck

NTS

ORR
rail

IJUck

nil

IJUck

rail

Naval-Typo

INEt

383

HS

104

NTS
ORR

383

SRS

383

104

484

97

383

104

484

97

1192

60S

104

Savannah River Production

I

SRS

HS

484

97

t-.J

\0

INEt

484

97

ORR

NTS
ORR

SRS

1

1
Hanford Production

HS

1192

INEt

1192

SRS

~

!I'I

NTS
ORR

INEt

60S
1192

ORR

<
o

60S

1

1

60S

~

r

Table 1-2. (continued) .

~

[T1

Central ization

Decentra lization
Origi n

Destination

truck

rail

1992/1993
Planntng Basis

Regionalization
by Fuel T ype

truck

truck

rai l

rail

SRS

HS
truck

rail

truck

INEL
rail

truck

NTS

ORR
rail

truck

rail

truck

rail

Graphite

FSV

244

HS
244

lNEL

35

244

35

244

35

SRS

244

35

35

244

ORR

35

NTS

-

INEL

HS

162

244

35

162

23

3

3

23

I

Vol

o

SRS

162

23

162

ORR

23

NTS
Domeltic non-DOE

AFRRI

HS

3
3

INEL

SRS

•

ORR

NTS

3

3

3

3

3

3

3
3

3

3
3

3

Table 1-2. (continued).
Centnlization

199211993
Decentralization
Origin

USGS

DeIliMtion

t!\lck

rail

PlIMing Basis

Regionalization
by Fuel Type

t!\lck

truck

rail

nil

HS
INEL

HS
truck

6
6

6

6

6

6

SRS
rail

truck

INEL
nil

truck

ORR

nil

NTS

nil

truck

nil

6

6

6

SRS

6

6

6
6

ORR

6

NTS

-

truck

6

6

185

185

3

3

Domeltic non-DOE

I

W

NIST

HS

185

185

INEL
SRS

185
185

185

185

185

185

185

185

185

185
185

ORR

185

NTS
USAF

HS
INEL

3
3

3

3

3

3

3

3

SRS

o<

r

~
rn

3

3

3

3
3

ORR

NTS

3'-1()

3

<

?2

c:

Table 1-7.• (continued).

::
('Tl
Centn!llization

1992/1993
Decentralization
Orig in
DOW

De stination

truck

rail

Planning Basis

Regionalization
by Fuel Typ"

truc k

truck

rail

n!lil

HS
INEL

HS
[rucK

3
3

3

3

3

3

SRS
n!liI

t ruck

INEL
rail

truck

roil

[ruck

n!lil

3

3

3

3

3
3

ORR

3

NTS

-

HS
INEL

4

4

3

3

4

4

8

8

4

4
4

rail

[ruck

3

SRS

GE

NTS

ORR

4

4

4

I

v.>

IV

SRS

4

4

"

4
4

ORR

4

NTS
GA

HS
INEL

8
8

8

8

8

8

8
8

8

SRS

8

8

8
8

ORR

NTS

3

II

8

Ie 1-2. (.:ontinued ).
Centraliz.ation
199~J1993
De~.ntn llZA tlo n

Ori ~i n

De su nati n

RO

HS
L"EL

truc k

n il

Planning Ba sis

Rcg iona hzation
by Fuel Type

(ru;k

(ruck

n il

nil

HS
(ru.:k

3
J

J

J

3

J

SRS
n il

(ruck

ORR

INEL
n il

l1\Je k

n il

l1\Jek

NTS
nil

l1\Jek

nil

3
3

J

SRS

3

3

3

ORR

3

3

t-o"TS

3

3

519

519

83

..

Univcnitic.
J,,'cniti cs

HS

519

I::'EL

261

261

261

261

116

116

SRS

258

258

258

258

403

403

519
519
519

519

519

ORR

519

519

STS
Commer.:ia1
DP

HS
NEL

SRS
ORR
!,;"TS

83
83

4

83

4

4

83

83

4

..
83

.

8r

Table 1-2. (continued).

~

tTl

Centrolization

1992/1993
Dece ntralization
Origin
B&W

De stina tion

truck

rai l

.'Ianni ng Basis

Regionalization
by Fuel Type

truck

truck

roil

rail

HS
INEL

HS
truck

2
2

2

2

SRS
roil

truck

rail

truck

roil

rail

truck

2

2
2

2
2

2

NTS

-,

INEL

Vol

7
7

7

2
7

27

HS
lNEL

27

27

S

SRS
ORR

NTS

27

.s

6

2

S
27

6

2

S

.s

NTS
INEL

7

2

ORR

HS

2

2

NTS
SRS

2

2

SRS

.:>.

rail

2

ORR

HS

trucle

2

SRS

ORR

NTS

ORR

INEL

6

2
6

2

2
6

2

Table 1-2. (continued).
Centralization

1992/1993
Decentralization
Origin

Destination

truck.

rail

Planning Basis
truck.

rai l

Regionalization
by Fuel Type
truck.

rail

HS

INEL

SRS

truck.

raiJ

truck.

rail

truck.

NTS

ORR
rail

truck.

rail

truck.

rail

Commercial
ANL-E

HS

I

lNEL

I

I

I

I

SRS

I

1

I

ORR

1

NTS

-•

lNEL

Vol

370

HS

1

370

74

113

24

74
370

SRS

IJ1

1

74
370

ORR

NTS

74

DOE Reaearch
ORR

113

HS
lNEL

SRS

o<
r-

c:
3:

m

>
"0
"0

m
Z

o

S<

NTS

67

14

46

10

67

14

24
113
113

24

24

o<
~

Table 1-2. (continued).

m
Centralization

199211993
Origin

BNL

DUlination

Decentralization

Planning Ba.i.

Regionalization
by Fuel Type

\lUck

\lUck

truck

rail

rail

rail

truck

71

HS
INEL

35

7

SRS

35

7

SRS

HS
rail

\lUck

INEL
rail

\lUck

rail

\lUck

rail

14

71

14
71

14

NTS

-

SNL

1M

0'\

27

HS
INEL

12

3

12

3

SRS

15

3

15

3

27
27

INEL

SRS
ORR

NTS

17

17

..

6

17

4

6

4

4
17

27

6

NTS

17

14

6

27

HS

71

6

ORR

LANL

nil

14

ORR

I

\lUCk

14
71

71

NTS

ORR

17

4

..
17

4

Table 1-2. (continued).
Centralization

1992/1993
Decentralization
Origin

ANL-E

Destination

truck.

rai l

Planning Basis

Regionalization
by Fuel Type

truck

truck

rail

rail

HS
INEL

HS
truck

10

10

2

10

SRS
rail

truck

INEL
rail

truck

NTS

ORR
rail

truck

rail

10

2

10

2

2

10

ORR

2

NTS

-,

lNEL

5

I

518

39

518
518

SRS

~

......

SRS

114

1003

23

o<
r
c:

:::ITl
>

."
."

ITl

Z

o

>!

INEL
ORR

NTS

94

19

165

353

71

165

NTS

353

1003

165
1003

HS

39

165

ORR

SRS

518

39

NTS

1003

2

39
518

HS

10
39

ORR

INEL

rail

2

SRS

HS

truck

71
353

71
353

71

~

r

Table 1-2. (continued).

c:::

:::m

Centralization

Origin

De stination

Decentralization

1992/1993
Planning Basis

Regionalization
by Fuel Type

truele

truck

truck

rail

rail

rail

HS
truck

SRS
rail

INEL

truck

rail

1008

1008

truck

ORR
rail

truck

NTS
rail

truck

rail

Foreign
Poinll of
Entry

1008

HS
SRS

546

546

546

546

838

838

INEL

462

462

462

462

170

170

1008

1008

1008
1008

ORR

1008

NTS

-

TOTAL

1,742

1,742

2,267

1,824

3,078

1,926

5,099

2,375

5,951

2,848

4,897

2,655

6,695

2,995

1008

1008

6,815

3,021

I
1..0)

00

Acronxm.
AERO
Aerotcst San Ramon, CA
Anned Force. Radiobiology Research lnstirute Bethesda, MD
AFRRI
Argonne National Laboratory-East
ANL-E
B&W
Babcock &. Wilcox Company Lynchburg, V A
Broolchaven Nalional Laboratory
BNL
DOE
Department of Energy
DOW
Dow North America Midland, MI
FSV
Fort SI. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station
General Atomic. San Diego, CA
GA
General Electric Pleasanton, CA
GE
HS
Hanford Sile

\NEL
LANL
NIST
NTS
ORR
SNL
SRS
USAF
USGS
WVDP

Idaho National Enginuring Laboratory
Lo. Alamo. National Laboratory
National (rutirute of Standardl and Technology Gaithersburg , MD
Nevada Test Site
Oak Ridge Reacrvation
Sandia National Laboratoriel
Savannah River Site
United States Air Force McClellan , CA
United States Geological Survey Denver, CO
West Valley Demonstration Project

Table 1-3. Spent nuclear fuel shipments for the Regionalization by Geography alternatives.
Regionali2.atic '1 by Geography
HS and SRS
Origin

Oeatination

truck

rail

INEL and SRS
truck

rail

NTS and SRS
truck

rail

HS and ORR
truck

rail

INELand ORR

NTS and ORR

truck

truck

rail

nil

Naval-Type
INEl

HS

J8J

J8J

104
J8J

NTS

104

104

383

104

484

97

1192

60S

ORR
SRS
Savannah River Production
SRS

HS
INEl

I

W

484

ORR

-0

97

484

97

1192

60S

NTS
ORR

SRS
Hanford Produclio1

HS

INEL

1192

60S

SRS
ORR
NTS

o<

r

~
en

>

."
~

en

Z
C

S<

ORR

INEl

1192

60S

tble 1-3. (continued) .
Regionalization by Geography
HS and SRS
Origi n

Destination

truck

mil

Ii INEL and SRS
.,.il

trude

NTS and SRS
truck

rail

HS and ORR
truck

rail

NTS and ORR

INEL and ORR
truck

rail

\tUck

rail

Graphite
FSV

HS

244

244

35
244

INEL

35
244

35

35

SRS
ORR

244

NTS
INEL

HS

162

35
162

23

244

3S

162

23

3

3

23

SRS
ORR

162

NTS

23

Domellic non-DOE

AFRRI

HS
INEL
SRS
ORR
NTS

3

3

3

3

3

3
3

3

3

3

Table 1-3. (continued).
Regional':o:ation by Geography
HS and SRS
Origin
USGS

D~ stinat io n

HS

truck

6

rail

INEl and SRS
truck

rail

NTS and RS
rail

truck

6

truck

6
6

INEl

HS and ORR
rail

INEl and ORR
truck

rail

NTS and ORR
truck

rail

6

6

6

6

SRS
ORR

6

NTS

6

6

6

18S

18S

3

3

Domestic non-DOE
NIST

HS

INEl
SRS

18S

18S

18S

18S

18S

18S

ORR

18S

18S

3

3

18S

18S

3

J

NTS
USAF

HS

INEL

3

3
3

J

SRS

o<
r

~
m

ORR
NTS

3

3

3 5('

o<
c

r

3:

Table 1-3. (continued) .

!T1

Regionalization by Geography
HS and SRS
Origi n
DOW

Destination

tru ck

rail

INEL and SRS
truck

ra il

NTS and SRS
truck

rail

HS and ORR
truck

rail

NTS and ORR

INELand ORR
truck

rail

truck

rail

HS
INEL
SRS

3

3

3

3

3

3

ORR

3

3

4

4

3

3

4

4

3

3

4

4

II

R

NTS
GE

HS

4

4
4

!NEL

4

SRS
ORR

4

NTS
GA

HS
!NEL

II

4

II

II
II

II
II

II

II

SRS
ORR
NTS

II

II

Table 1-3. (continued).
Rcgionalization by Geography
HS and SRS
Origin
AERO

Destination

truck

HS

3

rail

INEL and SRS
truck

rail

NTS and SRS
truck

rail

truck

3

3
3

INEL

HSand ORR
nil

NTS and ORR

INELand ORR
truck

nil

truck

rail

3
3

3

3

SRS
ORR

3

NTS

3

3

3

310

310

209

209

83

4

Univcnitici
Univcnitiea

HS

209

209

INEL
SRS

310

310

209
209

209

310

310

310

310
209

209

209

310

310

310

ORR
NTS

209

310

209

Conuncn:ial
WVDP

o<
r"

~
IT!

HS
INEL
SRS
ORR
NTS

83

4

83

4

83

4
83

4

83

4

ol""'<
c::

s:

m

Table 1-3. (continued).
Regionalization by Geography
HS and SRS
Origin
B&W

DesliMlion

rail

100Ck

INEL and SRS
rail

100Ck

NTS and SRS
rail

100Ck

HS and ORR
rail

lOlck

INEL and ORR
tOlck

rail

NTS and ORR
rail

truck

HS
INEL
SRS

2

2

2

2

2

2

ORR

2

2

2

2

2

2

27

S

27

S

27

S

6

2

6

2

NTS
ORR

HS
INEL
SRS

7

2

7

2

7

2

NTS

SRS

HS
INEL
ORR
NTS

HS

!'IIEL

6

2

SRS
ORR
NTS

6

2

Table 1-3. (continued).
Regionalization by Geography
HS.nd SRS
Origin

Destination

truck

rail

INEL and SRS
rail

truck

NTS and SRS
truck

HS and ORR

rail

rail

truck

INEL and ORR
truck

rail

NTS.nd ORR
rail

truck

Commercial

ANL-E

HS

INEL
SRS

1

1

1

I

1

1

ORR

I

1

370

74

1

1

1

1

370

74

NTS

...-,

rNEL

HS

370

74

SRS

Vo

ORR

370

NTS

74

DOE RelUrch
ORR

HS

INEL
SRS

o<
r

~

rn

...,>...,
rn
Z

o

S<

NTS

113

24

113

24

113

24

o<

r

c::

~

Table 1-3. (continued).
Regionalization by Geography
HS and SRS
Origin
BNL

Destination

truck

rail

NTS and SRS

INEL and SRS
mil

truck

truck

rail

HS and ORR
truck

rail

INEL and ORR
truck

rail

NTS and ORR
truck

rail

HS
INEL
SRS

71

14

71

14

71

14

ORR

71

14

27

6

71

14

27

6

71

14

27

6

17

4

NTS
SNL

HS

27

6

27

INEL

6

SRS
ORR

27

NTS
LANL

HS
INEL

17

6

4

17
17

4

4
17

4

SRS
ORR
NTS

17

4

ble 1-3. (continued).
Regiona lization by Geography
HS and SRS
Origin
ANL-E

Destination

truck

rail

INEL and SRS
truck

rail

NTS and SRS
truck

rail

HS and ORR
truck

rail

IN ELand ORR
truck

rail

NTS and ORR
truck

rail

HS
lNEL
SRS

10

2

10

2

10

2

10

ORR

2

10

2

518

39

10

2

518

39

1003

165

353

71

NTS

HS

518

lNEL

39

SRS
ORR

518

NTS
INEL

HS

1003

39

165

1003

165

SRS
ORR
NTS
SRS

1003

165

HS
INEL
ORR

---NTS

353

71

353

71

o<

r

~

[TI

Table 1-3. (continued).
Regionalization by Geography
HS and SRS
Origin

Destination

truck

rail

lNEL and SRS
truck

rail

NTS and SRS
truck

HS and ORR

rail

truck

rail

lNELand ORR
truck

rail

NTS and ORR
truclr.

rail

Foreign
Pointa of
Entry

HS

230

230

SRS

778

778

lNEL

230
778

778

230

230

778

778

TI8

ORR
NTS
TOTAL

230

4,235

2 ,202

4 ,033

2 ,482

230

230

5,951

2,848

Acron:z:ms
Aerolest San Ramon, CA
AERO
Armed Force. Radiobiology Reaurch IJUtitute Betheeda, MD
AFRRI
Argonne National Laboratory-East
ANL-E
Babcock &. Wilcox Company Lynchburg, VA
B&W
Broolr.haven National Laboratory
BNL
Department of Energy
DOE
Dow North Arnerica Midland , MI
DOW
FSV
Fort St. Vrain Nuclear GeDCrating Station
General Atomic. San Diego, CA
GA
General Electric Pleasanton, CA
GE
HS
lIanfom Site

351

778

4,979

INEL
LANL
NIST
NTS
ORR
SNL
SRS
USAF
USGS
WVDP

2,349

230

230

TI8

TI8

4,777

2,629

778

778

230

230

6,695

2,995

Idaho National Eniincerilll Laboratory
Lo. Alamo. National Laboratory
National IJUtitute of Standard. and Technology
Gaithersburg, MD
Nevada Test Site
Oak Ridge Reservation
Sandia National Laboratorie.
SavallMh River Site
United Stale. Air Force McClellan. CA
United Stale. Geological Survey Denver. CO
West Valley Demonstration Project

1-4 INCIDENT-FREE TRANSPORTATION RISKS FOR
SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL

Table 1-4. Incident-free unit risk factors for offsite truck and rail shipments of spent nuclear fuel.
Unit risk factors (person-rem per kilometer)"
Mode

1-4.1 Methodology

Exposure group

Urban

Suburban

Rural

Truck

Radiological impacts were determined for crew workers and the general population during
normal , incident-free transportation . For truck shipments, the crew were the drivers of the transport
vehicle. For rail shipments, the crew were workers in close proximity to the shipping containers
during inspection or classification of railcars. The general population was persons within 800 meters
(2,625 feet) of tho road or railway (off-link), persons sharing the road or railway (on-link), and
persons at stops.

1.7

X

10-4

10.5

1.1

X

10-4

10.5

1.5

X

10-4

X

10-4

1.2

X

10-4

1.5

X

10-4

3.8

X

10-4

x 10.5

1.0

X

10.5

1.0

X

10.5

x 10.7
6.6 x 10.8

3.3

X

10.5

2.9

X

10-4

8.5

X 10.7

2.4

X

10-6

4.8

X 10.6

4.8

X

10-6

3.8

X 10. 5

3.0

X

10-4

4.6

x 10-5

1.0

X

10-4

1.2

X

On-link·

x 10.7
x 10-6

1.6

5.0

1.5

X

Stops

1.2

X

10-4

1.2

General population
total

1.3 x 10-4

Occupational d

1.0

Occupational

Radiulogi cal dose during normal, incident·free transportation of SNF results from exposure to
the external radiation field that surrounds the shipping containers . The dose is a function of the
number of people exposed, their proximity to the containers, their length of time of ex posure, and the
intensity of the radiation field surrounding the containers.

General population
Off·linkb

Rail

General population
Collective doses for the crew and general population were calculated using the RADTRAN 4
computer code (Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992). SNF was assigned a dose rate of 14 millirem per hour
at I meter (3.28 feet) from the shipping container. This dose rate yields a dose rate of 10 millirem
per hour at 2 meters (6.56 feet) from the vehicle, which is the regulatory maximum based on an
exclusive use vehicle (see Madsen et aI . 1986). A dose rate of I millirem per hour at I meter
(3 .28 feet) was used for naval-type SNF shipments, based on measured dose rates from previous
naval SNF shipments . Three population density zones (rural , suburban, and urban) were used .
These zones correspond to mean population densities of 6,719, and 3,861 persons per square
kilometer, respecti vely (Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992).
Calculating the collective doses is based on developing unit risk factors. Unit risk factors
provide all estimate of the impact from transporting one shipment of radioactive material over a unit
distance of travel in a given population density zone. The unit risk factors may be combined with
rout ing information, such as the transport distances in various population density zones, to determine
th e ris k for a single shipment (a shipment risk factor) between a given origin and destination.
Cashwell et al. (1986) contains a detailed explanation of the use of unit risk factors.

Off-Iinkb
On-link·
Stops·
General population
total

1.7

4.8
5.0

x 10-6
x 10-6

a. The methodology, equations, and data used to develop the unit risk factors are dis~ussed in .
Madsen et aI. (1986) and Neuhauser and Kanipe (1992) . Cashwell et al. (1986) contains a detaIled
.
expianation of the use of unit risk factors.
b. Off-link general population were persons within 800 meters (2 ,625 feet) of the road or raIlway.
.
c. On-link genera! population were persons sharing the road or railway.
d. The nonlinear component of incident-free rail dose for crew workers because of raIlcar
inspections and classifications is 0.011 person-rem per shipment. Ostmeyer (1986) contains a
.
'
detailed explanation of the rail exposure model.
e. The nonlinear component of incident-free rail dose for the general populallon because ~f ratl car
inspections and classifications is 0.0087 person-rem per shipment. Ostmeyer (1986) contains a
detailed explanation of the rail exposure model.

Unit risk factors were developed based on travel within rural, suburban, and urban population
zo nes using RADTRAN 4, us ing default data (see Neuhauser and Kanipe 1992). Table 1-4 contains
the un it risk factors for offsite truck and rail shipments of SNF . Table 1-5 contains the unit risk
factors for offsite truck and rail shipments of naval-type SNF . Shipment risk factors were also
developed for offsite shipments by combining the un it risk factors with routing information derived
from the HIGHW AY and INTERLINE computer codes .
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Table 1-5. Incident·free unit risk factors for truck and rail shipments of naval·type spent nuclear
fuel.
Unit risk factors (person·rem per kilometer)'
Mode

Exposure group

Rural

Suburban

Urban

Truck
Occupational

1.5 x 10-5

3.3 x 10-5

5.4 x 10-5

7.7 x

General population
Off-linkb

8.8 x 10-9

1.2 x IO~

On·link'

3.6 x 10-7

1.0

Stops

IO~

X IO~

1.1 x 10-5

4.3 x 1 0~

4.3 x 10~

4.3 x 10~

General population
total

4.7 x 10-7

6.5 x 1 0~

2.3 x 10-5

Occupational d

7.2 x 10-7

7.2

1.2 x 10.8

2.3 x 10~

On-link'

4.7 x 10·9

6. 1

X 10-8

1.7

X

10-7

Stops'

3.4

X

10-7

3.4

X

10-7

3.4

X

10-7

3.6 x

10-7

2.7 x IO~

2. 1 x

10-5

Rail
X

10-7

7.2

X

10-7

General population
Off-linkb

General populati on
total

2. 1 x 10-5

a. The methodology, equat ions, and data used to devel op the unit risk factors are discussed in
Madsen et aI . (1986) and Neuhauser and Kanipe (1992). Cashwell et aI . (1986) contains a detailed
explanation of the use of un it risk factors.
b. Off-~i nk general population were persons within 800 meters (2,625 feet) of the road or railway.
c. On-link general populallon were persons sharing the road or railway.
d. The nonlinear component of incident-free rail dose for crew workers because of railcar
inspections and classifications is 0 .00080 person-rem per shipment. Ostmeyer (1986) contains a
detailed explanation of the rai l exposure model.
e. The nonlinear component of incident-free rail dose for the general population because of railcar
inspections and classificat ions is 0 .00062 person-rem per shipment . Ostmeyer (1986) contains a
detailed explanation of the rail exposure model.
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Incident-free nonradiological fatalities were also estimated using unit risk factors. These unit
risk factors accou nt for the fatalities associated with exhaust emissions, but the distances used to
estimate the impacts must be doubled to reflect the round trip distance because these impacts occur
whether or not the shipment contains radioactive material . Two sets of data were evaluated : (a) data
from the Non-Radiological Impacts of Transponing Radioactive Material (Rao et al . 1982), and
(b) data from the Motor Vehicle-Related Air Taxies Study (EPA 1993). In Rao et al. (1982), the
nonradiological un it risk factor fo r trucks was 1.0 X 10-7 fatalities per kilometer and the
nonradiological unit risk faclOr for trains was 1.3 x 10-7 fatalities per kilometer. These unit risk
factors are applicable only in urban areas. In EPA (1993), the unit risk factor was calculated to be
7.2 x 10-11 fatalities per kilometer; th is unit risk factor is applicable in all areas (i.e., rural ,
suburban, and urban). Based on the routes analyzed in this EIS, the unit risk factors from Rao et aI.
(1982) were fou nd to overestimate impacts by about 20 to 30 times relative to the unit risk facto rs
from EPA (1993) . Therefore, the unit risk factors from Rao et al. (1982) were used as a conservative
estimate of the incident-free nonradiological fatalities presented in this EIS . It should be noted that
the unit risk factors from Rao et aI . (1 982) account for all fatalities, not just cancer fatalities . Other
effects of chronic exposure to diesel exhaust emissions have been followed in occupationally exposed
workers, but these data are insufficient to make a correlation between the effects and the exposure
experienced (EPA 1993). Therefore, these impacts were not estimated in this EIS .

1-4.1.1 Maximally Exposed Individual Exposure Scenarios
Maximum individual doses were calculated using the RISKIND computer code (Yuan et aI .
1993). The maximum individual doses for the routine transport offsite were estimated for
transportation workers, as well as members of the general population . For rail shipments, the three
general population scenarios were (a) a rail yard worker working at a distance of 10 meters (32 .8 feet)
from the shipping container fo r 2 hours, (b) a resident living 30 meters (98 .4 feet) from the rail line
where the shipping container was being transpo rted , and (c) a resident living 200 meters (656.2 feet)
from a rail stop where the shipping container was sitting for 20 hours. For train shipments, the
max imum exposed transportation worker was an individual in a railyard who spent a time· and
distance-weighted average of 0. 16 hours inspecting, classifying, and repairing railcars (Wooden

1986).
For offsite truck shipments, the three scenar ios for the ge neral popul ati on were: (a) a person
caught in traffic and located I meter (3.28 feet) away from the surface of the shipping container for
one-half hour, (b) a res ident living 30 meters (98.4 fee t) fro m the highw ay used to transport the
shipp ing contai ner, and (c) a serv ice stati on worker wo rki ng at a d istance of 20 meters (65 .6 feet)
from the shipping container fo r 2 hours. The hypothetical max imum ex posed individual radiological
doses were accumul ated over the 4O-year period . However , fo r the situ ation invo lving an indi vidual
caught in traffic next to a truck, the rad iological exposures were calcul ated for onl y one event because
it was considered unlikely th at the same indi vidual would be caught in traffic next to all containers for
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all shipments. For truck shipments, the maximum exposed transportation worker is the driver who
was assumed to drive shipments for up to 2,000 hours per year.

1-4.2 Results of Calculations
This section summarizes the results of the incident-free transportation analyses for SNF
shipments that occur outside the boundaries of U.S. Department of Energy sites (offsite). These
results do not include the impacts of SNF shipments within the boundaries of DOE sites (onsite).
Onsite transportation impacts are addressed in site-specific Appendices A, B, C, 0, and F of this EIS.

This section includes the impacts of offsite transport of naval-type SNF stored at the Idaho
Chemical Processing Plant as of June 1995 to storage locations at other DOE sites, as identified in the
alternatives. Shipments of naval SNF and test specimens are addressed in Appendix 0 of Volume 1
of this EIS.
1-4.2.1 Impacts from the No Action Alt rnative
Under the No Action alternative, the only offsite transport of SNF involves shipments of
naval SNF and test specimens. These shipments are addressed in Appendix 0 of Volume I of
this EIS.
1-4.2.2 Impacts from the Decentralization Alternative
For the Decentralization alternative, the incident-free transportation of SNF was estimated to
result 0.11 to 0.34 fatalities over the 4O-year period 1995 through 2035 (see Table 1-6). The
statistically estimated fatalities were the sum of the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer
fatalities and the estimated number of nonradiological fatalities from vehicular emissions. A range of
fatalities occurs because of the option of using truck or rail transport for SNF shipments.
The estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for transportation workers
ranged from 0.023 to 0.082. The estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for the
general population ranged from 0.041 to 0.24. The estimated number of nonradiological fatalities
from vehicular emissions ranged from 0.017 to 0.044.
1-4.2.3 Impacts from the 199211993 Planning Basis Alternative
For the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative, the incident-free transportation of SNF was
estimated to result in total fatalities that ranged from 0. 11 to 0.42 over the 4O-year period 1995
through 2035 (see Table 1-7). These fatalities were the sum of the estimated number of
radiation-related latent cancer fatalities and the estimated number of nonradiological
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Table 1-6. Cumulative doses and health effects from incident-free transportation of spent nuclear fuel for the Decentralization
alternative (1995 to 2035).
Spent nuclear fuel type
DOEc,d

Foreignb

UniversityA

Total

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Maximum individual dose (rem)

4S

I.S

93

3.4

20

0.73

160

S.9

Collective dose (person-rem)

S9

16

130

37

IS

S.O

200

5S

0.024

0.0064

0.OS2

0.015

0.0060

0.0020

O.OSO

0.023

Maximum individual dose (rem)

0.21

0 .S7

0.41

1.7

O.OSS

0.36

0.71

2.9

Collective dose (person-rem)

140

29

310

43

IS

S.O

470

SO

Estimated latent cancer fatalities

0.070

O.OIS

0.16

0.022

0.0090

0.0040

0.24

0.040

Estimated nonradiological fatalities c

0.0050

0 .012

0.010

0.027

0.0023

O.OOSI

0.017

0.044

Occupational

Estimated latent eancer fatalities
General popUlation

a. Maheras (199Sa).
b. Maheras (I99Sb).
c. Maheras (I99Sc).
d. DOE SNF includes special-case commercial. DOE research. other domestic research. graphite. N-Reactor. naval4ype. and Savannah River production
reactor SNF (see Tables 1-2. 1-3).
e. Occupational incident-free nonradiological fatalities are included with the general population incident-free nonradiological fatalities.

Table 1-7. Cumulative doses and health effects from incident-free transportation of spent nuclear fuel for the 1992/1993 Planning
Basis alternative (1995 to 2035).
Spent nuclear fuel type
Foreignb

UniversityA

DOEc,d

Total

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Maximum individual dose (rem)

37

1.8

71

3.4

52

1.0

160

6.2

CoUcctive dose (person-rem)

59

i6

130

37

66

7.3

260

60

0.024

0.0064

0.052

0.015

0.026

0.0029

0. 10

0.024

Maximum individual dose (rem)

0.21

0.87

0.41

1.7

0.30

0.50

0.92

3.1

CoUcctive dose (person-rem)

140

29

310

43

140

12

590

84

Estimated latent cancer fatalities

0.070

0.015

0. 16

0.022

0.070

0.0060

0.30

0.042

Estimated nonradiological fatalitiese

0.0050

0.012

0.010

0.027

0.0054

0.0065

0.020

0.046

Occupational

Estimated latent cancer fatalities
General population

,

VI
VI

a. Maheras (\995a).
b. Maheras (\995b).
c. Maheras (1995c).
d. DOE SNF includes spccia1-case commercial, DOE research, other domestic. research, graphite. N-Reactor, naval-type, and Savannah River production
reactor SNF (SCI: Tables 1-2, 1-3).

o<
r

~

e. Occupational incident-free nonradiological fatalities are included with the general population incident-free nonradiolot:ical fatalities .

fatalities from vehicular emissions. Again, a range of fatalities occurred because of the option of
using truck or rail transport for SNF shipments.
The estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for transportation workers
ranged from 0.024 to 0 . 10. The estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for the
general population ranged from 0.043 to 0.3Q. Tr...-: estimated number of nonradiological fatalities
from vehicular emissions ranged from 0.020 to 0.046.
1-4.2.4 Impacts from the Regionalization Alternative

1-4.2.4.1 Impacts from Regionalization by Fuel Type. For the Regionalization by Fuel
Type, the incident-free transportation of SNF was estimated to result in total fatalities that ranged
from 0 . 14 to 0.58 over the 4O-year period 1995 through 2035 (see Table 1-8). These fatalities were
the sum of the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities and the estimated number
of nonradiological fatalities from vehicular emissions. The reason for a range of fatalities was
because of the option of using truck or rail transport for SNF shipments.
The estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for transportation workers
ranged from 0 .026 to 0 .14 . The estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for the
general population ranged from 0 .053 to 0.41. The estimated number of nonradiological fatalities
from vehicular emissions ranged from 0 .027 to 0 .059 .

1-4.2.4.2 Impacts from Regionalization by Geography. For the six Regionalization by
Geography alternatives, the iilcident-free transportation of SNF was estimated to result in total
fatalities that ranged from 0 . 10 for regionalization at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and
Oak Ridge Reservation to 0.85 for regionalization at the Nevada Test Site and the Oak Ridge
Reservation (see Tables 1-9 through 1-14). These fatalities wert! over the 40-year period 1995 through
:035 and were the sum of the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities and the
estimated number of nonradiological fatalities ~om vehicular emissions.
The reason for a range of fatalities was because of two factors : (a) the option of using truck
or rail transport for SNF shipments, and (b) the six regionalization by geography alternatives .
For regionalization at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and Oak Ridge Reservation,
the estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for transportation workers was 0 .028 .
The estimated number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for the general population was
0.042 . The estimated number of nonradiological fatalities from vehicular emissions was 0 .034 .
For regionalization at the Nevada Test Site and the Oak Ridge Reservation , the estir.1ated
number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for transportation workers was 0 .20 . The estimated
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e 1-8. Cumulative doses and health effects ftom incident-free transportation of spent nuclear fuel for Regionalization by
Type (1995 to 2035).
Spent nuclear fuel type
Foreignb

U niversityA

DOEc,d

Total

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

l ximum individual dose (rem)

27

1.8

52

3.4

81

1.3

160

6.5

,lIeclive dose (person-rem)

54

IS

150

41

150

11

350

67

0.022

0.006C

0.060

0.016

0.060

0.0044

0.14

0.027

0.21

0.87

0.41

1.7

0.63

067

1.3

3.2

120

33

350

54

340

17

810

100

Imated latent cancer fatalities

0.060

0.017

0.18

0.027

0.17

0.0085

0.41

0.050

mared non radiological fatalities c

0.0051

0.014

0.012

0.037

0.0098

0.0081

0.027

0.059

Ipalional

timalcd lalcnt cancer fatalilies

I population
ximum individual dose (rem)
eclive dose (person-rem)

lheras (1995a) .
•hcras (1995b).
heras (1995c).
E SNF includes special-case commercial. DOE research. other domestic research. graphite. N-Reactor. naval-type. and Savannah River production
SNF (see Tables 1-2. 1-3).
upational incident-free non radiological fatalities are inclutied with the general population incident-free non radiological fatalities.

! 1-9. Cumula ive doses and health effects from incident-free transportation of spent nuclear fuel for Regionalization
:ography at the Hanford Site and Savannah River Site (1995 to 2035).

Spent nuclear fuel type
DOEc.d

Foreignb

University"

Total

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Wmum individual dose (rem)

20

1.8

38

3.4

100

2 .3

160

7 .5

Uc:ctive dose (person-rem)

60

17

99

31

150

13

310

61

0.024

0 .0068

0 .040

0 .012

0.060

0.0052

0.12

0.024

lxlrnum individual dose (rem)

0 .21

0 .87

0.41

1.7

1.1

1.1

1.7

3.7

Uc:ctive dose (person-re m)

140

30

230

44

330

18

700

92

timated latent cancer fatalities

0 .070

0.015

0.012

0.022

0.17

0.0090

0.35

0.046

timated non radiological fatalitiese

0 .0050

0.012

0.0076

0.Q31

0 .010

0.0084

0.023

0.051

pational

timated latent cancer fatalities
ral population

laheras (1995a).
laheras (1 995b).
laheras (1995c).
OE SNF includes speeial-case commercial, DOE research, other domestic research, graphite, N-Reactor, naval-type, and Savannah River production
)r SNF (see Tables 1-2, 1-3).
ccupational incident-free nonradiological fatalities are included with the general population incident-free nonradiological fatalities .

~ 1-10.

Cumulative doses and health effects from incident-free transportation of spent nuclear fuel for Regionalization
at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and Savannah River Site (1995 to 2035).

~graphy

Spent nuclear fuel type

DOEc,d

Foreignb

University·

Total

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

lXimum individual dose (rem)

21

1.8

40

3.4

99

3.2

160

8.4

,Ucctive dose (person-rem)

54

15

100

32

140

21

290

68

0.022

0.0060

0.040

0.013

0.056

0.0084

0.12

0.027

lXirnum individual dose (rem)

0.21

0.87

0.41

1.7

1.0

1.6

1.6

4.2

Uective dose (person-rem)

120

28

230

42

320

2S

670

95

timated latent cancer fatalities

0.060

0.014

0.12

0 .021

0.16

0.013

0.34

0.048

timated non radiological fatalities':

0.0046

0.011

0.0081

0.028

0.0083

0.0087

0.021

0.048

pational

timated latent cancer fatalities
ral population

laheras (1995a).
laheras (l995b).
'ahcras (l995c).

OE SNF includes special-case commercial. DOE research. other domestic research. graphite. N-Reactor. naval-type. and Savannah River production
Ir SNF (see Tables 1-2. 1-3).
ccupational incident-free: nonradiological fatalities are included with the general population incident-free: nonradiological fatalities.
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e 1-11. Cumulative doses and health effects from incident-free transportation of spent nuclear fuel for Regionalization
eography at the Nevada Test Site and Savannah River Site (1995 to 2035).
Spent nuclear fuel type
Foreignb

Universitya

DOEc,d

Total

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

aximum individual d se (rem)

14

1.8

27

3.4

120

4.S

160

9 .7

)Ucctive dose (person-rem)

S6

17

110

31

330

34

SOO

82

0.022

0.0068

0.044

0.012

0.13

0 .014

0.20

0.033

aximum individual dose (rem)

0.21

0.87

0.41

1.7

1.8

2.2

2.4

4.8

,Ucctive dose (person-rem)

130

29

250

4S

780

37

1200

110

timated latent cancer fatalities

0.065

O.OIS

0.13

0.023

0.39

0.019

0.60

O.OSS

tirnated non radiological fatalities c

0.OOS3

0.012

0.0076

0.031

0.040

0.012

0.OS3

O.OSS

'pational

Itimated latent cancer fatalities
:ral population

laheras (199Sa).
bheras (I99Sb).
laheras (199Sc).
IOE SNF includes spccial-case commercial. DOE research. other domestic research. graphite. N-Reactor. naval-type, and Savannah River production
or SNF (see Tables 1-2. 1-3).
ic:cupational incident-free non radiological fatalities are included with the general population incident-free non radiological fatalities.

Ie 1-12. Cumulative doses and health effects from incident-free transportation of spent nuclear fuel for Regionalization
ieography at the Hanford Site and Oak Ridge Reservation (1995 to 2035).
Spent nuclear fuel type
Foreignb

UniversityA

DOEc,d

Total

Truck

Rail

Truck

Ra il

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

laximum individual dose (rem)

17

1.8

32

3.4

110

2.8

160

8.0

()llective dose (person-rem)

56

16

94

29

170

17

320

62

0.022

0.0064

0.038

0.012

0.068

0.0068

0.13

0 .025

laximum individual dose (rem)

0.21

0.87

0.41

1.7

1.4

1.4

2.0

4.0

()llective dose (person-rem)

130

26

220

33

390

22

740

81

stimated latent cancer fatalities

0.065

0.013

0.11

0.017

0.20

0.011

0.37

0.041

stimated non radiological fatalities e

0.0049

0.0087

0.0066

0.020

0.012

0.0090

0.024

0.038

upational

stimated latent cancer fatalities
eral population

~aheras

(1995a).

~aheras

(1 995b) .

~ a heras

(l995c).

DOE SNF includes specia.J-case commercial. DOE researeh. other domestic research. graphite, N-Reactor, naval-type. and Savannah River production
tor SNF (see Tables 1-2, 1-3).
)ccupational incident-free non radiological fatalities are included with the general population incident-free nonradiological fatalities .

1-13. Cumulative doses and health effects from incident-free transportation of spent nuclear fuel for Regionalization
ography at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and Oak Ridge Reservation (1995 to 2035).
Spent nuclear fuel type
Foreignb

UniversityA

DOEc •d

Total

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

ximum individual dose (rem)

17

1.8

34

3.4

110

3.7

160

8.9

lective dose (person-rem)

50

15

95

29

170

24

320

68

0.020

0.0060

0.038

0.012

0.068

0.0096

0. 13

0.027

ximum individual dose (rem)

0.21

0.87

0.41

1.7

1.3

1.8

1.9

4.4

lective dose (person-rem)

110

23

220

30

380

30

710

83

imated latent ca.ncer fatalities

0.055

0.012

0.11

0.015

0.19

0.015

0 .36

0.042

imated non radiological fatalities c

0.0046

0.0077

0.0071

0.017

0.010

0.0094

0.022

0.034

!ational

imated latent cancer fatalities

.1 population

aberas (1995a) .
aheras (1995b).
aheras (\ 995c).
)E SNF includes special-case commercial. DOE research. other domestic research. graphite. N-Reactor, naval-type, and Savannah River production
r SNF (see Tables 1-2, 1-3).
:cupational incide·nt-frc:e nonradiological fatalities are included with the general population incident-free nonradiological fatalities .

Tahle 1-14. Cumulative doses and health effects from incident-free transportation of spent nuclear fuel for Regionalization
by Geography at the Nevada Test Site and Oak Ridge Reservation (1995 to 2035).
Spent nuclear fuel type
Foreignb

University-

DOEc,d

Total

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Max.imum individ ual dose (rem)

12

1.8

24

3.4

120

5.0

160

10

Collective dose (person-rem)

52

16

100

29

360

37

51 0

82

0.021

0.0064

0.040

0.012

0.14

0.015

0.20

0.033

Maximum ind ividual dose (rem)

0 .21

0 .87

0.41

1.7

2.1

2.5

2.7

5. 1

Collective dose (person-rem)

120

25

240

33

840

42

1200

100

Estimated latent cancer fatalit ies

0.060

0.013

0. 12

0 .017

0.42

0.021

C.60

0.050

Estimated nonradiological fatalities·

0 .0052

0.0083

0.0066

0 .021

0.042

0 .013

0.054

0.042

Occupational

Estimated latent cancer fata lities
General population

~

I..ol

a. Maheras (1995a) .
b. Maheras (I995b) .
c. Maheras (I 995c) .

d . DOE SNF includes special-case commercial, DOE research. other domestic research. graphite. N-Reactor. naval-type. and Savannah River production
reactor SNF (see Tables 1-2, 1-3).
e . Occupational incident-free nonradiologieal fatalities are included with the general population incident-free nonradiological fatalities .

o-<

~

m

number of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for the general population was 0.60. The estimated
number of nonrad iological fatalities from vehicular emissions was 0 .054.
1-4.2.5 Impacts from the Centralization Alternatives

For the five Centralization alternatives, the incident-free transportation of spent nuclear fuel
was estimated to result in total fatalities that ranged from 0.16 for centralization at the Oak Ridge
Reservation to 1.7 for centralization at the Savannah River Site (see Tables 1-15 through 1-19). These
fatalities were over the 4O-year period 1995 through 2035 and were the sum of the estimated number
of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities and the estimated number of nonradiological fatalities from
vehicular emissions.
The reason for a range of fatalities was because of two factors: (a) the option of using truck
or rail transport for SNF shipment and (b) the five Centralization options .
For centralization at the Oak Ridge Reservation, the estimated number of radiation-related
latent cancer fatalities for transportation workers was 0 .042 . The estimated number of
radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for the general population was 0.067 . The estimated number
of nonradiological fatalities from vehicular emissions was 0 .055.
For centralization at the Savannah River Site, the estimated number of ra iation-related latent
cancer fatalities for transportation workers was 0 .42. Th estimated number of radiation-related latent
cancer fatalities for the general population was 1.2. The estimated number of nonradiological
fatalities from vehicular emissions was 0.074.
1-4.2.6 Impacts of Using
Nuclear Fuel Shipments

~Iternate

Points of Entry for Foreign Research Reactor Spent

For incident-free transportation (rad iological and vehicle-related), shipments from
Jacksonville, Florida, and Wilmington, North Carolina, to the Hanford Site, Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory, Savannah River Site, Oak Ridge Reservation, and Nevada Test Site would
yield lower impacts than shipments from Charleston, South Carolina, Galveston, Texas , Hampton
Roads, Virginia, Savannah , Georgia, and the Military Ocean Terminal, Sunny Point, North Carolina,
to these same sites .
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Table 1-15. Cumulative dos s and health effects from incident-free transportation of spent nuclear fuel for the Centralization at
the Hanford Site alternative (1995 to 2035).
Spent nuclear fuel type
Foreignb

University·

DOEc,d

Total

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Maximum individual dose (rem)

16

1.8

32

3.4

110

2.9

160

8.1

Collective dose (person-rem)

100

26

220

56

430

32

750

110

0.040

0.010

0.088

0.022

0.17

0.013

0.30

0.044

Maximum individual dose (rem)

0.21

0.87

0.41

1.7

1.5

1.4

2.1

4.0

Collective dose (person-rem)

250

38

560

56

990

45

1800

140

Estimated latent cancer fatalities

0.13

0.019

0.28

0.028

0.50

0.023

0.90

0.070

0.0057

0.014

0.016

Om5

0.026

0.024

0.048

0.073

Occupational

Estimated latent cancer fatalities
General population

-

~

Estimated nonradiological fatalities

1.1\

I.

C

Maheras (1995a) .

b. Maheras (1995b).
c. Maheras (I99Sc).
d. DOE SNF includes special-case commercial, DOE researeh , other domestic research, graphite, N-Reactor, naval-type, and Savannah River production
reactor SNF (see Tables 1-2, 1-3).
e. Occupational incident-free non radiological fatalities are included with the general population incident-free nonradiological fatalities .
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Table 1-16. Cumulative doses and health effects from incident-free transportation of spent nuclear fuel for the Centralization at
the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory alternative (1995 to 2035).

tTl

:-

Spent nuclear fuel type
Foreign b

UniversityA

Total

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Maximum individual dose (rem)

17

1.8

33

:l.4

110

3.8

160

9.0

Collective dose (person-rem)

86

22

190

49

380

36

660

110

0.034

0.0088

0.076

0.020

0. 15

0.014

0.26

0.044

Maximum individual dose (rem)

0.21

0 .87

0041

1.7

1.4

1.9

2.0

4.5

Collective dose (person-rem)

210

33

490

49

880

49

1600

130

Estimated latent cancer fatalities

0 .11

0.017

0.25

0 .025

0.44

0.025

0.80

0.065

0 .0049

0 .012

O.OlS

0.031

0.022

0.023

0.042

0.066

Occupational

Estimated latent cancer fatalities
General population

Estimated nonradiological fatalities c
a. Maheras (1995a).
b. Maheras (1995b).
c . Maheras (199Sc).

d . DOE SNF includes spccial-case commercial. DOE research. other domestic research. graphite. N-Reactor. naval-type. and Savannah River production
reactor SNF (see Tables 1-2. 1-3).
e . Occupational incident-free non radiological fatalities are included with the general popUlation incident-free nonradiological fatalities.

J75

Table 1-17. Cumulative doses and health effects from incident-free transportation of spent nuclear fuel fol' the Centralization
at the Savannah River Site alternative (1995 to 2035).
Spent nuclear fuel type
Foreignb

UniversityA

DOEc,d

Total

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Maximum individual dose \.em)

14

1.8

27

3.4

120

4 .5

160

9.7

Collective dose (person-rem)

53

15

140

40

840

60

1000

120

0.021

0.006

0.056

0.016

0.34

0.024

0.40

0.048

Maximum individual dose (rem)

0.2 1

0.87

0.41

1.7

1.8

2 .2

2.4

4.8

Collective dose (person-rem)

110

34

330

54

1900

85

2300

170

Estimated latcnt cancer fatalit ies

0.055

0.017

0 . 17

0.027

0.95

0.043

1.2

0.085

Estimated non radiological fatalities c

0.0050

0.014

0.012

0.037

0.057

0.032

0.074

0.083

Occupational

Estimated latcnt cancer fatalities
General population

-

c....J
iJI

a. Maheras (1995a).
b. Maheras (1995b).
c. Maheras (1995c).
d. DOE SNF includes special-case commercial. DOE research. other domestic research. graphite, N-Reactor. naval-type, and Savannah River production
reactor SNF (see Tables 1-2 . 1-3).
e. Occupational incident-free nonradiological fatalities are included with the general population incident-free non radiological fatalities .
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Table 1-18. Cumulative doses and health effects from incident-free transportation of spent nuclear fuel for the Centralization at
the Oak Ridge Reservation alternative (1995 to 2035).

:-

Spent nuclear fuel type
Foreignb

University'

Total

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Maximum individual dose (rem)

12

1.8

24

3.4

120

5 .0

160

10

Collective dose (person·rem)

42

13

130

36

750

58

920

110

0.017

0.0052

0.052

0.014

0.30

0.023

0.37

0.044

0 .21

0.87

0041

1.7

2. 1

2.5

2.7

5.1

91

2S

310

39

1800

68

2200

130

Estimated latent cancer fatalities

0.046

0.013

0. 16

0.02

0.90

0.034

1.1

0.065

Estimated nonradiologieal fatalities c

0.0042

0.0091

0.0097

0.023

0.043

0.023

0.057

0.055

Occupational

Estimated latent cancer fatalities
General population
Maximum individual dose (rem)

~

00

Collective dose (penon-rem)

a. Maheras (1995a).

b. Maheras (I99Sb).
c. Maheras (1995c).
d. DOE SNF includes special~se commercial, DOE research. other domestic research, graphite, N-Reactor, naval-typc, and Savannah River production
reactor SNF (see Tables 1-2, 1-3).
e. Occupational incident-free nonradiologieal fatalities are included with the general population incident-free nonradiologieal fatalities.

Table 1-19. Cumulative doses and health effects from incident-free transportation of spent nuclear fuel for the Centralization at the
Nevada Test Site alternative (1995 to 2035).
Spent nuclear fuel type
DO Ec•d

Foreignb

University·

Total

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

Truck

Rail

ruck

Maltimum individual dose (rem)

12

1.8

24

3.4

120

5.0

160

10

Collective dose (person-rem)

94

2S

230

S4

590

S2

910

130

0.Q38

0.010

0.092

0.022

0 .24

0 .021

0.36

0.052

Maltimum individual dose (rem)

0.21

0 .87

0.41

1.7

2.2

2.5

2.8

5.1

Collective dose (person-rem)

230

37

540

S6

1400

64

2200

160

Estimated latent cancer fatal ities

0 .1 2

0.019

0.27

0.028

0.70

0.032

1.1

.080

0.0066

0.013

0.016

0.037

0.059

0 .028

0.082

Rail

Occupational

Estimated latent cancer fatalities
General population

b:
\0

Estimated nonradiological fatalit iesc

0.Q78

a. Maheras (1995a) .
b. Maheras (1995b).
c. Maheras (I995c).
d. DOE SNF includes special-case commercial. DOE researeh, other domestic research, graphite, N-Reactor, naval-type, and Savannah River production
reactor SNF (see Tables 1-2, 1-3).
e. Occupational incident-free nonradiological fatalities are included with the general population incident-free nonradiologieal fatalities .
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1-5 SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL TRANSPORTATION ACCIDENT RISKS
AND MAXIMUM REASONABLY FORESEEABLE CONSEQUENCES
1-5.1 Methodology
The offsite SNF transportation accident analysis considers the impacts of accidents during the
transportation of SNF by truck or rail. SNF is transported in specially designed casks that meet U.S.
Department of Transportation and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Type B packaging
specifications in lO CFR Part 71 (CFR 1994b).
Under accident conditions, impacts ~o human health and the environment may result from the
release and dispersal of radioactive material. Because of the rigorous design specifications for SNF
shipping casks, the U.S, Nuclear Regulatory Commission has estimated that casks will withstand
99.4 percent of truck or rail accidents without sustaining damage sufficient to breach the cask
(Fischer et al. 1987). The 0.6 percent of accidents that could potentially breach the cask are
represented by a spectrum of accident severities and radioactive release conditions. Accident analysis
methodology has been developed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission for calculating the
probabilities and consequences from this spectrum of unlikely accidents, but it is not possible to
predict where along the shipping route such accidents might occur.
To provide DOE and the public a reasonable assessment of SNF transportation accident
impacts, two types of analyses were performed. First, an accident risk assessment was performed
that takes into account the probabilities and consequences of a spectrum of accident severities using
methodology developed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Fischer et al. 1987). The
accident risk assessment used route-specific information for accident rates and population densities.
For the spectrum of accidents considered in the analysis, accident consequences in terms of collective
dose to the population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) were multiplied by the accident probabilit i~ to
yield dose risk using the RADTRAN 4 computer code. Second, to represent the maximum
reasonably foreseeable impacts to individuals and populations should an accident occur, radiological
consequences were calculated for an accident of maximum reasonably foreseeable severity in each
population zone. An accident is considered reasonably foreseeable if its probability of occurrence is
greater than 1 x lO,7 per year. The accident consequence assessment for maximally exposed
individuals and population groups was performed using the RISKIND computer code.
An important variable in the assessment of impacts from SNF transportation accidents is the
type of SNF. A wide range of SNF types exists within the DOE complex with significant differences
in radioactive material content, fuel material design, cladding design, reactor operating history, and
storage (cooling time) history. These differences among SNF types translate into different radioactive
material release characteristics under accident conditions. To account for the variation in ~NF types,
analyses were performed for the following representative SNF types: (a) naval reactor fuels ,
(b) Savannah River Production Reactor fuels, (c) Hanford N-Reactor fuels, (d) graphite fuels,
VOLUME 1. APPENDIX I
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(e) special-case commercial reactor fuels, (I) university researchltest reactor fuels , (g) DOE
researchltest reactor fuels , (h) foreign research reactor fuels . and (i) non-DOE research reactor fuels .
The impacts for specific alternatives were calculated in units of dose (person-rem) for each
origin and destination pair associated with each representative SNF type. The impacts are further
expressed as health risks in terms of latent cancer fatalities in exposed populations. The health risk
conversion factors used were derived from International Commission on Radiological Protection
Publication 60 (ICRP 1991).
1-5.1.1 Accident Rate.

R (4.1)

R (4.2)

R (4,3)

R (4,4)

R (4,5)

R (3, 1)

R (3,2)

R (3,3)

R (3,4)

R (3,5)

R (2,1)

R (2,2)

R (2,3)

R (2,4)

R (2,5)

R(I ,I)

R (1,2)

R (1 ,3)

R (1,4)

R (1,5)

Qj
<:

<I>

For calculating accident shipment-risk factors , state-level accident rates were taken from data
provided in Saricks and Kvitek (1994) for rail and heavy combination trucks. For truck
transportation, separate accident rates were used for rural , suburban, and urban population density
zones in each state. One average accident rate was used for each state for rail transportation. For
truck transport, accident fatality risks were based on state-level rates for interstate highways in urban
and rural areas (Saricks and Kvitek 1994). Accident fatality risks for rail transportation were
calculated using a nationwide average rate of 2.64 x 10.8 fatalities per rail-kilometer (Cashwell et aI .
1986).

c

§

.~

The severity category matrix represents a set of scenarios defined by a combination of
mechanical and thermal forces . A conditional probability is assigned in each category as shown in
Figure 1-2. For example, Category R(I, I) accidents are the least severe but most frequent, whereas
Category R(4,5) accidents are very severe but very infrequent. To determine the expected frequency
of each severity category , the conditional probability in each category was multiplied by the baseline
accident rate. Each population density zone has a distinct baseline accident rate and distribution
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Accident severity categories for potential SNF transportation accidents are described in a U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission report commonly referred to as the Modal Study (Fischer et
al. 1987). The Modal Study classification scheme for both truck and rail transportation is shown in
Figure I-I. Severity is described as a function of the magnitudes of the mechanical forces (impact)
and thermal forces (fire) to which a c;:sk may be subjected during an accident. Because all accidents
can be described in these terms, severity is independent of the specific accident sequence. In other
words, any sequence of events that results in an accident in which a cask is subjected to forces within
a certain range of values is assigned to the accident severity category associated with that range. The
accident severity scheme is designed to take into account all reasonably foreseeable transportation
accidents, including accidents with low probability but high consequences and those with high
probability but low consequences.

S3
(30 )

~

~

1-5.1.2 Accident Severity Categorie. and Conditional Probabilities

1-71
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T,

T2

T3

(500)

(600)

(650)

T.
(1050)

Thermal respons _ (lead mid·thickness temperature, ' F)
SAAOO92

FIgure I-I. Matrix of cask response regions for combined mechanical and thermal loads .
(Source: Fischer et aI . 1987)
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of accident severiti es related to differences in average vehicle velocity, traffic density , and other
fac tors , including rural , suburban, or urban location.
For the acc ident risk assessment, accident risk was generically defined as the consequences of
an accident multiplied by the probability of the occurrence of that accident, an approach consistent
with the methodology suggested by the existing RAOTRAN computer code. Accident unit-risk
factors were calculated using the RAOTRAN 4 computer code, then summed over the accident
co nditional probabilities and route characteristics for the origin and destination pairs to yield risk per
shipment estimates. These acc ident risk factors take into account the entire spectrum of reasonably
foreseeable transponation acc idents, including low probability accidents that have high consequences
and high probability accidents that have low consequences.

Legend:
(Pt )
(P r)

=Probabilty of occurrence assuming a truck accident occurs
=Probabilty of occurrence assuming a rail accident occurs

A (4.1)
(PI) 1.532 x 10-7
(Pr) 1.786 x 10 ·9

A (4.2)
3.926 x 1C' -14
3.290 x 10 -13

A (4.3)
1.495 x 10 -14
2.137 x 10 -13

A (4.4)
7.68 1 x 10 -16
1.644 x 10 -13

A (4.5)
<1 x 10 -16
3.459 x 10 -14

A (3.1)
(PI) 1.7984 x 10 ·3
(Pr) 5.545 x 10 . 4

A (3.2)
1.574 x 10- 7
1.021 x 10 -7

A (3.3)
2.034 x 10 . 7
6.634 x 10 -8

A (3.4)
1.076 x 10 -7
5.162x 10 . 8

A (3.5)
4.873 x 10 -8
5.296 x 10 . 8

A (2.1)
(PI) 3.81 92 x 10 . 3
(Pr) 2.7204 x 10.3

A (2.2) _
2.330 x 10' /
5.011 x 10 . 7

3.255 x 10. 7

·7
2.531 x 10 . 7

1.5~~~~)0

7.2~' (~'~b ·8

A (1 . 1)
(PI) 0.994316
(P r) 0.993962

A (1 .2)
1.687 x 10 . 5
1.2275 x 10 . 3

A (I .3)
2.362 x 10 . 5
7.95 11 x 10 . 4

A (1 .4)
1.525 x 10 . 5
6.140x 10 -4

A (1 .5)
9.570 x 10. 6
1.249 x 10 -4

For the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident consequence assessment, the doses were
assessed for populations and individuals assuming the most severe accident scenario with a probability
greater than I x 10.1 per year. In terms of the radioactivity released to the environment, the most
severe reasonably foreseeable accident is represented by eight accident severity categories [R(4, 1)
through R(4,5) and R(I,5) through R(3 ,5)]. Each of the eight most severe accident categories result
in the same total rel ease of radioactive material , but the conditional probabilities of occurrence vary.
Therefore, the accident consequence assess ment is based on a maximum reasonably foreseeable
release of radioactivi ty with a conditional probability that is the sum of the co ndit ional probabilities of
the eight most severe accident categories. Accidents of this severity are extremely rare, occurring
approximately once per 100,000 truck or 10,000 rail accidents involving a SNF shipment.

)

3~8(~'~b ·7

L 075 x 10 -8

1-5.1 .3 AtmospheriC Conditions

)

T,

T3
(650)

(500)

T4
( 1050)

Thermal response (lead mid-thickness temperature, of)

figure

Because it is impossible to predict the specific location of an offsite transponation accident,
generic atmospheric conditions were selected for the risk and conseque nce assessments. For accident
risk assessment, neutral weather conditions (pasquill Stability Class 0) were asSUl'led. Neutral
weather co nditions are typified by moderate windspeeds, venical mi xing within th e atmosphere, and
good dispersion of atmospheric contaminants. Because neutral meteorological cond itions compose the
most frequently occurring atmospheric stability condition in th e United States, these conditions are
most likely to be prese nt in the event of an accident involving a SNF shipment. On the basis of
observations from National Weather Servi ce surface meteorological stations at over 300 locations in
the United States, on an annual average, neutral conditi ons (Pasquill Class C and D) occur 50 percent
of th e time, while stable (Pasquill Class E and F) and unstab le (Pasqu ill Class A and B) co nditions
occur 33 percent and 17 percent of th e time, res pective ly (Doty et al. 1976). The neutral category
predominates in all seasons, but most frequentl y in th e winter (nearl y 60 percent of the observations).
For the accident consequence assessment, doses we re assessed under both neutral (Class D with 4
meters per seco nd windspeed) and stable (Class F with I meter per second wi ndspeed) atmospheric
conditions. Stable weath er co nditions are typified by low windspeeds. very lilli e veni cal mixing
with in th e atmosphere, and poor dispersion of atmospheric contami nants. Class F meteorology in

SAA0093

.-2.

Fraction of truck and rail accidents expected within each severity category. assuming an
accident occurs. (Source: Fischer et aI . 1987).
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combination with windspeeds of I meter per second generally occur no more than 5 percent of the
time. Results calculated for neutral conditions represent the most likely consequences, and the results
for stable conditions represent a worst-case weather situation.
1-5.1.4 Population Density Zones
Three population density wnes (rural, suburban, and urban) were used for the offsite
population risk assessment. These zones respectively correspond to mean population densities of 6,
719, and 3,861 persons per square kilometer. The three population density zones are based on an
aggregation of the 12 population density wnes provided in the HIGHWAY and INTERLINE outpu!.
For calculating, population density information was generated at the state level and used as
RADTRAN input for the origin and destination pairs.
1-5.1.5 Exposure Pathways
Radiological doses were calculated for an individual located near the scene of the accident and
for populations within 50 miles (80 kilometers) of the accident. Rural, suburban, and urban
population densities were assessed. Dose calculations considered a variety of exposure pathways,
including inhalation and direct exposure (c1oudshine) from the passing cloud, ingestion from
contaminated crops, direct exposure (groundshine) from radioactivity deposited on the ground, and
inhalation of resuspended radioactive panicles from the ground .
1-5.1.6 He.Hh Risk Conversion Factors
The health risk conversion factors used to estimate expected latent cancer fatalities from
rad iological exposures were derived from International Commission on Radiological Protection
Publication 60 (ICRP 1991 ): 5 .0 x 10 4 and 4.0 x 10 4 latent fatal cancer cases per person· rem for
members of the public and work ers, respectively .

1-5.2 Spent Nuclear Fuel Characterization and
Radioactive Release Characteristics
1-5.2.1 Characterization of Representative Spent Nuclear Fuel Types
Shipments of naval reactor SNF are addressed in Appendix D of Volume I of this E1S , with
the exception of naval· type SNF that has been transferred from th e U.S. Navy to the DOE and is
currenUy in storage at the Idaho Natio nal Engineering Laboratory Idaho Chemical Processing Plan!.
Characterization data for naval·type SNF were derived from Appendi x 0 of Volume I <"If this EIS.
Savannah River Site production reactor SNF was assumed to include both the spent driver fuel
used to power the production reactors, as well as the quantities of irradiated plutonium target material
1-75
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currently in storage at the Savannah River Site. Spent driver fuel stored at the Savannah River Site
includes fuel used in tritium and plutonium production . Analysis of these two fuel types showed that
typical tritium production SNF contains a higher fission product and transuranic inventory than
plutonium production SNF. Analysis of the characteristics of typical irradiated plutonium target
material also showed that the radionuclide inventory would be bounded by the inventory in spent
tritium production driver fuel. Therefore, for analysis purposes, both spent driver fuel and irradiated
plutonium target material at the Savannah River Site was assumed to have the characteristics of spent
tritium production driver fuel. Table 1-20 shows the radionuclide inventory developed to represent
Savannah River Site production reactor SNF based on published reports (WSRC 1991 ; WSRC 1990).
Characterization data for Hanford N-Reactor SNF were based on Mark IA fuel irradiated to
an average burnup of 3,000 megawatt~ays per metric ton uranium and assuming a IO-year cooling
time since removal from the reactor. The IO-year cooling time is conservative because the Hanford
N Reactor was last operated in 1987 and SNF of this type is expected to be at least 10 years old by
the time shipments would begin . Table 1-21 shows the radionuclide inventory used to represent
Hanford N-Reactor SNF.
Most of the graphite SNF under the responsibility of the DOE is from the Fon SI. Vrain
reactor owned by Public Service of Colorado. Some Fon St. Vrain SNF is already in storage at the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, but most SNF is still in storage at the Fon St. Vrain site
awaiting transpon to a DOE facility . In addition to the Fon SI. Vrain SNF, smaller amounts of other
graphite SNF are currently in storage at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Characteristics
for graphite SNF are, therefore, based on Fon SI. Vrain SNF. Table 1-22 shows the radionuclide
inventory used to represent graphite reactor SNF based on six Fon SI. Vrain fuel blocks irradiated to
ii.n average burnup of 70,000 megawatt~ays per metric ton uranium and assuming a cooling time of
1,600 days (Block 1993). The 1,6OO-day (about 4.3 years) cooling time is conservative because the
Fon St. Vrain reactor was shut down in August 1989, and shipments will not be made before June
1995.
SNF from various commercial reactors is currently in storage at various DOE sites, mostly at
the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory . Special-case commercial SNF currently in storage at the
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory includes core debris from the damaged Three Mile Island
Unit 2 reactor. Commercial SNF includes both boiling water reactor and pressurized water reactor
SNF. Pressurized water reactor SNF was chosen as most representative because it is most prevalent
and typically contains the highest levels of radioacti vity (Fischer et al. 1987). Table 1-23 shows the
radionuclide inventory used to represent commercial SNF based on one pressurized water reactor fuel
assembly irradiated to an average burnup of 33,000 mega w all~ays per metric ton uranium and
assuming a cooling time of 10 years (Fischer et al. 1987). The 10-year cooling time is conservative
because the majority of special-case commercial SNF currentl y in storage at DOE sites will be at least
10 years old by June 1995 .
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Table 1-20. Radionuclide inventory for representative Savannah River Site prod uction reactor spent
nuclear fueL'
Isotope

Inventory
(curie)

H-3

1.21 x 10'

Kr-85

Table 1-21. Radionuclide inventory for representative Hanford N-Reactor spent nuclear fueL'

2.62 x 102

Sr-90

3.2 1 x 101

Y-90

3.21 x 101

Ru-l06

7.64 x 10°

Rh- I06

7.64 x 10°

Cs-134

1.48 x 102

Cs-137

3.18

Ba-137m

X

103

3.01 x 101

Ce-l44

1.51 x 10'

Pr-I44

1.51 x 10 1

Pm-147

1.07

Pu-238

6.84 x 10 1

Pu-239

X

102

7.69 x 10-'

Pu-240

5.23 x 10- 1

Pu-24 I

9.52 x 10 1

Am-241

1.97 x 10°

Isotope

Inventory
(curie per metric ton uranium)

H-3

3.09 x 10'

Kr-85

5.89 x 102

Sr-90

6.80

Y-90

6.80 x 103

Ru-l06

5.56 x 10'
1.26 x 102

Cs-134

1.49 x 102

Cs-137

8.39 x 103

Ba-137m

7.94 x 103

Ce-l44

3.24

X

10'

Pm-147

2.24

X

103

Pu-238

5.06 x 10 1

Pu-239

1.l0 x 102

Pu-240

5.97

Pu-24 1

4.47 x 103

Am-241

9.33 x 10'

x

10'

a. Inventory based on Mark IA N-Reactor fuel, 10 years cooling out of reactor, average burnup
3,000 megawatt-days per metric ton uranium.

a. Inventory based on one fuel assembly from a tritium producing charge, 10 years cooling out of
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Sb-125

reactor.
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Table 1-22. Radionuclide inventory for representative graphite reactor spent nuclear fueL'

Table 1-23. Radionucl ide inventory for representative special-case commercial spent nuclear fueL'

Inventory
(curie)

Isotope

103

Kr-85

2.35 x

Sr-9O

1.57 x 10"

Isotope

Inventory
(curie)

Co~

6.28 x 102

Kr-85

2.23 x 103

Rb-I06

5.94 x 102

Sr-9O

2.75 x 10"

Ru-I06

5.94 x 102

Y-90

2.73 x 10"

Sb-125

3.36 x 102

Ru-I06

2.52 x 102

1-129

1.48 x 10.2

Cs-134

7.45 x 103

Cs-137

1.65 x 10"

Cs-134

4.85 x 103

Ce-l44

3.77 x 103

Cs-137

3.85 x 10"

Pr-l44

3.77 x 103

Ba-137m

3.62 x 10"

Pm-147

6.32 x 103

Ce-l44

9.01 x 10 1
1.36 x 103

Sm-151

5.4 x 10 1

Pu-238

Eu-154

9.48 x 102

Pu-239

1.67 x 102

Eu- 155

1.38 x 102

Pu-240

2.06 x 102

U-232

1.8 x 10 1

Pu-24 I

4.32 x 10"

U-233

2.4 x 10 1

Am-241

9.66 x 102

Pu-238

4.20 x 102

Cm-244

6.90 x 102

Pu-24 I

3.06 x 102

a. Inventory based on six Fort 51. Vrain fuel blocks, 1600 days cooling out of reactor, average
burnup of 70,000 megawatt-days per metric ton uranium.
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a. Inventory based on one pressurized water reactor fuel assembly, 10 years cooling out of
reactor, average burnup 33 ,000 megawatt-days per metric ton uranium.
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Domestic university research and test reactors represent a variety of reactor types and fuel
designs. High-enriched training, research, and isotope reactor (TR/GA) SNF was chosen as
representative of university reactor SNF because it is one of the largest groups of university SNF to
be transported and because it is a rod-type fuel that would be expected to have the highest release of
fISSion products unde' severe accident conditions. The radionuclide inventory of high-enriched
TRIGA fuel was calculated using the ORIGEN2 computer code (Croff 1980) assuming a 17-year
reactor operating cycle based on operation of the Texas A&M University TRIGA reactor. To
facilitate the modeling of accident consequences, the radionuclide inventory generated by the
ORIGEN2 program was truncated to eliminate minor contributors to dose. The radionuclides
eliminated accounted for less than I percent of the total dose. Additional details are available in
Enyeart (1995). Table 1-24 shows the radionuclide inventory representative of university research and
test reactor SNF based on 19 TRIGA fuel rods irradiated to an average burnup of 20.2 percent and
assuming a cooling time of I year.
DOE research and test reactors are also represe~ted by a variety of reactor types and fuel
designs. Experimental Breeder Reactor-II Mark-V SNF was chosen as representative of DOE
research and test reactors because the reactor at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory is one of
the few DOE research and test reactors still operating. Mark-V fuel is the current generation of
Experimental Breeder Reactor-II fuel types. The high plutonium content of Mark-V fuel increases the
relative hazard of the radionuclide inventory compared to other DOE SNF types. The radionuclide
inventory of the Mark-V fuel was calculated using the ORIGEN2 computer code assuming a typical
Experimental Breeder Reactor-II operating cycle. To facilitate the modeling of accident
consequences, the rad ionuclide inventory generated by the ORIGEN2 program was truncated to
eliminate minor contributors to dose. The radionuclides eliminated accounted for less than I percent
of the total dose. Additional details are available in Enyeart (1995). Table 1-25 shows the
radionuclide inventory representative of DOE research and test reactor SNF based on one Mark-V
fuel assembly irradiated to a burnup of 7.88 percent and assuming a cooling time of I year.

Table 1-24. Radionuclide inventory for representative university research/test reactor spent nuclear
fueL"
Isotope

Inventory
(curie)

Isotope

H-3

3.25 x 100

Cs-137

9.72 x 102

Kr-85

8.60 x 10 1

Ba-137M

9.20 x 102

Sr-89

4.28 X 10 1

Ce-141

3.86 x 100

Sr-9O

9.30 x 102

Ce-I44

1.47 x 103

Y-9O

9.30 x 102

Pr-I44

1.47 x 103

Y-91

9.77 x 10 1

Pm-147

8.81 x 102

Zr-95

1.48 x 102

U-235

4 .00 x 10-3

Nb-95

3.20 x 102

U-236

5.50 x 10-3

Ru-I03

7.47 x 100

Pu-238

1.00 x 100

Rb-103m

6.74 x 100

Pu-239

1.57 x 10- 1

Ru-I06

1.36 x 102

Pu-24O

6 .70 x 10-2

Te-125m

4. 11 x 100

Pu-241

5.88 x 100

Te-127

2.08 x 100

Am-24 I

4.57 x lO"2

Te-127m

2. 12 x 100

Cm-242

1.81 x 10-1

Cs-134

1.10 x 102

a. Inventory based on 19 TRIGA fuel rods (70 percent enrichment; 122 g/rod uranium-235
beginning-Qf-life), I year cooling out of reactor, 20.2 percent average burnup.

Foreign research and test reactors use a number of different fuel designs. DOE has evaluated
the characteristics of foreign research reactor SNF types in a separate EIS on a Proposed Nuclear
Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel. Based
on this evaluation, a shipment of 40 TRlGA-type SNF elements was determined to result in the
highest potential release of radioactivity in the event of an accident. To provide a bounding analysis
for this EIS, foreign TRlGA-type SNF was selected as representative of all foreign research reactor
SNF. To facilitate the modeling of accident consequences, the radionuclide inventory generated by
the ORlGEN2 program was truncated to eliminate minor contributors to dose. The radionuclides
eliminated accounted for less than I percent of the total dose. The radionuclide inventory of a single
shipping cask, shown in Table 1-26, is based on a reactor operating period of 3 years, with a burnup
of 31 grams of uranium-235 per fuel element, followed by a cooling period of I year.

1-81

VOLUME I. APPENDIX I

Inventory
(curie)
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Isotope

Inventory
(curie per assembly)

Isotope

Inventory
(curie per assembly)

H-3

7.98 x 100

Te-127

3.32 x 10 1

Mn-54

7.48 x 102

Te-l 29m

1.14 x 100

Fe-55

6.12 x 102

Cs-134

Table 1-26. Radionuclide inventory for representative foreign research/test reactor spent nuclear
fueL"
Inventory
(curie)

Isotope

Inventory
(curie)

H-3

1.31 x 101

Ce-141

6.97 x 102

9.15 x 101

Kr-85

3.63 x 102

Ce-I44

2.55 x 10"

2.75 x 103

Pr-I44

2.55 x 10"

Isotope

Co-58

1.25 x 102

Cs-137

1.04 x 103

5r-89

Co-6O

3.55 x 100

Ba-137m

9.80 x 102

5r-90

3.16 x 103

Pm-147

7.02 x 103

Y-90

3. 16 x 103

Pm-148m

4.68 x 101
4.18 x 101

Kr-SS

9.75 x 101

Ce-141

1.49 x 10 1

5r-89

1.45 x 102

Ce-I44

7.76 x 103

Pr-I44m

1.11 x 102

7.23 x 102

Pr-I44

7.76 x 103

Y-91

3.67 x 102

Pm-147

2.65 x 103

5r-90

7.23 x 102

Y-90

Y-91

4.56 x 103

Eu-154

Zr-95

6.48 x 103

Eu-155

2.27 x 101

Nb-95

1.28 x 10"

U-234

1.81 x 10-4

Ru-103

8.44 x 101

U-235

7.91 x 10-3

Rb-103m

8.44 x 102

U-238

6.51 x 10-3

Zr-95

7.00 x 102

5m-151

2.91 x 101

Ru-I06

2.54 x 103

Pu-238

3.03 x 100

Nb-95

1.52 x 103

Eu-155

1.00 x 102

Rb-I06m

2.54 x 103

Pu-239

5.50 x 10. 1

Ru-I03

4.88 x 101

U-235

2.90 x 10-3

5n-123

2.71 x 101

Pu-24O

2.09 x 100

Rb- I03m

4.40 x 101

U-236

3.34 x 10.3

5b-125

Pu-24 I

Ru-I06

3.65 x 103

Pu-238

1.48 x 100

Te-125m

1.19 x 102
2.87 x 10 1

Am-24 I

2.13 x 102
4.07 x 10. 1

4.05 x 101

Te-127m

5.57 x 10 1

Am-242m

9.00 x 10.3

Te-129m

2.31 x 101

Am-243

4.38 x 10-4

Rb-I06
5n- l23
5b-125

Pu-239

3.65 x 103
~.48 x 101

Pu-24O
Pu-241

1.21 x 102

Te-125m

2.96 x 101

Te-127m

3.37 x 101

Am-241

3.61 x 101
1.39 x 103
4.74 x 100

Cs-134

1.16 x 103

Cm-244

7.14 x 10-3

Cs-137

3. 19 x 103

Cm-242

5.2~ x 100

a. Inventory based on 40 foreign TPJGA fuel elements, I year cooling out of reactor, average
burnup of 31 grams uranium-235 per fuel element.

a. Inventory based on EBR-II Mark-V fuel, I year cooling out of reactor, total burnup of
317 megawatt-<lays.
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Non-DOE research reactor types are generally similar to domestic university research and test
reactors. Therefore, TRIGA reactor SNF was also chosen as representative of non-DOE research
reactor SNF.
1~.2.2

Radioactive Release Characteristics

Radiological consequences were calculated by assigning cask release fractions to each accident
severity category for each chemically and physically distinct radioisotope. The release fraction is
defined as the fraction of the radioactivity in the cask that could be released from the cask in a given
severity of accident. Release fractions vary according to SNF type and the physical/chemical
properties of the radioisotopes . Most solid radionuclides in SNF are nonvolatile and are, therefore,
relatively nondispersible. Gaseous radionuclides, such as krypton-85, are relatively easy to release if
the fuel cladding and cask are compromised.
Representative cask relea.;e fractions were developed for each of the representative SNF types.
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Modal Study developed release fractions for commercial
pressurized water reactor SNF . The Modal Study release fractions, shown in Table 1-27, are based
on best engineering judgment and are conservative for most SNF types. For this analysis, the release
fractions recommended in the Modal Study were applied only to commercial pressurized-water reactor
SNF and TRIGA SNF, both of which are rod-type fuels. Because of the significant differences in
fuel designs and the availability of more appropriate fuel-specific release characterization data, less
conservative release fractions were applied to the other representative SNF types.
Release fractions for a uminum fuels (aluminum alloy fuel, aluminum cladding) were based on
laboratory measurements of release fractions from aluminum fuels at high temperatures (Shibata et al.
1984) and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Modal Study (Fischer et al . 1987). Because of
the lower melting point of aluminum compared to metals used in other metallic fuels , the aluminum
fuel release fractions are considered bounding for metallic fuels (that is, Savannah River Production
Reactor, Hanford N-Reactor, and EBR-II Mark V SNF). Release fractions for the aluminum and
other metallic fuel types are listed in Table 1-28.
Release fractions for graphite fuels , specifically Fort St. Vrain SNF, were based on
engineering analyses . F lrt St. Vrain fuel is in the form of carbide particles, encased within a highly
retentive four-layer ceramic coating. Stress analysis tests have shown that the fuel particles can
withstand stresses well in excess of those that might be encountered in severe accidents . Thermal
diffusion across the ceramic barrier under extre e temperature conditions is the only significant
mechanism for release of fission products from intact Fort St. Vrain fuel. Fuel particles that have
failed during reactor operation (less than I percent of the inventory) are vulnerable to va orization
and impact-induced releases of particulates, but volatile fission products would have been released
within the extreme thermal environment of the operating reactor. Table 1-29 summarizes the release
fractions applied to Fort St. Vrain SNF, assuming I percent fuel failure during reactor operations .
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Table 1-27. Release fractions for transportation accidents involving special-case commercial, university, foreign, and non-DOE research reactor
spent nuclear fuel types for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Modal Study cask response regions.

rr1

Release fractiona
Inert gas

Iodine

Cesium

Ruthenium

Particulates

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

R(l ,2),R(1 ,3)

9.9 x to- 3

7.S x to-5

R(2, 1),R(2,2),R(2,3)

3.3 x to-2

2.S

X

R(I,4),R(2,4),R(3,4)

3.9 x to-I

4.3

R(3,1),R(3,2),R(3,3)

3.3 x to-I

R(1,S),R(2,S),R(3,5),
R(4,S),R(4, 1),R(4,2),
R(4,3),R(4,4)

6.3 x to-I

Cask response region
R(I, I)

-

to-6

8. 1

X

to-7

6.0

X

10-8

t0 4

2.0 x to- 5

2.7

X

to-6

2.0

X

10-7

X

to-3

2.0

X

t0 4

4.8 x to-5

2.0

X

10-6

2.5

X

to- 3

2.0

X

104

2.7 x to-5

2.0

X

10-6

4.3

X

to-2

2.0

X

to- 3

4.8

6.0

I

00

0\

a. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Modal Study (Fischer et al. 1987).

X

X

t0 4

2.0 X to- 5

Table 1- 8. Release fractions for transportation accidents involving aluminum and metallic spent nuclear fuel typesfor th U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Modal Study cask response regions.
Release fraction b
Cask response region
R(I,t)

~

Inert gas

Iodine

Cesium

Ruthenium

Particulates

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

R(I ,2),R(1 ,3)

9.9 x 10.3

1.1

X

10.7

3 .0

X

10,8

4.1

X

10,9

3.0

X

10,10

R(2,1),R(2,2),R(2,3)

3.3 x 10,2

3.5

X

10,7

1.0

X

10,7

1.4

X

10,8

1.0

X

10,9

R(I,4),R(2,4),R(3,4)

3.9 x 10,1

6.0 x 1O~

1.0 x 1O~

2.4

X

10'7

1.0

X

10-8

R(3,1),R(3,2),R(3 ,3)

3.3 x 10,1

3.5 x IO~

1.0 x !O~

1.4

X

10,7

1.0

X

10-8

R( 1,5),R(2,5),R(3,5),
R(4,5),R(4,1),R(4,2),
R(4,3),R(4,4)

6.3 x 10,1

6.0 x lO's

1.0 x lO's

2.4 x 10~

1.0

X

10'7

a. These release fractions are applicable to the following SNF types:
I. N Reactor
2. Savannah River Site production reactor
3. DOE research/test reactor
b. Derived from Shibata et aI . (1984) and U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Modal Study (Fischer et aI. 1987).
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Table 1-29. Release fractions for transportation accidents involving graphite spent nuclear fuel for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission Modal Study cask response regions.

I!'I

--

Release fraction

~
"II

Inert gas&

Strontium,
cerium b

AntimonyC

Cesium b

Ruthenium,
rhodiumc

Particulatesd

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

I!'I

z

0

S<

-

Cask response region
R(1, I)
R(I ,2),R( I ,3),R(I ,4),
R(2,1),R(2,2),R(2,3),
R(2,4),R(3,I),R(3,2),
R(3,3),R(3,4),R(4, I),
R(4,2),R(4,3),R(4,4)
R( I ,5),R(2,5),R(3,5),
R(4,5)

I

gg

5.3 x 10-3

3.7

10-7

1.0

X

10-6

2.4 x 10-7

7.3 x 10-8

1.0

1.2 x 10-2

5.0 x 10-6

1.0

X

10-6

9.1 x 10-6

7.3 x 10-8

1.0 x 10-9

X

X

10-9

a. Thermally induced, from NUREG/CR-0722, Table 40, all fuel (Lorenz et al. 1980).
b. Empirical data from the Fort St. Vrain Final Safety Analysis Report, Rev. 8, Table A.3-1 (pSC no date).
c. Thermally induced semivolatiles from incore failed fuel; I percent fuel failure, 100 percent respirable; release fraction from Lorenz et
al. (1980).
d. Impact induced nonvolatiles, 1 percent incore failed fuel, 5 percent respirable, release fraction of 2 x 10-6 from Wilmot (198 1).

1-5.3 Results of Calculations

Table 1-30. SNF transportation accident risks fo r the Decentralization alternative (1995 to 2035).

1':;.3.1 Imp.cta from the No Action Alternative
Transport mode

There are no offsite shipments of DOE, university, foreign, or non-DOE research reactor
SNF under this alternative. Consequently, there are no transportation accident impacts . The limited
number of naval fuel shipments mad. under the No Action alternative are covered in Appendix D of
Volume I of this EIS.

Traffic

Dose risk

Latent

(person-rem)

cancer fatalities'

ralalilica b

Truck

1.7

0.0009

0.15

Rail

0.57

0 .0003

0 .21

I . Estimated number of latent ratal cancers as a Ksult of radiation dose from transportation accidents .
b . Estimated number of fatalities from nonradiological C(fect of transportation ,('cident. for eumple. physical impa<:t.

1':;.3.2 1m pacta from the Decentralization Alternative

The SNF shipments included under this alternative are those of domestic university, foreign,
and non· DOE research reactor SNF to the Idaho National Engineer:ng Laboratory and Savannah
River Site. Naval fuel shipments made under different options of the Decentralization alternative are
covered in Appendix D of Volume I of this EIS. Shipments are expected to be made by truck, but
the impact analysis also assessed transportation by rail. The same shipping cask was assumed to be
used for both truck and rail shipments, and a single shipping cask was assumed for each shipment.
The cumulative accident risk for transportation by truck was calculated to be 0.0009 latent
cancer fatality and 0. 15 traffic fatality . The cumulative accident risk measures the total impact of
transportation accidents over the entire shipment campaign (1995 to 2035). The cumulative accident
risk for transportation by rail was calculated to be 0.0003 latent cancer fatality and 0.21 traffic
fatality . Table 1-30 summarizes the transportation accident risks for the Decentralization alternative.
As shown in Table 1-31 , the maximum reasonably foreseeable transportation accident has a
probability of occurrence of about 1.6 x 10.7 per year for a suburban population zone. Under
normal (neutral) weather conditions, the total population dose is estimated to be about 14 person.rem,
which would be expected to result in less than one latent cancer fatality in the exposed population.
For comparison, the same population would be expected to experience about 100,000 latent fatal
cancers from other causes. The probability of this accident occurring in an urban population zone, or
occurring under stable weather conditions in any population zone, is less than 1 x 10.7 per year.

Table i-31. Health effects from maximum reasonably foreseeable offsite SNF transportation accident
under the Decentralization alternative (1995 to 2035) .
Alternative : Decentralization
Maximum reasonably foreseeable accident: University research reactor SNF shipment by rail
Population zone: Suburban'
Maximum reasonably foreseeable accident probability: 1.6 x 10.7 per year with ncutral meteorology . less than
1 x 10.7 per year with stable meteorology
Doses and health
effcc:Ls

Transport

mode

Population
Neutral b

Stablec

Maximum exposed individual
Neutral b
Stablec

Dose

Rail

14 person-rem

<el

0.032 rem

<el

L.atent cancer
fatalitiesd

Rail

0 .007

<el

1.6 x 10· ~

<el

a. Thc maximum reasonably foreseeable accident occurs in a suburban population zo nc. The probability of the
accident occurring in an urban population lone is less than I x 10-7 per year. In a rural population zone. the dose
would be approximately 9 percent of the subu rban population dose .
b. Neutral meteoro logical conditions occu r greatcr than 50 percent of the time.
c. Stable meteorological conditions occur less than 5 percent of the time and result in less atmospheric dispersion o f
radioactivity released to the atmosphere.

1':;.3.3 Impacts from the 199211993 Planning Basis Alternative

This alternative includes the transport of five types of SNF. It assumes that the Fort St.
Vrain SNF currently in storage in Colorado is transported to the Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory. Likewise. special 'case commercial SNF currently stored at West Valley is transported to
the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. DOE research and test reactor SNF is transported to
either the Idaho Natio nal Engineering Laboratory or Savannah River Site. with most going to the
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d. ResulLs expressed as the estimated number of latent fatal cancers expected in the impactoo population as a result of
the radiation dose ; for the maximally exposed individual . resu lts express the probability of latent fatal cancer as a
result of the radialion dose. Fatal cancer risk factor: 5 x 10-4 fatal canccrs per person-rem (ICRP 1991).
e. Consequences not developed for acc idcnts with probabilities Icss than 1 x 10.7 per year.
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Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. Shipments of university, foreign, and non-DOE research
reactor SNF are split between the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and the Savannah River
Site. Shipments could be by truck or rail, so the analysis addresses the two extremes of all shipments
by truck or all shipments by rail.
The cumulative accident risk for transportation by truck was calculated to be 0.0009 latent
cancer fatality and 0. 19 traffic fatality. The cumulative accident risk measures the total impact of
transponation accidents over the entire shipment campaign (1995 to 2035). The cumulative accident
risk for transponation by rail was calculated to be 0.0003 latent cancer fatality and 0.22 traffic
fatality. Table 1-32 summarizes the transportation accident risks for the 199211993 Planning Basis
alternative.
The maximum reasonab ly foreseeable transponation accident involves a rail shipment of
special-case commercial SNF. The accident has a probability of occurrence of about 2.0 x 10.1 per
year for a suburban population wne. Und:r normal (neutral) weather conditions, the total population
dose is estimated to be about 13 ,000 person-rem (average dose of 26 millirem per person), which
could result in an estimated seven latent fatal cancers in the exposed population. For comparison, the
same population wou ld be expected to experience about 100,000 latent fatal cancers from other
causes. The probability of this accident occurring in an urban population zone, or occurring under
stable weather conditions in any population wne, is less than I x 10.1 per year. Table 1-33
summarizes the doses and health effects from the maximum reasonably foreseeable consequence

Table 1-32 , SNF transponation accident risks for the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative
(1995 to 2035).
Dose risk
(person· rcm)

Latent
cancer fatalities-

Traffie
fataLities b

Truck

(.9

0.0009

0 .19

Rail

0.61

0.0003

0 .22

Transport mode

•. Estimated number of latent fatal cancen as a result of radiation dose: from transportation accidents .

b. Estimated number of fatalitiCi from nonradiological effect of transportation accident, for examplc, physical impact.

Table 1-33. Health effects from maximum reasonably foreseeable offsite SNF transponation accident
under the 199211993 Planning Basis alternative (1995 to 2035).
Alternative: 1992/1993 Plllnning Basis
Maximum reasonably fOl"CJeeablc accident: Spcc:ial-<a.sc commercial SNF shipment by rail
Population zone: SuburbanMaximum reasonably foreseeable accident probability: 2.0 x 10.7 per year with neutral meteorology, less than
1.0 x 10.7 per year with slable meteorology
Doses and health
efFects

Transport
mode

assessment.

Dose

Rail

1.5.3.4 Impacts from the Regionalization Alternative

Latent cancer
fatalities d

Rail

This alternative includes Regionalization 4A (by fuel type) and Regionalization 4B (by
geography). Under Regionalization by Fuel Type, the same SNF types are transponed as in the
199211993 Planning Basis alternative with differences occurring in the destinations of some SNF
based on fuel type. DOE research and test reactor SNF is transponed to either the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory or the Savannah River Site, with most SNF going to the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory. Graphite-type and special-case co mmercial SNF is transponed to the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory. As with the 199211993 Planning Basis alternative, shipments could
be by truck or ra il, and the anal ysis evaluates impacts assuming either of two extremes: all shipments
by truck or all sh ipments by rail.
Under Regionalization by Fuel Type, the cu mulative accident risk for transportation by truck
was calcu lated to be 0.0010 latent cancer fatali ty and 0.26 traffic fatality . The cumulative accident
risk measures the total impact of transponation accidents over the entire shipment campaign (1995 to
2035). The cumulative accident risk for transpo nation by rail was calculated to be 0.0003 latent
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Population

Maximum exposccl individual
Stablec

Neulral b

StableC

Neutnl b

13,000 person-rem

<e)

54 rem

<e)

<e)

0.021

<e)

a. The maximum reasonably foreseeable accident occurs in a suburban population zone. The probability of the
acc idcnt occurring in an urban popul.ation zone is less than 1 x 10.7 per year. In. rural population zone, the dose
would be approximately 3 percent of the suburban popUlation dose.
b. Neutral mcteorologiC31 conditions occur gruter than 50 percent of the time.
e. Stable meteorologica l conditions occur less than 5 percent of the time and result in Icss atmospheric dispersion o(
radioactivity released to the atmosphere.
d. Rcsults expressed as thc estimated number o( btcnt (alai cancers e,;pccted in the impa.cted population as a result of
the radi:ltion dose; (or the maximally e,;poscd individual, results exprcss the probability of contracting fatal c:mcer u •
result o( the radiation dose . Fatal cancer risk (actor: 5 x 10-4 (alai cancers per person-rem (lCRP 1991).
e. Consequences not developed (or accidents with probabilities less than 1 x 10.7 per year.
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cancer fatality and 0.25 traffic fatality. Table 1-34 summarizes the transportation accident risk for the
Regionalization by Fuel Type.
As in the 1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative, the maximum reasonably foreseeable
transportation accident involves a rail shipment of special-case commercial SNF. The accident has a
probabil ity of occurrence of about 2.8 x 10-7 per year for a suburban population zone. The
consequences under normal (neutral) weather conditions are the same as those described under the
1992/1993 Planning Basis alternative. Table 1-35 summarizes the doses and health effects from the
maximum reasonably foreseeable consequence assessment.
The maximum reasonably foreseeable accident under stable weather conditions has a
probability less than I x 10-7 per year for all population zones except rural . A total population dose
of 3,500 person-rem was estimated for the rural population zone (average dose of 2 rem per person),
which could result in an estimated two latent fatal cancers in the exposed population. For
comparison, the same population would be expected to experience about 350 latent fatal cancers from
other causes .
The Regionalization by Geography alternative contains six separate alternatives, and the
transportation impacts of each option have been analyzed for compll'ison. Under this alternative, the
same SNF types are transported as under the 199211993 Planning Basis alternative with differences
occurring in the destinations of the SNF based on geographical considerations. Non-Navy SNF
originating from western United States locations or points of entry would be transported to the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory, Hanford Site, or the Nevada Test Site. Non-Navy SNF originating
from eastern United States locations or points of entry would be transported to the Savannah River
Site or the Oak Ridge Reservation. Navy SNF would not be split on an east-west basis because the
Navy would operate a facility for examining naval SNF at only one of the DOE sites.
Cumul ative accident risks for transportation by truck range from 0.0009 latent cancer fatality
and 0.21 traffic fatality for Regionalization at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and the
Savannah River Site. to 0.001 1 latent cancer fatality and 0.39 traffic fatality for Regionalization at the
Nevada Test Site and the Oak Ridge Reservation. Cumulative accident risks for transportation by rail
range from 0.0002 latent cancer fatality and 0.21 traffic fatality for Regionalization at the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory and the Oak Ridge Reservation to 0.0003 latent c.ncer fatality and
0.30 traffic fatality for Regio nalization at the Nevada Test Site and the Savannah River Site.
As in Regional izatio n by Fuel Type, the maximum reaso nably foreseeable transportation
accident invo lves a rai l shipment of spec ial-case commercial SNF. The consequences of the
maximu m reasonably foreseeable accident are the same for each of the six Regionalization by
Geography alternatives . The max imum reasonably foreseeable accident under neutral weather
conditions occurs in a suburban population zone because the accident probability for an urban
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Table 1-34. SNF transportation accident risks for Regionalization by Fuel Type (1995-2035).

2.0

Truck

Traffic
ratatitic:s b

utenl
cancer fatalities-

Dose: risk
(penon-rem)

Transport mode

_ _ _ _--=.:Ra::;:...1_ _ _ _ 0.65

O.OOtO

0.26

0.0003

0.25

•. Estimated number of latent r.tal cancen u a result of radiation dose from tnnsportation accidents .
b. Estimated number of fatalities from no nradiologic:al errect of transportation ac:ctI.!i:nt, for example. physical impact .

Table 1-35_ Health effects from maximum reasonably foreseeable offsite SNF transportation accident
under Regionalization by Fuel Type (1995 to 2035).
A1temative: Regionalization by Fuel Type
Maximum reasonably forcsccable accident: Special-usc commercial SNF shipment by rail
Population zone: Suburban (neutnl) and rural (stable)·
.
.7
Maximum reasonably foreseeable accident probability: 2.8 X 10.1 per year Wlth neutral meteorology: 1.1 x 10 per
year with stable meteorology
Maximum exposed individual
Population
Transport
DOSe!- and health
mode
effects
180 rem
54 rem
13 ,000 pcnon· rem
) ,500 penon·rcm
Rail
Dose
Latent cancer
fatalities d

-""'-"----

0.017

Rail

0.09

a. The maximum reasonably foreseeable accident occun in a suburban population zone under neutnl weather
conditions . The accident probability is less than 1 x 10.1 per year under stable weather conditions, except in a runl
7
population zone. For urban popUlation zones, the accident probability is less than 1 x 10. per year for both neutnl
and stabk weather conditions.
b. Neutral meteorological cond itio ns occur greater than 50 percent of the time .
e. Stable meteorological conditions occur less than 5 percent of the time and result in less atmospheric dispenion of
radioactivity released to the atmosphere.
d. Results expressed as the estimated number of latent fatal c.ncen expected in the. ~mpacted popu.latio n as a result of
the radiation dose; for the maximally exposed individual. n:sults express the prob.blhty of contnctlng fata l cancer as a
result of the radi.lion dose . Fatal cancer risk factor: 5 x 10 4 f.tal cancen per penon -rem (ICRP 1991).
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population zone is less than I x 10-7 per year_ The total population dose is estimated to be about
13,000 person-rem (average dose of 26 millirem per person), which could result in an estimated seven
latent fatal cancers in the exposed population. For comparison, the same population would be
expected to experience about 100,000 latent fatal cancers from other causes.
The probability of the maximum reasonably foreseeable transportation accident varies slightly
among the six Regionalization by Geography alternatives. The maximum reasonably foreseeable
accident in a suburban population zone has an estimated probability of occurrence ranging from about
2.7 x 10.7 per year for Regionalization at the Hanford Site and Savannah River Site, to about
3.7 x 10-7 per year for Regionalization at the Nevada Test Site and Savannah River Site. The
maximum reasonably foreseeable accident in a rural population zone has an estimated probability of
occurrence ranging from about 1.5 x 10-7 per year for Regionalization at the Hanford Site and
Savannah River Site, to about 3.3 x 10-7 per year for Regionalization at the Nevada Test Site and
Oak Ridge Reservation.
Tables 1-36 through 1-47 summarize the doses and health effects from the accident risk
assessment and the maximum reasonably foreseeable consequence assessment for each of the
Regionalization by Geography alternatives.
1-S.3.5 Impacts from the Centralization Alternatives

The impacts from centralization at the Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,
Savannah River Site, Oak Ridge Reservation, and the Nevada Test Site are presented in this section.
1-5.3.5.1 Centralization at the Hanford Site. Under this alternative, SNF currently stored

at other DOE sites, Fort St. Vrain, university, foreign, and non-DOE research reactors is eventually
transported to the Hanford Site. The analysis evaluates impacts assuming either all shipments by
truck or all shipments by rail.
The cumulative accident risk for transportation by truck was calculated to be 0.0050 latent
cancer fatality and 0.57 traffic fatality . The cumulative accident risk measures the total impact of
transportation accidents over the entire shipment campaign (1995 to 2035). The cumulative accident
risk for transportation by rail was calculated to be 0.0013 latent cancer fatality and 0.52 traffic
fatality. Table 1-48 summarizes the transportation accident risks for the Centralization at the Hanford
Site alternative.
As in the 1992/ 1993 Planning Basis and Regionalization alternatives, the maximum reasonably
foreseeable transportation accident involves a rail shipment of special-case commercial SNF. The
a cident has a probability of occurrence of about 5.1 x 10-7 per year under neutral (normal) weather
conditions and 3.6 x 10-7 per year under stable (worst-case) weather conditions. The consequences
are the same as those described under the Regionalization by Geography alternative. Table 1-49
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Table 1-36. SNF transponation accident risks for Regionalization by Geography (Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory and Savannah River Site) (1995 to 2035).
Dose: risk

Latent

(person-rem)

cancer fatalities'

Traffic
fatalitics b

Transport mode

Truck

1.1

0.0009

0.21

Rail

0.59

0.0003

0 .22

Transport mode

a . Estimated number o f latent fatal cancers

II

a result o f radiatio n dose from transportation accidents .

Table 1-37. Health effects from maximum reasonably fo reseeable offs ite SNF transponation accident
under Regionalization by Geography (Idaho National Engineering Laboratory and Savannah River
Site) (1995 to 2035) .
Alternative : Rcgionali7.ation by Geography (INEL &. SRS)
Maximum reasonably foreseeable accident: Spcci. l-<:a,Sc commercial SNF shi pment by rail
Population zone: Suburban (neutra l) and rural (stable )Maximum reasonably fotescelblc accident probabilitY" 3 .0 )( 10. 7 per year with neutral meteorology. 1.9 x 10.7 per
year with stable meteorology
Doses and health
crfects

TransJXlrt
mode

Ra,1

Dose

Population-

13.000 person-rem

3.500 person-rem

Maximum exposed individual

54 rem

180 rem

o.o:!?

0.09

Latent cancer
d

-fatalities
- - - - Rail

a The maximum reasonably forescc.able accident occ urs in a suburban populatio n zonc unde r neutral weather conditions .
The accident probability is leu than I x 10. 7 per yea r unde r stable weather conditio ns. except in a rural population zone
Fo r urban population zones. the accident probability is leu than I x 10. 7 per yea r fo r both neutral and stable weather
co nditions
Neutral meteorological conditions occur greate r than 50 percent of the time

e Stable mcteorologtcal I.:unditions occur less than 5 percent of the time and result in leu atmospheric dispersio n o f
radK>activity rek:ased to the atmosphere .
d

ResultJ: expn:.ucd IS the eltimated number of latent fatal cancen e}l:pccted In the impacted population IS a reJult o f the
rad~t ion dose: fo r the maximlUy exposed individual. resu lts express the probabi lity o f co ntracting fall I cance r as a result
o f the radiation dose Fatal cance r risk f. ':tor· 5 x 1(1..4 fatal caneen pe r penon· rem (ICRP 1991).
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405

Dose risk
(penon-n:m)

cancer fatalities·

T raffic
fatalitics b

Truck

\.8

0.0009

0.22

Rail

0.40

0.0002

0.21

Latent

a. Estimated number o f latent fatal cancen as a result of radiation dose from transportation accidents .

b. Estimated number of fatalities from no nradiologica l effect of transportation accident. fo r example. physical impact .

b

Table 1-38. SNF transponation accident risks for Regionalization by Geography (Idaho National
Eng ineering Laboratory and Oak Ridge Reservation) (1995 to 2035).

b. Estimated number of fatalities from non radiological effect of tranlJVIrtation accident. for example, physical impact.

Table 1-39. Health effects from maximum reasonably foreseeable offsite SNF transponation accident
under Regionalization by Geography (Idaho National Engi neering Laboratory and Oak Ridge
Reservatio n) (1995 to 2035) .
Alternative : Regionaliz:ttion by Geography (tNEL &. ORR)
Maximum realonably foreseeable accident: Special-<:ase commercial SNF shipment by rail
Populatio n zo ne: Suburban (neutral) and rural (stable)a
Maximum n:asonably foreseeable accident probability: 3 .0 x 10.7 per year with neutral meteorology. 2.0
year with stable meteorology
DOles and health

Trans~rt

effects

mode

Dose

Rail

x 10.7 pe r

_ _ _ _...,.......:.p.::;
OPc:u::I.::ti:::on:...·_ _ ,--_--.:M:::::8X>:::·m:::u::m::..:ex~po='ed::..:in:::d:::iv:.::id::ua=I~_ __
Neutral b
Stablee
Neulral b
Stable!:
13 ,000 person-rem

3,500 person-rem

54 rem

180 rem

0.027

0.09

Latent cancer

...:::
r':::'":::ti·':..:ic.:..
,d_ _ _

Rail

a. T he maximum rc.asonably foreseeab le accident occu rs in a suburban population zone under neutral weather
conditions . The accident probability is less than 1 x 10.7 per year under stable weathe r conditions, except in a rural
population zone . For urban population zones, the accident probability jj; less than 1 x 10. 7 per year ro r both neutral and
sllb le wcather conditions.
b. Neutra l metco rologica l conditions occu r greater than 50 pe~ent o f the time.

c. Sub ]e meteorological conditions occu r less than 5 percent of the time and result in less atmospheric dispers ion of
rndioactivity released to the atmosphere .
d . Results expressed al the estimated number o r latent fatal cancen expected in the impacted population as a result o f
the rndiation dose; for the mnximally exposed individual. results express the probability o f co ntracting fatal cancer as a
result of the radiation dose. Fa161 cance r risk factor: 5 X 10"" fatal cancen per person-rem (ICRP 1991).

1-97

VO LUME I, APPENDIX 1

Table 1-40. SNF transponation accident risks for Regionalization by Geography (Hanford Site and
Savannah River Site) (1995 to 2035).
Transport mode

Dose risk
(person-rem)

Latent
cancer fatalities-

Traffic
fatalities b

Truck

1.8

0 .0009

0.24

Rail

0 .62

0 .0003

0.22

Table 1-42. SNF transportation accident risks for Regionalization by Geography (Hanford Site and
Oak Ridge Reservation) (1995 to 2035).
Dose risk
(pcrson·rem)

Latent
cancer fatalities-

Truck

1.9

0 .0009

0 .24

Rail

0 .43

0 .0002

0 .2t

Transport mode

. , Estimated number of latent (atal caneen as a result of radiation dose from transportation accidents .

Traffic
fatalities b

a. Est imated number of latent fatal cancers as a result of radiation dose from transportation accidents .

b . Estimated number of fatalities from no nradiological effect of transportation accident , (or example , physical impacl.
b. Estimated number of fatalities fro m nonradiological effect of transportation accident. for example, physical impact.

Table 1-41. Health effects from maximum reasonably foreseeable offsite SNF transportation accident
under Regionalization by Geography (Hanford Site and Savannah River Site) (1995 to 2035).
Alternative:: Rc:gionalization by Geography (HS & SRS)

.

.

.

Maximum reasonably foreseeable accident: Special"use commc:re18.1 SNF shIpment by raiJ
PopUlatio n zone:: Suburban (ncutral) and rural (stable)·
.

.7

Maximum reasonably foreseeab le accident probsbilily: 2.7 X 10.7 per year WlLh neulral meteorology , I.S x 10
yea r with stable meteorology

Doses and health

Alternative: Regionalization by Geography (HS & ORR)
Max..imum reasonab ly foreseeable acc ident : Special-<ase commercial SNF shipment by rail
Population zone : Suburban (neutral) and rural (stable)·
Maximum reaso n:l.bly fo reseeable accident probab ility : 2.7 x 10.7 per year with neutral meteorology , 1.5
yea r with stable meteorology

T ransport _ _ _ _-::-_P:..:o:!:P::::UIa::":::
·o:::"_a_-::-_ _..:M:::=axun=
·:::u::m::..:.cx:;;po:='ed:.:..:Ut:::d:::iV
:::id:.:u-:al::-;-:-;;_ _

c (fectJ
Dose

per

Table 1-43. Health effects from maximum reasonably foreseeable offsite SNF transportation accident
under Regionalization by Geography (Hanford Site and Oak Ridge Reservat i~n) (1995 to 2035).

mode

Rail

Neutral b

StableC

Ncutral b

StableC

13 .000 person-rem

3 .S00 person-rem

54 rem

180 rem

utent eaneer
ratalities d

0 .021

- - - - - Rail

0 .09

• . The maximum reasonably fo reseeab le accident occurs in a sub urban population 7.o0C u nde~ ?cutral weat ~cr
eonditio ns . The accident probnbility is less than I x 10" per year under stable weathe r co nd itions. except III a ru ml
population zone . Fo r urban popuinlion zones, the accident probability is less than 1 x 10.7 per year (o r both neut ral and
stable weather conditions .

b. Ncutn l meteorological co nditions occur greate r than 50 percent of the time.
c . Stable meteorologica l condition, occur less lhan S percent o f the time and result in less atmospheric d ispersion o f
radioactivity released to the atmosphere ,
d . ResulLs expressed u the estimated numbe r of latent fatal cancen expected in lh~ ~m pac tcd popu.lation as a result o f
the rndiatio n dose; fo r the mu.imally exposed individua l. results express the probability o f contrachng falal cancer as a
result oflhe radiation dose . Fatal cancer risk facto r: S x 10.... fata l cancen per person· rem (ICRP 199 1).
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x 10. 7 per

a

Doses and health
e ffccts
Dose

Transport
mode
Rail

Maximum exposed ind ividua l
Population
-----;:--....:.-.:::.:c...--:-------i,.------:-__
Neutral b

StableC

Neutnl b

StableC

13 ,000 perso n·n::m

3 ,500 person·rem

54 rem

180 rem

0 .027

0 .09

Latent cancer
d

-fa13lities
- - - - Ra il

T he maximu m reasonab ly fo reseeable accident occurs in a subu rban population lone under neutral wealher
conditions . T he accident probauility is less than 1 x 10-7 per yea r under stable weather conditions , except in a ru m!
populat ion zone. For urban popu lation lones , the acc ident probab ility is less than 1 x 10.7 per yea r fo r both neutral and
sltlb le weather condit ions.
R.

b. Neutra l meteo rologica l condit ions occur greater than 50 percent o f the time.
c . Stable meteoro logical conditions occur less than 5 percent of the time and result in less Il mos pherie d ispersio n of
radioact ivity re leased to the atmosphe re .
d . Resu lts expressed as the estimated number o f latent fata l cancers expc:cled in the impacted populalio n IS a res ult of
the radi3tion dose; fo r the max..imally exposed individua l, results express lhe probability of contracting fatal cancer U I
rcsult of the radiation dose . Fata l cance r risk faclo r: 5 X 10-4 fatal cancers pe r person-rem (lCRP 199 1).
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Table 1-44. SNF transportation accident risks for RegionaJization by Geography (Nevada Test Site
and Savannah River Site) (1995 to 2035).
T ransport mode

(person-rem)

Latent
cancer Catalities'

T raffic
Calalitiesb

Truck

2 .0

O.OO tO

0.38

Rail

0 .61

0.0003

0.30

Dose risk

I.

Estimated number of latent fatal cancen as

I

result of radiation dose (rom lransportation accidents.

Table 1-45. Health effects from maximum reasonably foreseeable offsite SNF transportatio n accident
under RegionaJization by Geography (Nevada Test Site and Savannah River Site) (1995 to 2035).
Alternative: Rcgionalization by Geogn.phy (NTS &: SRS)
Mnim um reasonably fo reseeable accident: Special-CllSC commercial SNF shipment by rail
Population zone: Suburban (neutnll) and rural (stable)·
1
Maximum reasonably fo reseeable accident probability: 3 .7 x 10-7 per year with nc:ull1l1 meteorology . 3 .3 )( 10' ~r
year with stable metcorology

effects

Do.e

Population' __.,--_____
Maximum -;:-_
exposed individual
T ransport _ _ _ _-:-......:..2.:==
____-;-__
mode
Neutral b
Stab Icc
Neutral b
Stab Icc
54 rem

Rail

Latent cancer
ratalitiesd

0.027

- - - - - Rail

180 rem

0.09

a . The rnuimum reuonab ly forc:sccable acc idcnt occurs in a suburban popUlation zone under neutral weather
co nditions . The accident probability is less than I x 10-7 pe r yea r under stable weather co nditio ns , except in a rural
popub.tion zone . For urban population zones, the accidcnt probability is less than 1 x 10-7 per yea r fo r both neutral and
stable weather conditions .
b . Neutral meteorological conditions occu r greater than SO perccnt o f the time .
c . Stable meteorological conditions occur leu than 5 percent o f the time and result in less atmospheric d ispersio n o f
radioactivity releued to the atmosphere .
d , Result. expressed as the e.5timated number of latent fata l cancen expected in the impacted populatio n as a resu lt o f
the ndiation dose; for the maximally exposed individ ual. resu lll expresl the probability o f contracting fatal cancer 1.1 a
result of the nadiatior. dose . Fatal cancer risk facto r: S x 10'" fatal eaneen per person-rem (lCRP 1991).
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Dose risk
(person-rem)

Latent
canccr fatalitics'

Traffic
fatalities b

Truck

2. 1

0.0011

0.39

Rail

0.42

0.0002

0.30

Transport mode

a. Estimated number o f latent fata l cancen as a result of radiation dose from transportation accident.! .

b. Estimated number of fatalities from nonradiological effect of transportation accident, fot example, physical impact.

Doses and hea lth

Table 1-46. SNF transportation accident risks for RegionaJization by Geography (Nevada Test Site
and Oak Ridge Reservation) (1995 to 2035) .

b. Estimated number o f fatalities from non radio logical effect of transportation accident, for example , physical impsct.

Table 1-47. Health effects from maximum reasonably foreseeable offsite SNF transportation accident
under RegionaJizat ion by Geography (Nevada Test Site and Oak Ridge Reservation) (1995 to 2035).
Altcm:ative : Regionalization by Geography (NTS &. ORR)
Maximum reasonably foreseeable accident: Spccial-c:asc commercial SNF shipment by rail
Population zone: Suburban (neulnl) and ru ral (stable)a
Maximum rcaso n3bly fo reseeable accident probability: 3.6 x 10-7 per year with neutral meteorology , 3 .3 x 10-7 per
YCll r \\oith st3ble metcorology
Doscs and hClllth
effcctl
Dosc

Transport _ _ _ _-:--'p,,=PU:.;.Ia:.;.li:on:.:.a
.:. _ _ .,--_ _:.;.M"'
axun
"'·= um
-'c-';
xpo
= 'e:..:d...;in:.;.d:.;.iv_id
.;.U
...;4.;.1_-,-_ _
mode
Neutral b
Stablee
Neutral b
Stab lee
Rail

Latent cancer
fllLSlitiesd

- - - - Rail

54 rem

180 rem

0.027

0.09

a . The maximum rcason:ab ly fo reseeable accident occ urs in a subum.n popu lal~ n zone under neutnl weathcr
conditions . The accident probability is less than 1 x 10-7 pe r year under stable weathe r conditions. except in a ru m l
popul3tion zone. For urb:. n popul:ation lones, the accident probability is Icss than 1 x 10-7 per yea r fo r both neutml and
sl:.b1e weathe r conditions .
b. Ncutral metcorological conditions occu r greate r than SO percent o f the time .
e . Stablc metcorological conditions occur Icss thsn S percent o f the time and result in less atmospheric dispersion of
radioactivity released to the atmosphere.
d . Resultl expressed as the estimated number o f latent fat.a l cancen expected in the impacted popu lation as a result of
the radia lion dose; for the maximally c:xposed indiv idua l. resultl express the p robability o f contracting fata l cance r as a
result o f the radiation dosc . Fata l ca ncc:r risk faclo r: 5 x 10'" fata l cancen per penon-rem (ICRP 1991 ).
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Table 1-48. SNF transportation accident risks for the Centralization at the Hanford Site alternative
(1995 to 2035).
Dosc risk

Traffic

T ransport mod.:

(person-rem)

Latent
cancer fatalities'

Truck

9.9

0 .0050

0 .57

Rail

2.5

0 .0013

0.52

Catalitiesb

a. Esti.ma1cd number of latent ratal cancers u a result of radiation dose from transportation accidents .
b . Estimated number of fatalities from nonradiological effect of transportation accident , (o r example, physical impact.

Table 1-49. Health effects from maximum reasonably foreseeable offsite SNF transportation accident
under the Centralization at the Hanford Site alternative (1995 to 2035) .
Alternative: Centralization at lhe Hanford Site
Maximum reasonably foreseeable accident: Spccial-c.asc commercial SNF shipment by rail
Population zone: Suburban (neutral) and Runt (stable)·
Maximum reasonably foreseeable accident probability: 5.1 x 10.7 per year with neutral meteorology, 3 .6 x 10.7 per
year with stable rnctcoroloeJ
Doses and health
e((ects

Transport
mode

Dose

Rail

Latent canc:cr
ratalitiesd

Rail

Population-

summarizes the doses and health effects fro m th e max imum reasonably foreseeable consequence
assessment.

Maximum exposed individual

Neutral b

StableC

Neutralb

StableC

13 ,000 person-rem

3,500 person-rem

54 rem

180 rem

0 .027

0.09

1·5.3.5.2 Centrtl/ization at the Idaho National EngIneering Laboratory. Under this
al ternative, al l SNF currently stored at other DOE sites, Fort St. Vrain, and un iversity, foreign. and
non·DOE research reactors is eventu all y transported to the Idaho National Engineeri ng Laboratory.
The analysis evaluates impacts assu ming either all shipments by truck or all shipments by rail.
The cumulative accide nt risk fo r transpo rtation by tru ck was calculated to be 0.0048 latent
cancer fatality and 0 .49 traffic fatality. The cumulative accident risk measu res the total impact of
transportation accidents over the entire shipment campaign (1995 to 2035) . The cumulative accident
risk fo r transportation by rail was calculated to be 0 .0012 latent cancer fatal ity and 0.44 traffic
fatality. Table 1·50 summarizes the transportation accident risks for the Centralization at the Idaho
National Engineeri ng Laboratory alternative.
As in the 199211993 Planning Basis and Regionalization 4A and 4B al ternatives. the
maximum reasonably fo reseeable transpo rtation accident involves a rail shipment of special·case
commercial SNF. The accident has a probability of occ urring of about 4.7 x 10.7 per year under
neutral (no rmal) weather conditions and about 3.3 x 10.7 per year under stable (worst·case) weather
conditions. The consequen ces are th e same as those described und er Regionalization by Geography
alternative. Table 1·51 summarizes the doses and health effects fro m the maximum reasonably
foreseeable consequence assessment.

1·5.3.5.3 Centrtl/ization at Savannah River Site. Under this alternative. SNF currentl y

• . The: maximum reasonably foreseeable accident occun in • suburban population zone under neutral weather
conditions. The accident probability is less than 1 )( 10.1 per year under stable weather conditions. except in a rural
population zone. For urban population lones , the accident prob:ability is less than 1 )( 10.1 per yea r (or both nculml
and stable weather conditions .
b. Neutra l meteorological conditions occur greater than SO percent of the time.

c. Stable mc:tcorotogieal eonditions occur less than S percent of the time and result in tess atmospheric dispersion of
ndtoactivity released to the atmolphere .
d . Results expressed u the estimated number o f latent fatal caneen expected in the impacted population as a result of
the ndialion dose; fo r the muimaUy exposed individual. results express the probability of contracting fatal cancer IS a
result of the radialio n dose . Fata l cancer risle: (actor: S )( 10-4 (ata l cancers per person· rem (1CRP 1991).

sto red at other DOE si tes, Fon SI. Vrain , university, fo reign. and non·DOE research reactors is
eve ntual ly transported to the Savannah Ri ver Site. The analysis evaluates impacts assuming either all
shipments by tru ck or all shipments by rail.
The cumulative accident risk for transponation by truck was calculated to be 0.0016 latent
cancer fatality and C.84 traffic fatali ty. The cumul ative accident risk measures the total impact of
transportation accidents over the entire shipment campaig n (1995 to 2035). The cu mulat ive accident
risk for transponation by rail was calculated to be 0.0004 latent cancer fatality and 0.49 traffic
fatality. Table 1·52 summarizes the transponation accident risks for the Centralization at Savannah
River Site alternative.
As in the 199211993 Planning Basis and Regionalization alternatives , th e maximum reaso nably
fo reseeable transponation accident involves a rail shipment of special·case co mmercial SNF . The
maxi mum reasonahly foreseeable accident under neutral (normal ) weather conditions occurs in an
urban population zone and has a probability of occurrence of about 1.7 x 10.7 per year. A total
population dose of 72.000 person· rem was estimated (average dose of 27 millirem per person), which
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Table I-50. SNF transponation accident risks for the Centralization at the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory altern at ive (1995 to 2035).
Dose risk

Latent

(person-rem)

cancer fatalities'

T raffic
fal9.tilies b

Truck

9.S

0 .0048

0 .49

Rail

2.4

0 .00 12

0.44

Transport mode

a. Estim:lted number of 13tent fatal cancers as

I

result o f radiation dose from transpo rtatio n accidents .

could resull in an estimated 36 latent cancer fatal ities. For comparison, the same populalion would be
expeeled to experience aboul 540.000 latent cancer fatalilies from other causes .
The maxi mum reasonably foreseeable accident under stable (worst-case) weather conditions
occurs in a suburban population zone and has a probabilily of occurring of about 1.2 x 10.7 per
year. A tOlal popul atio n dose of 110,000 person-rem was estimated (average dose of 0.53 rem per
person). which could result in an estimated 55 latent cancer fatalities. For comparison, the same
popul atio n would be expected to experience about 42,000 latent cancer fatalities from other causes.

b. Estimated number of fatalities fro m nonradio logicai effect o f transportation accident. (or example. physica l imPlct.

Tab le I-53 summarizes the doses and health effects from the maximum reasonab ly foreseeable
consequence assess menl.

Table I-51. Health effeclS from maximum reasonably foreseeable offsite SNF transponation acc ident
under the Cenlralization al the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory allernative (1995 10 2035) .
Alternalive: : Centralization at the Idaho National Engineering Labontory
Mu.imum re3.son:J.bly forc:see:lblc accident: Spcc is l-case commercial SNF shipment by nil
Popul:Hion zone: Suburban (neutral) and rural (stable)'
Mnin'lum reasonably foreseeable accident probability: 4.7 x 10-1 per year with neutral meteorology. 3 .3 )( 10. 7 per
year with stable meteorology

Doses and health

Transpo rt _ _ _ _~Po~P=ULt=I=
io.;;n·-------...;M-=.lUITl=
· .:;u=m::....:cx::!po::::.cd::...:in.;;d=iv=id:.:u=.I~_

effects

Dose

mode

Rail

Neutral b

StableC

Neutral b

StableC

13,000 pcrson-rcm

3,500 penon-n:m

54 rem

180 rem

0 .027

0 .09

Lalent ca ncer

facilities d

-----

Ra il

.0The maximum re:uonably foreseeable accident occurs in • suburb4n popUlatio n zone under neutral weather

conditions. The accident probability is less than I x 10.1 per year under stable weather conditions. except: in • rul'3l
population zone . Fo r uman popUlation 7..ones , the accident probability is les. than I x 10. 7 per year (o r both ncutnl
and stable weather co nd itions .

/-5.3.5.4 Centralization at Oak Ridge Reservation. Under this alternalive, SNF
currently stored at other DOE sites. Fo n SI. Vrain. universilY, foreign , and non-DOE research
reactors is eventually Iransponed to the Oak Ridge Reservation. The analysis eval uates impacts
assum ing either all shipmenlS by lruck o r all shipmenls by rail.
The cumul ative accident risk for transponation by truck was calculated to be 0.0014 latent
cancer fatality and 0.78 traffic fatality . The cumulati ve accidenl risk measu res the tOlal impact of
Iransponation accidenlS over the ent ire shipment campaign (1995 to 2035). The cumulalive acc idenl
risk for transpo nation by rail was calculated 10 be 0.0003 latent cancer fatality and 0.43 Iraffic
fatali ty. Table I-54 summarizes the transponation accident risks for the Centralizat ion al Oak Ridge
Reservation alternative.
As in the 199211993 Plan ning Basis and Reg ionalization altern at ives, the maximum reasonably
foreseeab le Iransponation accidenl involves a rail shipment of special-case commercial SNF. The
maximum reasonably foreseeable accidenl under neutral (normal ) weather conditions occurs in an
urban population zone and has a probability of occurring of abou t 1. 1 x 10.7 per year . The accident
consequences are the same as those described for the urban zone accidenl under the Cenlralization al
Savannah Rive r Site alternalive .

b. NC'utrJI meteorologica l conditions occur greater than SO percent of the time .
c . Sl.lIblc meteorologica l conditions occu r less lh3n 5 percent or the time and result in leu atmo sphc:ric dispe rsion of
f'3dio ilclivity released to the: Itmosphere .
d . Results expressed as the estimated number o f latent (atal clnccrs expected in the imP3Cted popUlation as a result o(
the I'3di3tion dose; (or the mu.imally ellposed ind ividua l. ~sults ellprcu the probllbility o( contracting (3ta l C3ncc r as a
result o( the radiation dose . Fatal cance r risk factor: S x 104 falal cancers pcr pcrson·~m (ICRP 1991 ).

The maximum reasonabl y foreseeable accident under slable (wo rst-case) weather conditions
occurs in a rural population zone and has a probabi lilY of occurring of about 5.7 x 10.7 per year.
The accidenl consequences are the same as those described for the rural zone accident under the
Regionalization by Geography allernative.
Table I-55 summarizes the doses and health effects from the maximum reasonably foreseeable
co nsequence assessment .
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Table I-52. SNF transportation accident risks for the Centralization at the Savannah River Site
alternative (1995 to 2035).

Table I-54. SNF transportation accide nt risks for the Centralization at the Oak Ridge Reservation
alternative (1995 to 2035).

Dose Risk

Latent

(person-rem)

cancer fatalities·

T raffic
rataliticsb

Tronsport mode

Truck

3. t

0 .OOt6

0.84

Rail

0.80

0 .0004

0.49

Tnnsport mode

Dose Risk
(person-rem)

Latent
cancer fatalities'

Troffie
faL1lities b

Truck

2.8

0 .001'

0.78

Rail

0 .52

0 .0003

0.43

a . Estimated number of lalent ratal cancers as • rcll ult of radiation dose from transportation accidents .

a . Estimated number of latcnt (aL1) canccrs as a result of r:ldiation dose from tnlnsporution accidents .

b. Estimated number of fatalities from nonradiological effect of transportation accident. for c:u mple. physical impact.

b. Estimated number of fata lities fro m non radiological effect o ( transportation accident. (or example. physical impact.

Table I-53. Health effects from maximum reasonably foreseeable offsite SNF transportation accident
under the Centralization at the Savannah River Site alternati ve (1995 to 2035).
Alternative:

Ccnln.l izal~n

al the Savannah Rivc:r Site

Maximum reasonably fo reseeable accident: Spccial-c&Jc commercial SNF shipment by rail
Population zone: Urban (neutral) and Suburban (sable)·
Maximum reasonably fo reseeable accident probability : 1.7 x 1?'7 per year with neutral meteorology. 1. 2 x 10. 7 per
year with stable meteorology
Doses and health
cITects

Do ..
Latent cancer
fatalitiesd

T ransport
mode
Rail

Population·
Ncutral b

Stable

72 .000 person-rem

110.000 person-rem

C

Maximum exposed individual
Ncutral b

Stablec

54 rcm

180 rem

Table I-55. Health effects from maximum reasonably foreseeable offsite SNF transportation accident
under the Centralization at the Oak Ridge Reservation alternati ve (1995 to 2035).
Altem:!.tive : Centralizatio n at the Oalc Ridge Reservation
",h,umum reaso nably foreseeable accident : Spccial<ase co mmereial SNF shipment by rail
Popu1:llion zone : Urban (neutral) and rural (stable)·
Maximum reaso nably foreseeable accident probability: 1.1 X 10.1 per year with neutral meteorology, 5 .7 x 10.7 per
YC3r with stable meteorology
Doses and hC3 lth
effects

Rail

SS

36

0.027

0.09

a The maximum reasonably foreseeable accident occurs in an urban population zone under neutral weather conditions .
The probability o f the accident in an urban zone under stable weather co nditions is less than 1 )( 10.1 per year. The
maximum reaso nably fo reseeable accident for stable weather conditions occ urs in a suburoan population zonc .
b. Neutral meteorologic. I co nditions occu r greater tha n 50 pe rccnt of the timc .
c . Stable meteoroJogica l conditio ns occ ur less tha n 5 percent of the timc and n:sult in less atmospheric dispersion o f
radioactivity relelSed to the atl'T"'Osphere.
d Results expressed IS the estimated number o f latent fatal cancers cxr ·t led in the impacted populatio n as • result o f
the radiation ::Sose ; fo r the maximally e :~ posed individual. results express the probability o f co ntracting f.LaI c. ncc r as •
4
resutt o( the radiation dose . Fatal canter risk fa c' r: 5 x 10 (ata l ca nce rs per person- rem (ICRP 1991).

Transport
mode

Population'

~'1 !u.imum

exposed individu:l1

Neutr:ll b

Stablec

Neutral b

Sl.:lblec

3.500 person-rem

54 rem

180 rem

0.027

0.09

Dose

R.1iJ

72.000 person·rem

L3tcnt C.1nce r
f:!.Ulities d

R.1i l

36

4 . The maximum rcason:.bly fo reseeab le accident occurs in I n urban population lone undcr neulf'lll weather conditions .
The accident probability unde r sl.3ble wC3thc r cond itions is less than 1 x 10. 7 per YC3r, excel" in a rural popul:ltion
lone .

b. Neutra l meteorolog ic:!.1 comJitions occu r greate r tha n 50 pcrecnt of the time .
c . Sub Ie meteorologica l conditions occu r Icss th3n 5 percent o f the lime and resu lt in less atmosphc ric d ispers ion o f
r:!.dioacli \'ity releascd to the atmosphe re .
d . Rcsults cxp ressed as the estimated numbe r of 13tenl (:rota! c3nce rs expectcd in the imp3cted population .s a result o f
thc rodiation dose; (or the m.lxim311y e);posed individual. results cxpress the probability of contracting fatal cance r as It
4
resu lt of the n dialion dose. Faul cancer risk (acto r: 5 )( 10 fata l cance rs pcr perso n·rem (lC RP 199 1).

VOLUME I. APPENDIX I

1· 106

~15

1-107

VOLUM E 1. APPENDL'C I

/-5.3.5.5 Centralization at Nevada Test Site. Under this alternative. SNF
currently stored at other DOE sites. Fort St. Vrain. university, foreign. and non-DOE research
reactors is eventually transported to the Nevada Test Site. The analysis evaluates impacts assuming
either all shipments by truck or all shipments by rail.

The cumulative accident risk for transportation by truck was calculated to be 0.0050 latent
cancer fatality and 0.72 traffic fatality. The cumulative accident risk measures the total impact of
transportation accidents over the entire shipment campaign (1995 to 2035). The cumulative accident
risk for transportation by rail was calculated to be 0.0012 latent cancer fatality and 0.58 traffic
fatality. Table I-56 summarizes the transportation accident risks for the Centralization at Nevada Test
Site alternative.
As in the 1992 / 1993 Planning Basis and Regionalization alternatives, the maximum reasonably
foreseeable transportation accident involves a rail shipment of special-case commercial SNF . The
accident has a probability of occurring of about 1.0 x 10.7 per year under neutral (normal) weather
conditions in a suburban population zone and about 5.0 x 10.7 per year under stable (worst-case)
weather conditions in a rural population zone. The consequences are the same as those described
under the Regionalization by Geography allernative. Table I-57 summarizes the doses and health
effects from the maximum reasonably foreseeable consequence assessment.
1-5.3.6 Impacts of Using Alternate Points of Entry for Foreign Research Reactor Spent
Nuclear Fuel Shipments

For transportation accident risks (radiological and vehicle-related), shipments from
Jacksonville. Florida. to the Hanford Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Savannah River
Site. Oak Ridge Res.,rvation. and Nevada Test Site would yield lower impacts than shipments from
Charleston. South Car ~ lina , Galveston. Texas, Hampton Roads, Virginia. Savannah , Georgia, and the
Military Ocean Termi nal. Sunny Point . North Carolina. to these same sites. Shipments from
Wilmington. North Carolina. to the Savannah River Site and Oak Ridge Reservation would also yield
lower impacts than shipments from Charleston . South Carolina. Galveston, Texas, Hampton Roads.
Virginia, Savannah. Georgia. and the Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point, North Carolina. to these
same sites. Sh ipments from Wilmington, North Carolina. to the Hanford Site. Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory, and Nevada Test Site would yield slightly higher impacts (about
6 percent) than shipments from Charleston. South Carolina. Galveston. Texas, Hampton Roads.
Virginia. Savannah. Georgia. and the Mil itary Ocean Terminal. Sunny Point. North Carolina. to these

Table I-56. SNF transportation accident risks fo r the Centralization at the Nevada Test Site
alternative (1995 to 2035).
Transport mode

Dose Risk
(person-rem)

Latent
cancc:r fatalities·

Nonradiological
(ataLities b

Truck

10.0

0 .0050

0.72

Rail

2.4

0 .0012

0.58

a. Estimated number of blc:nl fatal cancers as a rc:,ult of radiation dose from transportation accidents.
b. Estimated number of fatalities from nonradioiogica l effect of transportation accident, for example . physical impact.

Table I-57. Health effects from maximum reasonably foreseeable offsite SNF transportation accident
under the Centralization at the Nevada Test ~Ite alternative (1995 to 2035).
Alternative : Centralization at the Nevada Test Site
Maximum reaso nably foreseeable accident: Special-c:u:e commercial SNF shipment by rail
Popul3tion zone: Urban (ncutral) and Rural (stable)a
Maximum reasonably foreseeab le accidcnt probability: 1.0)( 10-7 per year with neulrs l meteorology , 5.0 )( 10.7 per
yea r with stable meteorology
Doses and health
effects

Transport
mode

PopUlation"

Maximum exposed indi\'idua l

Neutral b

Stablec

Neuln..l b

Sublec

3.500 person-rem

54 rem

180 rem

0.027

0 .09

Dosc

Ra il

n,ooo person-rem

utent C3ncer
fau litiesd

Rail

36

a. T ho.: ma:Wnum rc1sonab ly foreseeable accident occurs in an urban population zone unde r neutral weather conditions .

The accident probability is less thnn 1 X 10-7 per yea r under s13.ble wC3thcr conditions. except in • NT31 popUlation
lone: .
b. N\!utra l mctl!o rological cond itio ns occur greater than 50 percent o f the time .

c. SUbie meteorologica l cond itions occur less thL:.n 5 pereent of !.he time and result in less atmospheric dispers ion of
rud ioactiv ity released to !.he atmosphere .
d . Results upn:ssed as the estUnlited number o f latent fata l cancen expected in the imp.1cted popUlation as a result o f
the rnd iation dose; fo r the maximally exposed individua l. results express the probability of contracting fl11.31 cancer as a
resu lt of the radiation dose. Fata l cance r risk racto r: 5 x 10 4 rami cancers pcr peno n-rem (ICRP 199 1).

same sites.
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1-6 POTENTIAL MITIGATION MEASURES
The possible impacts fro m transponation associated with the alternatives could b~ mitigated in
a number of different ways . For example, the routes used for truck ship ments could be chosen using
U.S. Depanment of Transponation routing guidelines. These guidelines are designed to reduce the
radiological impacts associated with transponation. The guidelines consider as primary fac tors (a) the
radiation exposure from incident-free transpon, (b) the risk to general population from an accidental
release of radioactive material , and (e) the economic risk from an acc idental release of radioactive
material. The guideli nes consider as secondary factors (a) emergency response effectiveness,
(b) evacuation capabilities, (c) location of special facilities such as schools or hospitals, and (d) traffic
fatalities and injuries unrelated to the radioactive nature of the cargo.
Impact mitigation is also provided through the use of approved shipp ing comainers. For
shipments containing large amounts of radioactivity, such as SNF, Type B contai ners will be used.
These containers are designed to withstand normal transpon conditio ns and hypothetical accident
conditions.
If an accident did occur, Federal, state, local, and Tribal authorities are trained in emerge"cy
response. For example, the Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, the State of Idaho , Bingham County, Bingham
Memorial Hospital, Bannock Reg ional Medical Center, Pocatello Regional Medical Center, Idaho
Power Co mpany, Intermountain Gas Company, and the U.S. Depanment of Energy panicipated in a
comprehensive, cooperative Transponation Accident Exercise held in Idaho in 1992 (TRANSAX '92).
The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency has developed protective action guides (EPA
1991) and protective actions that are designed to limit doses in the event of a nuclear incident. Use
of these guides and actio ns also mitigates the impacts of transponation accidents involvi ng radioactive
material .

1-7 SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL TRANSPORTATION BY BARGE
As an alternative to truck or rai l transpon of SNF, barge transpon of 71 SNF shipments from
Brookhaven National Laboratory. located on Long Island, New York, to the Savannah River Site was
evaluated. This section summarizes the impacts from transponing the 71 shipments from Brookhaven
National Laboratory to the Savannah River Site.

1-7.1 Transportation Routes
Several routing options were evaluated for the barge
Laboratory to the Savannah River Site:

sh i ~ ments

from Brookhaven National

Truck transpon from Brookhaven National Laboratory to the Shoreham, New York,
dock or Pon Jefferson, New York. Shoreham and Pon Jefferson are both located on
Long Island near Brookhaven National Laboratory .
Barge transport from Shoreham or Pon Jefferson, New York, to Hampton Roads,
Virginia; the Military Ocean Terminal , Sunny Point, Nonh Carolina; Charleston,
South Carolina; Savannah , Georgia; or directly to the Savannah River Site.
Truck transpon from Hampton Roads, Virginia; the Military Ocean Terminal , Sunny
Point, Nonh Carolina; Charleston , South Carolina; or Savannah , Georgia to the
Savannah River Site.
The HIGHWAY computer code (Johnson et al . 1993a) was used to estimate the truck routes
and the INTERLINE computer code (Johnson et al. 1993b) was used to estimate the barge routes.
The truck and barge routes are summarized in Pippen (1995).

1-7,2 Incident-Free Transportation
Incident-free transt>Onation assessments were conducted for barge shipments from Brookhaven
National Laboratory to the Savannah Ri ver Site and included transpon by truck, transpon by barge,
and intermodal transfers (e.g" truck to barge and barge to tru ck transfers). The mtthods and data
used to estimate the radiolog ical and nonradiological impacts of these shi pments are discussed in
Pipp~n ( 1995).
For barge shipments using the Shoreham, New Yo rk, dock as a point of departure from Long
Island, the cumulative number of total fatalities (radiological plus nonradiological fatalities) ranged
from 0.0048 to 0 .0092 . The lower number of fatalities was estimated when the barge shipments were
made directly to the Savannah Rive, Site. The larger number of fatalities was estimated when the

VOLUME I. APPENDIX I

1-110

I- III

VOLUME I. APPENDC< I

barge shipments were made from Brookhaven National Laborato ry to Shoreh am. New York. to
Hampto n Roads. Virginia . 10 the Savannah Ri ver Site.
For barge shipments us ing Pon Jefferson. New York. as a po int of depanure from Lo ng
Island . the cumulative number of IO tal fatalities (radiological plus no nradiological fatalities) ranged
from 0 .OOS2 to 0.0093 . The lower number of fatalities was estimated when the barge shipments were
made directly to the Savannah Ri ver Site. The larger number of fatalities was estimated when the
barge shipments were made from Brookhaven National Laboratory to Pon Jefferson 10 Hampton
Roads. Virginia. to the Savannah River Site.

1-7.3 Transportation Accidents
Transpon atio n accident assessments were condu cted for barge shipments from Brookhaven
National Laboratory to the Savannah River Site. These assessmen!s included evaluations of accident
risks (both radiological risks and traffic fatalities) and accident consequences . The methods and data
used to estimate the accident risks and consequences of these shipments are discussed in Pippen
( I99S).
For barge shipments using the Shoreham. New York . dock as a po int of depanure from Long
Island. the cumulative accident risk (radiological plus nonradio logical fatalities) ranged from 0.0011
to 0 .0019. The lower number of fatalities was estimated when the barge shipments were made
directly to the Savannah River Site. The larger number of fatalities was estimated when the barge
shipments were made from Brookhaven National LaboralOry to Shoreham. New York, to HamplOn
Roads. Virginia. to the Savannah Ri ver Site.
For barge shipments using Pon Jefferson, New York. as a po int of depanure from Long
Island. the cumulative accident risk (rad iological plus nonradio logical fatalities) ranged from 0.00087
10 0.0018. The lower number of fatalities was estimated when the barge shipments were made
directly to the Savannah River Site. The larger number of fatalities was estimated when the barge
shipments were made from Brookhaven Natio nal Laboratory to Shoreham. New York , to Hampton
Roads. Virginia. to the Savannah River Site.
The consequences of the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident for barge shipments were
less than the consequences of the maximum reasonably foreseeable accident for truck shipments. as
discussed in Section I-S. This was because the barge routes are funh er from populatio ns than tru ck
routes.

1-8 TRANSPORTATION IMPACTS OF
FOREIGN PROCESSING OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL
CURRENTLY LOCATED AT THE HANFORD SITE
This section summarizes the transponation impacts of processing the Hanford Site N-Reactor
SNF at a foreign processing facility . The detailed assessment of this transponation option, including
a description of the foreign processing option anJ the methods and assumptions used in the analysis,
is contained in Volume I , Appendix A, Anachment B of this EIS.

1-8.1 Radiological Dose to Workers
This subsection describes expected radiological consequences to workers during transponation
of N-Reactor SNF currently slOred at the Hanford Site. The transponation analysis included shipment
from the Hanford Site to representative West and East Coast points of entry (portland . Oregon;
Seanle, Washington; and Norfolk, Virginia) followed by overseas transport to a representative
commercial processing facility in the United Kingdom . Overland shipment by barge, truck, or rail
was considered as appropriate for each point of entry.

1-8.1.1 Worker Dose from Shipment Preparation Activities at the Hanford Site
Packaging of the K Basin fuel fo r overseas shipment was estimated to result in worker doses
of app roximately 140 person-rem (S.5 x 10.2 latent cancer fatalities) over a period of approximately
2 years. However, if stabilization o~ the fuel befo re transport were necessary, an additional
180 person-rem might be accumulated by onsite workers over a 4-year period, resulting in
7.0 x 10.2 latent cancer fatalities . Consequences of fuel-handling accidents of the K basins are
addressed in Volume I , Appendix A.

1.8.1.2 Worker Doses from Transportation
Collective worker impacts from incident-free transportation were estimated to range from
1.3 x 10') latent cancer fatalities for barge transportation between the Hanford Site and the point of
entry at Portland , Oregoll . to 4.3 x 10.2 latent cancer fatalities for the option of transport by truck
between the Hanford Site and the point of entry at Norfolk . Virginia. These impacts account for
transport of SNF leaving the Hanford Site as well as the return transpo rt of high-level waste,
plutonium oxide. and uranium ox ide.
Radio logical consequences to workers fro m activities at the point of entry for transport of
SNF to the United Kingdom were evaluated based on commercial experi ence during the last 9 months
of 1994. The consequences for loading and unl oading 408 casks during shipment from the United
States to the United Kingdom were estimated to be approxi mately 1.2 person-rem to all workers over
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the expected 5-year campaign . An additional two fuel -handling activities per cask at the Hanford Site
and at the United Kingdom process facility would approximately doub le that estimate, res ulting in a
colleetive dose of 2.4 person-rem and a potential for 9.8 X 104 latent cancer fatalities for all
shipments. The maximum dose to an individual worker, assuming that worker was involved in
handling all 408 casks at one point in the shipping sequence, would be approximately 0.4 rem over
5 years .
The consequences to a nearby worker were evaluated for accidents at, or on the approach to ,
the representative points of entry considered in the overland transportation analysis. In addition, the
point of entry at Newark, New Jersey, was included in this part of the analysis because of its large
surrounding population (it is adjacent to New York City) whereas the other points of entry are located
in smaller population centers. The consequences of the maximum reasonably foroseeable accident
(frequency> I x 10-7 per year) to a worker at a distance of 100 meters (328 feet) ranged from
1.7 rem (6.8 x 104 latent cancer fatalities) at Sear.lerracoma, Washington, to 2. 1 rem
(8.4 x 10-4 latent cancer fatalities) at Portland , Oregon, or Norfolk, Virginia. The corresponding
total risks from accidents of all severity categories for 17 SNF shipments were 8.0 x 10-9 latent
cancer fatalities at Seanlerracoma to 1.0 x 10-8 latent cancer fatalities at Norfolk or Portland.
Radiological consequences were estimated for workers as a result of normal transport
operations and accidents during overseas shipments of SNF from the Hanford Site to the United
Kingdom. The primary impact of routine (i ncident-free) marine transport of SNF would be potential
radiological exposure to crew members of the ships used to carry the casks. While at sea, the crew
dose would be limited to those individuals who may enter the ship's hold during transit and receive
external radiat ion in the vicinity of the packaged fuel. The consequences to crew members would
depend on the duration of the voyage and the time spent inspecting each cask . Assuming surface dose
rates at the regulatory li mit , the collective dose to the inspection crew from all SNF shipments could
range from 2.4 to 12 person-rem, depending on the routing. Return shipments of high-level waste,
uranium, and plutonium would result in lower doses to the crew. All doses to individual crew
members would be within ad ministrative control and regulatory limits for radiation workers. Actual
commercial experience indicates that worker consequences could be much lower than these bounding
estimates .
The consequences of accidents during ocean transit wou ld likely be similar to those of point
of entry workers who are near the scene of an acc ident. Individuals in the immedia.te vicinity of the
impact would probably not survive an accident severe enough to release radioactive materials from a
SNF shipping cask. Effects on the ocean environmen t would not be ex pected to be discernable
beeause of dispersion during an airborne release.
The frequency of accidents o n the open ocean was estimated to be 4.6 x 10-5 for an average
duration voyage of approxima:ely 20 days to transport SNF from foreign research reactors to the
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United States . The frequency of acc idents for overseas shipment of SNF and process materials via
ships built for this purpose w~uld likely be within a factor of 2 or 3 of this estimate.

1-8.2 Consequences to Members of the Public
This subsection describes expected consequences to the public from activities required to
transport N-Reactor SNF to the United Kingdom .
1-3.2.1 Public Impacts from Shipment Preparation Activities at the Hanford Site
Activities at the Hanford Site before and during preparation for shipment of N-Reactor SNF
would result in generally small consequences to the public, as discussed in Volume I , Appendix A, of
this EIS . Removal and packaging of SNF at the K Basins was estimated to result in offsite
consequences comparable to those observed during initial segregation of the fuel , or less than
3 x 10_ 7 rem (1.5 x 10- 10 probability of latent cancer fatalities) to the maximally exposed offsite
individual. The risk from accidents involving handling of N-Reactor fuel at the K Basins is presented
in Volume I, Appendix A, of this EIS .
1-3,2.2 Public Impacts from Transportation Activities
Members of the publ ic exposed to radiation during transportation include persons on the
highway, railroad , or waterway with the shipment; persons residing near these transport links; and
persons at intermediate stops along the route (such as refueling stops and stops at rail classification
yards) .
Public impacts from incident-free transportatioll include radiological impacts from direct
rad iatio n as well as nonradiological impacts from vehicle emissions . Radiological impacts from
incident-free transportation were estimated to range from 2. 1 x 104 latent cancer fatalities for barge
transportation between the Hanford Site and the point of entry at Portland , Oregon, to 1.3 x 10-1
latent cancer fatalities for the option of transport by tru ck between the Hanfo rd Site and the point of
entry at Norfolk, Virginia. Nonradiological impacts from incident-free transportation were estimated
to range fro m 1.2 x 10-) latent cancer fatalities for the option of truck transport from the Hanford
Site to the point of entry at Seaulerracoma, Washington, to 1.6 x 10-2 latent cancer fatalities for the
opti on of tru ck transport fro m the Hanford Site to the point of entry at Norfolk, Virginia .
Public impacts from potential transportation accidents include radiologi cal risks from
radioactive materials that could be released to the envi ronment as well as nonradiological risks
associated with traffic accidents (i .e., vehicle collisions). Cumulati ve radiological transportation
accident risks range from 1.8 x 10-6 latent cancer fatalities for the optio n of ra il transport between
the Hanford Site and the point of entry at Seanlerracoma, Washington, to 4.2 x 10-5 latent cancer
fatalities for either truck or rail transport between the Hanford Site and the point of entry at Norfolk,
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Virginia. Traffic accident risks range from 8.9 x 10·) fatalities for the option of truck transport
between the Hanford Site and th e point of entry at Seanlerracoma, Washington, to 1. 3 x 10. 1
fatalities for the option of truck transpo rt between th e Hanford Site and the point of entry at Norfo lk,

1-9 HISTORICAL SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL TRANSPORTATION
ACCIDENTS

Virginia.
Transportation incidents fo r 1949 through 1970 were surveyed using summary reports
The maxi mum reasonabl y foreseeable transpo rtation acc ident involves a return shipment of
high-level waste transported by rail from th e point of entry at Seattlerracoma, Washington, to th e
Hanfo rd Site . If this accident were to occur in an urban population wne, it could result in an
estimated one latent cancer fatality within th e affected population. The probability of this accident is
about I. 3 x 10.7 per year.
Normal port activities during transport of N-Reactor SNF are not ex pected to have any
consequences for members of the public oth er than poi nt of entry workers. The consequences to the
public fro m accidents during point of entry transit were estimated using the same assumptions as for
worker consequences. The highest risk to the public from point of entry activities was estimated to
result fro m accidents at the dock. Under staNe atmospheric dispersion conditions, the maxi mum risk
to the public was estimated to be 8.4 x 10.5 latent cancer fatalities. The maximum foreseeable
accident resulted in an estimated 380 latent cancer fatalities in the population within 80 kilometers
(50 miles) of Newark, New Jersey. The esti mated frequency of this accident was 2.2 x 10-7 for
17 overseas shipments of SNF.
There is not expected to be any dose to members of the public or mari ne life resulting from
incident-free ocean transport of N-Reactor SNF to the United Kingdom . The effects of losi ng a cask
at sea are estimated to be comparable to those evaluated for transporting fo reign research reactor SNF
to the United States based on s imilar shipping in ventories of long-lived radio nuclides per cask. The
maximum dose to an individual for a cask lost in coastal waters was expected to be II millirem per
year if the cask was left in place until all its contents dispersed. The corresponding co nsequences to
marine biota were 0.24 millirad per year for fish, 0.32 millirad per year for cru staceans, and
13 millirad per year for mollusks. The consequences resulting from loss of a cask in the deep ocean
would be many orders of magnitude lower than the estimates for coastal waters.

prepared by the U.S. Atomic Energy Agency (AEC 1957, Patterson and DeFatta 1962, Patterson and
Mehn 1963, AEC 1966, McCluggage 1971 ). In these summary reports, incidents are classified into
six classes based on the extent of radioactive material release (patterson and DeFatta 1962) and
acc idents and incidents are not differentiated . For 1949 through 1970, there were 14 incidents
involving irradiated fuel elements. No packages approximating a Type B shipping cask were
breached as a result of these incidents (McCluggage 1971). Two representative incidents are
summarized below.
On November IS , 1960, a tractor-trailer carrying 7 steel-jacketed lead casks co ntaining
25 irradiated fuel elements was involved in an accident with a station wagon. The station wagon was
completely demolished and the driver killed. The tractor was bad ly damaged and the drive r suffered
a broken hand and abrasions. The irradiated fuel elements were und isturbed. This incident was
classified as a Class I radiation release, which means that no radioactive material was released and
there was no loss of integr ity to th e package.
In another case (June 2-6, 1960), leakage of contaminated cooling water from a rail shipment
cons isting of irradiated fuel elements and some ruptured elements in aluminum cans resulted in
co ntamination of three ra ilroad yards. This incident was classified as a Class IV radiation release,
whic h means th at rad ioactive material was released to the ground or trafficway with no runoff or
aerial dispersion. There were no injuries associated with th is incident.
Spent nuclear fuel transportation accidents for 197 1 through 1993 were surveyed based on
data in the Radioactive Materials Incident Report database. This datahase co ntains information on
radioactive materials transportation incidents and accidents from the U.S . Department o f
Transportation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Co mmission , U.S. Department of Energy, state radiation
control offices , and media coverage of radioactive materials transportat ion incidents and accidents
(Cashwell and McClure 1992). The Rad ioactive Materials Incident Report database contains
information o n transportation accide nts , handling accidents, and repo rted incidents; th is d iscussion is
limited 10 transportation accide nts involving SNF .
Between 1971 and 1993, there were seven transportation accide nts involving SNF. Three of
these accidents invo lved rail shi pments . and four of th ese accidents involved tru ck shipments . These
acc idents were summarized in Cashwell and McClure (1992) . Only one of these accidents res ulted in
more than minor damage to the SNF cask. On December 8, 1971 , a tru ck transporting a SNF
element in a Type B shipping cask on U.S. Highway 25 in Tennessee swerved 10 avoid a head-on
collisio n with another vehicle and was forced off th e road. The driver of the truck was killed by the
impact and the SNF cask was th ro wn into a ditch. The DOE Radiol ogical Assistance Team from Oak
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Ridge, Tennessee, arrived and surveys indicated that the structural integrity of the cask was intact and
there was no release of contents .

1·10 CUMULATIVE IMPACTS OF TRANSPORTATION
1·10.1 Radiologicallmpacts
The cumulative impacts of the transponation of SNF consist of impacts from (a) historical
shipments of SNF to the Hanford Site, Savannah Ri ver Site, Idaho National Engineering Laboratory,
Oak Ridge Reservation. and the Nevada Test Site; (b) the alternatives eval uated in this EIS; (c) other
reasonably foreseeable actions that include transpon atio n of radioactive material ; and (d) general
radioactive materials transponation that is not related to a panicular action. The discussion of
cumulative trartsponation impacts concentrates on the cumul ative impacts of offsite transponation,
because offsite transponation yields potential doses to a greater ponion of the general population than
does ons ite transponation. The collective dose to the general population and workers is the measure
used to quantify cumul ative transponation impacts. This measure of impact was chosen because it
can be directly related to latent cancer fatalities using a cancer risk coefficient and because of the
difficulty in identifying a maximally exposed indi vidual for shi pments throughout the United States
spanning the period 1943 through 2035 (93 years).
Collective doses from historical shipments of SNF to the Hanford Site, Savannah River Site,
Oak Ridge Reservation, and the Nevada Test Site were summarized in Jones and Maheras (1994a,
1994b, 199<k. 1994d). Data for these shi pments were available fo r 1971 through 1993 and were
linearly extrapolated back to the stan of operations at each site because data before 1971 were not
available. For the Hanford Site and Oak Ridge Reservation, the stan of operations was 1943; fo r the
Savannah River Site. the stan of operations was 1953; and for the Nevada Test Site. the stan of
operatio ns was 1951. The results of these analyses are summarized in Table I-58 .
The historical shipments of SNF to the Idaho National Enginee ring Laboratory consisted of
shipments of naval SNF and test specimens from 1957 through 1995 (see Attachment A to Appendix
o of Vo lume I of this EIS) . Extrapolation of naval shipments was not necessary because a detailed
records search accounted for all shipments . Histori cal SNF also consisted of shipments of other DOE
SNF to the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory besides naval shipments. such as research reactor
S NF and special-case commercial SNF (Maheras 1994). Data for these shipments were available for
1973 th rough 1993 and were linearly extrapolated bac k to 1953. the stan of operatio ns at the Idaho
Chemical Processi ng Plant. because data fo r 1953 th rough 1972 were not ava ilable. The resul ts of
these analyses are also summarized in Table I-58 .
There are considerab le uncen ainties in these historical estimates of collec ti ve dose. For
example. the popul at io n densities and transpo rtation routes used in the dose assess ments were based
o n census data for 1990 and the United States highway and rail system as it ex isted in 1993 .
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Table I-58. (continued).
Table I-58 . Cumulative transportation-related radiological collective doses and latent cancer fatalities
( 1943 to 2035) .
CoUcrtivc
occupational

CoUectivc
general
population

dose
(person· rem)

dose
(person-rem)

Hanfo rd Site
(1943 to 1993)

S2

27

Savannah River Site
(l9S3 to 1993)

SO

29

Category
Historical

S~Dt DlKlear

(uel

Catego ry

30
1.6

Oak Ridge Reservation

3S

18

1.4

0 .70

I. S to IS

0 .34 to 12

DOE truck (100" )'
(l99S to 203S)

0 .0 to I,OIJO

0 .0 to 2,300

DOE ""in (1 00")'
(l99S 10 203S)

0 .0 to 130

(1943 to 1993)
Nevada Teat Silt"
(l9S 1 to 1993)

Spent Duclear fuel Jhipmeots (or Alt.et"uti.es 1·5
Navalb

(penon-rem)

(penon-rem)

200

110

I.S 10 1,000
1.S 10 ISO

0 .34 10 2,_
0.34 to 190

11 ,000
820

SO,OOO
t700

&<n<ra1
do..

Spent nuclear fuel shipments for
Alternatives I-S
Truck

Train

S6
62

population

Summa..,.
Historic&!

Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
(l9S3 to 1993)
DOE spent nuclear fuel
Naval spent nuclear fuel

Reasonably foreseeable actions
Tru<:k
Train
General transportation (1943 to 2035)

Total coUecti'fe dose
Tolal Iateat caoc:er fatalities

31 0 ,000

270 ,000

320,000
!30

320,000
t60

a. Shipments from Turkey Point Power Plant in Florida to the Engine Maintenance, Assembly, and Disassembly Facility
at the Nevada Test Site.
b . Naval SNF and test specimen shipments based on a combination of truck and rail tnnsport.
c . Shipments based on 100 percent tnnsport by truck or 100 percent transport by rail .

0 .0 to 170

d. Reference: DOE (1986)

Reasona bly foreseeable Ktioas

e. Reference: DOE (1990)

Gcologic rcpoSilOry'"'"
Truck (1 00")
Tnin (1 00")

Waste Isolation Pilot Plante
Tell phase (1 00 " truck)
Disposal phase
Truck (100" )
Tn.in (muimum)'

8,600
7S0

48,000
740

110

48

1,800

!.SOO

68

940

The maximum rail case is based o n rail transport where rail access is available and truck transport where raiJ access
is not avsiJ.a.ble .

g. Reference; USN (1984)

h. Reference: DOE (1994) .
i. Reference : DOE ( 1992).

0 .OS3

Submarine reactor compartment dispo ... "

Rdum

Collective

CoUcctivc
occupational
do..

or cesium- 137 isotope ClpsU~

0 .42

S .7

O.SO

0.014

190'1 10 1982

220.000

170,000

1983 10 Z03S

89 ,000

98,000

Uranium billcUi

Gaer.1 tran:oportltioD
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Usi ng census data fo r 1990 overestimates histo rical collective doses because the United States
popul ation has continuously increased over the time covered in thesl assessments. Basing collective
dose estimates on the United States highway and rail system as it existed in 1993 may slightly
underestimate doses for shipments that occurred in the 1940., 1950s, and 196Os. because a larger
portion of the transport routes would have been on non-interstate highways where the population may
have been slightly closer to the road . Data were not available that correlated transport'::~n routes
and population densities for the 1940., 19505. 1960s, and 19705; therefore, it was necessary to use
more recent data to make dose estimates . By the 19705, the structure of the interstate highway

suitability of Yucca Mountain, Nevada. as a site for a geologic repository for commercial SNF and
defense high-level waste: therefore. the geologic repository was assumed to be located in Yucca
Mountain, Nevada. for the transportation cumulative impacts analysis .

system was largely fixed and most shipments would have been made on interstates.

750 perso n-rem or 0.30 latent cancer fatalities . The collective dose to the general population from
train shipments to a repository was 740 person-rem or 0.37 latent cancer fatalities .

Shipment data were linearly extrapolated for years when data were unavailable, which also
results in uncertainty. However, this technique was validated by linearly extrapolating the data in
SAIC (1991 ) for 1973 through 1989 to estimate the number of shipments that took place during the
time period 1964 through 1972 (also contained in SAIC 1991 ). The 1973 through 1989 time period
correspooded to the time period when data were available for the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant.
The data in SAIC (1991) could not be used directly because only shipment counts are presented for
1964 through 1982 and no origins or destinatio ns were listed for years before 1983. Based on the
data in SAIC (1991), linearly extrapolating the data for 1973 th rough 1989 overestimates the
shipments for 1964 th rough 1972 by 20 percent when compared to the ac;ual shipment counts for
1964 through 1972.
Collective doses for SNF shipments associated with Alternatives I through 5 were
summarized previously in this appendix and in Appendi x 0 of Volume I of this EIS (for naval spent
nuclear fuel). For truck shipments. the collective dose to workers ranged from 1.5 person-rem (the
No Action alternative) to 1.000 perso n-rem (Centralization at Savannah River), or 0 .00060 to
0.40 latent cancer fatalities . Collective dose to the general population ranged from 0.34 person-rem
(the No Action alternative) to 2.400 person-rem (Centralization at Savannah Ri ver). or 0.00017 to
1.2 latent cancer fatalities. These doses and latent cancer fatalities include shipments of naval SNF
and test specimens.

Based on the transportation dose assessments presented in DOE (1986). the worker collective
dose for truck shipments to a repository was 8,600 person-rem or 3.4 latent cancer fatalities . The
collective dose to the general population from truck shipments to a repository was 48.000 person-rem
or 24 latent c an~er fatalities . The worker collective dose for train shipments to a repository was

Based on the transportation dose assessments presented in DOE (1990), the worker collective
dose from truck shipments to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant was 1.900 person-rem or 0 .76 latent
cancer fatalities . The collective dose to the general population from truck shipments to the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant was 1.500 person-rem or 0.75 latent cancer fatalities. The wo rker collective dose
from train shipments to the Waste Iso lation Pilot Plant was 180 person-rem or 0.072 latent cancer
fatalities . The collective dose to the general population from train shipments to the Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant was 990 person-rem or 0.50 latent cancer fatalities . These collective doses include the
5-year Test Phase and the 20-year Disposal Phase.
There are three other reasonab ly foreseeable proj ects th at involve limited transpo rt at ion of
radioactive material : (a) 100 shipments of submarine reactor compartments from the Puget Sound
Naval Shipyard to the Hanford Site fo r burial . (b) return of cesium-137 isotope capsul es to the
Hanford Site, and (c) transport of uranium billets from the Hanford Site to the United Kingdom. The
transpo rt of submarine reactor compartments is an ongoing activity that is not yet completed ;
therefore, it was categorized as a reasonabl y fo reseeable action . The doses for these actions are
presented in Table I-{; I.

specimens.

n.ere are also general transportation activities that take place th at are unrelated to the
alternatives evaluated in this EIS or to reasonably foreseeable actions. Examples of these acti vities
are ship ments of radiopharmaceuticals to nuclear medicine laboratories and shipments of commercial
low-level radioactive waste to commercial disposal facilities. The U.S. Nucl.ar Regul atory
Commission eval uated these types of shipments based on a survey of radioactive materials
transportation publ ished in 1975 (N RC 1977). Catego ries of radioactive material evaluated in NRC
( 1977) included : (a) limited quantity shipments. (b) medical. (c) ind ustrial. (d) fue l cycle. and
(e) waste.

Transportation impacts may also result from reasonably foreseeable ~rojects. Two major
propo.ed projects that involve extensive transportation of radioact ive material are: (a) shipments of
SNF and defense high-level waste to a geologic reposito ry , and (b) shipments of transuranic waste to
the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, located in Carlsbad. New Mexico. DOE is presently determining the

The U.S. Nuclear Regul atory Commission estimated th at the annual collec tive work er dose
for these shipments was 5.600 person-rem or 2.2 latent cancer fatalities. The annual collecti ve
general population dose for these shipments was estimated to be 4.200 person-rem or 2. 1 latent cancer
fatalities . Because comprehensive transportation doses we re not availahle. these collective dose

For train shipments, the collective dose to workers ranged fro m 1.5 person-rem (the No
Action Alternative) to 150 person-rem (Ce ntralization at Nevada Test Site). or 0.00060 to 0.060 latent
cancer fatalities . Collective dose to the general population ranged from 0.34 person-rem (the No
Action Alternative) to 190 person-rem (Centralization at Savannah Ri-e r). or 0.00017 to 0.095 latent
cancer fatalities . These doses and latent cancer fatal ities incl ude shipments of naval SNF and test
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estimates were used to estimate transportation collective doses for 1943 through 1982 (40 years).
These dose estimates included SNF and radioactive waste shipments and truck and rail shipments.
Based on the transportation dose assessments in NRC (1977), the cumulative transportation
collective doses for 1943 through 1982 were 220,000 person-rem for workers and 170,000 personrem for the general population. These collective doses correspond to 88 latent cancer fatalities for
workers and 85 latent cancer fatalities for the general population.
In 1983, another survey of radioactive materials transportation in the United States was
conducted (Javilz et a1 . 1985). This survey included U.S . Nuclear Regulatory Commission and
Agreement State licensees and the U.S . Department of Energy . Both SNF and radioactive waste
shipments were included in the survey. Weiner et a1. (1991a, b) used the survey by Javilz et a1.
(1985) to estimate collective doses from general transportation . The transportation dose assessments
in Weiner et a1. (199la, b) were used to estimate transportation doses for 1983 through 2035
(53 years). The interval 1995 through 2035 corresponds to the interval of time associated with the
spent nuclear fuel management activities evaluated in this EIS .
Weiner et a1 . ( 1991a) evaluated eight categories of radioactive material shipments by truck:
(a) industrial , (b) radiography, (c) medical . (d) fuel cycle, (e) research and development,
(I) unknown, (g) waste, and (h) other. Based on a median external exposure rate, an annual
collective worker dose of 1,400 person-rem and an annual collective general population dose of
1,400 person-rem were estimated. These collective doses correspond to 0.56 and 0 .70 !atent cancer
fatalities per year for workers and the general popula(ion, respectively. Over the 53-year time period
from 1983 through 2035, the collective worker and general population doses would be
74,000 person-rem or 30 and 37 latfnt cancer fatalities for workers and the general population,
respectively.

1960s was less than the amount transported in the 1970s. For example, in 1968, the shipping rate for
radioactive material packages was estimated to be 300,000 packages per year (patterson 1968); in
1975 this rate was estimated to be 2,000,000 packages per year (NRC 1977). However, because
comprehensive data that would enable a more realistic transportation dose assessment are not
available, the dose estimates developed by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cl'mmission were used .
The total worker and general population collective doses are summarized in Table 1-;8. Total
collective worker doses from all types of shipments (historical, the alternatives, reasonably
foreseeable actions, and general transportation) were estimated to be 320,000 person-rem (130 latent
cancer fatalities), for the period of time 1943 through 2035 (93 years). Total general population
collective doses were also estimated to be 320,000 person-rem (160 latent cancer fatalities). The
majority of the collective dose for workers and the general population was because of general
transportation of radioactive material . The total number of latent cancer fatalities over the time
period 1943 through 2035 was estimated to be 290. Over this same period of time (93 years),
approximately 28,000,000 people would die from cancer, based on 300,000 latent cancer fatalities per
year (NRC 1977). It should be noted that the estimated number of transportation-related latent cancer
fatalities would be indistinguishable from other latent cancer fatalities, and the transportation-related
latent cancer fatalities are 0.0010 percent of the total number of latent cancer fatalities.

1-10.2 Vehicular ACCident Impacts
Fatalities involving the transport of radioactive materials were surveyed for 1971 through
1993 using the Ractioactive Material Incident Report database. For 1971 through 1993,21 vehicular
accidents involving 36 fatalities occurred . These fatalities resulted from vehicular accidents and were
not associated with the radioactive nature of the cargo. No radiological fatalities because of
transportation accidents have ever occurred in the United States. During the same period of time,
over 1,000,000 persons were killed in vehicular accidents in the United States.

Weiner et a1. (199Ib) also evaluated six categories of radioactive material shipments by plane:
(a) industrial , (b) radiography, (c) medical , (d) research and development, (e) unknown, and
(I) waste . Based on a median external eXIX's·"e rate, an annual collective worker dose of
290 person-rem and an annual collective general population dos .. of 450 person-rem were estimated.
These collective doses correspond to 0. 12 and 0.23 latent cancer fatalities per year for workers and

For Alternatives I through 5, 0.047 to 1.4 vehicular accident fatalities are estimated to occur.
During the 4O-year time period from 1995 through 2035, approximately 1.600,000 people would be
killed in vehicular accidents in the United States.

the ge neral population, respect ively . Over the 53-year time period from 1983 through 2035, the
collective worker dose w()uld be 15,000 person-rem and the general population collective dose would
be 24,000 person-rem or 6 .0 and 12 latent cancer fatalities for workers and the general population,
respectively .
Like the hIstorical transportation dose assessments. the estimates of collective doses because
of general transportation also exhibit considerable uncertainty . For exampl •. data for 1975 were
applied to general transportation activities from 1943 through 1982. This approach probably
overestimates doses because the amount of radioacti ve material that was transported in the 19505 and
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This appendix describes a range of technologies potentially available for management of spent
nuclear fuel (SNF) and the status of each technology. The identified technologies support the SNF
programmatic objective to define a management path and proceed toward ultimate disposition of all
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) SNF. Included are technologies for fuel preparation, storage
(stabilization) or, where appropriate, direct interim storage. The stabilization and direct storage
technologies may also be applicable to ultimate disposition in some instances. The stabilization
technologies selected for discussion range from the minimal to the extensive stabilization processing
technologies that could be applied to prepare the SNF for ext<oded interim storage or ultimate
disposition . In addition, programmatic and institutional factors, which are considerations in the
selection of technology options for application, are discussed. Also presented is a brief description of
the types of DOE SNF. particularly as their characteristics apply to the technology options.
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J-1 BACKGROUND
During the last 40 years, DOE and its predecessor agencies have generated, transported,
received, stored, and reprocessed SNF at facilities in the nationwide DOE complex . This SNF was
generated from various sources, including DOE production reactors; the Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Program reactors; DOE, university, and other research and test reactors; special-case commercial
power reactors; and foreign research reactors. Production reactors were constructed and operated at
the Hanford and Savannah River Sites to provide special nuclear material and other radioactive
isotopes for the DOE's defense programs. These production reactors are no longer operated. Naval
Nuclear Propulsion Program reactors and some test and research reactors are still operating. DOE
has reprocessed SNF at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Hanford Site, and Savannah
River Site to recover fi ssile materials (uranium-235 and plutonium-239) and other valuable
radionuclides.
More than 100,000 metric tons of heavy metal (MTHM) of SNF was produced by DOE and
its predecessor agencies since 1943. In the past, most of the SNF was chemically processed to
recover the fissile materials, largely uranium-235 and plutonium-239, either for the national defense
programs or reactor research and development.
With the end of the Cold War, DOE and the U.S . Department of Defense reevaluated the
scale of their weapons production, nuclear propulsion, and research missions . Because of the lack of
need for additional fi ssile materials. DOE decided in 1992 to phase out reprocessing for the recovery
of fissile materials . Approximately 2,700 MTHM of SNF remains that has not been processed .
Additionally, approximately 100 MTHM of DOE SNF is expected to be generated in the next
40 years. This DOE SNF. which is in a wide range of enrichments and physical conditions, is stored
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at various locations in the United States and overseas. This material requires management until a
decision regarding its ultimate disposition is reached.
Most of the existing fuel is currently stored in 10- to 4O-year-{)ld water pools (designed for
temporary storage of SNF until it could be reprocessed) at several locations at the Hanford Site, Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory, and Savannah River Site. Smaller quantities are stored at
approximately 60 locations nationwide, including SS non-DOE United States research reactor
facilities . The vulnerabilities associated with the storage of SNF are identified in a recent DOE report
to the Secretary of Energy entitled, Spent Fuel Working Group Rtporr on Inventory and Storage of the
Deparrnunt's Spent Nucltar Fuel and Other Reactor IrradiaJed Nuclear MaJerials and Their
Envirofll1U!nt, Safety, and Health VulnerabilitIes (DOE 1993). A DOE plan of action (Phases I, II,
and III) to address these vulnerabilities has been issued (DOE 1994a, b, c).

J-2 SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL
Individual fuel elements and assemblies in nuclear reactors are constructed in many
configurations, but they generally consist of the fuel =trix, cladding, and structural hardware. The
fuel assemblies and structural hardware constitute the reactor core. Section 1. 1.1 of Volume I of this
EIS presents a summary description of SNF.
The fuel matrix contains the fissile material (rypically uranium as a metal, metal allOY, or an
oxide). For water-cooled reactors, the matrix form is typically plates or cylindrical pellets.
Typically, for gas-cooled reactors, the matrix is particles, which are an oxide or carbide composite of
the fuel material encapsulated by a ceramic coating.
Cladding materials surrounding the fuel matrix serve two principal functions: (a) protection
of the fuel matrix from corrosion tf the fluid that removes heat from the reactor core, and
(b) containment of radioactive fission products generated within the fuel during reactor operation.
The degree and rate of cladding corrosion varies with reactor design.
The structural hardware serves both to support the fuel assemblies and to maintain a fixed
geometry for the fissile materials in the reartor core. For example, structural materials fix the
location of the fuel elements relative to one another in a fuel assembly and also fix the location of the
fuel assemblies relative to one another in the reactor core. Structural hardware also provides
mechanical support for the assemblies and the core, as well as providing defined paths for cooling the
core. These functions are .ssential to control the nuclear reaction.; in the reactor core and ensure that
adequate cooling is provided to all heat-generating regions of the reactor core.
The characteristics of the fuel elements in a reactor are tailored to the purpose of the reactor
system. Two examples, important to SNF management, are discussed below. One example is for
fuel with high-integrity cladding and the other is for fuel with lesser cladding integrity. Integrity
refers to the corrosion resistance of the fuel to the reactor coolant andlor to its corrosion resistance in
the environment in which it is stored.
High-Integrity Fuels Used in Naval Reactors and Nuclear Power Plants. Naval fuels
use highly enriched uranium, while nuclear power plant fuels generally use
low-enriched uranium. These types of reactors use water for cooling the fuel
assemblies. The reactors are operated at high coolant temperatures and pressures.
The design objectives associated with commercial fuel and these reactor types are to
maximize power output and minimize time spent refueling . For naval reactors, other
design objectives are also critical : ability to withstand battJeshock, ability to preclude
release of any fission products because operating personnel must live and work in
close proximity to the reactor, and ability to change reactor power levels quickly so
the ship can alter speed when needed . As a result, the cladding materials are selected
to be very corrosion resistant at high temperatures (a zirconium alloy is used). Long-
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term fuel element integrity is emphasized. From the standpoint of SNF management,
such fuel element designs are well-suited for direct storage of the SNF (either wet or
dry) without additional stabilization. Aggressive (concentrated) chemical and/or
mechanical means are required to remove cladding if fud processing is considered as
an option for stabilization.
•

Savannah River Production Reactor Fuels (and targets). The Savannah River Site
production reactors also used water for cooling fuel assemblies. However, the
reactors were operated at relatively low temperatures and essentially at atmospheric
pressure. The design of these production reactor cores was optimized for production
of special nuclear materials and other valuable radioactive isotopes. Fuel irradiation
times were generally on the order of a few months. Fuel element cooling times prior
to reprocessing were relatively sbort because the fuel elements were designed for
special nuclear materials production and recovery. A higb degree of corrosion
resistance for the cladding was not part of the design. Aluminum cladding was
selected so that the fuel elements could be dissolved for processing by less highly
concentrated chemical solutions than for fuel with higber integrity daddiog.
Therefore, this fuel type is not as suitable for long-term storage (either wet or dry) as
are the higher integrity fuels.

The DOE SNF represents a broad spectrum of fuel element designs, both for the fuel matrix
material and the cladding. To provide perspective, the characteristics of the principal types of DOE
SNF are briefly discussed below. Inventories for the various types (current and projected), in units of
MTHM, are summarized in Table 1-1, along with a qualitative statement regarding fuel element
enrichment and cladding integrity.

J-2.i Category i-Naval Fuel
This SNF type includes the fuel from the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, including fuel
from submarines, surface vessels, and prototype reactors. Naval fuel is highly enricbed and is clad
with a zirconium alloy. This fuel design is structurally strong (able to withstand battlesbock loads
well in excess of 50 times the force of gravity), the cladding is bighly corrosion-resistant (no release
of fission products), and the fuel is designed to operate for more than 20 years.

J-2.2 Category 2-Aluminum-Clad Production Reactor Fuel
The principal source of DOE aluminum-clad SNF was target and driver fuel from the
Savannah River Site defense production reactors. The driver fuel is highly enriched aluminumuranium alloy clad with aluminum. Most of the targets are depleted uranium metal (containing less
uranium-235 than natural uranium), also clad with aluminum. Corrosion resistance of the cladding
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Table J-1. Spent nuclear fuel inventories and corrosion resistance. a
Projected
new SNF
Existing
SNF
category

Reactor type
Naval reactors

2

Produ<:tion reactors, with

inventory
(MTHM)

inventory
for the next

Total
projected

Cladding

40 years

inventory

corro.ion

(MTHM)

(MTHM)

resistance

Enrichme:nt

10

SS

65

High

High

190

25

210

Medium

High and low

2100

0

2100

Medium

Low

aluminum..::1ad fuel; also aluminum..::1ad
fuel from research and development
reactors
3

Production reactors, zirconium-aUoy..::lad

to low

fuel

....

28

0

28

High

High

160

0

160

Variable

Variable

Experimental, llainle..-ItCeI..::1ad fuel

83

14

97

Variable

Variable:

6b

Experimental zirconium·aUoy..::lad flxl

78

78

Medium

Variable

6c

M isceUancou. fuel

Variable

Variable:

4

High-tempetalun:: p • ..::ooled reactor fuel

S

Commercial raearch and development
fuel

6a

I

VI

0.42

0.42
1.3

a. Numbers may not .um due: to rounding.
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is moderate. Aluminum cladding is susceptible to corrosion when stored in water pools with poor
water qUality. Also, this category is used for SNF from the Advanced Test Reactor at the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory, some domestic and foreign research reactors SNF, and some
production reactor fuel at the Hanford Site. With proper water quality, this fuel has been stored for

to study fuel behavior in simulated accidents. The damaged core from the Three Mile Island-Unit 2
reacto r was investigated extensively by DOE, under cooperative research and development
agreements, at several DOE sites. This damaged fuel is also included in this category.

more than 20 years without cladding corrosion problems.
Some of the fuel and targets have been in storage in water pools (with poor water quality)
since 1989. Fuel is showing signs of corrosion, and targets are heavily corroded.

J-2.6 Category 6-Test and Experimental Reactor Fuels
This is a category of fuels of broad description. The fuels range from low to high enrichment
and encompass metal, metal alloy, and oxide fuel matrices . The fuel can be divided into three
categories .

J-2.3 Category 3-Zirconium-Clad Production Reactor Fuel
J-2.S.1 Category Sa-Stalnless-Steel-Clad Fuels from Experimental Reactors
All fuel in this category is from the Hanford Site N Reactor. It consists of a low-enriched
uranium alloy fuel matrix, clad with a zirconium alloy. The fuel irradiation times were such that
relatively large concentrations of fissile plutonium were produced .
Sc me of the N-Reactor's SNF has been in storage for over 20 years and a large number of
fuel elements have holes in the cladding (breached), which permits corrosion of the fuel matrix . One
result is contamination of the water in the storage pools at the Hanford Site. With respect to fuel
with breached cladding, it is known that the irradiated metallic uranium can undergo reactions with
water to produce uranium hydrides. The hydrided, irradiated uranium can be pyrophoric (subject to
spontaneous burning) if it is permitted to dry out and is exposed to air (!TAT 1994). The potential
pyrophoric nature of the fuel is an imponant consideration as management strategies for this fuel
(including stabilization and transportation) are evaluated.

J-2.4 Category 4-High-Temperature Gas-Cooled Graphite Reactor
Fuel
Graphite-matrix fuel was primarily used in two gas-cooled, commercial reactors: Fort St.
Vrain and Peach Bottom. This type of fuel consists of small pellets of highly enriched uraniumcarb ide fuel surrounded by layers of pyrolytic carbon and protective layers of other carbide
co mpounds that serve as the primary cladding. The pellets are dispersed in much larger graphite
stru ctures that provide neutron moderation and secondary containment. The fuel has high corrosion
resistan ce when stored dry. However, the fuel is not amenable to wet storage.

Uranium enrichments are generally high in fuels from these reactors, but low-enrichment fuels
are included as well. Fuel matrices consist of uranium-zirconium hydride, uranium dioxide,
plutonium oxide, plutonium alloy, uranium carbide, uranium metal, and uranium alloys . The
principal sources of fuel in this category are the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II and Zero Power
Physics Reactor at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, Hanford Fast Flux Test Facility, and
the blanket assemblies from the FERMI reactor.
J-2.S.2 Category Sb-Zirconium-Alloy-Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel from Experimental
Reactors
Typically, fuel in this category has a uranium dioxide fuel matrix, but there is uraniummolybdenum alloy fuel also in this inventory. Enrichment can be either high or low . Most of this
SNF originated at the Shippingport Power Reactor where the light water breeder reactor concept was
tested. Some thorium and uranium-233 fuels are found in this category.
J-2.S.3 Category Sc-Miscellaneous Fuel
Fuel in this miscellaneous category is derived mainly from the Molten Salt Reactor
Experiment at the Oak Ridge Reservation. That fu el is now stored in the salt storage tanks beneath
th e reactor.

J-2.5 Category 5-Commercial Reactor Research and Development
Fuel
DOE has participated in numerous commercial reactor and SNF safety investigations. These
activities have resulted in accumulations by DOE of SNF elements from a number of commercial
reactors . TypiCally, this SNF consists of zirconium-alloy-clad, low-enriched uranium oxide fuels .
Many of th ese elements were examined in DOE analytical facilities ; others were used in test reactors
VOLUME I, APPENDIX J
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J-3 SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL INTERIM MANAGEMENT OPTIONS
In 1992, the Secretary of Energy directed the DOE to develop an integrated long-term SNF
management program. The program is assessing DOE's current SNF inventory and SNF storage
facilities, integrating DOE's many existing SNF activities into one program, developing an integrated
decisionmaking and policy basis for SNF operations, and ensuring that all issues associated with SNF
are resolved safely and cost effectively.
Until ultimate disposition is determined, it is not possible to define the SNF characteristics
suitable for ultimate disposition. Pending selection of an ultimate disposition, SNF must be
maintained in safe storage. Solutions to the storage questions may require changes in management
strategies for these fuels, including such options as the construction of new facilities and stabilization
of certain fuels.
Technologies for SNF management are required to ensure safe, environmentally sound, and
economic management until ultimate disposition is implemented. There are a number of technology
options available for accomplishing these objectives. Key design factors to be considered include the
fuel design, structural integrity of the fuel, degree of corrosion of the cladding, fuel enrichment, and
the chemical stability of the cladding and the fuel matrix. The principal technology option categories
for storage are outlined in a general way on a flow chart (Figure ]-1).
The options for SNF management include direct storage (high-integrity fuels) or SNF
stabilization in preparation for continued storage. Technologies included under SNF stabilization are
containerization, processing without separation of fissile materials, and processing in which there is
separation of the fissile material. The status of technologies for each of the approaches are discussed
in Section 1-4. Related institutional factors associated with implementing the various management
approaches are discussed in Section 1-5.
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J-4 SUMMARY OF TECHNOLOGIES FOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL
MANAGEMENT
In 1992, DOE had proposed to engage in research and development activities for technology
development and demonstration required to ensure that SNF could br appropriately prepared for
disposition in a geologic repository. Any such repository is not expected to be available until after
the year 2010. Therefore, DOE has changed its focus in this effon to better define the SNF research
and development program. The DOE is utilizing a system approach (a logical, structured approach to
assure effective actions) to technology development for preparing SNF for safe interim storage and
ultimate disposition in a geologic repository.
Figure J-I summarizes the technology options available for preparing SNF for interim
storage. Indicated under each of the four general categories on the figure is a range of representative
technology options. This section describes technology options listed on Figure J-I and discusses the
following :
The option (describes what it involves)
Applicable fuel types
Maturity (demonstrated technology, early stages, or developmental)
Status of commercial and foreign applications/development that may be applicable to
DOE SNF management
References that contain more detail on the technology .
When evaluating SNF management options, criticality control is an imponant factor,
panicularly for SNF with enriched uranium fuel.
CritiCality considerations apply for both direct storage and stabilization. The storage system
must meet applicable requirements governing nuclear criticality, which specify that the system be
designed to ensure that a nuclear criticality is not possible unless at least two independent (concurrent
or sequential) changes occur in the systems essential to the control of nuclear criticality.
Also imponant in selecting management options for SNF are the characteristics of the fu el
type and the physical condition of the fuel. For specific types of fuel, characterization may be
necessary to determine the extent of stabilization required and/or the most suitable stabilization
process to transition the panicular SNF into interim storage.
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J-4.1 Direct Storage
Direct storage means storing SNF in essentially the same pbysical form in which it is
removed from the reactor (that is. little or limited stabilization of the fuel elements). Fuel that has
high-integrity cladding is amenable to direct storage provided criticality issues can be adequately
addressed for the planned storage interval (JAEA 1988). Specific examples are naval SNF and SNF
removed from most types of commercial nuclear electric generating stations (both in the United States
and foreign countries).
If a reactor that has operated at high power bas fuel removed soon after shutdown (within
weeks). the level of heat generation associated with fission product decay may be sufficient to damage
and possibly melt the fuel if the fuel assembly is not cooled adequately. In addition. radiation levels
are high from decaying fission products and radionuclides in the irradiated structural materials. Thus.
both effective cooling and effective shielding of the stored SNF are essential . Common practice is to
place the SNF in a water pool. for at least a period of time, following removal from the reactor. The
level of heat generation and radioactive decay associated with SNF decreases with time after removal
from the reactor. With the passage of time. it is possible and may be desirable to transfer SNF from
a wet to a dry storage mode because. in general, the costs and potential environmental safety and
health vulnerabilities associated with dry storage are less than those associated with wet ttorage
(Lopez 1994. Taylor and Shikashio 1993). The status of wet and dry storage technologies is
discussed in the following two subsections.

J-4.1.1 Wet Storage
Water pools (or water pits) are pan of the design of nearly all nuclear reactor facilities . They
are used to provide a storage location for SNF when it is removed from the reactor. The pools
usually are designed to store the inventory of fuel removed from a reactor for a number of years .
Pool depth is sufficient to provide shielding for personnel working in the region of the water pool.
The water pool system normally includes a subsystem for water chemistry control with a purpose of
maimaining the conditions of the water in the pool so cladding corrosion is minimized , water in the
pool is clean enough that the SNF can be viewed underwater during fuel movement and fuel removal
operations, and chloride content is controlled to maintain pool liner integrity. The water pools
usually are of concrete construction and lined with stainless steel so as to minimize the potential
accumulation of radioactivity on or under the surface of the concrete pool walls.
Wet storage systems generally have more heat removal capability than dry storage systems
because heat transfe to liquids is more efficient than to gases, such as air or nitrogen.
Desig n, construction, and operation of water pools for SNF storage is a mature technology
option for DOE and for commercial nuclear power plants (faUts 1994). Wet storage system design
modifications usually center arou nd re-racking the fuel in a pool to permit more fuel to be stored in a
given pool. Fuel element spacing in rack designs is carefully analyzed to ensure that there is an
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adequate margin relative to criticality prevention for existing or contemplated SNF to be stored :"- the
racks in the water pool.

J-4.1.2 Dry Storage Systems
In a dry storage system, cooling is provided by heat transfer to the inner wall of the storage
system with eventual heat rejection to the air surrounding the storage system. Dry storage systems
are mature technologies that are being applied for DOE SNF and for SNF at United States
commercial and foreign nuclear electric generating systems (Schneider et aI. 1992).
Dry storage system options generally are of three types: (a) stand-alone modular casks, (b)
modular vault arrays, and (c) multiple-ur.;t vault storage systems. Hot cells are also employed but are
not generally considered cost efficient for storing significant quantities of SNF. Multiple examples of
each of these three types have been built and are storing SNF at the present time in DOE,
commercial, and foreign applications.
Sland-Alone Modular Casks. A number of large stand-alone casks are available in
the DOE system and in commercial applications. The casks are top- or end-loading,
made from a variety of materials, and have been developed primarily in North
America and Europe (Monthey and Bergsman 1994). Some cask designs are licensed
for offsite transpon of SNF and others are used principally for onsite fuel movement.
There are also a variety of smaller stand-alone casks that are designed primarily for
onsite transponation and storage of specific irradiated fuels and other materials . The
safety basis documentation for these casks can be found in accompanying safety
analysis repons (for example, Saito 1992).
Modular Vault Arrays . A second type of dry storage system uses a basic concrete
housing with an arrangement of openings in the concrete. Canisters containing fuel
are placed in the openings. The concrete housing provides supplementary shielding
and prohibits unauthorized access to the SNF. Depending on the design, fuel can be
stored either venically or horizontally in canisters.
Multiple-Unit Vault Storage Systems. Multiple-unit vault systems tend to be large
facilities that contain cask unloading stations, fuel handling cells, ventilation systems .
and office space (Caner 1994). In the main storage area array, fuel assemblies or
fuel assembl ies in canisters are stored venically in noor wells topped with shielded
plugs. Insen io n or removal of a canister containing the fueled component is
accomplished using a shielded, noor-supponed machine or a wail-mounted .
unshielded bridge crane.
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J-4.2 Containerization
Some SNF has deteriorated because of past storage conditions, fuel damage during operation
or destructive tests, or use of cladding materials that are quite susceptible to deterioration if placed in
prolonged wet storage without adequate protection. To provide adequate protection for the public,
environment, and facility workers, containerization technologies bave been employed to (a) add
additional containment to the SNF, (b) provide a passivating environment for the spent fuel (a
passivating environment is one where corrosion is minimized), or (c) place the spent fuel into an inen
atmosphere to retard or eliminate the fuel-element deterioration process. These technologies are
described below.

J-4.2.1 Canning
Canning is the technology whereby the SNF is placed into an engineered metal canister,
which then is usually sealed. This technology (commonly called overpacking) is usually done in a
water pool. Overpacking is used as a temporary corrective action if the SNF is releasing fission
products. Further refinements include blowing the water out of the overpack canister while it is still
underwater and then evacuating the canister (vacuum) to evaporate the remaining water. An inen
gas, such as helium or nitrogen, can also be added. Another refinement to this technology involves
adding a chemical for passivation to the water inside the canister to retard the corrosion of the SNF
by the water. This approach has been attempted at the K-West Basin at the Hanford Site; however,
its effectiveness is unknown because the fuel has not been inspected since it was canned. Small vents
in the lid of the can, which allow release of gases generated by radiolysis or corrosion, have also
been used.
Canning can also be carried out in a shielded, dry cell having remote-handling capabilities.
The SNF is brought into the remote cell and dried, either by normal drip-drying or employing heating
ovens to expedite the drying process. The SNF can be visually inspected in the remote cell and then
placed into a metal canister that is welded closed . Inen gas can be added; high quality inspection of
the closed canister is also possible.
This technology has been used extensively throughout DOE and foreign countries for research
fuels. The commercial industry has not done a significant amount of direct canning because the
commercial nuclear fuels have been designed for high integrity and so rarely require an overpack.

J-4.2.2 Passivation
The pass ivation approach is applicable to SNF that may contain regions that could undergo
adverse chemical reactions if exposed to air or moisture during dry storage. Passivation increases the
stability of the fuel by reducing its reaction rate with air or other oxidants. Consequently, if the fuel
were inadvenently exposed to air during dry storage, the heat generated would be less than the
minimum heat dissipation rate, thus minimizing the chances of a fuel fire or rapid adverse chemical
J- 13
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reactions. This process potentially could be used to stabilize metallic fuel with damaged cladding,
such as Hanford Site N-Reactor fuel.
Passivation could also include preparatory steps such as SNF cleaning, drying, and heating in
a controlled environment to remove any bound water or to potentially remove or oxidize uranium
hydride. A typical process first involves fuel cleaning. When cleaning is completed, a now of dry
inert gas is intrnduced around the fuel, which is maintained at the predetermined elevated
:emperarure. A small concentration of oxidant is intrnduced into the flowing inert gas. Reactive
regions of the fuel matrix react with the small amount of oxidant at the elevated temperature to
oxidizo them and malee them nonreactive. When process instrumentation indicates that the reaction
rate between the oxidant and the fuel (in the contrOlled environment) is sufficiently low, the fuel is
cooled down and appropriately packaged . The fuel packaging must restrain the fuel from excessive
movement to prevent the formation or exposure of new highly reactive fuel regions.
A pas.;ivation process has been used on metallic fuel in a laboratory setting by the British,
who considered it to be a potentially viable method to transition their SNF from wet to dry storage.
Passivation is being investigated for use on N-Reactor fuel at the Hanford Site.

J-4.2.3 Coating

Processing of SNF with separation of fissile materials has a long history of operations. The
technology is mature and well understood. The primary process used for fissile materials separation
for DOE SNF, comme<cial fuels, and foreign separations processing has been the PUREX (plutonium
URanium EXtraction) process or variations of this process. Facilities for PUREX-lype processing
have been built in the United States, a number of European countries, Russia, and Japan. In the
United States, all of the recently operating facilities are owned and operated by DOE. With the end
of the cold war, DOE and the U.S. Department of Defense reevaluated the need for additional fISSile
materials and decided in 1992 to phase out processing for recovery of fISSile materials. DOE's
processing facilities at the Hanford Site and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory are now shut
down. One processing facility at the Savannah River Site has recently been restarted to stabilize
aqueous solutions of uranium.
While chemical separation is the only technology currently available, there are other
technologies that could accomplish fuel processing. The following technologies are intended to
provide representative examples of technologies that could be employed for various types of SNF
subject to the appropriate National Environmental Policy Act documentation. All technologies are not
applicable to all types of fuel.
Several processes have been proposed and studied to stabilize SNF that do not involve

Coating is a technology whereby the SNF is placed into a metal container, dried to remove
any water, and then heated to the casting temperature for particular materials such as lead, copper, or
an epoxy. The fuel element is covered with the molten material . The intent is to provide monolithic
containment around the fuel element to ensure that the SNF will not release any fission products, nor
encounter an atmosphere that causes the fuel to degenerate further . To date, this technology has been
investigated primarily as an approach for preparing SNF for disposal . Pressing copper around SNF at

separation of uranium andlor plutonium from the other highly radioactive contaminants. These
processes involve changing the SNF physical and chemical form to malee the volume smaller, material
less reactive, or the material more homogeneous. Materials to assist in preventing nuclear criticality
(nuclear poison) may also be intrnduced into the process. Because none of these methods remove
fi ssile material , the possibility of a nuclear criticality exists for DOE SNF with a fuel matrix of highly
enriched uranium-235, unless the uranium-235 is diluted with uranium-238 or a nuclear poison is
added to a~sist in preventing nuclear criticality.

high pressures has been studied by the Swedish government.

J-4.3 Processing

J-4.3.1 Oxidation
An oxidation process can be used for two purposes. It can be used to (a) separate the fuel

For over 40 years. DOE has employed aqueous reprocessing. The purpose for reprocessing
was to separate plutonium and residual uranium materials in the SNF from the radioacti ve fissio n
products and structural materi";, including fuel element cladding.

fro m the cladding, min imize the volume of material to be stored, or prepare the fuel matrix to be
more easily dissolved. or (b) convert fuel matrix or graphite fuel elements into a stable oxide form .
The decladding options include

Some of the SNF that is cu rrently in storage at the Savannah Ri ver Site. Hanford Site, and
Idaho National Engineering laboratory shows signs of degraded cladding. Aqueous processing may
be a way of preventing safety and environmental problems with fuels that have questionable cladding
integrity (DOE 1994a). From the standpoint of SNF stabilizatio n, processing is a technol ogy for
which DOE facil ities exist and where there are still capable technical and facility operating personnel
to staff and support facility operations . By removing part of the SNF inventory from the present wet
storage environments. processing affords an additional level of stabil ity for the inventory of stOred

AIROX-Holes are drilled into the fuel matrix . Uranium diox ide (U~ is oxidized to
U 30 a by injecting oxygen gas at 400·C (750·F). There is an increase in fuel matrix
velume of about 70 percent. The uranium then is reduced back to UOz using
hydrogen gas . The process is repeated several times until the cladding breaks apart.
This process is in the developmental stages.

SNF.
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RAHYD-Holes are drilled into the fuel matrix. Uranium metal is reduced with
hydrogen gas at 225°C (435°F) to produce uranium trihydride. There is about a
70 percent volume increase. The fuel matrix is then convened back to uranium metal
by heating to 780°C (14OO°F). The process is repeated several times until the
cladding breaks apan. This process is in the developmental stages.
CARBOX-Holes are drilled into the fuel matrix. Oxygen is injected into uranium
carbide fuel at 400 to 700°C (750 to 1300°F) to form U30 8 . There is about an
85 percent volume increase. This process is in the developmental stages.
After the fuel is declad, the fuel matrix material can be consolidated and packaged for storage.
Development work was performed on decladding technologies in the late 19505 and early
1960s in connection with dry SNF reprocessing research at Atomics International .
The fuel elements can also be oxidized to conven the cladding and/or the fuel matrix into
oxide form . One example is the burning of the graphite and metal fuels . The oxidized fuel and any
ash would contain the uranium, plutonium, and most of the fission products, which then would be
consolidated and packaged for storage. Technology for burning graphite fuels is well developed and
has been used at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (WINCO 1992).

J4.3.2 Chemical Dissohltion
The fuel is dissolved chemically by a highly concentrated acid or base solution. If necessary,
a nuclear poison can be added to assist in criticality control. Separation of the fissile material from
the fission products and cladding material does not occur. The resultant product is converted into an
SNF interim storage form, such as a glass, oxide, or ceramic, with improved characteristics relative
to criticality control. This process applies to all DOE fuel types except graphite fuel. The di5'olution
technology is well developed (Long 1978) and has been used throughout the DOE complex and in
several foreign countries.

J4.3.3 Mechanical
Several mechanical processes, such as shredding, chopping, grinding, and disassembly, have
been proposed to change the configuration of the fuel. The resultant product can be mixed with other
material, such as glass formers or depleted uran ium, for safe interim storage. All DOE fuel can be
treated by this method. Choppers have heen used at several DOE facilities, and shredders have been
evaluated at the Id<ho National Engineering Laboratory for graphite fuel (WINCO 1992).
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J4.3.4 Aqueous Processing
The primary aqueous extraction processing approach used is called PUREX. Aqueous
processlOg consists of chemically dissolving the fuel in an acid, adjusting the solution pH for stability
and uranium extraction, and contacting (mixing) the acid solution with an organic phase, such as
kerosene or n.(\odecane, usually with tribu:yl phosphate added (Long 1978, Benedict 1981). The
organic compound forms a compkx w;!!l !~, e uranyl ion that is extracted into the organic phase, thus
separating the uranium from other dissolved constituents of the fuel. Depending on the fuel type, the
entire fuel element may be dissolved, or the cladding can be breached by chopping the element to
enable the acid to leach the fuel matrix. For the chop-leach approach, there remains undissolved
cladding hulls. The acid solutions used in the process are tailored to the fuel type. By adjusting the
valence of plutonium, it can be separated from the uranium and/or fission products by a series of
water-solution-to-<lrganic-phase extraction steps. The PUREX process is applicable to almost all fuel
types, if there is a suitable fuel matrix dissolution (headend) process. A process variation .called
TRUEX, developed at Argonne National Laboratory, can be used to recover the transuran,c elements
other than uranium or plutonium.
Aqueous processing of SNF utilizing the basic PUREX separation approach is a mature
technology and is used world-wide (Leigh 1992). The United States has used PUREX aqueous
processing for separating fissile materials from irradiated defense fuels since the 1950s at the
Savannah River Site, Hanford Site, and Idaho National Engineering Laboratory. The West Valley
Plant in New York, constructed for fissile material e"raction from commercial light water reactor
fuels, used a PUREX-type process. The United Kingdom, France, Russia, and lapan use large-scale
aqueous PUREX processing to recover fissile materials from spent fuels.

J4.3.S Electrome tallurgical Processing
Electrometallurgical processing employs rapid anhydrous (or water-free) chemical reactions at
high temperature for the extraction of metal from mixtures or concentrates and for refining metallic
elements and compounds. The process is based on passing an electrical current through fused salts.
It involves three steps . First, a basket of chopped fuel is made anodic with respect to the
electrorefiner crucible, which promotes rapid dissolution of the fuel into the electrolyte salts. These
salts fl oat on a pool of liquid cadmium metal . Second , a metallic cathode is introduced into the salts
and much of the uranium is deposited on the metallic cathode (which is removed for uranium
recovery) . Third, a liquid cadmium cathode is then used to collect the remaining uranium,
plutonium, and fission products . Zirconium and noble metals remain in the molten electrorefiner
cadmiu m pool. Most fission products remain in the electrolyte salts. Cadmium in the liquid
cadmium cathode can be distilled, leaving the fissile materials and uranium/plutonium for further
disposition, as approp riate. The process is being developed at Argonne National Labo ratory-West and
being demonstrated on a near-commercial pilot-plant scale in the Fuel Cycle Facility at the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory using sod ium-bonded metallic fuel. In principle, other metallic fu el
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can be processed electro metallurgically. This develop mental process is unique to DOE with no
fo reign or commercial counterparts at th e present time.

T ab le J -2. Capabilities of existing facilities for processing each type of spent nuclear fuel (SNF).
Conditioning and
SNF

J4.3.S Halide Volatility

category

A dry chloride volatility process is being developed for separation of the nonradioactive bulk
cladding material (e.g. , zirconium), fissile uranium, and other fissile or nonfissile transuranic
prod ucts in SNF. This process is in the conceptual stage (Christian 1994). The process involves
complete volatilization of a SNF element. Fuel is exposed to chlorine gas at high temperature
[greater than 1200' C (2200' F)]. All of the fuel constituents form volatile chlorides. The chloride
compounds are separated by scrubbing the gases through a molten zinc chl oride bath to remove the
fission products and transuranic radionuclides. The fission products and transuranic radio nuclides are
recovered by evaporating away the zinc chloride. The remaining chloride gases are fractionally
condensed to separate and recover nonradioactive constituents, uranium, iodine, and krypton . The
process produces a single waste form (e.g., glass) for ultimate disposition. A significant reduction in
volume can be achieved. The process can be applied to fuels with almost any of the existing
claddings (such as zircon;um alloys, al um inum, and stainless steel) .

D escriptio n

Metallic fuel with
zirconium-&.lloy
cladding

Processing
technology
stalus

Existing applicable

racilitiCi

Excellent condition:

Proven on ..

Existing Idaho National

minimal stabilization
required

production

Engineering Laboratory
r.cilitiCi Ul in& second
generttion dissolution

scale

and extraction via

CPP-60t facility
Highly enriched
metallic fuel with
aluminum clad

Fuel from the
Savannah
River Site
production
reacton ;
Idaho National
Engineering
Laboratory
Advanced Test
Reactor driver
fuel ; some
domestic and
foreign
research
reactor fuels

Fuel Types
The current DOE SNF inventory was characterized into six categories as discussed previously

expanded on below.

Naval fuc:1

stabilization need.
for interim ston.ge

racilitiCi (Ouorincl
dissolution process cell)

J-4.4 Capabilities of Existing Facilities for Processing Each of the

in Section J-2 and Table J-I . T able J-2 summarizes the locat ions fo r each category of SNF as well as
the processing capabilities that might be brought LU bear on them. The information in the tables is

Source

Low enrichment,
metallic fuel with
zircaloy-clad

Hanford Site
N-Reactor fuel

Condition varies;

stabilization is.
near-lCnn issue; fuel
in wet storage will
degnde further
during interim
period; long-tenn
dry storage has
unresolved questions

Poor condition and
degrading; about
hair of the SNP hu

Proven on ..
production
scale

Proven on a
production
.cale

Existing Savannah River
Site or Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory
facilities with new chopleach hCAd~nd ; certain
foreign (acilitiea exist that
have the capability to
process N-Reacto r SNP

Proven on a
production
scale (or

Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory or
Savannah Rive r Site
facilities could be used
with a ncw head~nd
Cacility

breached cladding
with fuel leaching;
stabilization it a
near-tenn issue

Uranium carbide in
graphite matrix
within a graphite
structure U0 2 fuel
with zirconium

Gas-cooled
commercial
reactors at
FortSt. Vrain

ExceUcnt condition;
minimal stabilization
necessary

ROVER SNF;

and

proven on a
prototype
scale ror other
graphite fuel.

Pcachbottom

Zircaloy-clad rods
typicaUy with lowenrichment U0 2
pcllc15

DOE teslS of
commerc ial
reactor fuel;
damaged
Three-Milc
Island core

Condition excellcnt
with the exception
of Three-Mile Island
core debris; minimal
stabilization
necessary

Existing Savannah River
Site facilitiCi (or Savannah
River fuel; other research
and development SNF can
be processcd at either the
Savannah River Site or
Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory

Proven on a
productio n
scale

Existing Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory or
Savannah River Site
Cacilitics perhaps with ncw
head-cnd facility

debris
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J-S SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL INSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

TobIe J -2 . (continued).

SNF
category

6a

Conditioning and
stabilization needs

Description
V.rious stainless-sleel

clad fuels with ei:.hcr
high or low enrichment

for interim .torage

Source

ProI;Clling

Exisling

lcxhnology

applicable
racilitic:a

slatus

Idaho National
Engineering
Laboratory and
Hanford Site test

Varioul and
lometimCl unknown
fuel condition .

Proven on ..

Degradation of some

clad high-

rucl<>n

fuels expected
because of long
storage tUnes

enriched
uranium SNF;

production
scale for steel·

prototype

demonstration.
are nceded (or
other typel
6b

Zircaloy-clad UOl or
U-Mo alloy of high or

low enrichment

Shippingport
power reactor and
various
experiment
reacton

Various and

Proven for

sometimes unknown

lOme fuel
types; olhcn

fuel condition;
degradation of some:
fuels expected

may require
further work

because or long
storage times

Liquid unnium-2JS in a
salt so lution. no
cladding

Molten salt
rca.ctor
experiment at Oak
Ridge National
Laboratory

Unknown; corrosive
na!ure or ruel niSei
questions regarding
present conditions;
evidence or
corrosio n or storage
container exisl1;
stabilization will be
required

Processing
technology not
yet identified

Existing Idaho
National
Enginccring
laboratory or
Savannah River
Site facilities
with new or
modified head-

This section, in a general way, summarizes potential impacts of institutional considerations on
SNF management. The institutional factors include availability of an infra::tructure of persoMel with
knowledge and training in SNF management; facility capacity for SNF operations; and availability of
equipment, facilities, railheads, and roadways for transport of SNF. These factors are important
considerations in ~valuating and selecting technology options for SNF management.

J-S.1 Availability of Technical Personnel Trained In Spent Nuclear
Fuel Management

end

Existing Idaho
National
Engineerin&
Laboratory or

Savannah River
SilC racilities
with an
upgraded
dissolution
racility
one at present

The management of SNF requires persoMel qualified and experienced in a number of
appropriate skill areas and operations. The skill areas include proficiency in the design, fabrication,
and use of special tooling; specific traini ng in safety and radiation protection; specific understanding
of criticality controls; an understandi ng of SNF and SNF handling and shipping operations; and
emergency preparedness capabilities. Most operations involving SNF must be perfonned remotely in
hot cells.
The disciplines specific to SNF management .nclude mechanical and structural engineering,
construction engineering, radiation protection, nuclear safety, industrial safety, chemistry, and nuclear
physics.

J-S.2 Availability of Facilities for Spent Nuclear Fuel Management
Operations
Important facilities factors to be considered in SNF management include availability and
adequacy of existing facilities for storing and stabilizing of SNF and the design requirements for new
facilities. Important factors when evaluating existing facilities include fuel type to be handled, fuel
integrity, type of storage (for example, wet or dry), stabilization requirements. capacity and condition
of dry storage facilities, and any conditioning or processing that could be required for ultimate
disposition.

J-S.3 Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel
Important factors relating to transport of SNF include fuel reactivity or stability, availability
of shielded casks. availability of cask-handling cranes with adequate capacity, status of licenses and
permits for a particular site, availability of transport equipment and loading and unloading facilities.
availability of qualified roadways and/or railheads, and vehicle tracking and comm~nications
capabilities .
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J-S.4 Safeguards and Security
The management of SNF typically requires rigorous safeguards and security controls to
protect the fissile material within the SNF from diversion. In addition. protection of personnel, the
public, and environment must be maintained . These requirements result in specific safeguards and
security criteria that include access control to areas where SNF is handled, stored, and processed and
the maintenance of controlled databases to account for fuels and their inventory of fissile materials.
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Appendix
Appendix
Appendix
Appendix
Appendix
Appendix

A
B
C
D
E
F

The appendix contains (a) a key to alternatives, (b) a summary of data by alternative, and
(c) a summary of data by alternative and site. The leey to alternatives defines the site combinations
represented by the subalternatives and options and relates these to the columns in Tables K-I and K-2.
The summary of data by alternative in Table K-t presents the summed (or maximum) impacts across
all sites involved in that alternative, subalternative, and option. The summary of data by alternative
and site in Table K-2 presents data for each site that is affected by that alternative, subalternative, and
option . Those sites not affected by a particular option are not shown.
Ten categories of data, numbered in the first column of the attached tables, were used to
develop the discussions and graphs in Chapter 5 and are summarized by diScipline below.
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I.

Land Use-The value presented is an estimate of the amount of additional acreage that would
be disturbed if a particular alternative was implemented. Minimum and maximum values
were provided for options within each alternative where available. The maximum percent of
the total site area that would be dedicated to spent nuclear fuel (SNF) management activities
was also calculated . Land use impacts are discussed in Section 5.2.1 of Volume I. A
detailed discussion on land use is provided in Appendices A through F.

2.

Employment Related to SNF Management-The values presented are the projected to-year
average changes in site employment related to proposed SNF management activities for the
period from 1995 to 2005 . Minimum and maximum values were calculated where data were
avail able. Baseline site employment refers to the sitewide employment at June 1995, inclusive
of those employed in SNF management activities. The maximum percent of baseline site
employment represents the maximum incremental change in sitewide employment that might
K-I
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occur because of the proposed SNF management activities. SNF-related employment is
discussed by alternative in Section 5. 1, Chapter 5, Volume 1. A detailed analysis of
socioeconomic impacts is provided in Appendices A through F.
3.

Population Collective Dose-The radiation dose that wo,tld be received by the population
within 80 kilometers (50 miles) of each site per year from normal operations. It is derived
from data in the site appendices and represents the dose for the maximum option within each
alternative. Because of the differences in methods used to generate the data, the estimated
SNF manage'!lent doses are sometimes higher than total site doses. The SNF management
doses were dev.loped by modeling releases from existing and proposed facilities, and sitewide
doses were determined by a combination of modeling of existing facilities and monitoring
data. The monitoring data are more accurate, while the modeling approach overestimates
expected dose, making the expected dose higher than would probably be realized. Population
collective doses are described by alternative in Section 5.1, Chapter 5, Volume 1.

4.

Maximally Exposed Individual (ME/)-The MEl is a hypothetical person located downwind at
the site boundary closest to the facilities that might have radiation releases. The MEl doses
are calculated by modeling releases from existing and proposed facilities from normal
operations. Data on the MEl doses can be found in Appendices A through F and represent
the dose for the maximum option within each alternative.

5.

Worker Dose-The dose that would be received by workers at facilities, based on expected
radiation levels at those facilities for normal operations. Sitewide worker doses are based on
historical monitoring of workers. These values are not particularly useful in comparing
among sites or alternatives as worker doses are controlled by limiting worker involvement in
activities that could result in exposures to radiation . Both individual doses and collective
doses to workers are taken from Appendices A through F.

6.

Water Use-The values represent an estimate of the change in annual consumption of water
(in millions of gallons) that may result from the proposed SNF management activities for a
given alternative. Minimum and maximum values are provided where available. The
baseline water use is the annual water corsumption for a site for all operations . The
maximum percent of baseline site water represents the annual maximum incremental change in
water u~e that would occur because of the proposed SNF management activities . Water
impacts are discussed in Section 5.2.6, Chapter 5, Volume I . A detailed discussion of water
use and related consequences is provided in Appendices A through F.

7.

El ectricity Use-The values represent an estimate of the change in annual power consumption
(in megawatt hours per year) that would result from the proposed SNF management activities
for a given alternative. Minimum and maximum values are provided where available. The
baseline site electricity use is the annual power consumption for a site for all operations. The
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maximum percent of site electricity use represents the annual maximum incremental change in
power consumption that would occur because of the proposed SNF management activities .
Electricity use is discussed by alternative in Section 5.1, Chapter 5, Volume 1. A detailed
discussion of electricity use is provided in Appendices A through F.
8.

Sewage-The values represent an estimate of the change in annual rate of wastewater
generation (in millions of gallons) that would result from the proposed SNF management
activities for a given alternative. Minimum and maximum values are provided where
available. The baseline site sewage value represents the annual volume of wastewater
generated from total site operations. The maximum percent of baseline site sewage represents
the annual maximum incremental change in wastewater generation that would occur because
of the proposed SNF management activities . Wastewater generation is discussed in Section
5 .2.9 of Volume 1. A detailed discussion of wastewater generation is provided in Appendices
A through F.

9.

Waste Volume Estimates (high-level, transuranic, mixed, and low-level waste)-The annual
generation rate of these waste types (in cubic meters per year) from the proposed SNF
management activities is provided . These values represent to-year cumulative generation
rates divided by ten. Minimum and maximum values are provided where available. The
waste volumes are discussed by alternative in Section 5.1 of Volume I. A detailed discussion
of the waste-generating activities at each site is provided in Appendices A through F.

10.

Facility Accidents-For accidents, the individual and collective dose values in the tables
represent the consequences for the accident having the highest radiological risk (dose times
frequency, not necessarily the highest dose) to the public or to workers. The accidents
selected for reporting are not necessarily the same for workers and the general population. In
each category, the accident with the highest risk was selected, which may be different for
workers and the general population. Doses and risks in Table K-2 are the maximum values
from each alternative in Table K-1. Accident analyses reported in this summary are based on
SNF management-related activities only and are found in the site appendices. Doses from
accidents are described by alternative in Section 5. 1 of Volume I. The Savannah River Site
did not quantify the worker dose for the maximum risk accident because the safety analysis
reports from which accident information was extracted were prepared before the issuance of
DOE Order 5480.23 (DOE 1992). Before 1992, applicable DOE orders did not require the
inclusion of worker doses in safety analysis reports. Appendix C to Volume I of this EIS
provides a co-located worker dose rather than a worker dose for the maxi mum risk accident.

11.

Transportation-For incident-free transportation, the values in Table K-2 represent the total
annual average fatalities from shipments of SNF for each alternative. Total fatalities are th ~
sum of radiation-related latent cancer fatalities for transportation workers and the general
population, plus nonradiological fatalities from vehicular emissions. These data are an
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risks, two sets of data are presented in Table K-2 for each alternative. The estimated risks of
cancer fatalities represent the radiological risk from transportation accidents. The estimated
risk of traffic fatalities represent the nooradiological risk from traffic accidents. Both
quantities are on an annual average basis. These data are an aggregate of the data presented
in Appendices D and I.
The data in Table K-I have been rounded to two significant figures, the greatest number of
significant figures that can be justified with this analysis. Zero values indicate no impact for that
parameter. In the summary table by alternatives, however, missing site dala are treated as zeroes, so
the impacts for given alternatives can be understated. Missing data are indicated by blanks. Missing
values exist only where impacts are expected to be very small or trivial, so the magnitude of
underestimation is probably also small.

Key to Alternatives and Sites
No Action: Very limited SNF shipments, limited upgrade. to facilities, limited stabilization.

Decentralization: Non-DOE sites (cKeep( Navy) transport to DOE Jiles . lOme upgndes to facilities , ltabi.li.z.ation.
No examination of naval SNF
Limited examination of naval SNF at Pugd Sound Naval Shipyard
FuU examination of naval SNF at Idaho National Engineering Laboratory; SNF returned to Navy Jiles
for storage

Option A :
Option B:
Option c:

199211993 Plaaoinc Basd: New SNF tran.pol1Cd to Idaho National Engineering Laboratory or Savannah River Site.
facility upgrades and expansion, stabilization.
RegiooaUzaooa: SNF transportcd to regional lites, facility upgradea and expansion, ltabilization.
4A:
48 :

Table K-\ shows the magnitude of differences between alternatives is very low. To
understand observed differences between alternatives, Chapter 5 of this EIS should be consulted.
Differences between sites within an alternative require examination of the site-specific appendices for
the reasons noted above.

SNF to Idaho National Engi.nccring Laboratory or Savannah River Site depending on fuel type
SNF to Weste:m or Easte:m Regional Site depending on geognphy

Option

Western Regional Site

Expended Core Facility
location

Eutem Regional Site

Savannah River Site

IE

Hanford Site

Savannah River Site

IW

Hanford Site

Savannah River Site:

Hanford Site

2W

Idaho National Engineering
Labontory

Savannah River Site

Idaho National Engineering
Labo ..lory

3E

Nevada Test Site

Savannah River Site

Savannah River Site:

3W

Nevada Teat Site

Savannah River Site

Nevada Teat Site

4E

Hanford Site

Oak Ridge Reaervation

Oak Ridge Reservation

4W

Hanford Site

Oak Ridge Reservation

Hanford Site

SW

Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory

Oak. Ridge RCKrvation

Idaho National Engineering
Labo ..lory

6E

Nevada Test Site

Oak. Ridge Reservation

Oak Ridge Reseryation

6W

Nevada Test Site

Oak Ridge Reservation

Nevada Test Site

CeotnlizatioD: SNF transported to central site. facility upgrades and expansion. stabilization .
Optio n
Option
Optio n
Optio n
Option

Hanfo rd
INEL

SRS
ORR

NTS
Navy
Other
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A:
B:
C:
D:
E:

Hanford Site is the central site
Idaho National Engineering Laborato ry is the central site
Savannah River Site is the central lite
Oak Ridge Reservation is the: central site
Nevada Test Site is the central lite

Hanford Site
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
Savannah River Site
Oak Ridge Reservation
Nevada Test Site
Navy shipyards and prototype locations
Small DOE . other government. and university f'C.'earch reactor sites

K-5
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Table K-l. Summary of impacts by alternatives and by site.·
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Table K·l. (continued).

Table K·1. (continued).
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Table K· I. (continued).

Table K·1. (continued) .
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Table K-1. (continued).

Table K-l. (continued) .
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Table K-l. (continued).

Table K-l. (continued).
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Table K-1. (continued).

Table K-1. (continued).
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Table K-l. (continued).

Table K-l. (continued).
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Table K-J. (continu ed).

Table K-J. (continued).
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Table K-l. (continued).

Table K-J. (continued).
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Table K-J. (continued).

Table K-J. (continued).
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Table K-1. (continued).
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a. E indicates exponential notation. Refer to scientific notation in Appendix H. Glossary. for an
explanation of this way of writing very large and very small numbers.
b. SRS did not quantify the worker dose for the maximum risk accident.
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Table K-2. Summary of impacts by alternative. a

o<

r

Plannlf1lj
Basis

Regionali.
llriOn

Regionali.
lation

Regionali·
zation

Regionali.
zalion

No-Aclion

Decenlrali·
.. lion

Decenlrali·

Oecent,.ti·

lallon

1110'\

Units

No-Aclion

A

8

C

Lar>d fo< MW facilities, minimum

Acres

17

28

28

28

Lar>d fo< MW facilities. mumum

Acres

18

45

45

45

47

47

139

139

83

173

S~e

Acres

1.182.1 39

1,133,369

1.1 33.369

1,127,314

1,127,314

1,127,314

1,127,314

1,127,314

1,127,314

1,991 ,314

AIIemallY

~

Regionali·
1IIion

('r1

A

Suba~em.livI

CIlIior

area

Percenl 01 site area, muimum
iSNF.relaled employmerl . mnimum

~NF.relaled employmenl, mumum

I-[easerine site employment

Person·years pe<
year
Person·years pe<
....r
Person-years pe<
year

iPercent of baseline s~. employment, minimum
P"'cent of basefine

s~.

employment, mumum

Estimated maximum latent cancet' fatal~ in flO.
ikm population, SNF management

Lalent car>eer
fatalitles pe< year

Estimaled maximum latent cancer fat.lilies in flO.

Latent canoer
fatalities pe< year
Lalent canoer
year
falalities
Lalent canoer
falalities_"", Y"ar
Lalenl cancer
falalities
year
Lalenl cancer
f.talities Der ....r
Mllioan gam. per
year
Million gams pe<
year
M,nion gallons pe<
year

!tun populalion, s~e operalions
Estimaled maximum p<obabili:y 01 latent canoer
ata~ties in MEl, SNF manaoement
Estimaled maIimum p<obability 01 latent car>eer
atal~ies in MEf, site operalions
Eslimated maximum p<obability oIlalent canoe<
alalilY .. """'er, SNF manaoemenl
Maximum p<obabi~ oIlalenl cancer falality in
iwort.er s~e coerations
!waler use. SNF management, minimum
lWater use, SNF management. maximum

easeline waler use, srte operalions

'*
'*

Muimum percent 01 baseline $lIe waler use
Eieclneily use, SNF managemenl, minimum
Eieclriclly use, SNF managemenl, maximum
easeline sae elec1riclly use

Megawan-hours pe<
Year
/o4eoawan-hours per
year
~wan ·hours Der
year

Percent of site elec1uclfy use. mlnrTIum
Pe r~t

of site elec1ric.ty use. mannum

Sewage, SNF managemenl, m..imum
Sewage, SNF management. malllmum
Baseline srte sewage
Percent of baseline $118 sewage. rna.mum

MIllion gallons per
year
MIllion gallons per
year
MInoan gallons per
year

30

25

8

8

8

8

IE

IW

2W

3E

72

102

72

132

0.00

0.00

0.00

0,00

0.00

0.00

0.01

O.QI

O.QI

O.QI

· 178

52

117

308

500

482

743

743

S46

1,518

· 178

889

954

1,145

1,093

923

1,430

1,430

1,095

1,766

100,990

73,170

73,170

73,170

43,120

43,120

43,120

43,120

43,120

51 ,683

~. 18

0.07

0.16

0.42

1.16

1.12

1.72

1.72

1.96

2.94

.0.18

1.21

1.30

1.56

2.53

2.14

3.32

3.32

2.54

3.42

8.4E·5

8.8E·3

8.8E·3

8.8E·3

8.7E·3

9.7E-3

9.7E-3

9.7E·3

9.8E·3

9.7E-3

1.6E·2

4.7E·3

4.7E-3

4.7E·3

4.6E·3

4.6E·3

4.6E·3

4.6E-3

4.6E-3

4.6E-3

1.5E~

1.5E~

1.5E~

1 . 5E~

2.0E·7

2.0E·7

2.0E·7

2.0E·7

2.0E·7

2.0E·7

2 . 2E~

6.5E-8

6.5E-8

6.5E-8

6.5E-8

6.5E-8

6.5E-8

G.5E-8

6.5E-8

6.5E-8

1.6E~

2 . 0E~

2 . 0E~

2. 0E~

2 . 0E~

2 . 0E~

2 . 0E~

2 . 0E~

2 . 0E~

2. 0E~

8.8E·5

8.8E·5

8.8E·5

8.8E·5

8.8E·5

8.8E·S

8.8E·5

8.8E·5

8.8E·5

8.8E·5

6.3

12.0

12.0

15.0

15.0

15.0

17.2

17.2

34.9

37.4

6.3

131.8

131 .6

134.6

i35.2

134.4

135.8

135.8

146.8

137.1

39,239

39.239

39,239

39.239

29,380

29,380

2!1,380

29,380

29,380

30,500

0.02

0.34

0.34

0.34

0.46

0.46

0.46

0.46

0.50

0.45

·8,529

9,571

9,571

19.571

19,650

24,650

24,510

24,510

26,500

47,410

185,600

196,600

185,400

185,400

87,400

101,400

1.208,000

1.208,000

1,208,000

1,208,000

1,208,000

1,391 ,100

·8,420

173,580

173.580

183,580

1,619,067

1,619,067

1,619,067

1,619,067

·0.53

0.59

0.59

1.2 1

1.63

2.04

2.03

2.03

2.19

3.41

·052

1072

10.72

11 .34

15.36

16.27

15.35

15.35

7.24

7.29

10.3

13.9

13.9

13.9

13.9

13.7

14.6

14.6

15.0

18.5

10.3

16.5

16.5

16.5

16.9

17.0

18.8

18.8

17.2

19.8

380

380

380

380

380

380

380

380

380

380

2.71

4.33

4.33

4.33

4.44

4.46

4.94

494

453

5.19

Table K-2. (continued).
AlIamallY'

Planning
Basis

No-Aclion

Oecenlralizalion

OecenlraN-

zahon

OecenlrafizaHan

No-Action

A

B

C

0

0

0

0

0

0

25

25

25

17

18

18

17

39

1

A

Subaltemativ.
()pIior

H.gII _

waste. SNF management m"'mum

H.gII _

"'sle. SNF management. maximum

ransuranic "'Sle. SNF m.".gement. minimum
ransuranoe ...ste. SNF management. maximum
Mi""" waste. SNF m.".gemenl. minimum
Mi""" .aSle. SNF m.".gement. maximum
Low _
OW _

"'Sle. SNF management. minimum
"'518. SNF managemenl. maximum

High-_. Iransur8l1ic. and mixed wastes

Qenerlted. minimum
~igh-_. Iransuranic. and milled ... stes
_ated maximum

I!I

Cubic meters pe<
year
Cubic meters pe<
....r
Cubic meters per
ye.r
Cubic meters pe<
...ar
Cubic meters pe<
year
Cubic meters pe<
....r
Cubic meters per

.....

Cubic meters pe<
.... r
Cubic meters pe<
year
Cubic meters pe<
vear

Regional~

zation

Regionalization

RegionaNzation

B

B

B

B

IE

lW

2W

3E

0

0

0

6

6

31

31

28

28

185

28

18

18

17

17

17

17

33

39

39

75

74

70

70

74

86

0

0

0

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

2

2

2

2

2

550

49'

49'

919

1.119

1.119

920

920

1.305

1.138

550

1.020

1.020

1.445

2.005

2.04S

1.565

1.565

2.045

1.768

18

19

19

19

19

18

18

18

24

40

18

65

65

65

108

101

100

100

261

116

Latent c:ancer
fatafities

3.7E.l

8.1E.l

8. IE.l

8.1E.l

8. 1E.l

8.1E.l

8.1E.l

8.1E.l

8.1E. l

8.1E.l

Estimated maximum risk ellatent caroeer fata l~ies
in BO-km population from maximum risk accident

Latenl cancer
fata lities pe< year

3.7E-3

3.OE-3

3.DE-3

3.DE-3

3.4E-3

3.7E-3

3.SE.J

3.SE·3

3.5E-3

3.5E-3

Latent cancer
lalalilies

7.4E·2

9.4E·2

9.4E-2

9.4E·2

9.4E-2

9.4E-2

9.4E·2

9.7E·2

9.4E-2

9.4E-2

slimaled maximum risk eI worker falonl c:ancer
from maximum risk accidenl

Lalenl canQIf
lalafilies pe< year

7.4E-7

7.4E-7

7.4E-l

7.4E·7

5.6E·7

S6E-l

6.6E-7

6.9E·l

4.7E·l

4.7E-l

Oslimaled muimum 10001Iala.l~ies from incidenlee SNF tranSllOltalion
stimlled muimum risk eI earoeer fata lities from
Illransportalion accidents
slimaled muimum risk 01 traffoe fatalities from
r.nSllOltation . _ t s

Fatal ~ies

2.2E-4

8.7E-3

8.8E-3

9.4E-3

1.1E-2

1.5E-2

1.4E·2

1.3E-2

1.3E-2

2.3E-2

Clncer Illal~ies pe<
year

I.DE-l

2.JE·S

2.3E·S

2.4E·S

2.4E· 5

2.6E·S

3.3E-5

2.4E·S

2_4E-5

3.6E-S

Fatalities per year

I.2E-3

6.4E-3

6.8E-3

2.6E·2

1.8E-2

1.9E-2

2.1E-2

1.9£·2

18E-2

2_4E-2

ala l~ies

~

Units

Regionalilation

Estimated maximum latent cancer fatal~ies in BOkm population from maximum risk accident

Estimated muimum worker latent cancer
alalities from maximum risk accident

o<

Regiona W.
zation

pe< year

o<

Table K-2. (continued).

~

Reg""",li·
zalion

MemallV.

I'll

SubaHemallVe
VMS

Reg"",aH·
lltion

l1eg;onati.
1.l hon

B

B

B

3W

4E

Region.h·
ZltlOl"l

Regiona~·

zalion

Regional•.
lltian

B

B

B

5W

6E

6W

Centrati·
zation

Cenlralizalion

Centrali·
zation

Ce<'lrai·

Centrali-

lIhon

zallOn

A

B

c

o

E

'or

Acres
162
151
151
121
211
111
121
121
lancl
new 'aolrtoe • . mlnmum
31
n
211
~---------------------~r--------~-----+----~~----r------r-----+------r-----+-----~-----r-----+----~
Acres
133
Land fOf new faalit"' , mUJmum
t13
189
189
133
133
223
223

SIt•• fea

Acres

Percent of srte Irea, mUJmum
P8fson-yaars per
yaIr
Pe<son·years per

SNF·relaled employmenl. m",,,,,um
SNF·relaled employmenl. maximum

vear
Pe<son' yaars per
year

Basaltne sile employm.",t

1.991 .314

1. 161 .981

1.161 .981

1. 161 .981

2.025.981

2.025.981

1.1 21.314

1.127.314

1.127.314

0.01

002

0.02

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.00

0.01

0.Q1

0.01

1.518

1.154

1.154

1.257

1.929

1.929

712

701

1.767

1.313

1.313

1.766

1.186

1.786

1.451

2.122

2.122

1.329

995

2.030

1.566

1.566

1.161 .981

51 .683

60.202

60.202

60.202

68.165

68.165

43.120

43.120

43.1 20

60.202

51 .683

employmenl. minmum

2.94

1.92

1.92

2.09

2 90

2.90

1.65

1.63

4.10

2.28

2.66

Pe<cenl 01 baseline s~a employmenl. maonum

3.42

2.91

2.97

2.41

3.09

3.09

3.08

2.07

4.11

2.60

3.03

9.1E·3

3.2E-3

1.1E-4

4.6€-3

3.2E·2

4.6€·3

Pe«:enl 01 baseline

s~a

rr populatton. SNF management

stmaled maximum talenl cancer 'ala l~ias in 80·

Lalenl cancer
'alailm PIr year

9.1E·3

32E·3

3.2E·3

3.3E·3

3.3E·3

3.2E·3

6.1E-4
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37.4
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M,II1On gallons _
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Maga .... n·lIOurs per

year
Mega .... n·lIOurs per
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Table K-2. (continued).
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- ---

---

-
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--

-

-
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Itansutanc. and mtIed wastes

Ioenerated. m ..umum
H.gn·~a l .

Units

Cube marefS per

year

uansuranc. and m ll.&d wasles

I

I

1

I

1

I

2

I

2

I

1.508

I

1.858

I

27
262

1 138

year

CuDe meters ~

year
Cube metars per

I •• ~I'"

--

E sllmated ma• ."um nsk of lalent cancer fatalitIeS
fn 8O-km populatIOn horn m aU"T1um n slt acoden1

1.123
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1.378

.0
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8 E.I

-
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35E·J
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\

I

I-- - -- EstImated
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I

1.378
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I
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81E·l
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I

81E. l

34E-3

3 .E·3
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lala
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2

I
I

-

5

16
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21
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57

61
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1

1

1

I

I

2

2

2

2
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935
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1.138
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1
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I

I

1

I

2

2
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1 .~ 1
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I
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~
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27

I
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2.6
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81E.I
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81E.l
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1.• E·3
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3 .• E-3
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I

I

I

I

3.E·3
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9.E·2
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.7E ·7
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23E-2

32E·2

28E·2

. 3E·2

39E·2
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31E·5

1 3E-e

12E-e
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13E-e

18E·2

I
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28E·2

25E·2

36E·2

3.• E·2

3.JE·2

. 7E·7

66E ·7

23E·2

'.E ·2

' . E-2

29E·5

30E·5

2.E·5

25E·2

20E·2

19E·2

I

I

5

89

73

2

37

I

21

I

26

37

I

.

26

26

21

1

28

26

I

73

183

183

26

I

26

6

I

86

6

6

I

21

E

6

6

26

I,

D

6

6W

0

33

C

6E

0

-

B
6

5W

6
I

A

0

B

.W

28

lalion

B

,

,

Centra h·

zllm

lal K)(!

.E

I

Cenuall·

zalfOr'

Reg"",a"·

zal lOn

3W

I

. y,.r
CuOC """e<s per
ye ..
CuOC mele<s per

I

B _~_

Central!·

zal l()O

Reo""" '"

zatlOO

B

-

_y.ear
Cube met'"S per

Cube meters per

Mixed wa ste. SNF management. maa:rmutn

low level wa ste. SNF management. ". .,.. mum

-- . I

,I

Central!·

Reo""'·'"

B

J8.'

r-ransuraruc wasta. SNF management m..,.mum

Mlled wasta. SNF manaoemenl. mtnU'Mum

zatf()O

-

CuOC mele<' per
year

um

---

Reg"",a'"

zall()()

C""bt( met81S per

Htgl'l level waste. SNF management. mlf'umum

HIQh . lev~

-

001.",

Hog/lleYel wa sle. SNF man aoem,,"l. max

Reg.anah.

zafl()n

--

~~ema~

.

Reg"",a '"

f-

I

I

I

I

!T1

a. E indicates exponential notation. Refer to scientific notation in Appendix H, Glossary, for an
explanation of this way of writing very large and very small numbers.
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Ro ntld Denno::y
Jllhn C. DevlOe
P" le.!olllr A!,plieJ Te.:hllt,I.'g)" Int;"
51111)' Bennell De\' hn

Table 1\1-1. (conlinued )
C R.) D.ck"","
U S Dep'l'Irnenl .,f C.'mmerce
Nllilln.l ().;:clnu: and Af ""'~rh c:m:
Admln.sl rat .. ,"
P J Dlrkm..1
U S. Dep,nment " f Ener);), IJ.h,.
Ope r'l i" n~

Office

J . O Dinm.. r
Wendy Di'(ll n
AMESH OOE/WMP
Sle\'t: o., lIey
Nu..:Jeu C" Rlrol In~ilul t:
T,.m [)':' nndly

Table 1\1-\. (co nlinued)
8<... Fer~u!lt'n
Id.ho Dep.nment "f Health &: Wdf.ro:
INEL o.·ersil! hl PNt:tl m
Ken Ferguso n
Dr. K",vlII W. Ferguso,lII
N. r;('In"·Ide En"'iwnmenlll Prug r. ms
Dr. L. P Femlndu
h ' hn Ferrlnle. Ph .D .
Telr. T«h. Inc
C ui Fieldl
J A Finhn"'n
Id.h ... 1Xp.t1menl of He.lm & Wdfue
Du.rrici 7 Envim nrncnlll Hulth

$puh Soens.e St'lund Pc:'. ... "

J. ne Dn u);hl)'
Shlron o..'IJ,g11i
Patrick O"yle

Huold Draper
D Dreyfus
U.S. DOE. RW-5
Ann

Duffel

Roy F WUlo n. Inc .
T«hnical Inform.lion eenler
Paul X. Dunigan
U.S. OOE. Riehl."d Operatw.n5 Office
Oirt. Dunning
Oregon OqI.nnwnt of Energy
Mert E. Dupont
Savannah Rh.' eT Site
Spenl Nuclear Fuel
JotHI ... .

D)' iOn

HO'A'aN Eeken

U.S . OOE. E.\t -n
[)eonnu EddiM

L ITCO
Krny Edelmarer
8 n.n Edgeno n
U.S OOE . Idaho Opc-rllin ns Office

p.t.e T Enen
[)(\n Eichdhe-fJer
Bot> Eichler
Sue Elpen
Ro llnd Enl!Ji~ 111
Ma ryland Slife Cl unn8hou~
Offit-e of Sl.Ite PI.nmng
ThomaJi Enye.n
William Y Epling
Willi.m Y Ephng
INTECH. Inc
R.lph Erinon
U S DOE . EM ·)!
Rou Esp.ru
Am.nda Everet'te
l y nne F.",-..henl
11m F.rley
U S DOE. ER ·S 2
h et F.rmer
Dtvld F.rrcl
U S Envlmnmenlll Protect.lln Alleney
RejrK'ln 9 IE·J,
j ,,,",n F•• wll
Neh,..,u Dep.t1menl of R.dlolnglell
Haith
G.ry Fel, emlhr
CommunI ty &: Env",'"menul P\.nnlllll
OtVI$f()fl

Inp.nrnenc of PI.nnln• • nd &lIlding

Sd ence Appliulions Inremlli.'n.1 C" Il' .
J Fiu:getllJ
U.S . DOE. Hudq u. ners. EH· 30
Willi.mFlinl
L)'nn Flo ry
Rich.rd Flory

Meta
Rohen W. Fo lsom
Joon Fo rd
U.S . DOE. Dp·J]
lin Fo rsythe
~kh o:ed Id.ho T echnology Comp.ny
~huricc FouWlee
Tec:hniul PI.nning Co mmissioll
Sel"licel Division
H.lIe Fowler
Hury Frllllete
The Honor.ble Cun A. Fr.nHn
Id.ho Dep.rtrncnl of Hulth &: Wdfuc
Division of Environrncntll Qu.lity
~hrily n F,..zicr
MutFrci
U S . DOE. EM-l4
Elizlbeth Fulmer
Southern StileS EneriY Board
LeIT)' G.dbcli~
U.S. Envlronmentll ~ect tfln Agency
ClthlHII Gtllo .00 To ny G.lln
Joe G.llo. Esq .
G.llo &: Rou
Ikn G.nnon
S.nd,.. G.mer
Wo rld Computer SYIlem
Henry G.non
U.S . OOE. DP·]
MihG.lu
U S. OOE. EM-]6
Fr.nk Gum. n
Rkh.rd Gi!ddu
1000 Geddie
Ekn Gesner
Tom Gihhon.
Alphatrtc
G L Glhuu il
LITCO
R.lhertGlffen
G.ryGIlI
H,w," OffICe of Env"n nrncnl.1 Qu.lity
Co nlrol
RunG.lI
Well V.lley Nucl ur Sel"lice. Comp.ny
Commu nit), Rel.lio n. Dep.nment
8 ... nd. Flory GIrod
J ..nll Auocill" Co tpotltion
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LeviGllSper
Mich.el Anhur Goldbert,:
Dr. Mo n.'n Goldm.n
H.ll ihun o n NUS Co.lrp.
N.di. Gnidm.n
T;rzo Gonzalez
Advanced Sci ence~ . Inc .
Leon. rd Goodm.n
U.S. Oep.nrnenl .,f Ener~y
Wllte Po licy InSl itule
F.wn Gouwiller

urco
Rich.rd Gouley
Idl ho Dep.nment (If Fish & Glme
Advisory C,'mmiuion
Ke lly F. Grahn
Rogers &. AS!l(lCillell Engineering
Michlel W. G,..iney
Oregon Oep.nmenl of Energy
Kathlene Gr.umeire
U .S . OOE . Vucu Mountain Proj«t
Office
Lind. 8 . G,..)'
ludy Green
liM Gr«n
U.S . DOE. Idaho Operllio ns Office
M.uddou Greenwell
Roben M . Grenier
Ge neral Alomics/NWM
Jenifer Grinspoon
P. no ns 8rinchmoff
Ted Groc ho" 'ski
Bthcock &: Wilco x
To ny Gruve r
Oep.nmenl of & o log)', TCP
Dr . Chri~i.n E. Grue
Univenity of W.shingro n
School o f Fisheries. WH- ID
KriuyGunther
H.llihuno n NUS Co rporatio n
Cindy H.ddo n
Idaho Dep.nmem .,( Hulth &: Wdf.re
INEL Oversighl Pmgr.m
Itn H'gers
U.S . OOE . Id.ho OpertllOnll Office
Tho mu Hlggen)'
Electric: Bott Division. Deplnment -WI)
D.ve H.11
8 ill H.milton
Luis H.ngca . I r .
K.. l.thui Hawaii
Did: H.nntn
U.S . Deplrtmenl o f T r.nspnnlllo n
OHM 60
Mufi Htnnemtnn
City .nd County of Honolulu
C;ty Counc il
Glen H.n5On
Blrdle- Alhuquerque Office
l im H.rdemtn
Georgil Dep.rtmenl of Nllur.1
RelOUrces
Environmenlll R.d illion Pnl~r.m
Dott)' Hlrdinge r
N.nc)' H trd~' ic k
Lewrence H . lI.rmon
M.c Technicil Sel"liccs. Co .
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Ernie Hllfr
H.lllnun.'n NUS
5 ... "" Harringt"n
lohn G . H trri ~
LC D lrn:llIl'Or'led
S\I~lIn H.rris
T~'i n F.II ~ INEL Outre.ch Offi .. e
Jo hn T . Hlrriso n. Ph .D .
Uni"'ers;l}, of Hawlli ' i '1 fl.hnn.
JerI')' Hlrunll
Oer.nmenl of H... lth

Kt'n Ullit
U.S . Oepll nment ~,f He.lth .nd Human
St ....·iceli. Centers f»r Di suse C nntr.>1 &
Pn:"enlio n
Mlrk HIlIt
Lih r.l')· of Co ng ro: u
Ann Hum.n
Covinglo n & Burl ing
D. vid Hopkins
U.S. En"'ironmt'ntal Protectio n Agency

M lh s inHI~n

EloiM Hopper
U.S . Dep."ment llfOefense
U .S. Air F.lrte
Jean Hops

M. rk H l5 ke~'
Illy H.ulh
T elt,"ill Engineerin/,! Complny
IIme~ H .... ke
SI.. le of Ne"ada Division uf Emerg.mcy
MS
Sho!>hone· B.nn,:lek Tri bes
Kazu H.)'shida
T r.n~ponlli o n Depanmenl
Charle) He.d
U .S. DOE. EM-37 (FORS)
Da" e Hedgepeth
Nuh ville Puce Actio n
Pllrici. Hendrix
To m Hendrix
Debhie Hensel
U.S . DOE
Beth Herzherger
Defense Cle.nup P.sh. Publicllio ns
Ron Hen
Nc\·.d. Buretu of Mines .nd GeOlogy
Am)' Heuslein
U.S. Dep.nmenl of the Interior
Bureau nflndi.n Aftairs
Miry Hieh
Maui lind Comp.ny. Inc .
LO~' ell W. Himmler
N'l'.1 Sea Systems Commtnd . PM S
l85;!
Dllrrell Hindley
U.S . DOE. Idaho Operllio ns Ofti .. e
D.niel E. Hllhhs
Dlvid Hod
U S . OOE . EM -J7
Leura A. Hofm.n
H&R Te.:hnic.1 AUtle .
Rnhe n H"gg
U S. Nucletr Reg ulllillry Commiuion
Dep.nmenl of Wule M.n.):t'menl
Did: Holder
~hll ihu no n NUS
Mike Hull.nd
U 5 DOE. Broo kh, \,en Area Oilio:e
Br.'t,kh,\,en Nllion. 1 lIhofltory
Lee U ,' ll ing~he.d
Willi.nl Uo"in,
Le~ rt'n"e A Hllim
T,'m Ho lm· H.nsen
PRC Env!tonment.1 ~hn.gt'menl In<:
~".:h.d Hl,lmt's
Pub" .. Se ....·... e Co mp.n} " fC,llo r.d.,
F,'n SI. Vr.1n Stlll.'n
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urco
N.dine Hnm
Ge<'Irgi. Task Fo n.:e "f Nlli"e American
~ ltrci. Houkl
R"n Hover
D.ve Hovl.nd
l o nath.n H O~' eli
No nh C.rolin. Ocp.nmenl of
EnvironmenUlI Hulth .nd Nllu r. 1
Rl!soun:es
So ng Hu.ng
I.ckie Hudson
Doug Hu A'mtn
D.n Hughel
Nint Huizinga
Pennsylv.ml Oep.nment of
Environmenlll Resources
Greg Hul.
U.S. OOE. Id.ho Operllions Office
D""id L. Humphrey
Id.ho Depanment of He. lth ~~ Wl!lf.re
Bruce Hunter
AII.nlic M.n.gemenl Center. Inc .
Ray Hunte r
U.S. DOE. Headqu. ners. NE·+l
Wtrten Hun
M.rk Hyl.nd
M.i ne Dep.nment <If En"'ironmenlll
Pmlec:lion
Federal F.cilities
Ron Hyr.
U S. Dep.nmenl IIf the Inleri,lf
N.llon.1 Puk Se ..... lce
M. Llngr. m
T~lm Ivory
EG&G Rock)' FI.I ~
Su~n lthlonski
TexIS i..ow· Le\·el R.d ill,cli'·e WlSte
Di spoMI Authorit)'
Jiml.c kvo n
R,men ltc kson
Cr.igltc,)hk'n
LITCO
Michlel ltnsk}
l onllhllnlll"lis
US Dep.nment uflhe Intent'r
Ctlters IIf tht' Mot'n NIII,'ntl
fl.1t' nume nl
Ed~' lIrd A Jenn,. .. h
Ru):ers & ASM't:llleJ Englllee.,ng
h mu Jenson
D.me~ & M,"' re
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G. illernig.n
Weslin);hnuk S,,·.nn.h Ri \'cr C.,mpllny
LiM- I eler
Hu.trd uus M.leri.h C.mtNI Re kltln.:e~
InMitute
l ohn I i.:h.
U.S. OOE. EM ·]7 (FORSI
J. Jo be
Gelchell Lihr.ry
Go\'ernmenl Puh l i~'lIil'ns
J. Johnson
RMSto r.ge
Gener.1 Oyntmin
Mel Johnscon
Office nf Emt'rgo:m:,- Mln');emt'nl
Vicki L.I.'hn»t1 n
U .S. Dep.nmenl nf Eneft:)·
Dr. J udith Johnsrud
l im Johnsl,'n
Id. ho Dep.nm.: nt of Hulth & Welf'fe
INEL o.·cl'$ighl Progr.m
Bu b Jo nes
U.S . OOE. Id.ho Operati,ms Offi.;e
Mich.dJ nnes
University of H.~·. ii
Depanmenl of Ph)'sics & ASIh'loom)'
Kc ithl uli.n
Philip Juslus
U .S. Nucletr Rt'guillo r), Comml ui(t n
M IS T7·C6
Andre..' C . Ktd.k
Ylnkee Alo mic Electric C"mr'o~
R. D . Kte"lner
Weslinghou!tl: EI«lric Cllrporlli,'n
C I.,.. Kl kali.
Geo f¥e M . Ktpl.u
U .S . Dep.nmenl of Energy
Nudt"! S.(dY Po,li .. )' .n.J Siand.rd"
Ro n Kea t
Hul.n Kealo n
Oep.nmoent .,f He.lth &: Reh. hlh tllt.'n
Se1"l'icel
En\·in' nml!nt.. 1 R. dill ..'n S':':II<,n
R.di.li.'n Cunln,1
J udy Kelley
Cindy Kell}
U.S. DOE. EM ·5 I FORS I
J<'hn Ke lly
Ariz" n. G,.wernu,·" Office
H.tT}· Kelk'
ViT};inll C.'tln':l l n n the En\'In' nmoent
P.,lic), PI.nlllng .011 Public A((.1n
Oo.'ng Kim
U.S Oep.nml!nl ,.f Eoc1')!y
He ll! nKim
Knrea EI«ln.. p.",~er C"T',n l,,' n
D"'id King
Thl! H.. n.'r.hll! limes Kong
Ne..· Villk St.. le A ~!tI:mhl)
Ro n KIng
U S DOE . Id.h" Opo:rlll<>n\ Offi .. e
Chrisline KInne
C.l ifoml. Ol" etnll" ~ OffiCI! u(
PI.nnlllj: .nd Rese.n:h
Mnn. Kinner
C,ty nf Burle) Pubh.: Llhr.!,)
Will i.m K.,k
UNC N."I Pn'tJuct\

Ta b'" M-1. (continued)

Ta ble M-1. (co ntinued)

j , ..: Kll chen

U S OOE. Nt'\,.J. Orcnh"n~ Office
M , k... K1c, nn..:k
lj

S OOE. EM

~=

, FORS I

0.." Kh rTa
E,.\tcmOllic c
W}n~ Kn..rr
(Kor.IJII~

KMrz
P" n ,.f l ..n~ lkach
R.>hcn G Knud .. m

SC IENTEC H. Inc
Dr Sic",," Knnttl
Bend] ... Plc,fi.. N •• nh ........., Lf,!\n ra h'ry
<n.'f'1c KOJkl.. sky
Din K''III.n~ky
U S Dtpllnl'Tknl (I f the Tnrc not'
Bureau (I f lInrJ M.lVgcnwnt
J.~K ...t"on

LIM Kou nlou~
U 5 OOE. Unde r
IFO RSI

s.ecrrtlll')'"

Office

NaNr,1 R_ 1oUn:C o."' ll1lf'n
Prtcr Ao;hwn Knnkel
UnJ\'cBfty nf Nevld.· Rcntl
DqI.rul'wnI o f C i,,' ,1 Enltu'le~nn~
('-SS)
LArry Knpp~
PI ..d M KnJJtna
OI¥. KNq-cr
NWPO/NARUC
AmM KUJ.II
Emh.uy of Finl.nrJ
Ge.~c KuJ)n) ch

Sh).m Kum-r
Wnf Villey Nuclur Se"' ICC' Cnmp.ny
Dr And re .. H Kunl)"u ll.l

K.. lAh ul H.... n
o. \ld Kun~mlllcr
DFK &. AUflCIII ...,

T cIT) Kuy kcndlll
P. !'VIM Em',,,mnwnttl Sc""'",c" Inc
h mul u HfI... ,
AI'J''IflM NI'
I L1hontn ry
lime<! lImfoo. kw
KAPL
Stdne) lAngt'f

o...nn lArkn

LA"'--" InlcmaollOMl t. 'CII

~ 1S5

Pamd. a...' .... hn
0 . \-1: lAchel
Eu,CI'Io! Uhf
US l>.rp.nlfWnII "( Tri MpOrU h,,n
e.n""'>flIfWnt.1 o,"1"'~n

RI) H u.ln

Elrl L.em,n,
T eftnC'_ Orp,nffWnt n( Efl'/un nlfWnr
"nOJ Coruoc".. ho n
DOE o...c",,,,hl Dlv"M1n
Brct Lc,he
In_rtutc fl"'f Erwf'J)' k EnVIronnwnc. '
Rc-. rch

Dr D.nlel lcun~
Ar,;.'nne NII;nMI Llhortlhll'), West
Envlronment.1 A"K',,~menl DivI,,; .. n
Dr S..hllnlln lctJn,l!
Id.h,. SI.le Unl\'coll)'
C"UCi!C "f En~ ; n«nn~
U S Envin'nmcnl.1 PnllC'Cli,'n Ai!cnl.:Y
N.th. n J u.vlne
A'L.hbreo:hl
TEMA
Ke"'1n L,h.'n,'
H..... li Federtll 1'.hhllry C ..urn:il
Slin l'l.:hlman
U.S. DOE. EH-25 (FORS )
Ann lichll'll!r
Inlerj;ovemmenlll Rel.lioM. Office of
the Govcrnor
R.ill'MlA . Liin
U.S . Anny Corps o f Engin«n
Suu n Lintner
Bartolr. Lither
U S. Envin~nmenlll Protection Agency
Region X
Tink Lodth.n
UTCO
NltlC'MI Trtln.sporllt;on Safety ~N
Office (If Re.search .nd Enginecring
John A Lng.n
Melody Long
C. rt. S . u lo,icr
l im Loring
A. L. l..on,
Delli 21 Re$OOrceJ. Inc .
M.rt tu.k
Adv' I'ICN ScleI'lCCJ. Inc: .
Jerry l yle
U S ~ .n mcnl o(Ent'rgy. Idaho
Opel"llKl n,Office
Office of Pn",r1Im E~«ul lO n
Cynth .. Lync:h
P.hNmp Indi.n T nhe
D.nlel M.ckay
K.noll~ AClinn Prll)ecl
Sci'll! M.ckey
TRW Env,ronnwnul S.(dy Systems
Roger M.ckhn
SUle o(Tenne,K'C
SIt'Vlln J M.h.ru
A'If~hM;

VII'JIm. Orp.nlfWnl of Hulth
OffiCII of Wlter Pn'gl"lm
Wilh.m M.nclnl
j nhn M.nJU.1
Transnuclear. Inc:
Phylh, M.nn
K,ts.!, CuunlY
o...-p.nlfWnl ..f Emerl!lIncy
M.natfcmenl
M'JUel M.nn'lue
VECT'RA (i(\vllmmenl St'rvIU\
lloyd K M.rM!
Ftl rel.w, on B.I.rd
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John Marlin};
Virgi nil Dep. n menl nf En\,inlnment.1
Qu.lit)'
Om"e \If Envlnlnment.1 Implici
Revie .....
G.ry L Marmer
E"\II{'ginl Sciences S~cti"n Environmenl.1 Assessm~nt Di"ision
D.. n~M.r.sh.1I
G.ryM.n.h.1l
Argonne Nllion.- I Lal'iouh'l)' We ~1
P.ul P M.nin
U.S . DOE. Id.hl' Operllinns 01Tlce
John ~1Ininson
World Comp uter System
Juliel Muon
T etra Tech
CharlesM.uq
Fou r Hills Homeowners "'swci.tion
N.re-ndr. M.ther
U.S . DOE. RW-J32 (FORSI
Churchill County Lihr.1)'
H.rryM.this
Bureau of Solid .nd Hu.n!"",s Waste
M.nagemenl
R. S. M.tthe"" s
InhnM Mlfuszek
New York SlIle H ~.lth Ot!p.nment
W.dsworth Center for Llbs .nd
ReSd n; h
G'I)'M'l)'ko
Roger M.ycs
Los Allmos T echnic.1 Associ.tes
R. D. ~lIyna rd
Operlling Engineen Loc.1 1370
CharlesMlZc
Batelle P.cific Northwesl Lahoratorie$
Carl ... . Mu:tol.
S . W. McAlh.ny
U.S. DOE. S.v.nMh River Operatinns
Office
Amy McC.b.!
O.k Ridge Resel'V.tion LOoul Ovenighl
Committee
Sieve McC.he
Michael McC. ner
M"C.ner Consulting. Inc .
Nina R McCoy
Americ.n Friends Set'\';ce Committee
Rich.rd S. McCut"hcn
W. R. McDonell
H. nlld F McF.rl.ne
Tom Mt(i(\",·.n
lame' M"Grllh
EnvilTlnment.1 Dep.n ment
Ed McGuinn
B & W Fuel Comp.ny
~"ke McKenzle-C.ner
SCience Aprhc.tll 'n~ Intemat;nn.1 C.. rp
M.I)' M c Kni~hl
U S DOE. Id.ho Ope:r.hnns Office
Tcus Go ... emor · ~ Policy Council
Oon McMum.n . nd W.nd. McMurri.n
o...nald L Mc Whoner
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Brilln E Me• ..:h.m
UI.h

Pell ":~

T ~sl

u.h,,'.hll")·
~ I IInl)

n

Me,~~

Bflh~h

Nude.r Fuels LtJ

"'eM V.lley Nud~.r S~t'\' I c e5 Cllmp.n)·
En\·\Rlnmenlf.1 Pllnning .nd
A sses~menl

Dr P"ul M~ r~e5. Ph .D
Bureli\l,I(R.di.tion
R~~ul.li ,.n

D.nieIMetl.),
Bud M ~II.m
In)"C' lUnIY
Funk Mi..:h.eI
D,n.Milier
Larr,. Miller
U S DOE . NE-4-B
En\'u\lRmenlll Reslurlfilln .nd Wute
~I.nagemenl Ad\';""!')' Soard
R,ln Milnar
U.S . DOE . RW·40 (Fa RS)
l eSS Minillm
l ind. D. Minion
Emeq:em:)' Nurses Ass<>o: .
Gom Mitchell
SCSPP Clltk AtI.nll UniversilY
S.mM ilchell
Machinist Union
Mill')' Ann ~I i,
H.iley Cil)' C,luncil
o.1Ug Mlsin
John i\l oc ll~r
1\111")' ~I ..eller
Ni;:k i\hm.co
1'.lell. Berger Co .
W,lli.m E. Mlmrne
Tennenee Dept. Ilf En vin'nm~n l &
CllOscrv.linn
DOE Ovcrsil1hl Divisi(ln
R ,lh~n M, .... lne)'
Phillir M" re
~USC\l rr
Clrul~ I\l tl r~.n

Defense Nudear F• ..:ilit;es Sli telY Btlllr.1
Ehzlheth 1'.1 "r~.n
J effM" r~(llin
~Iar)'

Mllrns

CMf' I I~hlms..l n

CHlOPCElOCM
leeM,ln{'n
Science Apr"clli(>n~ Intern.II" n.1 Cllrp
Stu.n M I>~~ r
Fr.nk M,lUn.
K" nu\ DWj\," n tlf Em~r~o!nc~
Prer ·rtdn~ ~~

R,lhen 1\1ull IR
Tenne~'ee V.lle)
Fuel. BRf)A

Auth ,' nl ~

Nude.,

P" n\rt\llulh CORlIRUml) Ct •• I,lh' n
Ale,.nd~r Murray
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AII.nMllrr.)'
Emh.u)' ~I f AUMr.\i.
Ht.1t MUfTI),
Pnnccton Universit),
N.nc)· Nl .1d
" .hnN.k·I1· .....•
Offi..:e ,,( Stile PI.nnin};
M.udN.T1111
Nev.dl Sute Cle.rin~ht,lI sc
D~p.nmenl of Admini~Ulli on
Willar.1 W . N• .sh
Stephen T . N.",·.l.niecMt.Neidhlrdt
I. C. Ndson
Kevin Nel~lln
Rhode blind Division o( PI.nning
The HolltJr.hle Edmund Nephe .....
Cil),ofO.k Ridge
D"'id Neumann
Vivi.n Ne...·m.n
Glen Nihlt>e k
SCRIPPS
Ka)' Nichllll ....·
Science App\icltillns I nt~mat iu n.l Corp .
CI.y Nichols
U.S . DOE. Id.ho Operations OffiCe
P.ul Nickens
Batelle P.ci fi c Nt)r\h ...·esl LaOOrtllllries
Debbi Niebe n
WUlin};hou5e H.n(on! C(I .
Rich.n:! Nillsl.nik
Westinghouse EI«lric C,)rporllitln
Soh Nitschke
MlryO' Brien
W. Hugh O ·R,uN .n. E~ .
Gi\'ens Pursley &:. Huntle)'
SU-Sln O(fen:!.1
U.S. En\';lTInmenlll ProtC'Clilln Asenc)'
CI.ude L . Olinr
l im Olmsled
A. Ougou.g:
Rohen F . ()o.·erman
P.rk T. Qv.·en
M.nin ~lIrielll Enerl/Y Syslems. Inc .
lis. P.g: ~
P.ul P.ge
Ne ... YIlrk Stile Dep.nmenl (If
Economic De\'el,'p menl
G.I')· Pllm~ r
U.S. DOE. DEp·)
Ans P.p.dUrOIlI1l5
Chlrles Park
Beth P.nlo.....
South C.rolin. Gonrnur s Office
R,ch'N Pastull
Office (If Fcdertl Granls
Iud)' Pllucher
Dr Glenn P.uls..n
J tin W P"' ~glill
BNFL. Inc
JerI') P. ~ er
U S DOE. El\l ·) O
P~.nl.nd Gn) Panther\
B,'" Peelle
Su\.n P~rllh~
Argl'nne Nall" n.1 Llh,'r'hll') We,1
R H PCrll1l
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Chuck Per};ler
T eres. G . Perkins
U.S. DOE . l,Jlh,. Ope nt;"ns Office
Durl M. Pe rs..'n
Nlnd L. P~t eU
D.mes &: M,.... ' r~
Hl.pe Ph.mlhi
Frtm.th tlm~u sa

J im Phdps
Wesly Phillir s
W.yne Pierre
U.S. Enviro nment.1 Pl'\llco.:ti.,n
Region X

A~ enl.:Y

MIf~lrct Pi~ue t

R..hen L. Pitt
CI.Ylon Plemmons
Scot! Ploger
Leslie Po.:h
W . L" Pile
Ri..:h.N PtlChlR
U.S. En \· il'\ln m~RI.1 Pr"teO::lilln Age nl.:Y
l tlis Pohl
Missouri Di"'ision llf G~nerll Set'\'ices
Federtl Anist. nce CIClrin~hou5e
loyce Pol~
hmesS . l\:lles
Gert)' P"II~I
He_n of Amenu N(lr\h'\'ul
Gem poneng:er
Robcn Pottenger
P.lrici. Powell
U.S. DOE. Ruck)' FillS Pllnt
Rich'N H. p..,...·1I1I
W.lbridge J . Po.....ell
Mu POWer
WuhingtlJn Sllle D.!pln menl ,.f
Ec,)1(l8),
Nuclear & Waste Mgml Pnlgram
C I')'sul Price
Lisa Price
Science Aprlicllillns Inlenllli,'n.1 Corp
hne Prilc helt
Lain! PfOI.:lor
LafT)' D. Proctor
Dr.Pulie
ECOSTAT
W J . Qu'rp
JllCQuinn
Stile." IIf Ne\'ldl Emef);enc)'
i\lInagemenl Di\'ision
Ann R.g.n
Soolh C. rtllin. Ocp. n menl " f He.lth
.nd Envlronment.1 Conlnll
Jim R.imo
George Reddick .nd Julie Reioldick
W...stinght.usc U.nfoni C,.mr.ny

VICllln. R~l c h
Nuc\nr Waste Technlc.1 Re\·,ew Bo.rd
Bill R~im~
CNH

Dr V'c Re ,~
U S DOE . Dcfen5e Pmgr.ms

Table M-l. (continued)
CI.m~ R~ I1<'

EG&G . R,,,, ky Fl."
C " nf!rt:Sl>

" f ch II' Umh:J

SI.It: ~

OfficII' "f T .:.; hn. ,I,,~y

S.E

" ~!ie!>s~nI

Rh .-dC'~

Wi lham G Ru: hfHO n,J

Tablel\l- l. (co ntinued)
OctoI'. A RlUherfllr,,!
l,, ~ Al.m"~ N.li.lnll Lato.'rll" r)
Gh,Io.1 NuclelrMlterial,
M.n.):'emenl & C,' ntro.,1
0 , P Ry.n
U.S DOE. SI\'lnnlh Ri\'er Openti., n)
Office

S.IhR I~p

U S. DOE
0.\" ..1 Rihm
Indi.n. SI,U c Bud!!"'1 Ago:OI.: y
Dr Nnm R imlll~ I
1'01",\0,' YIltk Stilt: H",.lth [ftp.nmo:nl
&r.:IU •• f En\'H"'nmt' nl.l R. J i.,i,,"

J•.t\n Ri:'l}!le
OrC'j;o n 5,.10: Uni\"cnil)'
Barbua Ritchi.:
Wu h inl!,,'n SUite: Umv er5il)"
M ith.d RilC'OI'l1f
Mu y Ri"o:J.nd
Washington SLth~ Univ",,,il)'
Cullsl", Rotten .!;
Dcplnmcni llf H",.lIh .nt,! En\'i r" nrnenl
c.rI Roh",nson
U S DOE. Idahl) Oper'I!OnS Offi.:.:
Inf" nTh!!i;')n RC'5I"Urt"e MIMBernenl
Office'

1. V Robi ruon & A»<"oCille's
N,'rma Rod;""'cll
Wilham Rodgers. E5q .
UnlvC'rsiry of WlShin~o n
5.:h\:1001 o f La",'
G<lrdon R ogn~
Ml ry GtllceR')iers

T R..,II.,w
U S OOE. Ht:.dqu.ners. £H- IO
U S DOE. EH

tnforn,,'"'" Cenl",!

Willlim L Roper
U S [kp.n~nl ,If H",.lth . nJ Hunun
Ser.Ke!
"geney fN T'l1I$ Sulosurn:e! nd
Dik.k Regi~ry
l ohn Rn!UlS

Westem Go,.. emon' A!k'lCiltit.' n
Glry RO$I
Idlh., Deplrtnwnl o ( TI'.nSJl'l.~rt. l l(\n
En\'lnlnnwnUlI Seelle>n
R,.)'.II
South C u o htll Deplrt:TlC!nl .,(

Bo~1o

Juilln Ruh,n
Muk RuJ,n
UNl V Cnllege " f Health S<:,ence,
Ue. llh Phy~\e s Pr"j:"m
J,m Rudolph
Science Applte.I,..n" I"'emlhuruol ClO'l'
C.rl Rupe rt
Cle.n W.ler Fund I,f Nn"h C.n,llR.
Sue Rush
Rf..: ky Mou nUl,n I:.n.. ,mnmen4.1

"..,.,.;,.1",

Pn l~ r.m! Division
Kl Y Ry. n
Speci.1 PruJC\:I) Envlr<mment. 1 Se r.' ,ce ~
D.ve R)"!.!.:h
Idlh" W.lerRe)<lun:e St'lI'd
I,.hnI. S.d.:ett
AI'g<mne NlllOnlll I...ab.'rah'r)· WeM
R" n S.do ra
U.S . Dep.rtment <,f Defense
DefenSe: Contr." Administratio n
l imSlhr
lITCO
lime! E. S.nders
P.t Sinders
Rich.rd E. Sinderson
U.S. En\'ironmenlll ProlC\:tion Age ncy
S. S. S.reen
TRW
CynS.rth.\U
W.ltSlto
U .S. DOE. hI.h" Oper.lions Office
Buu S.v.ge
l upiterCorporatio n
1.1Iln SI"'lge
Oregon Dep.rt ment of Energy
uslie Scarbo rough
Wendy Sehmier
LITCO
left'Schrade
Office of Senato r Larry Crllig
P.trick Sch""lh
Inho rah L. Schwlrz
U.S . Dep.rtment of the Interinr
Burelu o( Reellmllllon
Rohert G . Schwender
We~ingh l\U~ SI \'.nnlh R, ... er Co mpany
D.rrell s.:oggin5
EG&:G Nucloea r Instruments
1.'hn Scor.h
U S. DOE . DP·J3
Kl lhey SCOIt
NUS
J (l ~hC SeneI'
Uun tingdo n Engineeri ng .nd
Envlnlnment.1. 1m:
D.d.Seruoz
Stile t'fNe\'lda
Dept of EnVironmental Prnto:ctio n
o B Se\·er.nce
R.m Sh.ckdfnrd
Cn.'tlIl AII,.nce ro'f • S.fe Envirnnment
M ,k.eSh.mul ....
Nltw Yo rk St.te P..,I.ee
R. Jendr. Sh.trnI
U S DOE . NE· +l3
~ltch l,,1 R Sh.rp~ten . Ph 0
LITCO
G.ry 0 Sh.mltr
LAle ShIVer
KA LAhu, H..... "
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Kith)' Sherlin!
Mike Sh~rh~ rd
Ed ...·. nJ Sh i dJ ~
Fr~d S'':II

B.. II.ffeM & Ass.lt:IIUes. Inc

B.,ise Stille Uni\'ersity
urI)· St~\' ens

Cltlll Sierrll
l ohn S ie"I~':
J"h nM . Sm.• ,
OIlI\'I"Sih'lI
E.:<,ll'gy InJ EnvirolRmenls. In..: .
Bets), Silve r
U.S. DOE. Idllh •• Op~r"li'lIl.s Om.:e
Mi..:h. d Silve rstein
U.S. D~partmenf .1f LahM
<xcupllional Slfet)' and H ~alth
Administratio n
MirillmSimele.
0.1e. R idg~ N.ti"nal Lah" l'Itv ry
Md ... inSires
GI~n Sjo blo m
U.S . Deplrtm~nt (If Ener~)'
Alfred SllItin
Zimpro Envi ronmental. In.: .
O\' n Slaughterha.:k
Science Appliutio ns Infemlli,'nal C"rp .
Mark Smu lders
Sierrll Club Legal ~fenSC! Fund
Blrry Smith
Ikn L Smith
SUlle of Tenness<~
Governor's PI.nning Ofti..:e
C . Wesley Smith
Dllnny Smilh
SCIENTECH. In..: .
Ellen Smith
O.k Rid ge Nllio nll Labo rlllllty
GroVer Smith lind O\"lris Smith
M.ril ynSmi th
Washingto n SllIte Dep.nmen! of
Ecology
Nuclear Ind Mi '(ed Wl5le Lihrar)'
SUlll n Smith
U.S. DOE, RW 30
Terry Smith
Office of the G'Werml r
Jo hn C . Snltdeker
Syne~, sti c D)·nllmic$. [nc
Jim Snell
M.rk So nnenhe rg
Jerry G . So uza
Pea rl Cil), Neighh,lrhO(ld Board
Ind Mrs. Hllf\'e y Spencer
Nanq' Sprin!!nulIl
T,w I Stahin
Uni" ersil)' o f Washing,,' n
En ... inlnment.1 Uellllh l ihrllty
J" hn St.ngle
JimSfllnk )'
Ne ..... port Ne ...·s Sh,p Bui ldin~
RngerSlinley
WI ~JlIng l" n SI.te o.:plnmenl "f
Eeo l.1gy
Nude.r .nd M' ketl Wu:le
M. n.gemen t Pr"~ rlm
R.,hert 0 Steldm. n
leffSltele
U S DOD. U .S. N. vy. Nil ". ] Sell
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ABB G .w ~rnment Ser.·ices. Inc .
M . Slewart
Snlle Ri ver Alliance
J,lC!Sto'C .... rd
Hilt" n ~Ie.d Island
Water C,' mmille~
It.'nlllhiln Stole
~hrg llrel

Ke vi n Shlner
Strulin
SlIle "f Ne\'ldll Nudear PruJc.:: t Ag~nc )"
CliVe Stru ng
Id.h., Office of the Alto me), Gener.1
Nltural Re J.tm rces Di\'ision
Terry ~tnl ng

J.lhn Th,lmpsun
Ne"ll.· Yorl St.te Hea[th Deplrtment
Burelu .,f En vi nlnm~nt.1 R.di.lio n
Prul«llOn
Myr. Thompson· l«
Orego n Oep.rtment ,.f Emergenc)"
l\l lllIgemenl
Rob Tho mson
Larry Thome
Rllph Throclmort\ln
U.S . DOE . Idllho Opetllions Office
Ale.'!. Thn.wer
S (\(:i ~llnd Scientific Syslems
E. V . Tiesenhansen

hl~ ph

Dep.rtmenl ,'fH~lth

Di\'ision llf R.diol"gi.:.l P,,' IC!1:lion
T ye Sirong
I\'an St\.I.rt
NAC Sen.·il:es, Inc .
O\lnnl SIUClY
P.ci fi c No nh ...·ut LAburllo r)·
Fnu Sturuz
U.S . Nucloear Reg ullto r)· Ctl mmiuion
Office of Nucle.r MlleMlls Sifety
.nd Sifegaurds
EJ ...·lrd Sulli,·.n
PmtC!1:li\ln
Dale L. Summers
1o1hn P SUIII,:tn
Dr. Erik S\'enson
U.S. DOE
hnine S ...·eene)'. Esq .
U.S . DOE
Office o f General Counsel f,' r
En\'irunmenl
Joyce T.ho!
Ato mic Energy or C.llId. LId .
G~"ffT.llent

Oep.rtmenl of Ec" loloY
Men.' T.n~l
C"lll'leil <If Energy R e ~un:~ T ritoe,
Dr. Jl)hnTl nllinger
D8EDT. Energy Division
Sle"'e Tulel" n
COIN.do Department of U ~. lth
R.)C l y Flit' Prog rlm Umt
Mile Tate
Pugel Sound N.\'II Shipy.rd
Bill Teer

TESS
Bell)' Tegner
Terr)' Teh.n
Nall"n.1 Org'luli,'n .,f TeM. Re5e.n:h .
R'''5 Te"ll.bhur)·
Gre~ ThOITIU
Puh"..: Uealth Ser.·,ce/ ATSDR
Dep.rtlTlC'nt of Uulth ,\;: Hum.n
Sen.' Ice'
EI\·,r. Th.lmpJ.tln
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Gell)· Tl)t,mey
T O(>mey Technology Ind Engineering.
Inc .
0 1' . 0 .1... T owell
Idah.) Department of Fish & Game
Suzanne Trluto· MelllY
Florid. SI.le GO\'emment
Lance E. Tr.ver
Dr. Willi.m D. T rl\·ers
U.S . Nudelr Regu lltory C.m~minion
Office of Nudu.r Reaclo t Rl'};ulilio n
Judy TN'ichcl
Ne\,ld. Nudea r WlSte T.sk Fon:e
Ricl Trembl.y
Boise INEL Outreach Office
Wil bu r T rilole
To ...·n of Milto n
G . -O'r)·-Trimble
GPU Nudear Co rporltio n
Western Regio n
Richlrd K. T ripp
Ch.'\es H. T rost
Boh Troutman
Dimes&: Moore
Kim Tully
U .S . DOE . EM Infotrnltion Center
Pltrici. Tumnwns
R\l};er Twil.:hdl
U.S . DOE. Idaho Operalio ns Office
Willilm E . T ydeman
Idlh., Slit... Hi510ri.:ll So.: id)'
IJlh.) Lihr.ry& An:hi ... es
Kdl y Tzo umis
U .S. DOE. Chic.g'} Fidd Offic e
Edg.r P. Ulbricht. M .S .C .E .. P.E.
Integrit y Rese.n:h
Michelle Ulicl
Science Applic.tio ns Iniemalio llli Corp .
Putoli.: Po licy Sp«illist. Yucca Mt n .
Alfred J . Unio nl. Ph, D.
Jl son ASSOI:illes Corporllio n
Bonnie Urfer
Mall Urle
US . DOE, GC·5 1 ( FORS)
Elgin Us",y
Tennessee Eme r};e ncy l\lIn.1,!ement
At:ency
Richlrd Uyeh ....
FeJer.1 Employee Mel.1 rril.'o C,}un.:iI
Jo hnny V.mlerp"ol
Mr V.nzuuch
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Robert W V.mey
New H.mpAAire Dep.rtmenl t..f
Envinmment.1 Ser.·i.:es
Luuis V.rrilc.:hi,.
William L. VIS!:"ni
NT S Co mmunity AdviSt'r)· a.,.ni
Vincenl V.ZZlnI
Knolls Ato mic Ptl""er Lato.~ rlh ' r)'
Don.[d Vemoln. Jr,
E.:o logy & Env;nmment. Inc .
MlmieVillltlo r
M30CRWMS
Edith VilllSlrit:O
Wo men Striko! Fo r Pelc e
Mich.clV()C!ge1e
Science Applications Intemati,lnlll Corp .
Clrl W. Vogt
Nati"n.1 Transpo rtatio n SlfdY s.,ard
Paul G . V\,illeque
l\tJ P Risk Ass< ument. Inc .
D.... id Volmach
Woolpert
Don W.hl'r
MichaelW.dddl
Lynn W.de
U.S. DOE. EM·35
Slln W.ligora
En\'ironment. 1 DimensiltnS
l ohnWllker
l ohn 8 . W.lker
Slit ... of Nevldl Agenc y fo r Nudo!ar
Programs
Nudear Wute ProjKI Office
M.II W.[trip
VC!1:t ra T echno logy. 1m: .
P.u l W.ng
Ames Laho rllolty
Sonne Ward
FutuN' Free Transport.tion
Frank W.llers
Don WiltS
Id.ho State HislOric Pre~n.· .ti o n Offic.:
Dr. Robert W.yllnd
Larry We.... er
Ohio Office of Budgel Ind I\Iln.};emo!nt,
SlIte Clelringho uSe:
1\I1!'5hIIlWelver
Mind 0 O\Jko! Engineering
Dilna Webb
U .S. DOE. Los Allmo5 AN'. Ofiice
Jeff Weiler
Chris Welch
Unh'ersity of H. w.ii En\'ironme nlal
Center
Dr. Willi.m E. Well s 111 . PHD. CIH.
C UMM
M.ry E. Thde r C" mmumty Center
DI ...e Wessm.n
U .S Deplrtment ,)fEnergy. ld.h"
Operlliolns Offi.:e
Ben Wesl
U,S DOD. U .S. N.... y N.\·.I F• .: ilihes
Enl!1in\"ering ComllUlnd
Fr. nk Westrum
Inplrtment of Uoealth
D.... id W Wheeler
Puget Sou nd N.,·.I St'llP)·.nt

Table M-l. (co ntinued)
Grel! Wh,te
Pn'Ject Time and Cn. t. Inc .
Cynth .. Wh itfield
ew York State Department
En,\, 1fllnmental C~'n c:rVll1t' n
There", Wh i~ ...th

,'I

urco
Th,'ma, L. Wichmann
S DOE. hlah" aperaunns Oftice
T,' m Wierman
D,'nna Wiet ing
U .S . Department "i Commerce
atio nal Oceanic and tmo'pheric
Administratio n
Gwen Wilder
.S . Department of the Interi ...
Linda Wildman
TRW
Dale Wilhelm
Tennessee Valley Authori ty
Alene Wilkins
C . . Willia ms
.S . DOE. Sava nnah Rive r Operations
Offic e
CAro l Williams
JK Resurch Associates
Glen Williams
RM Poley Associates
Linda Will iams
l icheel R . Williams
Woodi e Will iams
Jack Williamson
City of ewpo rt News
Emergency Services
Harry Wills
Harry Wilson
Sierra Clul>
Robert Wilson
Charles Winklehaus
JupIter Corpo ration
Robert L. Wise
S Department of Energy

Brenda Witloc k
T err) Wo lfe
EClll" l!), & Envirnnment . Inc
I\ Iariene Y. W,,,>d
Md l W,lt>d.
Tal Wll rley
Ca rlllyn Wright
tah State Cleannghllus"
Offic" o f Planning and Budget
K" vin Wnght
Christine Wunderl in
UN LV Enviro nmental Studies Prog ram
Sabrina Nico le Wy nn
Jon Xerxa
Hanfo rd Citizens ' AdvISOry Board
Diana Yerpe
Cultural Resource
Norman C . Young
Michal R . Zanotti
Gerry ZallZlllari
Gerry ZallZlllari
EBASCO Environmental
Dr . Paul Zelus
Idaho State Uni"e rsity
Mathew J . Zenlcowich
U .S. Department o f Energy. EM -323
Fred Zoep fl
Phoenix Co nsulting
Charles Zogby
Pennsylvania State Gove rnment
Julie Zoller
Lawrence Livermo re National
Labo rato ry
Ed"" ard Zurmuhlen
Beatty Citizens Advisory Council
City of Beatty
City of Burley Public Lib rary
City of Filer
File r City ClIu ncil
C ity of Goodi ng Public Library
Colorado DiviSIon of Local Government
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Env ironme ntal Defens" Ilhtitut.
Ha nlnrd Education Acti"n L"al!ue
Idah,' Depa rtment " l Health & Wdrilr"
INE L O\'er,il!ht Pro)! ram
Idah,) State Lill ral)
Fed" r.1 D" cum"nts Dep"rtm"nt
Idah,' State Uni\'e r it)' Lil> rary
Documents Department
Kitsap Re)!innal Lil> raf)'
Massachuseu Executive Office nf
Energy Resources
Nevada State Lil>r81)'
Archi"e Fede ral Rel!ulatilln
ew Yo rk Bureau " f Envlrl' nmental
Radia tinn Pfl)tectl(ln
ew Yu rk Stat" Depa rt ment nr
Hea lth
ew Yll rk SUIte Clearing H"us"
Division o f the Budget
Nuclear Infu rmation & Resou rce Service
Snake River Alliance
SUIte o f Hawaii
Office o f Envin)nmental Quality
C" ntrol
State of Idah"
Dept Of Health & Wel fa re
State of " "ada C("aringhouse
Department u f Administratio n
SUIte o f Nevada Cleannghous"
Department o f Admlni trat llln
T win Fall s INEL Outr-..ach Office
U .S . Depa rtment o f th" Interi,)r
Naroonal Park ServIce
University o f Wl\shinghlO
Suzzallo Lib rary
U LV Lill rary
Gove rnment Pul>licati" ns
Virginia D"partment " I' EnVIronmental
Qual ity
Wash ingto n SUIt .. D"rartm.. nt " f
Ecology

Table M-2. Dislribution of th< FEIS Summary
The U"""r.thl" N"II .-'I t..:r.: rn mhIC
U 5 H ..u\c .. f R.:p r",cnfltl l\ '"
The H,m"rlhlc Nell Ahcr":I"1 '1I1""~
U S H ll\lSC of RC r rc ..... nl.tl\' C ~
Nlt llm l Ah rlhllm
KII lahUl HII ..... ii
The fhlno rlhlc Spcm: .. r Ahrahlm

U nlllC'd

Sllllc~

5.. n.l.:

Jn hn J Achille
The fl o no r.hl" Glry L. Adtcf'fMn
U .S. H<lu!>I: oi Rcp r<'~n'.li\'c~
Bnl n A':\lff
s.:Tly J (~

A dams

Fern Adllm~
Jt1 hn i\dlm.\
Nuclear EngmccrinJ;
H C Ad.:rh.-,Id

UhOflhlr)'

Ctlrncll University
Jim Adnan
M. t~ard Ah(l
Pam Ahren s
Id,h,' o.:p.nrnenl of Administratiun
Tho: Ho no rahl.: Plm Ahrens
Idah'\ Hl"'u!>C tlf Rcprc ~nta l iv cs
Pilli Ahrens
Pcl.:r L Ahrens
Ah rens CllnMrucllon C.l . Inc
Rohcn M Aikman
Rhea Cuunty
The H,lnorahl" Dan1d Ahk ..
United Slllo:~ 5':0110:
W H Aken
Mill A.IIn
Oanll:l L. Alhln and Suun AlbIn
Audrt:y Alhm
C" nMancc Alb recht
Sh ll ~one - B.nnnc k T rihe.•
The H (\no r. hl~ Jnhn A [~Xlnder
Id.h" Hnuse ..f Repres.enl'lives
The Honor.hle W.yne AiI.rd
U 5 Hou<tl: .,f R oepre~ntltlVeS
Nano.:y Ailhnllen
Bruce Allen

City Hf G reenshnrH
o, .nald Allen
The HI.nllr. hlll! Gel",ge FAllen
St.te .,fVlrglnl.
The H .~nnr.hle Howud AiJen
CIt) (1f T1oIoln fllb
lin AiJen
Dep.nment u f N.tur.1 Re'lol"lUrces
The H.ml lr.hle MUiuet Allen
W"hlnll'ton Hnu'\C of Repruentallves
Pa' AUen
P.r.metn, . In.:
PeEV) AJlen
W.~te Pohcy I n~l1lute
R. ymnnd AUen
The H"n('uhle Jeff Alltu s
Id.hn H <lu ~e .,f R ep r e~nllll Ve S
The Honnn hle Lincoln Aimtloo
Stlte f"l f Rhode Isl. nd
Todd AI\dOTf
Le.I,eAlller
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Table M-2. (conti nued)

Nick Ah'lfez
Chemehuevl Indlln T rihe
Wuhlnl,-1<l" Oni.:e . Stille •• fOkl"h.'mll
Da llld AmsJea
Anne Anderlil.n
Psychoilljo!y of S(~ i.1 Resr tlnsihility
Anne M. Anders,,"
HII.ry Ander50ln
1Iy Anderson
I n Andersnn
City Ilf u1olo'rence
Kristen Anderwn
Phil Anderson
LITCO
The H" llIlr.hle Cheryl! Andreas
Bil,: Pine Ind i.n T rihe
J. me~And reU\)n

BUlle C~)tlnIY Co mmission
The Hnnur.hle Rnhen E. Andrll!ws
U.S . HOUR: of RlI!pre ~en llti ves
The Hono,lr.bk Jim Andrus
City of Mesquite Cooncil
The Honor.ble Peter Angstadt
City ofPocateiln
The HO:lOr.hle Ed1olo'ud J . Annen, Jr.
City nf IUlamazon. Cil)' H. II
George W. Anthony
The Honor.hle Steve Anlone
Idaho Hous.e o f Reprucnt.tives
Jerry Apper5CIn
Julie Applegate
The Oa il)' Spectrum
The Hnoor.hle O.le ArlVe
Bingham County Bo.rd of
CI~mmis ioneTli
Julie Amogul
EM Sile SpKific Advism), RouJ - SRS
The Hono r.hle Bill Archer
U.S. Hoose of Represenillives
The HlInor.blll! Dennis Archer
City of De:lwit
The HOl'l(lrlb le 8nll:e An!
CilY (If Ammu n
Id.hn Envjfo nmentll
K. ren Arknosh
The Ho nnr.hle Richlrd K. Armey
U 5 , Hcous.e (If R er re~nu t ive~
Gerlld Armstrong
City of Boise
Or Ed Arnold
Phpici lns fnr Soci.1 Resp(ln,ibiliry
The Hnnorahle Jnhn P Arnold
Stile Cof New Hlmpshite
The Hn!1('lr.hle Rlch.rd Arnold
Ln Vegu Inl.han T rine Cenler
The Hunn r.hle John AMc ""ft
The Hnno,1, lhle VI~t n r Ashe
CII)' of Kno"vllle
The Uf"lntlr.h lc K.thy AUllUl'Iine
Nev ad. SI.le Anemhly
Alln. Allrihn
U S PIRG
The Honorahle Ed AUslln
CIIY of Jr.:hn nville
D.wn AUlltrom
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Dltmd :-.', Axel r,>.!
C" n Mru~I L \' e A.:tllln Par:)
Kenneth A)'ers
Wi lli ~ CMr,"'n Hea lth Care Cnn.:epilli
10hn J . A)'I ....·ard
Ann Azar;
CIIY IIf Fun Cn1lin~
MIII)'ellen Bllhhilt
1. O. B.chllud
The H o n\l rahl~ Spencer BIII.:hus
U.S . Hiluse o f RepresenlaTi\'es
Ed Badnlall'
Contingency ~1IInagemcnt Services
The Honor. hle Scotly Baeslc r
U.S . House n fRc p rll!s~ ntatives
Darryl B.he
Benll)n p. iute Indian Tn h~
The Hunorah [e Rnse ~lIri~ Bah~
Benton Paiute Indian Trine
Susan 8.h[
Dan. B.ile)'
Mark Bailey
KRIC Radio
William M . 83iley
Winnifrcd Bainbridge
The He.norahle Dulce Bainum
Hawai i Slite House of Rcprese nll tive~
The Honor.ble Bill Balcer
U.S. House of Represenutives
The Hnnorlhle O. J . Baker
U.S . Dtp.nm~nt o f Commerce
Natiuna[ (. c:anic .nd Atmuspheric
Admir,i.u rll;on
Kent Balcer
KHONTV-2
The Hono,ltlble Phil B.lcer
The HO!1('l rlb[e Rich.rd H. Baker
U.S . House of Representati\'es
Steve B.ker
LITCO
The ~I onorable John Baldlcc i
U.S . Hous.e of Represenl.l:ves
Dennis B.ldocchi
Jane Blldwin
June a.ldwin
P.ul Blldwln
The Honorahle Peler Balet
SIT.tngl Cou nty. New Y.1rk
Thll! Honorable Bill B.1I
City of Fr-:mont
Can11yn Ballard
The Honorable C lyde Balllrd
Wuhington H ou~ of Representatives
The Honorable Cau a.lIenger
U.S . House n fRepresenl.tives
Rich.rd Hang.n
U.S . NuclelT Regul.tory C.lmmissi.m
Divis;" n ,.f 1..ow-Le\'eI Wute
The HnnM.hle W. G . Bllnkheld
FlnrioJa Legislalure
Br.d T . Bamer
Stale IIfUtah
M.ryC Bamer
The Honllf.hle James A. B.tcia
U.S. H ou ~e of Rerre s.enil li ve~
Rohen Ba ris
The Honorahle Th,)mas B.mes
Cit), of G.ry
Jody B.mey

The Ihllhlrahlr: Bll\! Bur
U.S, H,ILlse I~ f Representatives
Tho: Htlnnu hl.: Jlck T . Barrld\,ut;h
[.Jah., HII\l5e II I' Representfllives
Tho: HnOllrllb l.: Bill Blrrelt
U.S . Hiluse .. f Representatives
The HonMlhle LemIre H. Barret!
IdlLh,1 Hnuse nf Repn:!ientatives
Tho: HIlmlrllble Thomas M . Ba rrell
U.S. House of RlI!pro:senlatives
John B.rringer
Wilham F, Barrows
BruclI! Barry
WTKR-T V
Bryan Barry
Yakama Indian Nation
T(lny B.no:lme
Charleston PMt and Courie r
Tho: Uo nMlblc fo"bri. Barth
Kittel)' Tllwn Cuuncil
Tho: Hono rahle Rnscoe G, B.nlell
U.S. House of Representatives
The Honorahle Joe Sirlon
U.S. Huuli': llf RlI!present.tives
The Honorflble J ~ L B. n on
U.S . House of Repn:sentltivlI!5
Co mmilte~ on Co mmerce
Earl Banschi
Thll! Honorahle Charles Bass
U.S . House o f Representatives
The H(lnor.ble Hemen H. Bal\;:man
t: .S . House of Rep=-esenlatives
Dnroth y Bites
Gary BIte)'
A . Bllthij.
The Honorlhle Phil 8 aft
State nfld"ho
Ann B.ninger
Brookh. ven N.tional LIIbo ratory
The Ho norable M IX BIIlCUS
United Slites Senate
The Honot.hle M.x Baucus
United SUtes Senate
Commillec o n Environment .nd
Puhlic Worlc~
Dr. Thomas B.uer
University of T exIS
The Honorahle Frank B.uman
The Hono rahle Dive Baumlnn
Id.htl ~I ouse of Represenl.tives
Cllrl S.usch
U.S. Dep.nment of Agriculture
Animlllnd Plant He.lth Inspeclion
Service
The Honorahle Ev.n 8a)'h
State o flnd ill\ll
Sh.nnon Baynham
Aiken SllmJa rd
N.ncy B.zin
u ....'rence Bean
Roncn Bclrd~ lc)'
Uni"n Ri ver Prllteclion Auoci.ti nn
Alto n Beuley
The Hunor.hle D. vid M 8eule)'
Stlte IIfSQuth C.rnlina
The Honor.ble X.vier B~eTflI
U S . ~I ()usc of Rcprellent.tives

D.:nn;slkchtel
Clark Count)'
Richard Bechtd
Western G.WlI!rnlHs· Associatilln
The Honorlble Rod Beck
Id.h,> Senale
Ollvid BeJln
Missouri Department Ilf Nalur. 1
RlI!sources
Division of Environment.1 Quality
Stacy Seem
Uniled We Stand & Jr . League \1f Boise
J.nel Beeman
Roger Begley
The Honorthlc Antho ny C. BeiJenson
U.S . House of Representativt:s
Geo rge A. Beitel
John 8e1gini
KUPI Radio
The Hono r.hle MlXine Bell
Idaho Hoose o f Reprl!Sentitives
Willard Bell
Cl.rence F, Bellem
EM Site Specific Advisory Bo.rd - INEl
Laurie J . Bellman Cruz
Frederick Benjamin
Augusta Focus. Inc .
M.rvel Benjamin
Rich.rd W. Benj.min
Weslinghou:w: Slvlnnah River Complny
D. vid Bennen
Linvil G. Rich Enviro nmenlll Research
Lob

The Honorahle Roben F. atnnelt
United SI.tes SenitI:
Sleven R. Bennett
Meredith Emergency M.n.gemenl
Agency
Bett)' Benson
Margarel Benson
The Hono rahle Ken Benlsen
U.S . House of RepreRnl.lives
The Honorable Jesse Bee.in
Idaho House of Represenlltives
Janet Berenson
Bob Berentz
The Hono rable Doug Bcreuler
U.S . House o f Represenl.tives
Bonnie Berge r
Neil Berlin
City of Arvadll
The Honor.hle Ho ...... rd L Bennan
U.S . House of Repre se nllti ve~
Kalrin. Bennan
Le.gue of Women Vllters
John Bem.rd
M .,sac hu leu~ Inslilule of Technology
The Ho norahle Roy A. Bc rnan:li
Office of the M.yor. City of Syracuse
The Hono rable Pit Berndt
City o f V.kiml
E. J . Bemthal
Julius Berrelh
Brend. Berry
Wilhlm Besst
Phil Besl .nd Mrs, KlTen Bc~1
Joanne BcI.Kh.n
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Dr. Lee Beuenhllu~en
Universit), "f ~t ll~sachusseus · L'lwe l1
The Hllnorl hle DllnllJ Belz
City l.f Wilmin~hln
The Hnnur.hle To m Be\'ill
U.S . H (lu~e ,)f Rerresenlltives
The HOO\lr. hle Tllm Bevill
U ,5 . House of Representali\'es
Committee nn AppwpnlllillOli
Manoh. r Bhide
Susan Dick
Georxe Bickenon
U.S. Dep.nment of Al,:riculture
Agriculture Food Safel), lind
Inspection Services
The Honor.ble Joseph R. Biden, Jr .
United States Sen.le
Bil: Biegel
J.y Bil.de.u
Idaho Dep.rtment uf Lands
Lands, Miner. ls. &. R.nge
M.n.gement
The Honorable 8n.n Bilhr.y
U.S . House of Representali\'es
The Honorable Michae! Bilir.ltis
U.S . House of Represenillives
The Honorahle Thom.s J . Billey. Jr .
U,S . H ou~ of Representat;ves
Commiltll!e on Co mmerce
Adron Billingsley
The Honorlble Jeff Bingllman
United SllIes Senate
Lyd i. Birk.
MMES/ORNL Engineering
The Honor.ble Sanfo rd D. Bishop . Jr.
U.S . House of Re present.tive~
The Honorable O.ve Bivens
Id.ho House of Represenllt;" es
BellY Black
G.ry BI.ck
Dow Chemica l Comp.ny
The Honorlhle Mn C. B[lck
Idlho House of Represenlltives
The Honor. ble Pete Blick
Id. ho Hoose o f Representalives
The Hono rable Ron.ld Black
Idlho House of Representatives
Ch.rles R. Bllckmlln
Kenneth R. BI.ckmln
City of S.nta R(lu
Ken BI.c kwell
WVEC-T V
Kevin 81.ckwell
Federal R.ilro.d Admin i~TratJ(ln
The Hi'lnor.h le Ron.ld Blllck\,\'fltld
CilY I'lf Mount Veronn
Jonnie BI.de ~
Joy 8[lir
Margaret Blair
Gllry Bllke
Florence K BI. nch.rd
Bill)' BI.ylnck
Iris B1elsch
Cit)' of Bou!der Cit)'
The Uonn,."!e EdwITd Blhrer
City \\f Gl ithershurg
Ca rl C Blickenstaff
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Table M-2. (continu.d )
The H,'no'fl t-Ie

Th "m.~

J BI, le). Jr

t; 5 H \>u ~ flf RcprC'!ic:nl'II \C' ~
l il. BI•..:);
U S lkpllnmenl " f the (nh.-riM
FI!J\ .nJ W,ldl.fe Service

Veh:>r.ns Adm int~Ir'I 1l'n M~du:.1 Ccoler
Tina BI.... ..:t
~lIrk Blucher
RUlI.nd RClllo NiI P1. nm n~ C..mml51 ••m
Elc.nolr Blunon
The H"I'k'r.hle Peter 81ut ..

Table M-2. (continued)
Tr• .:y Bo.ucher
s..11~ Pe.ce Quilt Project
Oanell Boomer
Rlndy L. 80\1, en
Kath.nn. ~''4·t'n
The Hnnu rahle Mich.eI J , Bo''4'en
Office \,f the Allomey General
Department of La ....·
Brett R & ....'h.n
U .5 . DOE. Idah" Oper.!i'ln5 Office
Office of General C(lun!lel
5coll ao . . . lden

U S. Hoo!t4: \.( R.cpreM"""II\'c,
l..IrryJ a.' ,m
E~1 Site Sp.,,:if, c Ad ... i~M)' a.~IfJ - IN[L
The Hunnr."".: Clyde Bo.IM1lhl
Id.h ... SCIUllO:

Le<' Bonet
Wo ,-,:c:Uu Po lylechnic Inll'IilUIC
~'«h.ni..:.1 Eniin«ring Building
O" -Id Bodin-s ky
Unl\'cniry of WutunglC'l n
Dep.nmcnt of PhY51CS
The Honor.blt! Sher"A'ood L. Boehlen
U 5 House of RepreHnutives
Mut A . Boehm
The HClMr. hle Joh n A . Boehner
U S. Hou sc .'If Rrp~ se n"ti\' e 5
Glenn Boeuchc:r
Doug Bogen
Clcln Wiler Aclion

Lury Sllmg
ANL
D.... ld &lIing

County of Ander"'n
umar Bollinger
College of Idaho
Snake River Re ~lon.1 SlUdies
J. mes Bologna
New Ynr k Dep.rtment nf Environ mental
C'ln~rv. t inn

Rick Bohon
INEl Ne'4'
~hch.eI Boltz
The Honor.hle Chnslopher S Bond
United Stites Senate
The Honnr. ble Henl1' Bonili.
U 5 House of R epresen,.tive~
The HMlorahle David E Bomor
U 5 House of Repre«,"t.h ves
The Honor.hle Sonny Bono
U 5 UN ,<"- of Represent.llve5
FrarwlM 8ooI:h
Delaware Sud,d Office
Gretchen 8urck
WAWG
The Honorahle Tom Bnnh!.u't
Get 'r,la H nuq of Rerresentatlve,
The H,'nur."'I. R" he n A 8 M'!kl
U 5 H. I\.I 'C "f Repr .. senta"v .. ,
Rflohen 8o~h
FMter Wh .... ler Corp
The HOf'N'rahle iiI . ymond Bosley
OffKe o(the Mayor. City o f 51 Lou ..
Junc:,M 80<1"", ..11
The Honorahle Rick Boucher
U 5 Hrou"-e o( Reprt'M'nta"vt'J

VO LL \lF I.

APPE~OIX

\1

The Honorahle Barhara 8o'(er
United SI&lel 5enale
Henry Boyd
Alheruon Co lle~e o f Idaho
Mark&ylan
WASTREN . 1m: .
Tht: Honorable Niles Boyle
Ciry o f Rexhurg
Terry Boyle
The Honorahle Rohen Boyt
Lu Vegu Indian Centt:r
R.nd Bt'ldford
The Honorahle Ritell Bradford
Richard T . Bt'ldford
U.S. Dep.rtment o f Tr.n5ponalion
Feder.1 High ..... ay Admini5tration
The Honora ble Bill Br.dley
Uniled State5 Senale
Edith Bradley
He.rt of America Nonh ..... ut
Ken Bradihaw
Loil Br.dsh ......
Robert B. Bradury
Stone &. Webller Engineering
Corporation
Marcia W. Br.dy
Boise Peace Quill Project
William A. Br.gg
Beatrice BrlilJford
EM Site Spec ific Advisory &.rd . INEL
w. C . Brlndon
Avi \'a Brandt
V.kama Herald
The Honol'lble Terry E. Brlnu.d
State o f low.
Keith Br.nler
Kri J Br.y
Suqu.miAh ElclMntlry School
Lawre nce A. Br.y
City of ArmarKoJi
ArmargoNi V.lley AdvillOry Council
The H/loo r.hle Joh n B. Breau x
UnI ted St.te5 Sen.te
The Honor.hle Erik C Br« hnilZ
CilY of Dec.tur
Deh"le Breedlove
The Honur.hle Bill K Brew"er
U S Hnulle ('I( Reprucnta tivet
Geoff BnUI
M.ry J.ne BnU'
Wlnda BrinJ
Tri-City Herald
Ru nel Bnll
LITCO
Pllrie .. A Brima'
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C,'ra Brinltln
Bill Brtlt:l
Th~ Tim ..s N".'4 S
P.i~ e Bnlnl
Met ro Planmn~ C,'mmlui,,,.
Sn'lI BNln!lein
Atlan'l Constitulion
The Honor.ble ~hrt:el)' BronMer
SI'le of H."",.ii
James Brooh
Or. Jllseph Brooh
Ai!:t:n C('! unty Puhli.: Schl\Ols
Rand.1I Brooks
WO(od Ri ve r Journal
Chuc k BrnM:i(lus
EM Sit~ Specific AdviSl.ll)' 80ll rJ . INEl
Juliet Brosing
Reed C"tiege
Physi.:s Dep.rtment
Lynd. L. Bmtht:n
Davis Wright Trenw;ne
The Hononlble Glen Bro ..... der
U .S . HouSo! of RepfC!scntativcs
Anne Bro ..... n
EM Site Specific Advi5(1)' Board - SRS
The Hononlble Cathy Brown
City of Clinlon
Ch.rles R. Bro..... n
Chris Brown
Citizen AI ... n
The Honor.ble Corrine Bro..... n
U .S . Hoose of Representatives
OolUlld E. Bm ..... n
Cit), of PtlrtsmOlith
Fred K. Bro ..... n
The Honorable George M . Bro ..... n
Georgi. Hou!te o f Representatives
The Honor.ble H.nk 8 ro ..... n
United States Senale
The Honor.hle James O . Brown
City o f Wigner
The Honor.ble Jeue Bmwn
U .S . Dc:p. nmenl of Veter.nJ Af(.irs
Norman C . Bro ....·n
Richard Brown
U.S . Dep.rtment of Hou5ing.mI Urb.n
Developmotnl
Office of Environment and Energy
Robert G . Brown
The Honorable Sherrod Bmwn
U.S. House of RepresenlltiveJ
Suun Brown
Brow n Tr.ining AuocialeJ
The Honorahle George E. Bro ..... n. Jr.
U .S. House of Represenllt ive5
Oon R. Bm..... n. P.E.
The Honor.hle S.m Bm ..... nb.ck
U .S. ~I ou~e o( Repruenli tiveJ
Ler. G . Bruce
Bill 8rudgnck
Sh oAho ne~ 8an nock Tribe.
The Honorable Fr.nk C . Bruneel
Id.ho House o f Repre.sentalive.
The Honor.ble Joseph L. Bru no
New Vork Stale Senile
The Honorahle Joey BruAh
Georgia HOUle of Represenlltivu

Mary 81)'lI n
O.k Ridt: .. En'·,r" nmen' Puce Alli.O<.:t:
Th .. H,'n.' rahl.. Richa rd H . Bryan
Uni, ..d Sillies Senile
ChrIS BrYllnt
Dt:hrll Bryant
Sla'.. " t' N"nh CAmli na
Th .. !-I,'O",.hlt: Ed Bry.n,
U .S. Il llust: o f Reprt:sentati" t:s
Tht: H,'n\lra hle Jllhn Bl1'lInt
U .S . HnU5t: ('I f Rt:rrest:nlali" ... s
R,'lIIlld Bry.nt
Adelia M Btlhh
Th .. Uo nMahlt: Rich.rd Bucci
City o f Bingh.mplon
Th ... Honl'r.hl... C rAit: Bu.:h.n.n
Cily o f Rich l.nd
James Buchan.n
Se.n Bucher
R~n uel ... r Polytt:i.7 hnic Institute
The Honor.ble Mich.eI J . Bu~.
CilY o f Bay City
Richlrd Budzich
Austin Bud
Suqu.mish Ehement.r)' School
Bruc": Bug~
Georgi. Public Servict: Comminio n
T. lm.due N . Buie
Cit)· ofK.illeen
Loui~t! M . Buker
U.S. DOE. Olk Rid~e Opt:ration5 Oftice
Or . O.niel Bullen
In...... Stilt: Univenity
Nucle.r Enginet:ring Prtl~ rllm
Angelita Builds
Kaib." p.iute Indiln Tribt:
Th~ HOnC\rahle Glori. Bullets 8enMln
Kai"a" Paiule Ind i.n Tribe
The Hnnnrahle D.le Bumpers
United Stites Senile
The Honorable H.rrold R. Bunderson
Id.ho Senate
The Honor.ble Jim Bunn
U.S . H\lUse o f Rep~senllti"eJ
Th .. H,'oorable Jim Bunning
US . House llf Representallve5
Fr.nk Bupp
P .nd S Associates. Inc
Chris Burford
II.G Burge.,
K. thy Burgeu
Norma E. Burgo5
Puerto Rico PI.nning Bol.rJ
Willi.mH . Burke
Confeder.ted T ri"t:s of the Umatill.
Ruervatilln
The Honorahlc Conr.d R. Buml
United Stat u Senile
The UOMr.hle Rlch.rd Burr
U S. House of Representa'ivt:s
IUlly Burm
M. ry S Burn5
The Honor.hle Charle5 W Bur'lOn
Slite ofTennen n
The Utll1M.h le A W Burt,'n
CIIY I.f Sugar C ity

Tht: U"Ollra"le D.n Burt(\n
U .S H,.uJ.C (If R tr rtSe nlllive~
The H,'nor."It: Geurge W. Bush
St.tt:"f T exu
J.nd Bush
C laudi. Butler
Di. ne Butler
Lt:sli.. Billion
L,nt Pine Indi.n Trihe
Tht: Hn!'lM.ble Stephen L. Buyer
U .S . Hou,... o f Repre,...nI.,ivu
Barbar. Buys
B. Bybee
Id.ho Nlliona l Ent:ineerint: Lahoralol)'
R. V. Byhee
The Honorahle Rohert C . Byrd
Uniled SllIes Sen.te
The Honor.hle Rooert C . BYN
United Stales Senate
Co mmillte on Appn'lprillionJ
Joh nC.cci.
Romy C. chol.
H.....·.ii St.te House of Rep resentatives
Kathleen C.h.1I
Breme rton Utilities
Lol. K. C.ld .....ell
Thte Honor.ble Sonny C.n.h.n
U .S. House of RepfC!senlalivu
Ron C.llen
M ichigan Puhlic Service Co mmission
The Honorable Ken C.lvert
U .S . House of Rt: prcsent.tivu
The Hllnorahle Ken C.lvert
U .S . House of Rt:pre5t:nt'lives
Commille~ on Resou rcC5
Jant:C.mt:n.
The Honor.hle Dun L. C.meron
Id.ho SelUlte
The Honor.hle D.ve C.mp
U.S . Hoose nf Represent.tives
George C.mp
B.rb,r. C.mpbell
The Honor.hle Ben Nighthorse C.mpbell
United Slatu Senale
D.rrel C.mpbell
Kenneth O . C.mp"ell
M. ,uchuKIt5 In5l itute of Technology
Lin C.mpbell
Idaho Dep.rtment of Water Resoun:el
The H" no rahl ... Robert C.mphell
City o f C layton
The HOllQrable William C . C.mpbell
City o f AII.nt.
The HnOlI,.hl ... Ch. rl u T . Cllnady
U.S . Htlu5\' of Reprcst: ntatives
Cr.ig C.n.n
Kerry C.nfield
Sunn Clnh.m
G_ry C. nnlln
CilY o f lU.uf" n
Hnward Canter
US DOE. OP-40
D.nteC.ntnll
Jl"eph C.p.lho
The UllI1urahl t: Ja me\ L CllrUMl
CIty nf Ballstun Spa
The Ullnmahl": GUIon C.pen lln
Slite of We.\! Vir,ini~
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The HnOt' r.hle Bt:nj.min L C'Nin
U.S . H.\U~ l,fRerrest:n,.ti vt:s
T .. reu C. rlt:lon
AI.nCarl"'ln

Oi.n... Carlso n
Cuunty Office BuilJint:
Laurie V . C.r1son
Hnnniulu Weekly
BarbaraC.mtan
The Honorllhlt: Mel C.mah. n
StAtt:nfMiJSouri
Tht: Hllnllfllhle Pllul C.rp.nell.
CilY "f O.yton. B~.ch
The Hono r.ble Mich.el E. Carpe",.. r
Office of the Attorney Gent:r. 1
Michelle L C.rp~nt ... r
The Honor.ble T om C.rper
State nfDela ...... re
The Honor.hle C . Jamel C.rr
City o f Wheaton
LutherJ . Carr
W. H . C.rr
MikeC.rres
WAMC News
P.uIC.rroli
SteviC.rrolt
Chrisline Caner
Luf. C.rter
The Honor'''le Sar.h C.ud.
Wishington House of Rerresenlltivt:s
MIl Casebe.u
Co ntinenlll News AS50.)Cillinn
Mr.Cuhwd l
University of Wisconsin
OeirdreC.uidy
Teresa Cutel.\\· La ..... len
Grand V.lIey St.te Univenity
Philo50phy Dep.nmenl
The Honorahle Mithael N . Cut Ie
U .S . House of Representalives
Jennifer Cutleherry
Dep.rtment o f He.lth
Arlene C.v.lUlugh
The Honm.ble Fred Cav.n.u~ h
CilY o f Aiken
The Honorable Wiltour C.ve
South C.mlin. H('Iuse o f Rt:p resenl.livu
The Uonorlble Bt:nJamin J . C.yetano
SlIle ofB ....... ii
The Honoflhle Steve Chah \l(
U .S . U ou~ ... \If Rt:pre!enlatives
The Hnnnrahle John F. Chafee
Unitt:d SI.te5 Senile
The Honunhle John II . Cha ft:t:
Commillee nn Enviftlnmelll IInJ
Puhl ic Works
The H('nM .hle Lincnln Chllff~e
CilY (If W.rwick
Tht: lIon.lr.hle Pelt: Ch.I",
City " fTern! U.ule
John Ch.mherl.in
WeM V.lley Den"lnMr'l1lln P"lJ~1
Ruhen Rood Chambe rJ
The Il unlluhle Suhy Chl mhltn
U S. ~l tlIl'e ,.f RepfC!)Cntlh vU
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Table M-2. (co ntinued)
Sherry' Ch. mr. ~ n",
Relit), USA .
L.lt.l1S F Chlmplin
A ..... C handler
Tho: H" n" tIlhl.: Gary Ch.odler
W.~ i n):t"n H nu~ o f Ro:prescn'lli"'O:li
Anlh(lny K. U . Ching
Haw,,;; StIle SC'n'le
Tho: H" "Of.ble Frank Chapm.n
Ciry ilf HillOn H..ad bland
Tho: HnflO rahle Jim Chapman
U .S. H.lU !IC of Represcnlllliws
Tho: H.,nolreh]", Je rry Ch.rles
Ely Shosh.lne Indian Trillo:
JoAnn eh.. se

Na tio nal Co ngrt'ss of Amerk, n Indiln ...
L~ Cha\'('z

Bilhop Paiule Indi.n Trihe
Tho: Hnnol'1lbl.: ~brtin J . ChlVcz
City (If Alhuquerque
The Honorahle Don Checb
Georgia Stile Senate
M.,.~en C hC'n

Nev.- York SUle Department l1f
Environment.1 C o n~r\'.li n n
Burellu of E.I.uem Remed ill Actio n
The Hnnn r.h!e Helen ChenolA'eth
U.S. House nfReprcsen'I'ivcs
John CherT)'
Snake River Audu hon Socid y
lling Chi Hw
Nevada Buruu of Mines nd Geology
~p.rtmo:nl of Geologic.1 Sciences
The Hono r.hle Lawton Chiles
SlIIe of Florid.
Will i.m Chisholm
Inn Cho.
!knelle P'clfic Nonhwe.'i l Laho flllOry
Ronln Chro:llen
S Ch n~
City of Suffolk
M'f¥.rel Chn\t
Jon ChnJ.lel1Se'n
Hi[lh Country Ne"'"
The Hnnotl hle Jon Chri.'llenscn
U S House of Repn! o.eolilive5
The H!loor.hlt: J.m ChnJ.li.nsen
Id.ho H.lUle nf Represent.llves
S.t: 1 Chn~h. nsen
The Hono r. hle 0 11:1: Chry,ler
U S Hotlse of RePn!o.eM'lIves
CnmmanderChuhh
US
Guard
M. nnoe . S. fely. Sccu nty . • nd
Eov.rnn 'Cnl.1 PmfKt.o n
Ch.rle' Church
CIty " f Lynchhu rj/
R J Chuner
The Honr ·.hle Vu\cenl A CI. ncl. Jr
CIty of Prov.dence
11m CICcone
SI.le nfTe'lll\
Office of SI'Ie'* Fl!deral Rel. lln n
W. yne Cunno,
Nf!W Ynrk SUle Office of F~e r. 1

C.I."

A(f.Ir.

VOltJ " t E I. APPENDIX \ 1

Table 1\1-2. (continued)
~-.ugII5CI'rk

CilY o f EK.lndid"
G . Wa yne CI.rk
The Hnnnr."'le Willi.m l. ( Billl C I.y
U .S. House of Repre~entllt ive.'i
D.ve CllyhOl.lrn
The Honor.hle £\.• CI.yton
U.S. House' of Represent.tivn
The Hooorahle Boh Clemenl
U .S . HouSC' of Represent.live.'i
linda Clements
Greenpe.(;e
The Honor.ble Judy Clihurn
CilYllfMercer Isl.nd
The Honl1r.hle Willia m F Clinger
U .S. HpuSe' of Repn!Jentative5
Committee on Government RefonTl
and Oversight
The Honor.ble! Willi.m F. Clinger. Jr.
U .S . House of Rt:presentati ves
Donald Cloquett
Lu Vt:gu Indian Cente!r
&ard of Direclors
Ot:nnis W . CloSt:
J . C . Pe!nney Comp.oy
Thomu A . Cloud
Tt:nnenee Emt:rgency M.nagemenl
Agelll:y
David Clovis
Id.ho Stale Univel'5ity
College of Engineering
Brett Clubhe
The Honorahle J.~s E. Clyburn
U.S . House of Repruenlltives
The Hono r.hle Willi.m Clyhu rn
Soolh C.rolin. House of Repn!lC'nlllives
C . Cmarul.
Hazel COlles
The Hnnor.hle D.n CoalJ
Un i l~ SI.te.'i St:natt:
The HoO(\nhlt: How. rd Cuble
U.S . HOOK of Reprek"nt'l ive~
The 1I0no r.hle Rooc" 0 Coble
City o f Columbll
The Hono r.hlt: Tom Coburn
U.S . Hoose of RepresenlAlivcs
T i. ju.n. Cochnluer
U .S. DOE, Id.h n Operllion!l Office
Ch.rle.'i Cochr.n
The Honor.hle Th.d CochrAn
United SUte.'i Sen.te
Jack Cochrane
Michael CHe
Wilh.m R . Coffman
LInd y Cog.n
The H,lnor.hle Bun.ln J Cohen
Sen.le of the Stile 'lf New H.mpshlre
The HUf'K\r. hle OlivlI Cohen
CIty of F.irfu:
Wilh.m Cohen
U S ~p.n""lOt nf JUShce
Gent:r.1 Lllig,"o n Section
The Hnno r.hle Willi.m S . Cohen
Un il~ St.tu Senate
Chri~l i ne N Cole
J R. Cnle
Lorr.ene Barrell
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R \'~.: r P C"I.:
PCler F. C .. lcm.n
The Hnnn r."'le R,lO. ld D C •. I~nlJUl
U .S . H,\lo.'iCi "f R ep re"en i lliv .:~
The ~h 'n'l rahl e Brent Cn h, ~
City ,If Buis ...
D,vid G . Cllk~
RIl\Jger F. Cnl~ ln
Cnnnit:CIJl1ier
Sci ... nce Applicali,1nJi Intemllli" .... 1 Corp .
Anhur L. Collins
H.mplon RIl.ds, Pl.nn ,n~ Distl;l:t
Commi.'i., inn
Th ... Hunnr.hl... Barillfl k tlsc C.,lJin.\
U .S . Htluse Ilf R... pre\.: ntltivl:s
Ben F . Collin.'i
EM Silc Spe!cific AdVISory 8.11n1 - INF..L
The Honorable Cardiu Cnllin~
U .S . HOlik nf Repre!se:lllliv... s
The Hooor.hl ... C.rdin Cnllins
U .S . HOUk of Rep rekOl.tives
C"mminee on Gnvc rnmert P.efhrm
.nd Ovcrsight
The! Honor.hle Mac Clillins
U .S. House Ilf Rcprc:sentllivcl!
JcffC . Collum
The Hooorahle Larry Comhe!>1
U .S . House of Reprc knt.li\,cs
j ohn Commander
Charles Comptu n
KFAE- FM R.dio News
C I.y Condit
The Hono r.blc G.ry A. Condit
U .S. House of Representllives
The Honorlble Charlel Condon
Stlte of Saulh C.rolin.
Denny L Condo!!.
Bi ll Cong,a
Pe1er C . l. Conlon
Anoci.tion of Amerinn R.ilro.ds
Tr.nspon. tion T nt Center
The HI)no r.ble j.ck Co>nnell
Georgi. HooK' o f Represenl.livn
JOin Connelly
Rooen Conner
Sieve N. Conner
Scienct: Applicllions Intem.ltional Corp .
!kmie Connon
WVNS
ClI'olyn C,.nrld
The Honorahle Kent Conr.d
Unil~ Statu Senate
The Honorahlc John Conyer! . J~ .
U.S . House of Represemllives
Ed Conzol.
D.ily G.ulIe
Chulel Cook
Ikrk5hi re CounlY Regil.nal PI.nnlng
Co mmiuilln
Jim Cook
AII'nll-FIlIt,lo Ct)lJnty
Emergency M.n.gement Agency
Reena Cotllr.
Rohen Coolr.

I.n M . Cooke
lenol. Coolr..
EM Site Specific AdvilOry Bo.rd - SRS

Th~

11 " 11<'(101", We!> C,...,ley
U .S H"use "r R"'rresentAtives
LinJII C''''r
Kltlh lo:o:n B. C"., 'per

Universit), " f Ne\'IJIt SyMem
Do:~ ... n R... seln:h Instilul ...
Dr Ra) C .... 'po:rMcin
U .S. DOE. DP- 2~
Trllt:)' C.lre!and
Arkansas Deplnm... m .,f Fin1lnee! and
Administ ration
Stile Clearin!;hl1use
R. lph C .. pley
& ... '15 C~lpo k
The Slandard
Wlrren Corh tc'1I
Dr . Carl)'le C,lrhin
Offie,", "flh.: G('IvemM.,flhe U.S .
Vir~in 1 ~ llnd5

The H,lnllr.ble Holly A. C,lrk
Soulh Carlllini Senale
Betty Cornelius
Colorld u Rivc r Indi.n Trihes
Ce!ciliaCofT
The Ho nof.hl ... Dee Dee Co rr.dini
To:o.ICoskey
Anthony E . CoSIl
Ge!ner.l So:rvices Adminislr.tiun
Planmog .nd Analysis Division
The ~I o n\\tahle Jerf')' F . Costello
U .S . House of Re presentatives
Thomas W . Costiky.n
EM Sile Specific Ad viso ry s.-..rd . SRS
Brian Costner
EM Silt: Spe(;ific Ad visory &ard - SRS
Energy Research Foundation
Thc Honor.ble Don Cot.nt
Cily of Chuhhuck
The Honor.ble Paul Covcrdell
United SIIIe5 Sen.tc
Eafrol Covington
8ingh'l'll County
Engineering & Zoning Offi(;e
Belly C~lwlc .'i
Chris COlt
The Honor.ble Chri ~lopht:r Cult
U.S . House .,f Representalive~
G.ylord Coyle
The Honofllhlt: William J . Coync
U .S . House of Represe!nlalives
The H,' no rahle! larry E. Craig
United States Stnate
The Hono rllhle Rnben E. ~ Bud· Cr.mer .
U .S. HOUk uf Roe presenlalil'es
Aodrew Cr. ne
Jeffrt:y Crlloe
EM Site Specific Advi!lOry &.rd - SRS
The Hllnor.hle Phillip M. Crane
U .S . Hnuse .,fReprcsenlllivu
The Hnoo r.hlt: Roo Cr.nt:
Id.ho H"use of Reprc:sent.ti\,c5
The HonM.hle Michael 0 CrapI'
US . HOlJ5t: o f Repre~ ntllti v e ~
Gordon C r. wfonl
Todd V. Cr.wfonl

The B"n" rahlt: Fraok C rem",an!>
U.S . H NI~O: nf Repn.' knllli\'O:s
Tho: H,' O\lr.h le Bartoarl Cro:w!>
M.)'Ilr ,.fG.h·esh.n
H,'I.I.·ud F. Criss. Jr .
H.....·.ii ·s Th" ll!tlnd Ftlend~
NllnC rl\4;ker
Tht: Hlln"r."'le Je!S5t: Cnlmwell
T ,'m Cropper
Do:moc: ralk Pany of Multnnmah Coonly
CecilCron
Th ... H,'norablc Delore5 J . Cnl\ll,'
Idaho House of Represcnlati ve!s
Th ... Honorabl ... Gordon F . Cro"'"
Idaho Senalo:
Candace Cruise
KQMQ
Stev... Crumlo:y
Carpenters lot:.1808
Glry Crutchfield
City of PII5(;('I
C PCruz
LyneueCruz
Ed . Hui Kako'o Inamaki.inlna
The Honor.ble Barbara Cubin
U.S . House: of Represent.tives
The Honor.b le Ch. ries D . Cuddy
Idaho HOUSe of Represenulives
D.vid Cul1ier
Id.ho St.lesman
T ori Cullin.'i
Sierrl Club ConSC'f\·.tion Committee
H.w.ii.n Humpb.ck N.tiona l Manne
S.nctu.ry
Pete Cummings
City of Las Vegu
Adminislrll;ve Servi(;es Division
W.llace Cummiogs
Joh Servke
Laur. Cummins
Chem-Nuclear GeoTech. Inc .
The Honor.ble R.ndy - Duke - Cunningham
U .S . House o f Representatives
Ca nll Cunis
The Honllr.hle Larry CurtIS
Cily!.,f Ames
P.lna CU5lidio1
Puen(' Rico PI'nning Board
M inillu GfI\'crmcnl Center
Fred Cutlip
Wesl Virginia Governor's Offil:e o f
Cnmmunity .nd Indusln.1 Developmenl
David D ·.lusi,)
The Honorahle Alfonse O' Amalo
United Slltes SenIle
The Honor.hlt: Rohen A. D' Andrt:.
New Ymk SIIIt: Auemhly
Ed Dlgue
WNYT New~
Tht: tjoO\lr.ble A. C . Dake
Cit)' o f Slr.,,'g. Spri ngs
Tht: Ho nor.hle lick. E. D.le
Cily 1,fS.ntee
Tht: Ufl no>r.hle Rk h.nI M . O,ley
CilY "f Chicago
Joseph 0111.\0
S.r.h.lg. County Ch.mher of C'lmmerce
Ameli.O.ly
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Katherine ROil)'
Dalzell
Oreg\lnGr.tlu.I ... ln.'i t;lul<
5(;1'11 D.nids
Bremen" n-Kitl>lp CIlunt)' Heillth D, ~t tll: t
S\11id W '~ le .mI W,ttr QUII III)
The Hl)n"r.hle Judi OanidSo.IO
Id.hl> Senale
The Honl)rahle P.t D.nner
U .S . House o f Rcprcsent.ti\'e~
The HonM.hle Denlon D.mngtl'n
Id.hoSenale
The Honllrahle Thomas A. D.schl ...
United Stales Senate
Vickie Dntillung
Jerry Oauh
Chern Nuclear Ge..... lcch. Inl: .
C.pllin Nklr. D'\'enplln
The Hon'lr.hle Rich.rd O'\'e)'
CitytlfRirie
CIlr. E. D.vidson
Fonn), Oavidwn
Nancy D.vidson
R.y C . D.vidlOn
Bruct: Davis
C. rterD.vis
Honolulu Fire Depl nmenl
Eliz.belh A. Davis
The Honor.ble Jerry Davis
CilYllf Hlm mln
Slephen Davis
Illinois Bu re.u ~) f Land
The Honouble Thoml5 M . 01\'i5
U .S . House of Repn:5t:nl.lives
The Honorable J . l. D'''''kins
City of F.yelleville
Jon Day
R' ymond D.y
lee Dazey
Citizcn Alen
The Honorahle E. de la Gun
U.S . House o f Representati vcs
The Honor.hle j ohn De SOh'
Honolulu Cit)' Coun(;il
J . De; Spain
The H00\1uhle Nathan Deal
U .S . House of Represent.tive.'i
The Honllr.hle Wil1iam W . Del l
Idahl) H(lust: o f Rcpre.'ientali\'es
The Honorahlt: Howlrd Dean
Sllie of Vermont
Tim Dl!hey
U.S . GeologIcal SIIf\'C)'
Ann DeBlui
Washi ngton Office !.If Ihe G,lvernor
GUlm
Keilh Dee
lind Deem.n
Tht: Honnr.hle Peter A. De;FlZin
U .S . House Ilf Rep re;senlllivc.'i
Jim DeFtl nl ... s
WBBQ
Dr. L. W Delln.:h
Argonne N.t ion.1 LAhnr.t0I)' We!~1
The Hnnnr.hle Fr.nkie 5 Del P.p.
S'."lofN,w.dl
The H,lOlIt.hle! R,I!\I L. DeI.o"l
U S Houst: o f Rcpresent.tives
J uliu~
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Table 1\1-2. (continued)
The H" n.. r .... lo: T u m D.:Lay
U S H" uSc: ,If Rl:'p rc SC'nl'h\' '''~
The Hnn';'!f,"' I.: RlllUlld V . Odiums
U.S H t)Use o f R eprc~nl'li ... eJ
The Ho nor.hle Rmald V . DclJums
U S Hrouse ,If Rcp rc5t!nl.llivcs
C u mmineI:' .m N.!itl lUil Security

The Honorahl" George lHLo.ch
GC'Org-i. H,lUse of Rrpk:senl'lives
[A)n,n Oelullgnan
The Honor.b le Jero me Delvin
Ami. Dtmarco
Dr l oo n Dcmch. lk
App.l.chi.n Reg io rul l Commissio n
Comm unity Development Division
GCflldlne B. Demenl
Joe J . Dement
Gu y DeMoss
Michael Dempster
P.trid Dennis
Kgmb TV·9
~hn::l' Denlo n

T,mi [kIener
Vickie Ikttmu
Inlentale Commerce Comminion
Division of A1\II 1)'lil
The: Honor.ble Peter lkulsch
U S HClUse o f Rc-p rescntllivc:s

The Honor1lble Ch.rle. A. o.:V.ney
City of AUgusta
Eugene E . o.:vc:ruux
Shirley Devi ne
Alhen J . Dewey
SIrIlQ8' County Office o f Emergency
Scrvicli!s

The Hoooubic Mike DeWine
The Honorable Lmcoln DiIl.-8tllln
U S . House of Represent.lives
The Hnnora ble 1.y Dickey
U 5 Hnuk nf Repuknulive.
Irene P Olck inMln
The Honorahle NOl'TMn 0 Dicit.
U S House of Represenillive,
The Hnf)llrable Normln 0 Oicb
U S House of Represenuli ve~
o.vld F Dickson
City nf Orange
Evel) n [heiler
Trend. Puhh~tu ng , Inc
Kathleen o.qJCohrnck
8111 Olelnck
Se. nle Time'
Ruth o.,hl
Le, Dilley
The H.. norlhle Joft n 0 Oingell
U 5 n nu~ nf RlI:p re""n'I'lve.
CommlRec nn Commerce
The Hl"nIlrlhle Jntln 0 o.ngell
U 5 H nu~ nf RepreHntllIVU
Commlncc on Energy I nd Cnmmerte
Rttnlu Dinger
UnlVe"lty of Mlu ou"
ReMirch Ruc:lor Center
The HMOUhle R.cta. rd T o.rll m
Cl ry n f be " ~

Table M-2. (co ntinued)
Muk Divl":en!11
olay Press
Betty olx,'n
J . R . Dixnn
The Hono rlble Juliln C . Dixon
U.5 . House o f Represent.tives
~h rj o rie Di)lon
The Honorlble Snnny Dixon
Georgil Hoose o f Represenillives
The Honorl ble Dcnnis A. Dizoglio
City of Methuen
Bri.n Dodd
Oregon Stile University
The ~I l.norl blc Chrisopher J . Dodd
United Stiles St'OIte
Eugene Doersam
The Ha ,lOrlble Lloyd Doggett
U.S . House of Represent.tives
The lionorlble Tom Dolin
CilY of Sindy
The Honorable Bob Dole
United Stiles SeOile
Roben Dollir
The Honorlble Pete V. Domenid
United Stlte. SeOile
The Honorlble Pete V. Domenid
United Stites SeOile
Comminee on Approprilrions
The Honorable Pete V. Domenici
Unitftl Stiles SeOile
Comminee on Energy Ind Nllurll
Resources
Briln P. Donohue
The Honorlble Cllvin M. Dooley
U.S. House of Rep rcscnulives
The Honorlble John T . Doolittle
U.S. House of Representllive.
The Honorable Byron L. l>org.n
United Stites SeiUlle
The Honorable Roben K. Domin
U S. Hoose of Represcnt.tivCl
The Honorlble Tom Dorr
Idlho Hook. o f Represcntltives
The Honorable John P. Doni.n
Cil)' of Del M o ine~
Ch.rles Doly
lenivc Doughen y
Br.dley O. Dougl ..
Wllhingto n Office
Sute of Missouri
Glry Doug l..
T enne.uce Dep.nmenl o f HClllh
Debhy Dove
K.thy Oowd
W.ller R. Dowdle
U S Depll'tmenl of Hullh and Huma n
Service.
Cenlers f" r 1),IC.sc Cuntrol &.
Preve",i,,"
P.tncil Dl'wne)'
The Honorlhle Mike Doyle
U S H oo~ ('I f RtprelCnt.lives
Rot>et1 1 Dr.k.:
Board of Benlon Cou nty Comminioners
City ofPl'flJlCr
MIrJ . Draper

Therese DIRou-b cohs
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The Hono rlt-tlc o .vil.! Dreier
U.S . House o f Repro:senl.ti\·es
Kennt!lh Dfe.....'es
Cristine OriKoll
Lynn R . Drow n
BeriUlrd Duclmr Ind Boh Bums
Univenity of Micbigan
Phoeni x Memoril l lAbor.tol)'
The Honor.hle Frink I . Duci
Office of the M.yor
Alln Oudzilk
U.S . DOE. WMpO
W"'PO
Miriam Duerr
Wu hinglon Stile University
Deplrtment of Ecology
Kenneth Duffy
Environmentl l MIOI1=ement Cllum:il
Bill Dugg.n
Manl'lltlln College
Mechaninl Engineering [kpt .
Robert W. Dugg leby
South Clrolinl Emcrgern:y Prepuedne5J
Division
Rohen A. Duke .nd ludith C. Duke
Scoll Dunnn
Los Allmoll Nitiolll i lAborllory
Public Aff.ir.
The Honoflble John J . Duncln . lr.
U.S . House of Reprtsentltive.
Mike Dunhlm
KOMO·TV Nl!w,
The Honorable lennifer Dunn
U.S . House o f Represenll,ive5
OoOlld E. Dunning
Argonne N.tiollli Labor.tory West
Lee Duplenis
Chefeb and Sh.dlow Wings Security
lee Duplessi.
Chereb Clnine Security &. Prolection
l ohn R. Dupuy
Advanced Sciences, Int: .
Richlrd Durlnle
The Honorl hle Richlrd J . Durbin
U.S . House o f Represenulives
The Honorahle Velma Dustin
City of Driggs
Glori. Duu !
Nlnjo Nltion
The Honor.ble Slrry E. DuVal
City of Newpon News
Eliubeth Duvil
IImi OovIIi
M OIll Dworkin
The Ho norlble Glm Dye
City of ~;t.ckly
The H",oorlble Wlyne Dyer
Y,)mb. Sbo.nune Indi.n Trine
Shi rley R. Dybhnom
Nonh D,knll Office of
Intergovemmt'ntl l Anist.nce
Joh n Elrgle
The Honorlble Eugene Elton
City ofTmy
The Hono rahle Briln Ebel'5Ole
Wuhi ngton HOUH o f Representllives
The Hono rlble Chlr!e. T Eblen
City o f Lenoi r City

Ge,lr}!e E": 'IO, 'm" ~
Mr .Ed
Sh,'sb,' ne· Bann,)Ck S\'h,,,,l
Tho: H nn~l r"hl e D.nid Eddy
Colorado RI\'er Indian Trih o:.~
O.'I\'id C Eddy
Jan M . Eddsteln
The H" ",'rlble Jim Edgar
S'llo: "f lllim, i.
Jlck Ed lo ....·
Edln....· Inll!fnltionl l Complny
Jerry Edmunds
Clwl EI.1 ....·.,ds
The Hon\'rlhle Chel EoJ ...·ards
U.S. Hou se of Representatives
Th~ Hunorable Ed ...·in W. Edward s
State .1fLo uisilnl
The Hooorlhie Ted Ed ....'.rds
Spen..:er To ....'nship
J,)seph R. E~ln
Egln & A5!lociat~s
The Honorlble W.yne Egln
City of AmeriCin Fill.
Th~ Honorlble Vernon J . Ehlers
U.S . House of R~ pre 5e ntati ves
Teri Ehresmln
LITCO
The Honorlble Roben L. Eh rlich Jf .
U.S . Hoose of Represemlrivl!5
M u Eiden
Cmho . Humphrey , Greener & Welsh
P.A.
C.megie B uildin~
Earl E. Eiglhroldt
The HI.norlble Loveua Eiselo:
Reverend J . A. Ekman
Ne ...' Engllnd Cong rcgltioiUl l Church
Dr . Mohlmed EI·Gen"
Unive"ilY of Ne ..... Mexico
Inslitute for SPice Nudear Po ....·er
Studies
R. L. Elber
T erry Eldllil!rion
Iml!lllIlIo nll Fedl!rltion of Pnlfessio nll
& Te..:hnical Engineer:\:
Jean Elle
Lelgue (If WOITl~n Voters
P.ull Ellis
The Stile
Thoml5 Ellis
Alhany Puce lind Energy CCllIncil
T" n)'1 Ellis
KIF I·TV Ch.onel 8 (NBC)
Dr. Atef Elzeftlwy
MARK Gmup
n le Ho norlh l ~ Bill Emerson
U.S . House of RepreM:nt.t ivcJ
Suun Em~ry
Suun Emory
The Honorable Eliot Engel
U.S House o fReprcM:nlltivl! s
Erikl Engle
KSSK

John Engler
SllIe nfM ichlg.n
The ~h'nLlrlble Philip S . Enlliish
US . House of Reprcsenlllives
Th ~ ~I tl nnrlt-tle

R" t-tert W. Enquist
The Doctnts C lini..:
The H'lnorahle Jtlhn Ensi!;n
U.S . Hnuse "f Rer re~nhll t i v e!i
olvid W. Erhllnd
The HI'norlble Milt Erh.n
Id.h" HOlI5C: " f Represenillives
Randee Encbo n
Clrol Emsl
Edw.rd S . £sheck
Tho: Ho nor.ble AniUI G . Eshoo
U.S. House of Representltives
Miclh Esplt''ZI
Suquamish EI~menllry School
Chlrly Espinl
KPO I
Judith Espino51
New MeXICO EnV iro nment Dep. rtmenl
Pluline Esleves
Timhish, Shoshone rndiln Trihe
Ch.rles Etlinger
Idl hn SlIlesman
l ohn V. EVln.
D. L. Evans 8tlnk
The Ho nor.ble lAne EVIns
U.S . House of Repre5t'nt.lives
R. D. EVI ns
The Ho norlble Ten)' Everett
U.S . House of Represcnutives
Rickie Everson
Oonlld Even
Lindl Ewald
Roben Ewing
The Honorahle Thoml5 W. Ewing
U.S. House of Representltives
The Hnnnri ble J . Jamel E)lon
United Stites Senale
The Honorl ble J . Jlmes Exon
United Stites SeiUlte
Co mmitTee on Anned ServiceJi
Ron Fall
Wl5hington SlIte University
Thecll B. Flbi.n
Nudt:l r Wute News
The Honorahle l....IIuch Fllirdtllh
United SlIlts SenIle
Michdle Fltl meau
The SIr.togi.n
Th~ Honorahle Eni F H. FaleomavleMa
U.S. House of Reprcsenlllives
~hrk Falkner
Grlnt County 80lrd ofCnmmiuioners
Audrey Fannin
S.C . Educllion. 1 Rldio
Ruth Farber
The Honorable Hugh T . Flrle)'
New York Stile Senlte
The Iionorible Sim Flrr
U S. ~l ouJ;C of RerreiCntllives
J . Flrrlr
UmversilY o f Vlrllini.
Nudelr RelChlr F.cilily
Ru n F.rrell
Cf,.lililln fM Petitio n RIHbu
The Hfl norlble Chlltl FI "lb
U S House of Rer resent..live,
JOInie Fluci
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Dr. Ri..:h.rt.i F.w
Klf\.S15 Stl te Unive r~ily
Nudelr Engineering Department
The ~h.nt)rah l e Harris W. Fa .....ell
U.S. House nf Representllives
Willi.mFIY
Explo rl tion Resou rces
The Honorlhle Vic FlZltl
U.S. House of Representath'o:s
Sindi FUMI5IY
Stir Bullelin
J . W. Feigel
The Honorlble Ru s~ 1I Feingold
United S'ates Senate
The Honorlble Oil nne Feinstein
United SIIte5 Senato:
David Feldm.n
Uni\'ersity ofTennes.see
Plul Feld mln
The Honorlble John Henry Felix
Honolulu City C.')lJncil
The Honorable HuT)' B. Felker
CilY of Topekl
Dia ne Fennema
Deltra Ferguson
Oregon Stl'~ Uni\'ersity
Ru n Ferrari
Aiken County Council
Denhy Ferr«el1
K/TV
Mike Fef1'ell
The Clpito l District Business Revie....·
Sieve Fe rronne
Loyene Fessenden
The Honor.hlt' T" m Fetler
City of Raleigh
Hem Feulner
Cl n er Ficklen
Alhen Field
Eleeler Fih! [Hp.n menl
The Honorlhle Frlnc~s Field
Idlho Hnuse of Rep resentllives
Chules E . Fields
The HonM.hle Cleo Field ~
U.S . House of Rt'rresentalives
The Honor.h le 1...:k Fields
U.S Hoo.e of Reprelien tll i\'e~
The H,,"or.h le &, h Filnl!r
U.S . U,)Use of Reptesen'ltive~
Angie Fincher
Phillip Fineman
The Honnrlble Cltlclon Finkhel ner
Cily o f T oledo
J. A . Finlin~ l n
Ellen Finn
Ot'IU~ Fisher
An oci.ted Prl!u
Edisu n S . Fisk
Ron Fi, se
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M.rg.,el Fuller
R" h.. " Fulle! r
E C Fullen"n
U S Drp.nlTK'nl ,,( C,'mmcrce
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U.S . H,>uw u(R~rrc w nl.li \· e!s
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VOLU M E I , APPENDIX M

Table :\1-2_ (co ntinued)

Tablel\l-2.

R....... ""' ~ H" n.: ..

t: S DOE . Id.h.> <>reflh,.n,
[). ' nN!

O ni~ r

H. I",

T" m H. nr.h. n
AJ e.'hne.' Jb n!>en

ureo
The'

H ,~", . rahl t:

p" H. I",

W • ..tllnp'.. n SeNIle
SIq'hr " H.lr
A u}:u \u Ch"' nl~l",
J. -t!n R H.IC'}

a..,ler ~bk .." L..:.I i OJ
T,'m H,\th,1I
D. le: Q . H. II a nd A~~": I. t n
Fo r",!>! ~ 1. NI ~t:" and C. 'n~u h. nl"

On,d H. II
G r~ ll ~ H.II
Jenmfer l H.I!
In' H.II
KO~tO R.di,>

S~ S

IJ.h,. Se.'nlllI'
The.' H" IlII'rl Me.' h~ .. V H.n!>en
U S H .'IU~ " f Repr.:'X'nl'"\e.'li
Thll' H.Ono'flI hle J.ohn 0 H.nsen
Id.h" Se.'nlle.'
The.' ....' no.fl hle IYren H.nlien
Thll' H.' no'r. hle.' I\Jrk H.n~n
The HO""f.hle R«<J H.nsen
Id.h" HouX' ',( RlI'pr.=sentllIVe5
GefllJ H.n5lef
Dd'''''lfll' RI\'ef Basin C" mmiul>ln
Anne.'ne H. nsnn
Gt'nle H.nSoOn
C.nWe

Tho: H,,","rahlo: Silt: H.1I
Cit) .. ( Rig h}

Pllmel. H.1I
Hl rhn EIClTknul')' 5.:h.-,o1
B., i ~

Pn'J ~1

Pca.;", Qu Ill

R B H,11
The H.ln<"lu hle R. lph M H.II
U 5 Hoo.k ojf Re-rrewntah \',,"'
The Honorable Tt, ny P H.I!
U S. H...... x t)f Rqrew ntllt\ C's
W. ) 1W Htn
H T H.Ul"
~ t .nllrn.:

Adm.n,\l n ,h••"

En.: H.lnl.: h

KR NV
W.de' H. mby
b l'M' w H. rN» . Jr

AFt-C IO

Uru\·C'",t) ,.( 'd. h"
~t.n ln In,m uIC' (,It PU':e Stud,c,
The H,lf)(lr. hlll!'

~

H H. mt lm n

U 5 Hou'o! ,,( Repr.., ,,n'.h\ C"
The H" t'It)f. hl", Lee II H.m,lto"
t.: S H.'Uw fl f Reprrscnt" 'H '"
C"mm,U« " n InletNIu"MI Rd'"<l n~
5.11) H. m,lu,"
C,t) " f S.n J.. w
\I .r" H.mmo.md
En.. ,n'nment & EnorrJ)
D.,r...th. H.mmnn.
OlIn H. nc,'C "

8 n h ~ E~. \')

Cenlef
The H.... "..r.f'tIe.' Mild H. ncN Il
t.; S H(>U w nf Rc.'JI~\C nt'I!\ e."
5.; ,," H. nc4'C t
T._n .,f S.rr.nt;:.nwn
j.>IIn H.nd)
Ikdlfe.'1 H. nford . I","
R..:h.. ,d H. ney u d M' I)
Denn" 't H.n",
Pllncll H.n,,'
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Flo rid. Legislltu n!
The Hono rahle.' G.I)' Uomy.k
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U.S H I"lU~ \~ f Reprr'C'nI.li"c.s
Anne Kinn.mtn
Rnn. 1oJ W Kinn!!)"
South C.ro,lin. Dep.nmC'nt I.f Hnlth
.nd En\'itl.'nmC'nlll C,l nlrlll
Oi"isi,'n ••f Wute As)c~!iI1lC'nt ,I(:
Ernc!'}:en.. y Resp<ln.sc:
OI" iJ Kipping
Amy Kirk
B. J . Kirkp.,n .. k
Ann Kirk w.... k1
N.m::y Kirner
Ensen::h EIIVlfllntllcnlal
Th.: HWl\..rlble Juhn Kilzh.bC'r
SllIle " fOrc~"n
ThC' H I~nl.,.blc P.ul Kidllooer
Id.hl' ... lUse IIf R.:rrr-"C'nllh\C's
ThC' HI,IO\'rlble GC'rald 0 Kle..:zh
U 5 H,lU'C' ilf RC'pn!SC'ntlll\'o:'\
ManlynK.l.:m
U 5 ~r.rtml:nI " fTran'p"rt.II,'"
Fn.lC'r.1 R.II"...... J Ad"""')tr_II,ln
R... hlnt F Klell1
RI,b lll Io:.leln
AnI)" JoiJelnC'r
G.·,·!!n11lr' .. Om....e
K.rl KlelOt l"!
The 1I ,'I\<.(_ble Gill KI':IOk" 1\
C.I) lI(T"" 10 F.ll,
Dr Kle">:h
U 5 AmlY CMl" " f En~lI1"r'
Of1i..:~ .11 En\·If"I.nmcnl.1 1',,11..-)
{CECW PO I
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Table 1\1-2. (continued)
Th~ " .." ,ITlhle

R" n Klink

US . l'h\Us<: " f Repre~ent.II"e~
The H.... no rahle Seoll L Kluj;
U.S . H ' ~k (lf Ro! presenllli\'cs
~"'Ic ~' lm R KnIp p
U S Nudc:.r Regullwry C,'mmiuLI>r\
Div isi!)n of WUIl' :-'fln.~emenl

Didc:r A. Kn«hl
EM Sile: Specific Ad visor)' Do.TJ . INEL
Cuo l Knight
Joseph Knight Irld Glendd knight
P.iEc Knig ht
". nford Witc h
The Honor.hle Joe Knollo:nbcrg
U.S . House nf Rcprc sem.live~
Ronald E. KnoUs
The Ho no rah le Tony Kno ....'lu
Stalc ofAlub
H.Try W . Knoll
The Honorable Ann Kobly.shi

Marti. Koben
U.S . Postal SCr'YIf;:C Unio n. APWU
Ann K.xhu
Faye Kochncff
Dwight D . Koebcrl
John Koestler
Willilm Kogut
The Ho nor.ble Hem Kohl
Unit~ State); SCMle

C.thcrinc Kolb
Suqu.mish ElementlfY School
The Honorable Jim Kolbe
U .S . House o f Representatives

Pcler Ko m
City o f Peon.
G.eorgc KosloWJky
Ann Kotowicz Lloyd
Angell KI'Imer
Suqulmish Elementlry School
Ko nrld B. Knuskopf
Stlnfo rd University
Geology Dqllnment
S.lIy Krebs
To wn o f Hillo n Had blind
Fuj i Kreider
lly Krell
Michele Kresge
MltthewKridler
C ity o f Spring field
Mike Krokos
Blrnwell People Sentinel
Dr Peggy Krug er
University o fTeus· Au Mm
Rn n Kucer.
M issou ri Dqllrlmenl o f Nlluul
Resou rc es
Henry Ku hllT'lln
Rohen R Kulik nw ~ k i
New Yo rk City Dep.nmenl o f Hellth
The Honor.ble Theodore R Kulo ngm kl
Stile of O rego n
Kenneth Kumor
N. IIOf\II AerOnlutlC1 I nd Spi ce
Adm lnlMrl tlO n
FlCl lltles EnXH,ee nng Dlv I.lOn Code

JX G
Knsllin Kune n
Alom ic Energy Claringhouse
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Table M-2. (continued )
Din Kunick i
Arlino:! Kunnu
Glylo:! KunllU
Jill Kurlm" I"
KGU
The Ho no uhle I on Ky l
UnillC\l Sllles Senile
Rich.rd L
The Honouhle l o hn J. uFllce
U.S . Houle o f Repre.sentlti ves
Genev ieve u flrgue
MirY IHth u geOlu r
The Hono rlble RlY u Hood
U.S . House o f Ro:!presentllivu
Jerry uhli
Slrgent & Lundy
hmes umhen
Klthryn (Cherie) lAmben Ho lenste in
hmes Llm bola(
Christiln lA molle
Colleen t... nclSler
The Ho no r.ble Alln t...nce
Stlte of Idlho
Lois lane
LInce lang
Wllhington Physicilns for Socill
Responsibility
The Honorlble R ichlrd LIng
C ity o f Modesto
The Honorable Ouie t...ngfelder
C ity o f Springfield
Ly nn Llngley
Ch.rteSlon New. & Cou rier
Mlri .. lIngwo nhy
The Honoflble Bob Llnier
City o f HOUlton
Klren Llnigl n
Steve lAnigl n
The Honof'll ble T o m lInlol
U.S . Hoult o r Representatives
The Honoflble T o m Llntos
U.S . HouJe o fRepreltntll ivu
Co mmillce o n InlematioNlI Relltio ns
limes t...pinlki
P~ C

The Ho nor.ble Sieve Llrgent
U .S . HOUle o f Representlti ves
Dlvid laRoche
SecuriTies Ind Exchlnge C o mmissio n
Public UTility Regu lltio n
The H.lra rabl e Allin F. lIrsen
Idaho HOUle o f Representllives
Ru LaTKn
City o f Rexburg
J im Ll rso n
Lester La rson
BlfT)' LaSIII
AFL·C IO
Tunspo nllin n Trl d es Deplnment
The Ho norab le Grego ry Luhutka
City o f C o lumbus
Bn ln uthlm
U S OOE. Idlho C\:teraliilnt Office
['he Ho norlble T o m Lathlm
U S H O'JJoe o f RepreKntalive.
The Hnnorlble Sleven LlTou re«e
U S Hnuse or Repre~ntatives
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Ed Lo,
~t lSS.Chu seU 5 Iml ituI Il11f T e..:hn'II.ll;)
The Ho no rlble Greg Llul;hlin
U.S . H"use II fRe pre~enll ti \' IlS
Mlrilinneuuf10en
ROYIII Dani sh EmblS~Y
The Ho no rlble Frink R. uUlenher~
Uniled Slltes Senltll
DeniH uveny
J oe M . Law
No rfo lk Nlv.1 ShipYlrd· Po nsm.,uth
Associltio n
Willilm F. u w len
EM Site Specific Adviso ry BOlrd . SRS
Lindl uwrenc r
The Ho no rable Mltk Llwro:!nce

Lore"l Llwson
The Ho no rlble Ri ck Lazio
U.S . House o f Representltives
The Ho norablo:! Ja mes A. Leach
U.S . House o f Representllives
The Ho norl b l" Pl trick J . Lel hy
United Stltn Senate
The Ho no rlble Mike Lea vi ll
Stlte o f Utah
JlnetLee
The Honorable Roben R. Lee
Idaho Senlte
lick Lefcoski
My rna Leffens
Chris Legeros
KIROTV NEWS
Kllus Lehrad
V.evin Lc.'lto
Allen Leihrlnd
Ksl LeichtlT'lln
Ro n Leistiko
Nuclar Free Po n COllition
The Honor.hle Mlthew Leiv ... Sr.
Chemehuevi Tribll Co uncil
Chlrles Lemmon
KMVT·TV
John Lenker
ChlriesLenkner
Mlrk Leonlrd
Jennifer Leslie
WBlR·TV
Dlvid Lester
Cou ncil o f Energy ReiQun:e Tribes
M lnin LetOUmelU
U.S . OOE. EM · 27
The Ho norlble Andrew l eV in
Hlwlii State Senlte
The Ho norable Ci rl levin
United StatICS Senale
The n o norlhle Sinder M . levin
U.S . House o f Repre SC' nllt ive~
Briln Levy
t!.SO
The Ho nora b le l o Ann Levy
Debfl J. lewillen
Louden Courry EmerRency Mlnagment
The Ho nora ble l erry Lewis
U.S . House o f RepresentllIVeS
The Ho norlble J oh n Lewis
U.S . Hooso:! o f ReprelentltiveJ

M..-vlnLewis
Nicho lu D. Lewis
Cherni":l l Wute ""'nlgement , In..: .
The Hl1norlble Ro n Lo:!wi5
U.S . H\luse o f Representltiv~s
Ric h..-d lewnow
The Honllr.hle Joseph 1. tiehel'fl'U1n
United Statet Senlte
Marvin Lig ht
USC ,Sllkeh.t .. h ie, U niversity C lmpus
The Honorlble l im Light foot
U.S . House IIf Reprcso:!ntltives
The Hlln.."lhle Bllnche Lamben Lincoln
U.S . House of Representllives
Greg tinder
The Honouble John Linder
U.S . Ho use of Representllives
Kd ly Linewelver
WlShingco n Office of the Governo r
Stlte of Soulll ClroliNl
The Ho no rlble Go lden Linfo rd
Idlho HoullC o f RepresentativII!s
Willilm S Linnell
Committee fo r Sife Energy FUiure
The Ho no rlble William O . Lipinski
U.S . House o f Representa tive s
l. Lipplrd
T o m tipplT'lln
Wnh ington Post
The Ho nor.ble Blrb,,-" Lisk
Wllhington House o f Representatives
ThOilUS R. Litjen
Washington Office
Stlte o f Nebraska
Glen Lillie
The Ho norable e.rol Livelll,l
Environmentll Mlnlgemem Council
Coumy Offices
The Honorlble Bob Livingston
U.S . House o f Representatives
The Ho norab le Roben l. Livingston
U .S . Hnose o f Representati ves
Commillce on Appropriltions
Ai.n Lloyd
Nlvy league
Hlwlii Counc il
Willi.m O . Lloyd
U .S . Deplnment of Energy ldlho
Opeutio ""Office
Anna G . Loldho lt
EM Site Specific Advisory Board · SRS
Chlrlo:!S Lobdell
U .S . Deplnment o f the Inte rior
Fish .nd Wildl ife Service
Ing rid Lobel
KPUI
The Uo no rl ble Fr.nk A. loBio nd (1
U .S . Ho use o f R epreSC'nlltive~
The Ho norahle Tho mas Loe nscher
Idlho Ho use o f RepresentativlCS
The Honor.ble Zoe Lofgren
U S . House of Representat ive!
C liffo rd L.o ng
Bonnevi lle C ounty
Bolrd o f C o mmiuioners
Everell L.on~

Jim Lu ng
The Po nl.nd Oregoni.n
Ji m Long
WC MS
Bee Longley
The Ho nor.hle Jim B. Longley . J r.
U .S . House of Representltives
Rich.rd Longmire
Administrltio n of Nltive Ameri\:.n5
Henry Loa
Aluandrl Loomis
Br.ndo n loomis
Tho:! Pm t Reg ister
The Ho norlblo:! Mitch Loo mis
C ity o f Spring City
Ciril tooliet
Tho:! Ho nor.ble S . Ly nn Loosli
Idaho House o f Representltives
Pete Lopez
KWEI· AM (1260) Ind KWEI· FM (99)
Mlril lopez·atin
U .S . Nuclear Regul.lo ry Co mmissio n
KlthyC. Lorelll
Stuln Loseke
Hlnfo rd Downwinder
The Honorab le a.ry loSIe r
City o f Siginlw
The Honorable Trent Loll
United States Senile
The Honorable Trent Lou
United States Senate
Committee o n Armed Services
A . L. lotts
Flirview Tech nology Center Ste 105
The Honor.ble Loren Lounsbury
Plni Lousen
The Honorlble Vlloril Lovel.nd
Wlshingto n Senlte
The Honoflble ROfllid O . Loveridge
City o f Ri verside
Frances E . Lowe
The Honorable Newt lowe
City o f Lavi Hoc Springs
The Honoflble Nita M . Lowey
U.S . Housc o f Representati ves
The Ho no rlble Michael Lowry
Stlte of Wuhingto n
The Honorlble Frank D. Lueu
U.S . House o f Representllive,
The Honorlble James R . Luc ..
Idlbo House o f Represe ntltives
Plmell L. Lucu
Ks Llhui Hlwlii
Beverly Ludden
Andy Ludlum
KIN O Rl dio New,
The Ho nouble Ri chlrd V. Lugar
United Stites Senlte
T o m Lundstedt
The Ho no rlble Dlniel E. Lu ng ren
Office o f the i\:to rne)' Gene rll
The Hnnor.ble Bin Luther
U .S . H.,...se o f Representltives
LociH l.uthy
C ynthll Ly nch
Pahrump Ind i.n Tn he
Lou i ~ B. Ly nn. Ph . D
ENV1RO Ag Science. Inc .
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Ro ben Mahry
The HonoTlhle Mllc MllcCll n;Je),
City o f Springtidd
Don Mlctlo nlld
U .S . Deplnment o f Energ y. Idl h ..
Operltio ns Office
Peler Mlc Doweli
Dr . Donlld MlcGregor
MlcGrego r. Bltes
The Honorlble Connie Mlck
United Stites Senate
The Hono rlble Simuel T . M.c rln..:
City of Nlperville
MlnhlMldden
Louisilna Governo r 's Office of Permits
The Ho nor.ble D.n Mlder
Idlho House o f Representllives
Th..: Honorlble Roger B. Mldsen
Idlho SeiUlte
Hetmln MUlliS
J Oin Mlgee
Plul Mlginnis
JlmesMlheras
MlryMlikmus
The Honorab le Pllricil Mlkely
Environme ntll M.nlgemenl Council
Leo "bki
Klonohi Millmi
Ka Llhui Hlwlii
Lindl Milin
Municipil Reference & Records Center
Liu J Mllllnl
Terence W. Milo ne
The Ho no rl hle Clrolyn B. Mllo ney
U .S . Ho use o f Representllives
Ro nald M.ngum
EI.ioe Mlnheimer
Union Rive r Blsin Protectio n
A$5OC;llio n
Hudson Mlnn
Idlho Deplnment of Health & Welfare
Division of Environmenlll Qullity
Meliul Mlnn
Edlow Internltio n.1 C o mplny
!<enM.nnelil
WlShingto n Office of the Go vernor
Stale o f ~'hry l. nd
Lilliln Mln nlng
MlryMlnni ng
Mi ry Mlnni ng
La5 Veg., Sun
Duncan "hnsfield
Auocilled Press
The Ho norlble Rene M lnsbo
Uono llilu CilY C('Iuncil
The Honmllble Tho rn., 1. M inio n
U .S . Hooso:! o f Representa.ivlCl\
Bill !IIh nwill
BonneVille County
The Ho no ra b le Donlld A M lozull.1
U .S . HooHl (If Represenuti ves
Joyce "t.n:us
The Uon""lble Edwlrd J Marke y
V.S . Bouse o f Repre!lentlli ves
The Ho no rable Rabe n T M lrkez
C ity u f Springlield
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Table M-2. (continued)
Idf Muk ic....·lct
Inti F~crllh," IIf Prll(cu,,,n.1 &
T echnlClI En~in« r ..
hnld So'hl

~htn'R'<1

Pucrt,. RIc ••

P1.nmn~

Bo ud

!\t.r~.rci M."cn~n

CI.rence "h"m
MUllynM,nln

Pauline Mlnin
Tefl')' ~t."in
Denni, Martllkau
University of MUSlit"husscos. LoVo'cll
Rcw Il"th f ound.,i,'n
The HOn\lflllllc M. nhe ...· G . ~t."incz
U.S. HouJe of R cp ~ scntllivc,
The Honora hle Bill ~1I"ini
U.S. Houu: o f Rcp~scnl.t ivcs
The Hunor.ble Frank Mascar.
U.S. H ouscof R~ reknlali,,'c!li
Jerry MUf'n
TS~fT

South e,mlina Houk n( Rcpt'ekntalivcs
The Honorab le DIVe MISlin
WuhinB"o n House of R~ ruenLllive,
[).}mink MU~rlpuqu.
U.S. Dep.rtment of Health and Human
Se ..... ices
Administtllion of NI,ive Americans

Huord S. Muumoto

Table M-2. (continued)
Philip O . McClnh y
T" ....·n .1f KJl1e ry. "hine
W A. !\I cCarthy
M ilJ r~ McCI.m
EM Site Sp«ific AJ vISl'ry Blll rJ - SRS
Gil McClenah.n
WKXT-TV
Ly n McColh:n
The Honorlble Bill McCollum
U.S . House of RepreK'ntltives
The Honofllble Dlnne! MI;Coilum
CilY ofChlmplign
The Honofllble Miry Anne McCollum
CilY ('I f Columhi.
The Honorlhle D.n McComl5
No rth Clrolin. Generll Assembly
Pillrici. A . McCombs
M R. McConnell
The Honor.hle Milch McConnell
United S'ltes Senile
Mlvis McCormic
Lugue of Women VOh!r.
The Honor. hle lim McCrery
U.S. House of Rep~K'ntllives
KatheeMcCrighl
Wuhinglon Office
Stale of MinncSOUl
Thc Honorable l oseph M . McDade
U S. House of Repre50Cnlltives
Trimeldl McDlnicls

Office of 5"'le PI.nning
John C . M .thuon
U.S. (kp.nmenl of Halth.oo Human

Servin!!'
Fnod ud Drug Administr.tion
Harold Mathew.
fr. ntlin Coonty
limes C M.!hews
Qullity Inn uke Wrighl
Yuki i\iJlSu-PislOl
The Honorlble Reben T . Mllsui
U.S HouK'of R ep~K'nt..tives
Colm M.t.Juuki
Pearl Hl rbor Nivi l ShipYlrd
o.vld ~hnem
PUllTlC1n't . Inc
The Hononhle John i\1Inhe... ,
Soulh Clmhn. Senafe
Judy i\hftullf
Joey MlfZ
Suqulmish EI_mentiry School
The Hnnor-Ihle ROjer E M.u.hmer
City o f M.ntutlJln
Kilfhryn MIl'
EM SIT. SpcclfK AdVISOry brd _ SRS
M K ~ Mlke ~ Munn
lames McAffce and Bernice McAffee
Sl~er Anna McAnnay
Pe.lCC Edoeillon
i\lIke McAuley
The: Honot"lhl. Jnnn McClln

Larry McCann
Rem. A!OfTtK Power UhUfifOry
The H~ahle Kilom McClrthy
U 5 HouH of Repf'Uot'nlII1VU
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Shilrron McDermil
U.S. Deplrtmenl of Health Ind HUmin
Services
Food .nd Drug Adm;n'''flIllon
Thc HOfl(inble l im McDerrnou
U .S . HouH; of RepreK'ntalives
Pillricil McDermott
Angu. McDonald
Elk Bend Fi~ Phone
The Honor-ble Din McDonald
Wuhington Senale
T im Mc Donald
Cincinnali Fire Divi.ion
Roben McEnaney
David R. McF.ull
Mario n Mc Fee
Stuv...ilS BInd o f Southern p. iutes
Pat McGlvran
Idlho Depan ment of Health &. Wclf.re
Connie McGehee
Shirley McGCOJIhegln
Ciry ofl.e ...iston
Charlet McGhee
The Honor-ble leo McGhee
AI McGlin,ky
P.tryMcGrlth
Dl vid R McGuire
U 5 Nuclear Reiruillory Commluion
Region II
bell: McGurk
Californll Deplnmcnt nf Hfllth
Senoice.J
The Hoonrahl. Paul McHale
U S HOUle of Repruenliltivt'l
The HOf1('lrlble l obn M Mc Hugh
U S Hoo e of ReprescntlllveJ
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The Hnnnrahle SCllIt Md nnill
U .S. H(luse Ilf Representlli\·es
The Honorlhle David Mclnh l~
U .S . HI1UlO<! of R ep rot~ nll li\'es
The HtltlHrahlc OI\'iJ Mdnhl~h
U.S . House <If R':f're !'.C otllivot~
Cumminee un Governmeot Refn rm
Ind Ove r si~ht
Ken M.:Kly
NAFRP
Rnn McKay
Feder.1 Emergelk:)' Malll);emeni
Agency
KeVin McKee
CilY of Boi se
The Honorahle Sylvil McKeeth
Idaho House of Representllives
The Honorable How.rd P. McKaltl
U .s . H ot'~e of Representltivell
Chlfles MdGbhen
Research Re.ctor Flcilily
The Honorable Cynthil A. McKinney
U.S . Hou se of Rep resentalives
Stln M . McKinoey
Soulh Clro linl Emergency Preplredneu
Division, OT AG
Virginil McKnighl
Dennis Mcuughlin and Plm MclAughlin
The Honorable ~h~uerile Mc Laughlio
Idaho Senale
hnis Mclemore
The Honor-ble Hllmld McMillen
Cily of Hlmplon
Hlrry o . Mc Nabh
Lori McNlmlrl
LITCO
The Honor.ble Michael R. McNult y
U.S. House of Representative"
Suun McReynolds
Tom McReynolds
The Honorlble B. Joyce McRobens
Idlho Senile
bmcl McSweeney
City of Portsmouth
The Honor.hle Dougl.. E. McTeer
South Clrolill.l HouK' of Representllives
Bri.n E. Meach.m
Utah Peace T e51
The Honorlble Glenn J . Mecham
City of Ogden
M . Medin
N.ney Medwell
The Honorable Mlnin T . Meeh.n
U.S . House o r Represent..tives
The Honor-hla Clrrie Meek
U.S. House of Representllives
Cllrk Meek
'''tho Office of the Governor
Bo~au of DillSlet Services
Phil Mees
Benton County Planning Depanmenl
Muey Megnlc
Roz Mellen
Fr.nk Meltzer
Chi Melville
Miry Mendoza
The Honorable Rollen Menendez
U .S . House of Representaliveto

The U.. n.. ,.hle Jerry Meninick
Yd:lml Trih.: Cuuneil
The H .. norlhle Le ....·is Menlllr
Cil), .,f Bremenun
DllnnIMer..:.J,,·Kim
H.. nnlulu CilY C.lundl
M,,"ty Merchllnt
Tennessee S.felY & Envin> nmentlll
Curp'''lIlion
The H.ltl.1rlhle Stephen Merrill
Slate uf Ne ....· Hampshire
Wide Meuic k

urco
The Hunorlnle b.:k Melclilf
U.S . House IJf Representill:ves
Shlron Melc.lf
Cil), Of Se'lIle
Dave Meyer
lorell. Meyer
Pon o f Oakl.nd
Environmenla l lX p. nmenl
Ri.:hlrd Meye r
The Honorlhle W.yne R. Meye r
Idlho House <If Represcnlalives
The Honorlhle hn Meye rs
U.S. House o r Represcnfltives
Pillrece Meu
Richlrd Meznlrich
The Honorable Kweis i MfUme
U.S. House of Represent.Iives
The Hooofllble l ohn L . Micl
u .S. House of Representllives
Lewis Mich.dsoo
Earth Technology Corp .
Iri s Mi ~ok mi

The H\lnurahle ROSl lyn n Mike
Moapa BInd of p. iutes
The Honorlble Blrbllra A. Mikulski
United SillIes Sen.Ie
The Hooorible Lindl Milam
City o f Idl ho Fills
EM Site Specific Advisory Board ·
INEL
Bremenon- Kilup CounlY Hellth
Deplnment
Heston Millag.n
Boh Miller
The Honorlb llL! Bob Miller
Stlte o f Nevldl
Cl rlr>.l iller
Idaho,) Busioess Review
Dan Miller
Cnlorado Deplnmenl of U W
T he Honor.hle Din Miller
U.S . House of Representltives
GeorseMilier
CilY of Laudon
The Hor.orable Geof)!e Miller
CilyofTu (lon
The Honotilhle George r..t iller
U.S . ~hMJte or Rep~senfllive,
The Hont1rahle George Miller
l,; . .!t . Hc.u ~e or Rellresenlillivell
Commine!! on Refource.
Dr Georye Miller
Umve r~ lly of Cl lifornil-Irvine
JUHphM iller

The Honorlble r..1Aywrd M . Miller
Idlh" Hnuse of R ep re 5e nta l i v e~
Pltl. Miller
WlSh in~ lon Offil;e of the Gtwemor
C"mmllnwelhh of Kentuc ky
Rod Miller
Wyoming Plllnning C.,-.rdinllIMs Office
Terry Miller
KlDK-TV Chlnnel 3 (CBS)
Vemlln Miller
Fon Independence IOOiln Trihe
Winifred E. Miller
The Honorable Zdl Miller
St.te of Georgi.
John Dlvid Mills
Klren Minelf Ind Vilitil Minur
The Honotilble NOrmln Minelli
U.S . HouseofRI!Jlft'scnll, ives
The Honorahle Dlvid Minge
U.S . House of Representatives
The Honorable P.tsy T . Mink
U.S . House of Representillive,
Lawrence B. Minor
The Honor-ble Tom Minor
CilY of S.n Benadioo
George Minol
The Honorahle Andy Mirikillni
Honolulu City Council
Catherine Mitchell
York Weekly
Don Milchell
Gr.hamM ilcheli
Ohio Enviro nmentll Proteclion Agency
HerhMitchell
Sfrulil Business Admini5lrllion
The Honotilble 10hn R. Mitchell
City of Fill River
Kell y Milchell
Suqulmish Elementary School
Sue Milcht'll
NUMATEC
ThomllS Mitchell
The Honorlhle Alfreda Mitre
Las Vegu Pliute Indian Colony
Norm.n Mizuguchi
Hawllii Stile Senate
Thoffil s MOIk
Mid-Columbia Librlty
The Honorlhle John Joseph MOllkley
U .S. House of ReprescnllliveJ
The Honorlble Phil Moeller
Washinglo n Selllle
Ed Moffet! Ind Jennifer Moffen
Dan Mohli.k
Fisl o fFury
The Honllrlhle SIIHn Molinl ri
U.S. HOllie of Representalives
Collin Moller
The Honor.ble AI.n B. Mollohln
U .S. House of Representllives
T . l. Monu leri"
Deln Monroe
U.S . DOE. Office of the Genetill
Coun'el. GC- II
Frink Monleferflnte
U S . Oepl nmenl or Commen:e
Economic Development
Administrllion
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RichlfJ Ml'nl);omery
Sylvil De M" ntigny
DffiCe of the Scleclmen
Town OffiCe
The Honoflhle G . V . (S.lnny)
Montogomery
U.S . House \If Rerre ~entl l i v C 5
AV'gencMol.lre
DRISE
Brem Moore
Sheelmetal Workers
Lou11213 -P
Emma E Moore
Mimic S . Moore
Mlrc Moore
Armed Forces Rldiobitllogy Resea rch
Inslilule
R.d iillion Sources Deplnmenl
M.neMoore
Suqu.mish Elemenlilry School
Richard Moore
U.S . lXpanmenl of Housing .nd Urnln
Development
Region X
Ron M oo ~
Idlho St..te Police
Deplnment of Law Enrorcemenl
The Honor.ble Thom•• Moore
South Carolinl Senate
Wilson C . Moore
The HOflOral1le Clltlo. J . Moorheld
U .S . House of Represenfllives
Berth. Moose
Big Pine Indiln Trihe
The Honofllble hmes P. Mora n
U.S . House of Representatives
Eliuheth Moredock
Terri Moreland
Wuhington Office
Stlte of Illinois
The Honorable Constlnce A. Morelli
U.S . House of Representlllives
Th~ Honor.ble Arnold Morgldo
Honolulu CilY Council
JenmrerMorgan
Reynolds Elcctrica l Ind Engin«ring Co.
Laren!! Morgan
The Honorable Linda Ml1rg.n
CilY of Atomic CilY
The H o norab l~ P.J . Morgan
City ofOmlhl
R. L. Ma rgin
META
An Mori
Life o f the Land
Miry KIY Morley
DorisZ. Mllrris
Evelyn MOrTi!
Heloise Morris
1. W. Morris
Ani" Mom :JOn
M ike Morrissey
Sive Ou r Cumberllnt.l MouncMms
M. Morse
"hcy Morse
Ponsmouth Community ClJlliti.lO
The Honor-ble Mu C , Mortensen
Id.ho House of Representllives
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SIc\' cM n r'Zcnll

P,"''''·... r Rnoun:l'J , In..:
R,*,,,n MOKardini
U S Tunl &: DyC'. Inc
The Hono,..ble Carol M.)sclc),-Bnun
Uniled Stall~J Senate
a.e..ufo n .Jaspcr Coonl), W.ter &: Sewer
W J 18 illl MOllel
The Honorable Linda M ..ult ... n · P.'h:~n
City nf H unl mJ1,,~n Belch
Anhur M o" 'ry

Tn.: Honorable Daniel Pllnt:1t Muynlhan
United Stale, SeMI...
Jll1'1elo Mraz
County Building
O&,,'c Muhlbalcr
Or. R. U. Mulder
University o f Virginia
OepIMmc!nt o f Nuclear Engineering
Rog:cr Muldcr
Office of the Governor
Envimnmentll Policy Divi.ion
Frank Munger
Knoxville New. Sentinel
Gcr.ld Munyan
Vtelona Murat;
Thlt Honorable Frink H. Murknw, ki

The Honorahlc Frink H . Murkowlki
United Stiles ScNlIe.'
Comminee on Energy Ind Natural
Rc5OU rcc.'l'

hneMurphy
The Hononble Patty Mumy
United StaIC. Senate
The Honoublc Piny Mum)'
United SlIt.eJ SentI ...
The Hononblc loh " P Murth.
U 5 House of RepreSCnlAlI Ves
~hke Muu.
AIU Nelghhorllood Bo.rd No 20
8 n .n Myers
C.l vm Myen
Mo.p. BInd o r p.iUlel
The Honor.ble l ohn T Myers
U 5 H(>uK or RepreKtlUtlVe,
The Hononble John T Myen
U 5 House nf Representallve,
Commmee on Appropn, " o n~
J'l)' Myen
Joy Myers
EM Sue Specific Ad'llillory fk'IIrd - INEL
TIM Honouhle Sue Mynek
U 5 House or ReprcownlAhv.s
RldllrdMyser
OhM' St.te Unlver"lf)'
The Honor.ble Tim Nlder
Clf)' or Chul. V,iIU
Th. Honar. hle l.rrold N.dl.r
U S H(>U 1IoI nf Reprcllolntlll'll')
K.wlh N.hoop ll
KIi Lthul H'''''III O.hu VlCe-Po'o
Chlrle, N.boh
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Table M-2. (conlinued)
S,MerNur.h
CitizenlO rllr En'lliru nmenlll JU ~ h.:e
P.t N.v.rro
Keith N.v"
The HMItU.hle Ri.:!i.rd E. Ne.1
U ,S . House of kepresenllltves
b ck Nedle~
U.S . [kp.nment o f the InleriN
N.tioNlI Puk Service
Ted Needles
U.S . DOE
Bamar. Neln"
The Honor.ble Ikn Nelson
St.teofNehruk.
Brute Nel~JO
Jon Nel",n
Cit)' ofCorv.llis
Lois ~ . Nels::, "
Mich.e! A. Nelson
Morley Nelson
Citizens Advisory Comminee
Ja- Ann Nestor
EM Site Specific Advisory Bo.rd . SRS
The Honorable George Nethercutt
U.S . House or Representltives
Donald Neubeny. Jr .
l o.nM Snow Neumann
Wlihington Office of the Governor
Slite o r Utlh
The Hononble Mark Neumann
U.S. House of Repruentltives
The Hononhle Bruce Newcomb
Id.ho House of Representltive.
R. I. Ne""m.ln
Tom Newton
MUlilchusen. In.-itute orT«hnology
The Honorlhle Bob Ney
U.S . House or Represe nUl ~ ives
The Honorthle Benj.min Nichols
Don Nicholl
The Honortble Graee Nichols
City of S.int Charlu
M.,y H. Nichnls
Nick NicholJ
LTTCO
Nllional Auociation o f Relired Federtl
Employee,
The Honor.ble [).)n Nici..ie5
United SUltCi Senate
Aln NicollOn
Ameriun Techamol)' Group . Inc .
Loke.sh Ni,.m
Ken Nimmer
WTC· EVP
C larenc. Niahihu.
W. ipahu NeiJhhoritood Board m
Mr Noe
H.wkinJ County CD Director
The Honuflble Llird Noh
Idaho SeNlte
Sunle CifY Counci l
ChffNoli
FOIter Wheeler Energy Corpontion
Pit Norlett
80M
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Rooen A. Nonnan
Couper. Numu.n &: CII
The HOr\<I(.hle Jllhn 0 N ,' rljuI~t
The H(lno rahle Chu.:k NI'rrls
Wnhinj,!lOn House of Repre~nl.tl"elO
Jerry B. Norri~
P. cific Basi n Development Ct'uncil
The Honorahle EluOtlf Holmes N('n.'n
U.S. House o f Represe ntllive ~
The Honorahle Charl ie Nof'Wc>oo
U.S . House o f RepresenUilives
Laura Nowlin
TeXIs A&M University
The Hono rahle Sam Nunn
United SlItes Senate
The Honorthle Sam Nunn
United SlItes Senale
Comminee on Anned ServiceJ
The Honorable Jim Nunle
U.S . House of RepresemativeJ
Dean Nyg.rd
Idaho Depanrnent of Health &: Wel fue
Division or Environmental Qu.lity
Frink O'Brien
American Nuclear Society
M.ryO· Brien
Nye County
Vincent 0 ' Brien
Bingham County Bo-rd of
Commissioners
Rosem.lry O 'Connell
John O 'Connor
Fann MaNlgement Inc .
l.,nes O'Neal
Ted O ' Neil
May Fire Depanment
Roben J . O ' Neill, Jr.
Terri O 'Sulli'll.n
laborers' ImemlfioNlI Unillr.
The Honorable Meyera Obemdorf
Municip.I Center
The HOllOrible JameJ L . Oberstlr
U.S. House or Representatives
The Honora ble D.vid R. Obey
U.S. House o f Repre&entltivet
The Honorahle D.vid R. Obey
U .S. Houle of Representltives
Commi"ee on Appropri.tionJ
Ed Offley
Sea"le Post· lntelligencer
William L Offi,"
County ofNye
City o r Ta nopah
Unice Ollie
M<MIp, Band o r Paiutes
The Hono r.ble Tom Ohmufl
Hew.ii State Hou" of RepresenlAti'llu
Owen Okumura
Fede,,1 Menagers A5s"ci.ation
Chul" Olenycti
U.S . .... nnJ Control.nd Disarmament
Alency
The Honorable Tommy OlmJtud
City or M.con
Ken Olsen
Moscow· Puliman O.ily News
The Hanortble Kirk Olsen

Umlitilill County Emergenc),
~ l lInligement

Lynn OISlln
The H,'nur.ble John W . Olver
U .S . House of Represent.tives
PhilOI..... ell
lim Omans
U.S . Oep.nOlen! of Defense
Bill Ormshy
JenniferOrpilla
U .S. ~OE . Idah" Operatinns Office
The HnnllTable Solomon P. Ortiz
U.S. House o f Representatives
The HonM.hle Bill Orton
U .S. House o r Representllives
The HOl\\.ITahie Marvin Osborne
Shoshone- Banl104:k Tribe"
Ch.rl ie Osolinn
Argonne National lahorllory East
Johnathln K. Osorio
University of Hawaii·M.no.
Ed Onley
SCiule Post-Intelligencer
PeterOstromecky
Intemlli(ln.1 Associ.tion of Fire Fighters
Joan R. Owen
Rohen E . Owen and EliUlbeth Ov.'en
The Hono rahle M.jor R. Owens
U.S . House of Representatives
The Honortble Sheni Owens
City of IsI.nd Puk
The Hnnorlhle ~if ic hle l G . Ollley
U .S . House of Representalives
The: Honorah le Michael G . Oxley
U .S. HOUle of Representatives
C(lmminee 11n Commerce
M.ri.n Pack
The Hoooat-k R<>n P.ckard
U S. House o f RepresenOlti\'cs
The Honor.ble Bob Packwood
United Stales Senate
Roben Page
CnuntyOffices
Sh.ron Pahlkt
The Hnnor.hle: lamcs Painte:r
City or Gaine.ville
Pekk. Pakhla
Emhass)' of Finl.nd
Douglas p.lenshu5
De:panrnent (If Ecolngy/Kenrn!wic k
The HOr'lllr1hle lacob A. P.lillo
C ity of Niasu. Falls
The HnoM.hle Frank p.llone . Jr.
U.S Hou!lC! of RepRsentatives
The Honor.hle Frank p.llone . Jr.
U .S . HOUle of Representative.
Cnmmittee on Commerce
Doug p.lmer
Jimmy p.lmer
MiuluipPI Dep.nmcnt of
Environmental Qu.lity
George P.nnell .nd Dehoflh P.nnell
Le. I P.qulO
Plulirn! P.rdy
GenevieveM Parker
Ltnd O. Puker
EM Site Specific Ad visnry an.rd . SRS

The Hllr'IIlrtble Mike Parker
U .S. House of Repretent.tivcs
Richar.! C . Parker
Ron A. Parker
The HIlnur.hle Roy Parker
Shunn Parker
T . F. Parkinson
StC"e Parks
Genevieve M . Paruni
EM Sile Sp«ific Advi50ry Board . INEL
Joe Parrene
The Honorlhle At...·ell J . P.rry
Id.ho Senate
Dr . Rich.rd M . P.rry , Jr .
U .S . Dep.rtment of Agricultu re
Agriculturtl Rese.rch Sen'ieu
Andrew Paryp.
line Pucu.1
KRTR
The Honorable Ed Pastor
U .S. House of Rep resent.tives
The Hononble George E . Pataki
State o f New Yort
The Honorlhle Elwood H. p.taw.
Confedcraled Trihes of the Um.@.
Indi.n Reservation
Colen Pathea l and Helen P.thul
Helen P.thul
lewis W . Pllrick
John P.non
Amold Paul
Fedenl EmployeeJ Mrul Trtdes
Council
Willi.m S . P.ul K n
Steve PaulliOn
Friends of the C leaf'W.ter
The Honorlhle Bill PUd n
U .S. Hoose of RepreK'nt. tive5
The Honorahle Donald M . Plyne
U .S. Hou5e of RepresentalivCl
The Honortble l. F. Payne
U.S. Hoose of Represent.tivcs
S . Payne
Sa\,.nnah Ri v· " Regional Oiversificllion
Initiative
Ernest Pu rso n
Esther Pea rso n
The Honorable Lin Pearson
The Honorlble George Pede('50 n
CilY o f S.nll Clarita
Gordon Ped row
Cily o f longmont
BOO ",",I
Ecology &. Environment. Inc .
The Honorthle CI.lbome Pell
Committee on Foreign Relations
The HonOrlhle CI.irbone Pell
Uniled SOltes Senile
The Honorahle N.ncy Pelosi
U.S. House of Representalives
R. L Pence
U.S. Depanment o r Energy. Id.ho
Openlion5 Office
Ned Pend.rvi.
Est.tes. Inc
J.net Penfield
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R. Len Penne
Wuhinghln Office
Stile of Nevad.
Mar~ ...~t Pense
Leon.rd J . Pepper
H.....lii Stile House of Represent.tives
Perlnl Perez
North C.rolina Slite Uni,,'enily
Terry L . Perez
EM Site Specific Advi~l ry ao.rd · INEL
G.ilPeten
The HllOo rahle Colin C . Petertt'o
U.S . House of Represenlilives
Commiuee lin Government Rerurm
.nd Oversight
The Honor.hle Collin C . Pelerson
U.S . House of Represent.tives
The Honorlhle Dooglu Peterson
U.S . House of Representatives
G regory P. Peterson
Jill Peterson
S.mara Peterson
Andrew Peltofsky
Will i.msburg Bureau
Richmond TimeJ· DiJpatch
The Honorahle Thomas E. Petri
U.S . House o f RepreKnta tives
Guy Peuy
Roben Petty
Cenlnl Intelligence Agency
Environme ntal S.fety Gl'OlIp
Bubara Petun
W.ahingto n Stile University
Arden Pfeiffer .nd PII Pfeiffer
Mike Phel.n

CNN
Alhe11a Phillips
Ke ith E. Phillips
St.te (lrWashington
Dep.nmenl of Ecology
P.ula Phillips
Tho mas Phillips
Washington Office
St.te o r~t i.ui.uippi
The H(lnorlhle Owen B. Pickell
U.S . House of Represent.tive5
Cheryn Picquel
The Hononl1\e Carol A. Pietsch
Idaho House of Representllives
Steve Pike
Dan Ping
Roane County News
Brad Pinkenon
b"e J . Pir'll\
City IlfSllntl Fe
The HOOllf.ble [)on PiS\:hner
Idaho House nf R ep rcsentllive~
Kathleen A. Pill
Obsidi.n, Inc .
Rosem.ry Pillman
lames E. Pilton
N. vy league of the U S.
lincoln Counly Nudear Wille p""Jeel
Anthony F Poche
~hke Pllchop
South D.k.,11 DePI \l r Envl",lnmenl ~t
N.tur.1 Ruoun:eil
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o
Dr

lA-.. P '-';Ulo;
The O'..." .n Cllm..:
G~ ,~ .. A P\~ .

FI.' ~ nce P,,.,j rIUi

Sam P••I..

urea
Ch.rl.. ~ S PI~ h l)' h
U S lXpartmcnl of th .. In,erio r
Herh PIlU,nt
f,J.hl~ Department o f Fish &. Game
R•.tten D. P" U.nI
Uni.lR ofC"l1Ccmnl Scl .. nl i'l ~
1110:1 HIIMrahl .. G. 8 PolI.oJ Jr .
GeNgi. SII'e Senate
Mlrily n Pollock
The Hiloora hl.. Richard W Po mbo
U.S. House of Repntsenll,ive,
The Hooonble Earl Pnmcmy

U.S. House of Representativu
The Honorable Hor-.ce Pomeroy
Idaho House of Repr.esenlllivd
NeI.on Pomeroy
Ch. rle, Pope:
Knight-Ridder
The Hono,..... I.. l ohn Ed'4'.rd Porter
U.S. Hou.se of Representatives

l ynn Porter
Han(ord Wlleh

The Hononbl.. Rob Portman
U S. HOO5e o f Representatives
The Honorthlc Glenn PosJIud
US . House o f Repl'uentltivu
William Possidenfe
Reynolds EIec:lnClI and EnJinccring Co .
BnKe Post
Office of Policy Resea rc h &.
CoordiMlion
R.lden,,, Poner and ~hnh. Potier

Rou D. Poner
OonM PfN.· au t~
Nez Perce Trike
~1Irt>dh POVo'ell
Mut Pnwe.1I
l uhan P(Y\\'en
~ePnte r

C.rm

Prll't

WGOV·TV
Ray ~uan
The Honnr. hl. lA rry Preule. r
Jn Pnu
M.n.nn Pnu
Roy Pnu
State of H,w. 1I C,vll Defente Council
\chu nn Pn(:e
Th. Hflf'lo lr.hle Anne Pnn,le
J(>hn Pr",,"
Federal M.na,er.. A.J\O(lItKm
Unyd Pntchen
Bremen."n Sun
DeMII J PTou.a arod Mul'o Proh a
M.tJ1IPTot ....
The Hnnnrahi. Oehnnh Pryce
U S Hrou ~ of Re-pteHntatlve,
Ene Pry,...
Tbe Sun1. Time'
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Table 1\>1-2. (continued)
The H"l1llr.hle D'\'id PryM
United SI.les Sen.le
RavTI'Klnd Pua
Office Ilfthe City C lerk
lAurd Pumphn:y
8tlise Pe.ce Quilt Prnj« t
JetT Pumer
Andrew L. Puuio
Wa5te Plllicy Institute
Ron.ld Qu.lmln
fl.hrcus Quiatan.
Nancy Quiggle
The Honor.ble James H Quillen
U.S . House tlf RepreKnt.tives
Vickie Quinley
Fnlnk Quinn
Y.nkee Atomic Electric Comp.ny
The Honotlhle Jack Quinn
U .S . House of Represent.tivlL!l
Kltherine Quinn
University o f MaHlchuu elts· Lo ....·dl
Slinford Rlbin
T .....,fic R. by
University of Maryl.nd
The Hono,..ble Mue R.cicort
State of Mont.M
John R.d.csi
Connecticut Office of Policy .nd
M.nlgement
The Honorable George R.d.novich
U.S. House of RepreSC"ntalives
The Honorable Jay R.dfo N
Dr. lima 8 . Rad ziminski
University of South Carolinl
College of Engineering
Ann Rag.n
EM Site Specific Advisory 80Ird - SRS
Enviro nmental Quality Cont rol
The HonoNlble Nick J. Rah.1I II
U.S . House of RepresentllivC".J
Rochelle R.mey
Ph il R.msey
Council
The Hono rt hle l im R.nutad
U.S House of Re-presentllives
Robert R.ndall
Glynn Environment.1 Coalition
Sperry Rlndolph
The Honorable Chules B. Ra ngel
U .S. House of Re-pruentl ti ves
Rlchan.! R.ngen
U .S. Nuclelr Regul.tory Commiuion
Divi,ion o f Low-Level WUle
Phil Ra nier
Id.ho Depanment of Wiler Resources
Tom R. usc h
Cnmmonwulth Edison
K. mal.klt B. R.ut
EM Sile SpKific Adv i~ ry Bt}lrd . SRS
Vern R. ve nscroft
Dehor.h R.y
Dr Junaid Rnvi
Generll Atomin
Andrew W Rea
EM Site SpeclfJC ,\dVllOry Board . SRS
Hetch Rud
Boise Puce ~111t Pm;tKt
Terry RKoni
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LeAnne Redick
Washint:ton Office o f the Gt>vern" r
Stlll:tJfMichij;ln
The Ho","r.hll: E. D.vid Rl:d", 101:
North Carnlin. Genn.1 Aliso:mhl)"
MYNI Rl:ece
EM Sill: Sp.:cific Advi~ 1"}' a..~.rd . SRS
WarrenReec::e
Tun A&M Univ.:nity
D.vid R«d
The Honor.hle lack Reed
U .S. House nf R... pro: ~ntll ti \"es
Kristi Rl:ed
Thl: Hnnnr.hll: MIry Lilli Ro:o:J
IJlhoS... nlll:
Ron Reed
MACTEC
The Honorlble Sleven R. Ro:ed
The Honor.b1e SUI: Rel:nlli
Id.ho Sentte
Th.: HOIlONlble R. Scotl Ree""
City of 81.ckfooc
The HoooNlbl.: Kenneth E. R« veli
City ofC.mhridge
Jack Reg.n
Nev.da Sille Assembly
The HOOONlble R'!ph Regul.
U.S . HouH of Representatives
The Hono,..hle HuT}' Re id
United Stales Senlte
The Honor.hle Lydia Re id
City of Mansfidd
Pele Reid
Whitman Colle1:e
Mich.el Reitenour
Dr. J. I. Frederick Re-ppun
Phy,ici.ns for Soci.1 Responsihility
C . T . Resch
Rhone Resch
Projects Performance
The Honor.ble Dorthy L. Reynolds
Id.ho House or Represutatives
The Hono,..ble Mel Reynolds
U.S . House o f Re:prescntatives
Vic Rezendes
U .S . General Accounting Office
Community & Economic
OtveloplT".enl
The Honorthle Thomas Rhoad
South Clrolinl HOOle of Repruentllives
Chute, Rice
EM Site Spec ific AdviJOry Board - INEl
JOinn Rice
Kevin Rice
The Honorable Nonnln Rice
City of Suttle
Sue Rice
Enviroc:.re of Ut.h
William T Richltdl
U.S . Department of Agriculture
Soil Conservation Service
The Honortble Bill Rich.rdlOn
U.S . HOUle of RepresentativCl
Kennil W. Rich.rdsan .nd hnel E.
Rich.rdson
The Honorable Melvi n ~,t. RichudJOn

The H"nnuhle S":,>lt H . Rich.rt.!s.ln
S,Iouth C'f\"llinll H (lU~': " f Rep~ st:ntlli,· e.
SI"" '.:n D. Ri..:hudS<ln
EM Sit ... Sp.:-.:ific AdviS<If")' 8t ,.~J . SRS
Dr. Pd.:r R i~' klrrl s
V,'l': "n INEL
W. Rlcken.
Tho: Htl ntlrahll: T,'m RiJt:e
51110: of Pennli)"lvani.
Tho: H,'nur.hle T im Riding... r
Idah u Hou5Ol: IIf Repr... senlltives
Ri.:h. rd Riem ... r
STAT CON In.: .
Thl: Hnnm ahlo: Fnnk Ril!~ 5
U.S . House of Ro:pre~ ... ntlliv0:5
W.rd Rigllt
Dow Cho:miCiI Compan)'
Chulo:s D. Rilbury
Thl: H"nllr.hl.: l tls.:ph P. Rill:)" . Jr.
Cil)" " f Ch arleslon
Muk Rino:h.,1
R.lph Rinella
The Honor. hl.: lArry Ringer
Cit)" of Co llege Station
The HOIlONlhle Rich.rd Rio rd.n
The HonoNlble Lynn Riven
U .S. HOUH o f Re-pt"esenlitives
Tho: Honor.ble Tommy Ri"ers
City of Williston
Tho: Honor.ble Chules S . Robb
United Stat,u Sen.te
Je.n C . Roberts
Lucy Roberts
The Hono Nlble PII Roherts
U .S. House of Rc."JIresentltivC5
R.ndy Roherts
D.ve Rllbert50n
U.S . Department ofEne~y . Id.ho
OperllionsOffice
Sh.Lln Roberuo n
Shushone-Blnnock T ribes
Enviro nmental Prog Nlm
Muk Rabinowi tz
Professor Enders A. Robinsan
Columbl' University
Klumb School of Mines
Muk Robinson
Pugel Sound N,vII Shipyard
The HonoNlble Kenneth L. Robison
Id.ho Hou!e of Repre!entllives
Tho: Honouble Joh n O . Roc kfdler IV
United Siaies SelUlle
The Honor.hle David Roderick. Jr.
Office o f the Mayo r
P.lrici. M Rodgers
The Honorable Tim Roemer
U .S . House of Represcntllives
Rich Roesler
The y.ltima Herald·Repuhlic
H.I ROMen
The Honor.ble Hu o ld ROllers
U.S . House of Representatives
Keith Rogen
Las Vegn ReVieW l \lu m.l
KIll Rogers
Finl Lighl Acupuncture
The HonM.ble O.na Roh ,..b. cher
U.S House of RepreSC"nt.tives

The H\It)'.'f.hle Dan. R.lhrah.cher
U .S . Huuse t>f Representllives
C,'mmillee nn Science
Ke vi n Rtlhrer
Intem.tional T e.:hnu logy ( IT) Curp .
Russ RIlI.nd
Th.: H" m'r.ble Roy Rumer
St.te \lf Culor.d n
The Honor.ble C.rlos A. Romem. . Ban:elt'
U.S . House of Repres.:nllli\'es
The Honm.hle John RootT
City of Wllerloo
IImesRoob
The Honor.hle llean. Rns· Lehtinen
U.S. House of Representalives
The Honor.ble Ch.die RoSt!
U.S. House uf Represcntatl\'es
Fred Ro~
Id.h,l Falls Center For Higher Educ.lion
Edwin L. Rosenbu rg
Dep.rtment of Cit)' PI.nning & Codes
Administrllion
The Honorahle Pedro Rossell6
Cemmoowetlth of Puerto Rico
The Honortble T ob), Roth
U.S . llouseor Re:presentatives
The Hono Nlhle William V . Roth . Jr.
United States Sen.te
The Honorable Willi.m V. Roth . Jr.
United States Senlte
Comminee on Governmental Affairs
Thoe Honorahle Marge Rookema
U.S . House o f Represent.lives
l oennirer Rowe
J . Victor Rowell
Williamsburg County
The Honorable J . H.ra ld Ruwl. nd
Cit)' of Wa)'nesboro
The Honora ble John Rowl.nd
St.te of Connecticut
T . J . Rowl.nd
West Valley Projecl Office
Dry.n Ro)'
The Honor.ble Lucille ltoyb. I-AII.rd
U .S. House of Representatives
The Honorable EdWIN R. Royce
U.S. House o f Rep resentatives
Wand. Rub i.ne.
Puerto Rico FedeNlI Aff.irs
Administr.lion
E . Ru iz
U.S. OOE, Id.ho OpeNltlORS Office
Helen Runstei n
Cheryl R'In)'o n
N.tionll Council of Slit.: Legisillures
1\hrylnn Ruppe
The Honorable Buttb)' L. Rush
U.S . Hou.e o f Represent'lives
Donald Russell
R o~emary Ru nell
O.vid Rutherfo rd
Metnl PI.nnins: Commission
8 rend.n R),.n
Klns.. St.te Univeuit),
Eliubelh R)'ln
W.shlnglon Office
Stlte o f Del.ware
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1\1111 Ry.n
Kitup County
Tho: Hmltlr.ble Greg Ryherg
South C af\)liM Senate
The Hooo,..hle 1\hnin 01.\, S.btl
U.S . Housl: of Rep~senl.' ives
Bill S.ccoman .nd P.II)" S,,:cllm.n
Dr. Jooo: S,c(:oRUln
Go rdon s.t.moto
Associ lied Pfl!Sl
Pej;gy S.luts
Hallelle R. S.la1lr
The Honorthle Willi.m T . S.li
Idaho H ou~e of Represo:nt.liv...s
The Hono r.hle ~hlt S.lmu n
U .S . House nfRepresent.live5
The Honorthle Don.lt.! S.mp5('0
Um.till. 8uud IlfTru sl«s
Krista L . S.nd.
Minnesoll Dep.nment of Public Service
The Hnno r. ble Bernard S.nders
U .S . House ofRcp~senlilive l
The Honor.ble H. Crote<:h S.nders
CilY of Blmwell
The Honorable Muk S.nford
U .S . House of Repn:sentalives
The Honorthle Rick Santorum
United St.les Senile
The Honortble P.ul S. Sun.nes
United Stales Senale
G . Sargent

urco

The Honor.ble Tod S.lIerthw.ile
CilY o fUrb.na
Lelh W . SUlgut
Council of Stille Governments
Mid\l,'utem Office
Gevene S,vII.
Klib.h p.iute Ind i.n Tribe
Elmer SlVill.
America' . Eagle M.g.tine
Wend),S.vkralU.
The Hooorahle Thomas C . S.wyer
U.S . House of Represenlilives
The He norable Jim Su.lon
U.S . House of Representatives
Dr.Say.l.
Science AppliCititlns Intemaliona l Curp
Mich.t:I Sulingi
1\lIrylnJ Univenity Tr.imn~ Re.ctor
Joe Sunnell.
The Honor.ble Joe SClfhuf\w!:h
U .S . House of Represent.lives
The Honn r.ble D.n Schaefer
U.S . House of R epresentl l i v o:~
Th e Hnnor.hle D.n S.:hlo:fer
U .S . H OOle nf R ef' re .\entl1ive~
Committee Iln Commerce
The Honor.hle Rllhert E. Sch.efo:r
Id.ho ll(wscufRrpresent.llvu
The Hono r.hle &I ....·.rd T S.:h.frr
St.le of Nonh O.kOl.
D. K.teSch.lck
R . B Sch.ppel
T\)d dSc h ~in

Peil'lIY Scheminsl .
Brooke Schierlllh
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The HUI'Il, uhl" Slt~"'e n S.;:hlff
U S H,lUU ,If Repl'tM' n'III\'u
Hdena SchlO1(iI
Bruc"L.xhlTUllt
J-tffSthfTUltjcn
Suqulmn h Elementa!)' School
GI,I SchmIdt
UIA I'tI'lCC Schmidt
Nc"" Je rk)' IXpl. of En\'ifllnmcntll
Proc ~lIon

. 00 EncfJ'Y

Pdtr W Sc hmidl
CnffiITlt1 n",·cllth ll(V,rjo!lOi.
DeplIrtrncnl " f EnvimnmcnUlI Qullity

R,.I.nd Schmincn
US . OqIlnmc nl ll ( Comml"n;c

NI,iollll ~hrinc Fisheries Service
The Honorable Kurt Schmokc
p.mS"hn.:ulc(
Clint Schoff
Amennn Federation o f Government
Empklyus
BIll Schmck
EFANW
The HOnfln.hlc Guy J . Schroeder
Idaho SCMle
The Hononblc Pllne!_ Schroeder
U S. HOUle o f RqJ~knllli vcs
The Honorahlc Arthur Schultz
CilY of Jo lic"
The Honora hle Oules E. Schumer
U S . Hou~ o f Reprucnlllli\'cs
O.le S , SchuRC
E G Schwartz
Idaho StIle p.,licc
Sieve SCh ..... u1:t

T ed M Sch",'.n:
l im SCh...·ciucr
Purdue University

Thu rn.., W Scionti
Frink Scon
The Honor. ble Robe" C Scm
U S House of Represenl.uves
G.I')' Scudder
T'horNs Seatnln
The Hononble Andru Sea31r.nd
U S House of Rqrescnuliv~s
The H ()n('IflIhl~ IImel Senlnnd
CI'Y Clf NClrth Lu V~gu
Ph) 1111 Sftl,
The HOMuhle Nikki S~lzl~r
South Clfoh Ni SeNile
" ' .n Selin
U S Nuclelr Rerul.t0l')' Commlulon
Th. Honnr. "'e F limes Semenhrenner.
I,
U S HfN'C of RqreMnulivel
y vun.... Sepench
The Honor.hle J('\tI Semi! . Jr
Slev. Serf
Bonnevili. Councy
TM HMlnr.hl. JoM E Serf.no
U S Hou,- of ReprescntltlYu

GIor,lI Envlronmrnul ProI:Khon
DlvlJton

On' Se-.II
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The Hom.r.ble J<lh n Sh.del!S
U.S. H Nl~ u fRepre~nl.llve"
The H.. n" flhle Je.n Sh.hun
Ne ....' H. mp5ohir-e SI.te SeOll\.Ir
Chri" Sh.ne
J . R. Sh.nehfOllk
Union Colle ~e
Beth L. Sh.nnon
John Sh.nnon
Mieh.el J. Shll'l'
l..Iboren· Huhh .noJ S.fel)' Fund
T,.mSh.1'l'
;\uo..: i.led Preu
The HonM.hle Chll'lel Sh.l'l'c
South C. rolinl House of Represcnlllivel
ROOen. R. Sh.l'l'e
P.cific School o f Rel igIOn
P. F. Sh.w
The Honorable F.. CI.y Sh.w , Jr .
U.S. Hoose of Represenulives
The Honofllble ChriSiopher Sh.YI
U.S. Houscof Repr-escnl.l jves
DoOild R. Shea
M.I')' Sheehy
Wuhington Office
SlIle of Wisconsi n
The Honora ble Owighl E . Shem~r
St~v~ n Sheiffer
The Honorable Rieh.nI C . Shelby
United Stites Senile
The Honorable Ingrid B. Sheldon
City o f Ann Athor
Ken Shep.nI

CKY
The Honor.hle Alell Shephenl
P.iute Indi.n Trihe of UI.h
Willi.m M . Shepherd
Aiken County
Willi.mShemlln
Vermont Dep."menl of Puhlic Sen-ice
Bill SherreN
Doug Sherwood
U.S . Environmentll Protection Agency
J uli~ Sh im
Philip Shimer
WUhington Office
Stlle of H.w. ii
Di.RI Y Sh ipley
John Shirey
City fIf CinclnOili
Edw.rd Shoh l
EDRU Innov.lon
Chll'la ShClOttnin
H.nlld Sho re
Timothy Shont
C()meli. Shotwell
Evelyn Shotwell
lunne Shreeve
Un l v~nlty of Id.ho
Ednl E Shroy
Mrs lIura Shutnlte
Vecua T«hnol&lY. Inc .
COMI. Shumw.y
DyMtnlC Corpof'll ion Libr.1')'
Th. Honor.ble Bud Shuller
U 5 HOUN Clf R ~reMnI. li\les
Lind. Slet.I.,
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H. Sidr.n
Cily ,.(San!e

T.~~." S i e~e!

K.1')·n Siego:r
Jim Sie\'erson
F .M .C .
Mirth. Sifnu
lifT)' Silverm.n
Ho:. n of AlT'k!nCl Nllnh ....·o:M
The Honora hle P.ul Simon
Uniled SI.tes So:n.le
W.), no:Si fTh.l no:.u
Rhode bl.nd Nude., S':len.:o: Co:nto:r
Sidney B. SiT'Ol)Cllnn
Geo rgi. Dcpanmenl ,.f Naluu l
R~!HIun: eli

Enyironmo:nlll Prole.:li,'n D"' I~i,,"
Douglu Simpkins
UniYenil)' o( Florid.
The Honorahlo: AI.n K. Simpw n
UnilN SI.tes SeOite
Erit Simpson

urco

The Hooorable Mich.e! Simpwn
Id.ho Hou5C of Repr-eSf:ntllives
The Hononble H.rold Sims
Lynn Sims
Don'l W.lle O regon
R ob~" SinglO:lon
80000.1')' Coonty School Dillricl 101
Emma L. Sirh.1I
Tho: Hono...hlo: NOmlln Sisisk)'
U.S . House o f Rep~ scnll.ti ves
Muk Sisk
AfMric.n Samo.
K.thleen Si s ne ro~
WlSle .nd W.ter ~h M1!emen' Divilll'n
Huith Dep.nm~nl
The HonoNlhle D.vid E . Shggl
U.S . Hou5C of Repr-escnllliYe5
The Honorahle Joe Skeen
U.S . Housc of Represcnl.livel
The Honorlble Ik ~ Skehon
U.S. House of Represenl.lives
Th~ Ho norlble Ike Skehon
U.S. House o f Represenll liv~s
Co mm;lIee on N.ttoNiI SecurilY
lIwr-e nce Skinner
lIwrence Skinner
N~vad .ns Opposi n ~ Nuclur Extincrion
Robe" Ski nner
AmeriCin Nucleu Society
Id.ho Section
Cyri l M . SI.nsky
Dr. D.vidSI.ughter
Univenity of Ut.h-S.h like CilY
Mech.nicat Engil\t"ering Ocr!.
The Hnno,.hle Louise Mclnlom Slaughter
U.S. Hou!le of Represent.. ti\' ~s
C.mt S I .ughl~rheck
H~ mr. Environmental Cnnwlt.nt
Robert H. ( Bob) Slay
EM S i l~ Specific AdviMlI')' Roanl · SRS
8 . Slifer
P.ul Sloe. o r Leo Willi. mJ
The Oat Ridger
The Honon ble Jesse R. SlNI n
City of Bloomi ngtnn
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hno: Smllo:~
Anhu r P Smith
Bo:n L Smith
Tho: H,m" r.hle Chri5hlpho:r H. Smllh
U S H,lO'O: ,.f Ro:pro:so:nllli\'es
Tho: HWl,'r.hlo: e h ri~hlpho:r H. Smith
U.S. H,.usc .,fR epro:sent.ti,·o:s
Commiltee fl n Intenuli,'RlI Rd.lions
Do:.nlll Smith
Sn.ke Ri\'o:r AIIi.nce
Dennie Smilh
Go:no:r.1 Ele':lri.: e,' mp.ny
Desm"nd F. Smilh
En.: Smith
Fr.n Smith
Hilton Hud IsI.nd P.ckel
G.I')' W Smith
B&.W Nudear En,·ironmo:nl.1 Servio;es
Gus Smith
The Hllnnr.hlo: J . R,ll. nd Smith
South e.mlina House o f Represenllti\'es
b ek L. Smith
Id.ho SlIle Uni y ~rsity
Colleg ~ o f Engineering
Tho: Honor.hle K~nd.1I Smith
The H ono r.hl~ lImar S. Smith
U.S. House o f Rcpresenllti\'es
Tho: Honor.hlo: Lind. Smith
U.S. House o f Repr-escnl.li\'~s
Lois Smith
~bn Smith
MorJ;. nSmith
NClrfolk NIY.I BaM:
Neil Smith
Universit), of Mis.souri· Roli.
The Honorablo: Nic k Smith
U.S. H ou~ ofRcpr-e5~nt.ti\· es
Perj ~1ta K. Smith
EM Sil~ Specific Advisory Bo.rd - SRS
Philip C . Smith
W.5ohinglon Office
St.le of 10""'.
R ~nee Smith
KSRA · AM (960) Ind KSRA-FM (91 .7)
The Honor. bl~ Rob~" C . Smith
Unilcd SlIlCI S~IlII~
Vicki Smith
Lome R. Smithh."
ViekiSnittlu
U.S. Dep. nment of the I nl ~rio r
Cr.lo:n ..,fthe Moon N.lional
M" numenl
Rachel Snook
Recorde r· Hef'lld
Dickey Sno .....
Re nee Snow
The H t'norab l~ Olympia J . Snowe
Uniled St.I~ 1 Sen.l~
Keilh Snyder
Ne ....' York Tim~1
lind.Soderquill
The BonMahle P.ul Soglin
The HfInor. ble R C Soles
No rth C. roliM G~neral AliS~mbly
The Honora ble Ger.ld B H Solomon
U 5 H ou~ of Represenl.live,

R.,. S,'lon1<\n
U.S . Oep.nm~nt ll f Ai!ricultur-e
U.S . Foresl Sen'ice
Jul ie A. Somers-Gubvig
Vicky SonS
Pennsyh'.ni. SlIte Un"'ersil),
Roben St'renson
Cil)' o f Tonopah
The Honorlhle Shi~l. Sorenson
Idaho SeOile
Jim Souby
W~lIem GO\'ernCln' AlSoci.lion
The Honor.hle Mlrk Soud~f
U.S . HtIIiSC ofR epresenllti\'C$
Joseph M. Souki
H.....·.ij St.te House o f Represenlltives
Sherr), Southern
U.S . DOE. SROO
Roben E. Southl.OO
Bob W. SO....·er
Fred SO..... ~r
U.S . Geologic.1 Survey
Denv~r Fed~r.1 C~nl~r

Linda Sp'Snol.
Stlte Uni"ersity of New Yort .1 Buff.lo
Th~ Honora ble Molly Spatmln
South C.roliM Hoose of Rep resentatives
EI.ine Specht
Energy &. T ... nspol'lltion N~twort News
SCOft Speci~s
F~ lI owlhip of Reconcili.tion
Th~ Honorable Arlen Spectu
United SIIICS SeRite
The H ono rlb l~ H~nl')' Sp~ight
City o f Oul,
Phillip D. Speight
City o f H~nd~rlO n
The Honorable Floyd Sp~nce
U.S . HOUWl of Representativcs
The HonoNible Floyd D. Spen<:~
U.S . House o fR~present.tives
Committee on N.tioRit Security
Thomas Sp~nc~r
KVEW-TV Newl
Cu o lyn W. Sp~tT)'
Rob~ n D. Spi~s
P.ulSpita lny
Dehra A. Spitur
M.rkus S pitt~r
Suunne Spore
Donnie l. Sp ... gue
The Honorable loh n M . Spran. Jr.
U.S . House o fR ep ruentlti\'~s
Elil.lbeth Springer
T imSt. llini '
City of O.k Ridge
Edith SI.nger
BonneYille Count)·
&.nI ofCommiuiClnen
lil. A . SlIng~r
Th ~ Honor.hle Woodrow Slinley
City ClfFlint
Th~ Honor.ble Fo"ney ~Ie Stark
U S H{lOSC of Rep resenllli,'cs
Jenny Stlrk
Suquamiil\ ElefMnlll')' School
Jim Slirling
SOUND INQS
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Ron SII,,,n
AsioClt:i.lcd Pr-eu
C."';eLStluffer
Willi.m C . Stluffo: r .nd Patriei. Z. SI.uffo:r
Th~ Hont)... hle C liff Steams
U.S. House t, f Representltivei
Ch.rlcsSlulo:
Common ....·e.lth o f M.l.llchusell5
Office of Federa l - Stlt~ RcI.lillns
K.ren Com Sleele
SCinie Post· lnlelligent:er
The Honorable R.Jph J . Steele
Id.ho House of Repr-escnl.ti,'es
Selm. A. Steele
Willi.m K. StHle
V~ roniu Sleff~ns

Karen Siein
Dr. ROflli d Siein
SlIle Uni\' ~rsity u f Ne ....· York .t Buff.ltl
Shirle), Siein
The Honorable Ch .rI~s w. Stenho lm
U.S. Hoole of Represcnllti\'es
Clint Stennett
The Honor.ble W . Clinton Slenneu
Idaho SeMle
AI.n Stephens
Idaho Stile Univenity
Edwud Stem
U.S . Dep."menl of lIbor
Occup.lioMI S.f~ty lind Health
Administr.tion
AleXinder R. Stevens
Ed Slevens
The H ono r. bl~ T ed Stevens
United St.l~s Sen.l~
Brend. SI~w.n
The Hono ... blo: George Sle...... n
City o f Provo
Mark Stew.rt.OO M. fJ .ret M . Slew.n
Kevi n Stigile
Roger Stillwell
Common....·e.lth of the Nonhern M.ri.OI
Islllnd .
W.5ohinilon Represent.lh·e
J.mes Sl i ~man
SMk ~ Riv ~r Alli . nc ~

D.le A. Slirling
I..Ind.u AssocI.lel. Inc .
G.I')'Sl jven
Environmenl.1 Ne ..... ' Netv, ork
Jeri Stockdale
Th ~ Honorlhle Steve Stoc kman
U.S. House o fReprescnllli v~1
Th ~ Honor.hle Jim StoichelT
Id.ho Hlltae of Rcpr-eSCftllll\'e,
Don R. Stokes
Th ~ Honor.hle lliuil Sioics
U.S. HfIule of N.~pr-esenlAlivel
M. rilyn Stllknes
Ikni~ Slone
G.I')· Slone
Th~ Honoflhle Ruh), R StroM
Id.ho H ou~e Ilf Repru~ntali ve~
L GcofJe Siontull .nd Sh~itl StoM11I
~bl')' Siori
~bny SIOry
AI Stotts
S.ndi. N.l1oMI l..lboratfll')'
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DunSh"Ul

Id.ho

St.l~

Uni\'enit)'

[)q'lanmcnt \,f M.themallCS
~t. l.nSlr.h

Hallit>un(ln NUS
Amy I . Strtnddl

En\' iron~nl.1

Co rp.

Bel~' S l rlRt'~

Cindy Sl,..usb .. u~ h
Sn. l(c Rlvcor Al1i.n~e
O"'· cn Str.w
Punk Roc k
Dorc:.:nSlnlwick
Ri chllnd Cit)' Council

S.ndi Stra .... n
Battlle Pacific

N orthwe~

La bonl1o ries

~hr)'SlrlWHr

lick Streeter
Siredcr Rul ~IC
The Ho no n-blc La Vinna Stroud
The Hono rable Mlrk Stubbs
Idaho House of Repl"ekntalivcs
The Ho no rlblc Gerry E . Studds
U.S . House o f Repru :nUltivcs
Ektty Ann Stume
The Ho norable 8oto Stu mp
U.S . House of Repf'Cknlll ivC$
f'hc Hono... ble Blrt Stupak
U.S. House of Represent.tives
Chris Sturges
Timu Union
M.rkStutt
Fa n 51 . Vr. in. P\Jblic Service Co mpany
D.n Suc;u
En"ironment.1 RCKIIl'Ch & Development
A . Suer
Debbie Suh r
Sleven Sl.lhrin~
Mike SUJka

Dr Jim Sulliv.n
U S . DqI.nmenl of Stlte
Office of Erwrgy &. Infrutn,lI:ture
Mlfqu~rite Sullivan
Was.tllngto n Office o f the Gmlemor
State of New Jersey
Michael Sullivan
S.. ,.lo, a County (N1tW Yo rk ) Board of
Supervlsan
Amy Sumarm.lll
Huntl n,do n
The Hnnor.. hle Allen Summen
Bilhop Pa,ule Indi.n Trihe
The Ho no r.ble Oon SundqulSl
Stale nf T ennesJee
~t. ry SUntl,
Ene CoonlY
Don Su~l ..
IFPTE
The Honor.ble Dun Sutherl. nd
Wu.tllnl1o n s.".te
Ba rT)' SUno"
The HOMr. hle Gertrude Suno n
Id.. ho HOUR of Rq:.resentallves
M It. Suno n
Pearl Ha rbor SUrv IVors
Shel~ Sunn n
Thomas B Sunon
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The H<)no ... ble S.m S... ffo nl
City ofD.),,,,n
Kem i .n A S..·.. n
Jnh n S ....'.ruon
M. ry S ..'.n50n
M.fJlI'cl S .... rttma n
MITIr. S ..' uringen
M.n:n Enterprises
The Honorable Bruce L . S ....'eene)'
Id .. ho Senale
The Honor.ble Mich .. eI SWHney
City of H.),..'.nI
S.lIie SlIo'eel
P.mel. SlIo'enson
The Honor.b le Bernie R.)' Swine)'
City of loudo n
SUMn Swil2er
B,.d S"'ope
S.vannah Newl-Press
M.n:ella Swo rds and Vincent McDermon
The Ho no,.hle Fife Symingto n
Stale of ArizoNi
Dana T.kahashi
Rich.rd T.hhuhi
Peart H. rbor Lio ns C lub
Or . Tim K . Tabro
Ha rborview Medical Center
Occupatio nal &. Environmental
Medicine Projram
The Ho norable J.mes M . T.lent
U .S , House of Rq:.rcsenlltivel
Joh n Talkingto n .nd Edwina Talkingto n
lerry Taniyama
Military·Civilian Advi50ry Council
Aiea· Purl City Bu,i nns Aun,
John Tanner
The Ho norable John S . Tamler
U S. House of Rq:.resenlltives
The Honorable Ben T.rver
City of Pleasanto n
Deboflh Tate
The Honorab le Marvin Tlloe
City o f Bry.n
The Hono,.ble Rind)' Tale
U.S. House of RepresenlitiveJ
Palrici. Tllich
PlaMina &. Co mmunity Dcvelor menl
The Honorab le D.vid T .ub
City o f Buu(o r1
The Ho no,.ble P.ul Tauer
Ciry o f Au ro,.
Mike Taugher
Greeley T rihune
Caro l Tausc.her
The Ho norable W . J . "Billy· Tauzin
U.S , HouN o(Representativu
Co mmitlee o n Co mmerce
The Ho nol'1lble W. J , (Billy) Tauzin
U .S. House of Repruentati vu
The HOnc)l'1Ible Charles H . Taylor
U.S . HOUR of RepreMntati ves
The Ho norable OoNild T.ylor
C ity o f Midl.nd
Th. Honor. ble Gene Taylor
U S HouM of Representallves
Joe T.ylor
ASJOeI.led Prtss
lArry L T.ylor

M-34

53Q.

M il;h.d T,),lo r
Rooen Ta)'lor
Soolh C .. ro lina R.dio NeI.. o rk
Ro n T,),lo r
W.shi ngto n T imes
Sieve T . T'ylo r
T un T.ylo r
Kentud,)' lnpanment fo r Environment. 1
Protectio n
Divisio n of WaSle M.na,em~nt
The Ho n.lrabloe W. O . T.),lo r
Id.ho Ho uK' of R~presenltlives
Z.ch T.ylor
~brle.se Teasl~y

The Ho no ... ble hm~s T c:disco
Ne... Yo rk State Asscmbly
Ten),Teh.n
Rhode Island Nuclear Science Cenll! r
Tho mas Teitge
The Honor.ble Fr.nk Tej ed.
U .S. House ofR~presentat ives
Rich.rdTelfcr
Chief Fl'1Ink Temoke
We.stl!m Shosho ne Elders Council
Jan TenBruggenuts
Honolulu Ad\'eniser
Ra y Tenpenny .nd Peggy Sue Tenpenn)'
Ch.rles Terrell
U .S . lnpanment of Agriculture
Soi l Co nservatio n SeNice
Phillip S . Teumim
State of New Yo rk nq,.nment of Public
Service
MeryleTeusher
Joa nna C . Tewell
Piern:Theri<>,
The Ho norable Cr.ig Tho mas
United States Senate
David Tho mas
Illi nois Hauruous Waste Re.sean:h .. nd
Infotmat tan Cenler
Tim Tho mas
The Ho norable Willi.m M . Tho mas
U.S . House o f Representatives
Angle Thompsen
Angie Thompson
Fede,.1 Emeraency M.nagement
Agency
The Hono,.ble Bennie G . Tho mpson
U.S . House of Representalivu
BI.ke Tho mp Ml n
Pave the Wilderness
Chuck Tho mpson
Dick Tho mpsan
No nhern Ner. Inc .
The Honol'1lble Fred Tho mpson
United Stiles Senale
The Ho norable hme. Tho mpson
Citizen' Advisory Co mmittee
The Honorable T o mmy G . Tho mpson
State of WiKonsi n
The H" no,.ble William Tho rnberry
U.S . House o f Representatives
Th. Ho norable J . L. Thorne
The Honorable Ra y Tho mlo n
U .S , House of Representa tives

The H.. no r. hle Kar~n l. Thurm.n
U S. H.tu$(" .. f R ~preSC'nt.tl\' ~ S
The H \' O\'r. hl ~ Stro m ThumK' nJ
Um ted St.h!s Sen."!
United St .. les Sen.. te
C<)mminee o n Armed Sen'ices
The Hmlll r.ble Todd T i.hn
U .S. Hu use of Representatives
The HOl'lOI'1Ihie Jay Tihmraen)'
City <)f Chandler
C.lhl!rine A. Tic e
Wood ....·.rd-Clyde Federal SeNi.:n
Ll!1..l T ieme),
Unio n P.c ific R.ilnl.. d
h c kieTilleu
The HOMr. ble Fred Tilman
IIl.h{l House o f Represcr.tati ves
Kent T ingey
Idaho Stale Univer$il)'
The Ho nol'1lble Keith Tinno
Shoiho ne-Bannoc;k Tribes
Fo n H.II Business Council
The Honorable John H . Tippets
Id.ho House o f Rcpresenllti ves
Vl!mI L T ippett
AI Tiringo li
Brucl! T odd
City o f Au ~tin
lisa R. Todd
Megan Todd
Suquamish Elemenllry Sl;hool
Moses Todd
EM Sile Specific Advisory Bo.rd . SRS
Paul T odd
Stuan Toler
Nile.s T oole
Toole Supply Co mp.ny . Inc .
R. l. Toole
C.rolina Mellis . Inc .
Rick T oole
W . R . Toole Engineers
M I'$. Fred To pik
MukTo n
TEM
The Honol'1lble Peler G . To rkildse n
U S. House of Repre5Cntati ves
The Honorable Esteb.n Edw.rd T o rres
U.S House of Representatives
The Ho nol'1lble Rober1 G . T o rricelli
U.S . Hoose o f Representalives
Soh'e ig To rv ik
Seattle Post. lntelligence r
p.tricia Jun Tou~ig nanl
EM Site Specific Ad viMl ry Bo.rd . SRS
Jim To wnley
The Ho nora hle Edo lphus Town,
U S . House of Representatives
Ben TO),.ma
The Hnnonhle h me. A Trafic .. nt, J r.
U S Hoosc o f Representati ve,
Jal:kTra velstead
M. rine Ruource Commission
FIShery M .. nagemenl
hme, Travi.
WSMV·TV
Robe r1 R . T rultle
Laborers' loc. 1 1372

Dorolh)' l. Trenl1 r
Wilbur Trieble
Saralo~. County . New Ym k
T <) ....' n ofMiltnn
Kelly Ahe Trifo novi tch
KHETTV· II
Todd Trigsted
Dr. Gera ld Trip.rd
Washington State University
Nuclear Radi.tlOn Center
John Trivellin
H.no ver Fire Administrllio n
Rohen E . Troj anows ki
Nudear Regul.lo ry Cllmmiuio n
Regio n II
Roben T roul
Doris G . Troxel
Siraj.ne M. Troxel
SconTschirgi
R.y Tsukimuru
Aerotest Opel'1ltio ns. lnc .
Fr.nk Tuck
D.nielleTucker
KHV H
The Honorable Jim Guy Tuc ker
Stale of Arbnsas
The Ho norable Tim Tucker
Idaho Senate
The Hono,.ble W.iter R . Tucker III
U S . House o f Representalives
G'f) · umlin
Patricia Tummons
Environment H.wai 'i
Eloise Tung:pal.n
H.w.ii Stale Senale
Tild)' Turchinett.
Johnnie Tumbill
Ka),eTumer
Lisa Tumcr
Fremont Herald/Chronicle
The Ho ooNlble M ich.el R . Turner
City ofO')'1o n
Roger Tumer
Roger Turner
Shosho ne-Bannoc k Tribes
P.tric k A. Turri
Tennessee Dep.nmenl o f Hea lth
The Ho no rable Jerry T . T wiggs
Id.ho Senate
Nancy T yler
William A . T yler
The Ho·tO rable Roben A. Underwood
U.S . House of Representatives
Richanl Unger
The Ho no rable Fred Upto n
U.S . House a fRepresent_tives
Sieve Usdin
Nuclear Remediatio n Week
D.vid F. Utterb.c k. Ph .D .• C IH
N.lional Inslitule fo r Occupational
S. fety .nd Health
Divilion of Surveillance . Haunl
Ev.luatio n and Field Studies
The tlooorab le Denni. Vacco
Slate of New YOfk
MrV.der
Stq:.hen V. il
John V.n Otr Hlfll

M-35

bck V.n K1ey
N.tio nal AsJt.'l:iali <) n llf Ano meys
General
S.II)'J V.n Nid
Uldis Va nags
Maine Slate PI.nnin~ ORice
AI V.nce
Pc-arl City Lio ns Club
Jesse V.nce
Russell V.nde Velde
ACZ lAbol'1lto ries. Inc ,
The Hono rable M'Nin G . VanJenbe,¥
Id.ho House of Represent.. tive,
Glo ria Vanderbilt
Peter V.nderven
Hean of America No rthwest
The Ho no l'1lble T o m Vandever
City of Charl<>,tuville
Roben V.nevery
Stephen C . Vanzandt
Judy Vargas
Bento n Paiule lndian Tribe
M.rg.rel Vamey
Louis Varricchio
Ch8mpl.in Co llege
William L. Vasco ni
NTS Co mmunity Advisory 80Ird
Edna R. Vaughan
Doug Vaught
Peggy Veg.
Bishop Paiute Indian Tribe
M.rk Vegwen
Vegwen &. Tho mas. Ch .. nered
Steve Velasco
The Ho norable Nydi. M . Velizqua
U .S . House of Represenlltivu
Mary Velhl'1ldlky
U . ~ . Dep. n ment o fVete ... ns Aff.in
Vete,.ns AdminiJll'1ltio n Medical
Center
The Ho nonble Bruce F . Vento
U .S. Hause of Representatins
Dr. W. G . Vernelson
University o f Flo rid.
G.ry D . Vest
U .S Dt:panment o f Defense
U .S . Air Fo rce
The Honorable Karen Vialle
City o f TaCOfNI
Therese Vil:k
Vincent Vielen
Frances Viglielmo
Spark M Matsun.ga Institule fo r Peacl!
Jim Vine
CATV·TV
The Ho nofl ble Ric h.rd VinRlOt
City ofC h.rlottl!
Jeff Viohl
WashiL.g to n Office
SI.. le of Indi.na
The HOl'lOI'1Ibie Peler J ViK losk)'
U .S . Hour.e o f Representall\' u
MichealJ . Vitacco. Ir
Georwe l. Vivian
U S . Bure.u o f M llws
Idaho National Engi""nn"
lAbol'1llory
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Table 1\1-2. (continued)
The H"'no..Irahll!

G«l~1:

V. Voinov ..: h

SI.le ,I(OtIl U

The Hur)l.lt.bloe H. rold L Volknwr

u .s . Hoose of R~f'doenl.lll i\·e l
The Honorahle 8IIrt..,.. F Vu.;-anovlch
U.S . Houle of RC'prne.ntlll\'d
LArry W.cter

C.cyofS.lem
Mart)' Wade
Mite Wade
R P. Wadkins
Or. Wagner

Univenity of

M'SM C hulSd1s-~' ell

~W.grwr

KOMa.. TV News

PererWlgner
Honolulu SUlr Bulletin

The Hononble Rob W,gner
Robert J. Wagner
State University of New York
Rus.w:1I Wagner
The Honorable. Pohc ~.goner
City of Dubois
The Honorable Leigh W.i Doo
HonoMu City Council

C. L.

W.umo

U.S. Environmental Procection Agency
Region IV
The Hono rable Enid W.ldholtt
U.S. HOUK of Representatives
Amy Walter
Anhu r H. Walker
The Hononble Chu tes Wilker
GecwJia Sl.IIle Senile
John Witter
Aiten Ch.mher o f Commerce
NorvLlR W,lt er
Allend.le County DiMs.ler Frep.redneu
The Hononble P.ul W.lker
Jeffenon Cooney Bo.rd ofCounry
Comnu...ioners
The Hono,..ble Raben S . Walker
U S. HouN of Repruenl.llivu
Tom Walter
Ciry of KltntWWick
Mcmll Wall
$hI_Its Southern B.nd of Pl iutu
Ann Wallace
Bill Wallad .
StI'VeM Pubhslun, COrponihOn
Gary W.llb.um
Robert W.ller
H.1l1tturton NUS Environmental COI'p
The Honor-ble Janws T W.Ish.
U S H(!UN o f Representatives
Mike Wllbh
Montana Office (If the Governor
C"rtlsWllhel"J
The Honnntble r~e W.llan
N.tION.1
Myrna I Walten
Pubhc UtIli, .... Commlu","
B.rhllNt A Wahon
JottnWama:r
Th. HON'lflb'- Zach Wamp
U S Howe of Reptuc-rutlvc.
Mehnda Wa ..

C""
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Table M-2. (continued)
F~ W.nzenri~

Cia Smllley Ward
State o f New MU lco
The Honorable Mich.d W.rd
City of In'inc
The Honor-hie Mike Ward
U.S. HouSlt o f Represent.ti ... es
The Ho norahle hmn W. Wamer
United States Senate
Sh. ron Warner
P.m W.m1en
Ch.mber ofCommen:e of H.,,'. ii
Militar)' Affairs Council
C.milla W.lT'Cn
EM Sile Specific Advisory Boud • SRS
Ch.rlie W.rnn
Ciry of Hood Ri"'er
Jeffrey W.rnn
Jim W.rnn
NCW.m
S.ndno W.rnn
AeroceSi Openotions. Inc .
Dennis W.shbum
Rotary Club o f p... rl Harbor
J.rM' Washburn
h .•a.:: Walhington
South C.rolina Black Media
Jim Washington
The HOAOnobie Muine Waters
U.S . House of Represenuuives
Elaine W.then
Nonh C.~ i na Division of Emergency
M.na, emeN
Karen Watkins
Bri.n E. W.tw n
H.metWaUOn
R~Col1t'Je

lackson L. W.lSOn .nd C.role W.lson
Kelley W.tson
The Honorable Melvin L. W.n
U.S . House of Rep resenutives
M.rilyn J . W.neyne
Frances Wans
Th. Honorable J. C . W.n•. lr.
U.S . House o f Rep ruenutivu
Cu o i S . W.t.HJ
The Hononoble Elwyn E. WU
Ciry of RoUa
The Honora ble Henry A. Wnmu
U S . House o f Representative.
Ch. rle. R. Wugel
Nonnan E. Wure
Barnwell Cooney Econom;c
o.velopmenl Commissw n
M.nhcw Wutherley-White
JOMph We.ver
Chuck Webb
O.vtd R 0 Webb
The Honorable Glori. 0 Webb
Ciry of Pot1smouth
Th. Hononble WellinJlon Webb
Stephen Wee,
Cmuc.nc. Weeb
hrry We,rrwn
The Honorable SUl.ln We"wr
City of Sav. nnah
Melv. Weir
MinnefoOta I...c,I.I. tlve Rell tion

The Hom)f.h \e Bill Welch
City tlf Slate ColI~t,!e
The H onor.bl~ Willi.m F. Weld
St.l ~ of Muuchus.:tls
The Honorable Cu n Weldon
U.S . H(\USe! of Repre54!nllt"'es
The Honorlble Dive Wddun
U.S. H ous~ of Repres~nt.ti v~5
The Honorabl.:: J.my W.::II.::r
U.S . HouSe! of Rq'ln:sent.ti\'~s
M.tthewWells
The Honor.ble P.ul WeliSlone
Unit~ Slates Senate
The Honor.ble Herman Wel m
City of S.n R.mo n
The Ho nora ble Stella Welsh
City ofOfYm
Chris Wentz
St.te of New Mex.ico R.Jio.clive W.ste
Task Force
Marsh. Werle
Ciry o f Emmett Public library
Roben Werth .nd Wend)' Werth
R. L . Wesley
Huu ld Wessell
The 8.illston Journal
~gJ)' Wessner
Steve West
State of Id.ho
Office of Environmental Huhh
The Hononoble Willi.m Westbrook
T . WeSie
Kevin Westervelt
The Honorable R. CI.ir Wetherell
Id.ho Senate
DlVid Wetmore
W.lhington Office o f the Governor
Stale o f C.lifornl.
Kirk. Wh.t!ey
AI.b.mI Dep.rtment of Public Hu lth
Oivist'.)n of Rad iation Control
The Honorable -Moon- Wheeler
Id.ho Senate
P.ige Wheeler
Kathy Whitaker
U.S . DOE. Idlho Operations Office
Charle. E. Wh ite
The Honora ble Del While
Nez ~rce Trib.1 Executive Committee
The Ho ool'"lble Ju.nill M . White
South Clrolina House of Repre.scntlt ivu
The Honorlble Rick While
U.S . HOUle of Representatl ... es
The Honorable Ric k While
U.S. HouMof Representatives
Sua White
The Honorable Edw.nI Whitfield
U.S . HouMof Rep resentative.
The Ho ......... ,.ble Christine Whitmln
State of New JerJey
Th. Hono,..ble Lin Whitworth
Jdaho Senate
Th. Hooorlbl. Ro,1t Wichr
U S . House o( Rep re.Mm.tivII
Frink. Wicks
Kirk WICks
Jt.HJith E. Wtdener
The Honorable Raymond J . Wteclorek

Rich.,d E. Wioethurn
Dvu~ l u Wi g~inli

Thumls Wiggins
BernaN Wilcox
The Hono rahlt! Dun Wildt!
City of Mud Llk~
The Honorable G.y l ~ Ann Wilde
Id.ho HOUK o f R~reKntati v es
The H"nor.blt! Rich.N Wilde r
Fon Independence Indian Triht!
Edna Wiler
RIMS
St~ \' e Wilhelm
Pu~ et Sound Bu si n~ s.s Jou rnal
Beaurine H. Wilkins
EM Site Specific Advisory Board . SRS
J. R. Wilkinson
C{lnf~erlted Tribes o f the Umltill.
Indi.n Reserv.lion
H.nford Envi ronmental Restoratio n
Prog~ m

Dcnr.is Willilms
Augusll NAACP
Dout,! Willi.ms
Or. J . Willi.ms
University of Arix.ona
Nude., Energy Dep.nment
J. niccWilli.ms
Kent Williams
M. dison Middle School
L.:ruy Williams
The Hono rl ble fl.hrshaU Willi.ms
South C .mli:\l Senate
The Hononob le P.t Willi.ms
U.S. House of Representati\'cs
P.ul Willi.ms
The Hono rable Robin WiIIi.ms
Georgi. Hoose o f Representatives
ThefYU E. William.
Tho mls E. WiIli.ms
U.S. Dtp.nment o f Energy . Id.h\!
Oper.tions Office
Xeni.Willi.ms
The Honor.blt! RuJ y Willis
Owens V.lley Bo.nI of T rustca
P.iute Professional Center
Steve Wills
School District 411
The HonoNll"ole Charles Wil son
U S . House o f Rqtflsent.ti ... es
Chriltopher B. Wilson
Gcorve Wilson
Ka y W. Wilson
The HortOrlble Pete Wilson
Stile o f C.hfumi.
Jan Wimherly
Chuck Winder
Tr.m Winllon
Ohio En"'lronmental Pnl4:ection Agency
John Wintel"J
Augusta Chronicle
RichanJ Winters
US . Dep.n"",nt of the Inlerio r
N.tional Pltk ServICe
The Honorahle Roben E . Wise. Jr .
U.S . HooM of Represent.tives

S.oor. Wi54e\: .... er
Mount.in Express
Hazel Wison
Ric k. Wolcoet
Dow Nonh Ameri".
The HOllOrlble Frank R. Wolf
U.S . Hoose llf Represenlatives
Nelson Wolff
Milillty Plau.
Je. nette Wolfley
Shoshone-B.annock Tribt!s
Donna Wong
H. ...... jj·s ThOOqnd Fnends
le.nnint!Woo;J
Idsho Senate
The Honorable Jo An E. Wood
Idaho House (If Represent.tivcs
M.rk S. Wood
The Honorab le Manha S . Wood
Thorn.. Wood
W.de Woodland
The Hononoble CheryU N . Woods-Flowers
City o f Moont Pl..... nt
Karen Wood..... rd
Mark Woodw.nI
The Hononble l ynn C . Woolsey
U.S . House of Representative.
The Hononl"ole WiIIi.m D. Workmln
City of Greenvillt!
Annie Worth
Bill Worth
M.rjorie Worthington
J.ne Wrenn
Alden Wright
C.therine Wright
Creed Wright
The H onorabl~ lhomls Wright
Nconh C. rolin. General A.sembly
Harold Wulke
Connie Wu rste r
The Honorable Ron Wyd." n
U.S . House of Represenlltives
[)(,nWYmln
The Honor.ble Alben Russell Wynn
U.S . Hoose o f Representative.
The Hooorlble P.ul Wy nn
Kenneth Y.ger
Fornst Y.ndell
The Hono nob le Sidney R. Y.te.
U.S . House of ~epresent .. ti... es
Roy J. Yee
K.EMS Kt!w.lo
M. rxaret M. Yeoman
Di.na Yel'pe
Cultur.1 Resource
Roben M . Yohe
Idll.ho St.te Historical SO\:iety
Nubo ru Yunaminc
H.w.ii St.te House of Representative.
Jon y ("Ishlihige
Honolulu Advl.rtiser
The Hononhle C W. Bill Young
U.S. HouH of Represent.tivel
The Hnoorable D.niel Young
City of S. nta Ana
Di.na 0 You n,
T'\e Honorlble Dun YounS
U S Hou,. ,,( Representa tiv ••

The Honorabl.:: Don Yount,!
U.S. House of RcpfYsenlltives
Co mmine.: un Resuun:es
Doug Young
Office of Pulicy .nd Initilli\'es
Lind. You ng
.fTC
Richard Young
The Honorable Ronnie Y\)Ung
City o f Aiken
Tin Hu Young
Karen Yourish
We.pons C')mplu Monilur
The H ooonob l~ R. ymoO\J Yowell
Western Shoshone N.tional Cl"lun..:i!
NeVI Yribarrcn
Rafiq Zaidi
NeUZej.c
Heart of America Nonhwest
The Hononoble Terrence Zaleski
City of Yonkers
S.lIy Zenover
EmmlZenti.n
C.rI W. Zeh
Hank Z~ile
The' H" oonoble Willi.m H. Zeliff. Jr.
V.S. HouSe! o f Representati \'es
Barbara Zepeda
W.shingtun Dt monstrali,ln Council
Steve ZerguhuNt
The Sun
Terry Zerkle
C ity "f Tempe
Bob Ziel
KID R.dio
The Hono r.ble Dic k Zimmer
U.S. HouSlt o f Repres.cnlltives
Walter Z immermann
KfTVTV·4
J. rrw:1 Zitzelbe rger
Frank Zollo
Knolls Action Pn.jc.:t
M.ri.n Zuc .. "
Big Pine Indi.n T rib.!
Willi. m Z uen: her
Anthony J . Zu\,el.
'S uqu.mish Element. ry Schtl\ll
Ammon City Council
Banlk""Ck Count)'
Highw.y nq,.nment
Bannock County
PI.nning .nd Devdopment Sel"\'lCCI
Bingh.m COUn!\
City of BI. ckfoot
Bingh.m County
Rllad Supennrendent
Bingb.m C(lUnlY
Shenff' s Oe:p.nm.nt
Bonneville County
CIVil De(ense .O\J Dlu~er Rehef
Boulder City
Bulle Cily Cooncl!
&.tlle County
Sheriff'. Dcp.nnwnt
CheNpeake BIY Sierr. Club
Chun:hlll County
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Table M-2. (continued)
Managers Offic e
City o f Arco
C\!y o f Arimo
C ity o f Blac kfoot
Water & Sewer D~ p a rtment
City o f Caliente
City o f Cincinnati
City o f Declo
Declo City Council
City of Downey
Downey City Co uncil
City o f Dubo is
C ity of Firth
City of Firth
City o f Hagerman
City of Hamar
City of Idaho Falls
City of Indian Springs
City of Needles
City of Oak Ridge
Environmental Quality Adviso ry
Board
City "f Pahrump
Advisory/ Planning Board
City of Ririe
C ity of Suga r City
Clark County Managers Office
Clark County Nuclear Waste Division
Clearwater Memorial Library
Clinton Courier News
Co nfederated Tribes a nd Bands of the
Yaka ma
C ounty of Nye
Nuclear Wa ste Protection Office
Defense Nuclear Agency
Nevada Operations Office
Ega n & Associates. P.C .
McGil Special Services Inc .
Egan & Associates. P.C .
Tri-State Motor Transit Co .
Environmental Adviso ry Council
County Legislature
Environmental Prot : tion Agency
Pacific Islands Co ntact
Esmerelda County Commission
Eureka County Co mmission
Fred ' s Signs and Art
Hawaii Navy News
Heritage Conservation and Recreatio n
Service
Divi sio n o f Environmental
Co mpliance and Review
Hood River News
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Ind ian People 's Muskogee Tribal Town
Confederacy
IN EL BOise Office
Jefferso n County
Jefferson County Boa rd of County
C ommissioners
Journal and Guide
KCMU Rad io
KCTS TV -9
~ w sroom

Kelly Tempo rary Services
KEPR-TV
KJNG-TV 5 News
Newsroom
KLAS -TV
KLVX -TV
KNDI-TV News
KNEV
KONA Radio
KORD Rad io News
KOTY Rad io
KROWfKBUL News
KSTWTV-II
Newsroo m
KTNV -TV
KVBC-TV Channel 3
KVEW-TV
Lander County Commission
City of Battle Mountain
Lincoln County Commission
City of Pioche
Madiso n County
National Council of the Mu skogee Creek
Navy News
Nevada Test Site Econo " ic Adjustment
TAS
Nye County Commission
City of Round Mountain
Nye County Nuclear Waste Repository
Project Office
OK95/KALE Radio
Peach State Public Radio
Pearl City Neighborhood Board No . 21
Rexburg City Council
Rexburg Standard Journal
Rigby City Council
Rocky Mountain Peace Center
Salmon Public Library
South Caro lina Engineer
Spo kesman-Review
Stanley City Council
Sun Newspaper
T . A. Rivard. Inc .
Ta coma News Tribune
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Teamsters Loca l 533
The Daily Times
The Idahonian
The Morning News
The Sho-Ban News
Town of Shelley Police Department
U- I02 Radio Station
U. S . Army Corps of Engineers
U .S . Department of Ag riculture
U .S . Depa rt ment of Agriculture
Soil Co nservati on Service
U .S . Department of Commerce
Eco nomic Development
Administratio n
U .S . Department of Health and Humao
Services
Nati·lna l Institutes o f Health
U .S . Department o f Labor
Occupational Safety and Health
Administration
U .S . Department o f the Interior
Bureau of Indian Affairs
U .S . Department of Veterans Affairs
Regio nal Office-Loan Gty . (026)
U.S . Naval Administrative Unit
WAG A-TV 5
WAGT-TV
Washington Offic e of the Governor
Commonwealth of Pennsy lvania
WASTREN . Inc .
WATE-TV
WATO Radio Station
WCBD-TV
WCSC-TV
Weave r Farms
WFOG
White Bird City Council
White Pine County Commissio n
WIS-TV
WJBF-TV
WLTX -TV
WNOR
WNTS
WOLO-TV
Worldwatch Institute
WOWI
WRAP
WRDW-TV
WSB-TV
WTAR
WTOC-TV
WXIA-TV II
Yuch i Trihal Organizati on. Inc .

